Wording of the Agreement. The NRC needs DOE to document the discussion of excavation-induced fractures. XXX responded that observations of excavation-induced fractures will be documented in a report or AMR by June 2001.
Wording of the Agreement. It is not clear to the NRC that the current list of FEPs [Features, Events, and Processes] (i.e., the list of FEPs documented in TDR-WIS-MD-000003, 00/01) is sufficiently comprehensive or exhibits the necessary attribute of being auditable (e.g., transparent and traceable). As discussed in the two TSPAI technical exchanges, there are unclear aspects of the approach that DOE plans to use to develop the necessary documentation of those features, events, and processes that they have considered. Accordingly, to provide additional confidence that the DOE will provide NRC with: (1) auditable documentation of what has been considered by the DOE, (2) the technical basis for excluding FEPs, and (3) an indication of the way in which included FEPs have been incorporated in the performance assessment; DOE will provide NRC with a detailed plan (the Enhanced FEP Plan) for comment. In the Enhanced FEP Plan, DOE will address the following items: (1) the approach used to develop a pre-screening set of FEPs (i.e., the documentation of those things that DOE considered and which the DOE would use to provide support for a potential license application), (2) the guidance on the level-of-detail that DOE will use for redefining FEPs during the enhanced FEP process, (3) the form that the pre- screening list of FEPs will take (e.g., list, database, other descriptions), (4) the approach DOE would use for the ongoing evaluation of FEPs (e.g., how to address potentially new FEPs), (5) the approach that DOE would use to evaluate and update the existing scope and description of FEPs, (6) the approach that DOE would use to improve the consistency in the level of detail among FEPs, (7) how the DOE would evaluate the results of its efforts to update the existing scope and definition of FEPs, (8) how the Enhanced FEP process would support assertions that the resulting set of FEPs will be sufficiently comprehensive (e.g., represents a wide range of both beneficial and potential adverse effects on performance) to reflect clearly what DOE has considered, (9) how DOE would indicate their disposition of included FEPs in the performance assessment, (10) the role and definition of the different hierarchical levels used to document the information (e.g., “components of FEPs” and “modeling issues”), (11) how the hierarchical Enclosure levels used to document the information would be used within DOE’s enhanced FEP process,
Wording of the Agreement. XXX proposes to meet with NRC periodically to provide assessments of the DOE’s progress, once it has initiated the enhanced FEP process, and on changes to the approach documented in the Enhanced FEP Plan. During these progress meetings DOE agrees to provide a justification for their approach to: (1) the level of detail used to define FEPs; (2) the degree of consistency among FEPs; and (3) comprehensiveness of the set of FEPs initially considered.
Wording of the Agreement. Provide the Integrated Safety Analysis1 guide. DOE agreed to provide the guide. The guide will be available in February 2002. NRC Review: At the July 24-26, 2001, NRC/DOE Technical Exchange and Management Meeting on Pre-Closure Safety, the NRC staff noted that Procedure QAP-2-3, “Classification of Permanent Items,” which DOE relied on for identification and quality level categorization of structures, systems, and components important to safety, does not appear to integrate the preclosure safety analysis in its identification and categorization process. In addition, staff noted that although there are several documents addressing the preclosure safety analyses, the overall DOE preclosure safety analysis process has not been presented in a clear and transparent manner. This discussion resulted in DOE agreeing to provide a document, intended as guidance for its staff, that would address NRC staff concerns and also present the DOE approach to preclosure safety analysis. By letter dated March 27, 2002, and in response to Preclosure Agreement PRE 6.02, DOE provided its Preclosure Safety Analysis Guide (Report No.TDR–MGR–RL–000002, Rev 00, February 2002). The NRC staff conducted an initial review of this document and provided preliminary comments to DOE. The DOE Preclosure Safety Analysis Guide and the NRC comments were discussed at an April 25-26, 2002, NRC/DOE Technical Exchange (see NRC letter dated May 3, 2002, which summarized the meeting). Several NRC staff comments were clarified at the meeting and XXX indicated the staff’s comments were clear and agreed, in general, that the comments needed to be addressed. Those comments that need further DOE consideration are presented below.
Wording of the Agreement. The Enhanced Characterization of the Repository Block (ECRB) long-term test and the Alcove 8 Niche 3 test need to be “fracture-informed” (i.e., observation of seepage needs to be related to observed fracture patterns). Provide documentation which discusses this aspect. DOE responded that for the passive test, any observed seepage will be related to full periphery maps and other fracture data in testing documentation. The documentation will be available by any potential license application (LA). For Niche 3, fracture characterization is complete and a three-dimensional (3-D) representation will be included in testing documentation. The documentation will be available August 2001.
Wording of the Agreement. Provide the Disruptive Events FEPs AMR, the FEPs database, and the Analyses to Support Screening of System-Level Features, Events, and Processes for the Yucca Mountain Total System Performance Assessment-Site Recommendation. DOE stated that it will provide the FEPs AMRs, the Analyses to Support Screening of System-Level Features, Events, and Processes for the Yucca Mountain Total System Performance Assessment-Site Recommendation AMR, and the FEPs database to NRC during January 2001. NRC Review: DOE provided, and NRC reviewed the following documents as they pertain to this agreement: Features, Events, and Processes: Disruptive Events (ANL-WIS-MD-000005, Rev 00, ICN 01), Features, Events, and Processes: System Level and Criticality (ANL-WIS-MD-000019, Rev 00, ICN 00), and FEPs Database (TDR-WIS-MD-000003, Rev 00, ICN 01). These FEPs documents were discussed during the two Total System Performance Assessment and Integration (TSPAI) technical exchanges held in May and August 2001, as well as the Range of Operating Temperatures technical exchange in September 2001. During these technical exchanges, the NRC and DOE reached a number of separate agreements pertaining to FEPs (see TSPAI Agreements 2.01 to 2.04) and criticality (CLST.5.03). The main issue is that, in light of the Supplemental Science and Engineering Report, DOE can no longer screen out in-package, near-field, or far-field criticality based on no waste package failure before 10,000 years (as indicated in the FEPs and Probability of Criticality Before 10,000 years reports). With the specific TSPAI and CLST agreements in place, the NRC believes this agreement can be listed as complete. Note that CLST Agreement 5.03, although not specifically stated, addresses near-field, far-field, and in-package criticality. Resolution of the criticality subissues depend on the satisfactory resolution of the remaining CLST Subissue 5, ENFE Subissue 5, and RT Subissue 4 agreements, as well as the criticality related portion of TSPAI Agreements 2.01 through 2.04.
Wording of the Agreement. Provide the list of validation reports and their schedules. XXX stated that the geochemical model validation reports for “Geochemistry Model Validation Report: Degradation and Release” and “Geochemistry Model Validation Report: Material Accumulation” are expected to be available during 2001. The remainder of the reports are expected to be available during FY2002 subject to the results of detailed planning and scheduling. DOE understands that these reports are required to be provided prior to LA. A list of model validation reports was provided during the technical exchange and is included as an attachment to the meeting summary.
Wording of the Agreement. Provide information on how the increase in the radiation fields due to the criticality event affects the consequence evaluation because of increased radiolysis inside the waste package and at the surfaces of nearby waste packages or demonstrate that the current corrosion and dissolution models encompass the range of chemical conditions and corrosion potentials that would result from this increase in radiolysis. DOE stated that the preliminary assessment (calculation) of radiolysis effects from a criticality event will be available to NRC during February 2001. The final assessment of these conditions will be available to NRC prior to LA.
Wording of the Agreement. Provide the update to Quality Assurance Procedure QAP–2–3. DOE agreed to provide the procedure. The procedure will be available in February 2002.
Wording of the Agreement. The NRC needs DOE to document the pre-test predictions for the ATC. DOE will document pretest predictions for the Alluvial Testing Complex in the SZ [Saturated Zone] In Situ Testing AMR [Analysis and Model Report] available in October 2001. General Agreement 1.01 (#42)
