{"component": "clause", "props": {"groups": [{"samples": [{"hash": "1Yvpkuk7y93", "uri": "/contracts/1Yvpkuk7y93#mai", "label": "Professional Services Contract", "score": 25.1930184805, "published": true}, {"hash": "9UY5VLOIRKe", "uri": "/contracts/9UY5VLOIRKe#mai", "label": "Professional Services Contract", "score": 25.1916495551, "published": true}, {"hash": "byF7ZJJllBv", "uri": "/contracts/byF7ZJJllBv#mai", "label": "Professional Services Contract", "score": 25.1492128679, "published": true}], "snippet": "Member of the Appraisal Institute", "size": 5, "snippet_links": [{"key": "appraisal-institute", "type": "definition", "offset": [14, 33]}], "hash": "4d86d0d4af60f5dd18e7aa7465441165", "id": 1}, {"samples": [{"hash": "l4FxP0CzuYs", "uri": "/contracts/l4FxP0CzuYs#mai", "label": "Sales Representation Agreement (Jones International Networks LTD)", "score": 16.0, "published": true}, {"hash": "gTMidCr5zcr", "uri": "/contracts/gTMidCr5zcr#mai", "label": "Sales Representation Agreement (Jones International Networks LTD)", "score": 16.0, "published": true}], "snippet": "will provide information on sales to JSN as each sale is made. The JSN log will close at 5 P.M. Mountain Time each Thursday for the broadcast week beginning a week from the following Monday. Any advertising time within that broadcast week remaining unsold by MAI at closing will revert to JSN. Complete logs for each broadcast week will be furnished by MAI to JSN one week in advance on the Monday preceding the Monday on which the broadcast begins.", "size": 2, "snippet_links": [{"key": "information-on", "type": "clause", "offset": [13, 27]}, {"key": "mountain-time", "type": "clause", "offset": [96, 109]}, {"key": "a-week", "type": "definition", "offset": [157, 163]}, {"key": "advertising-time", "type": "clause", "offset": [195, 211]}, {"key": "at-closing", "type": "clause", "offset": [263, 273]}, {"key": "one-week", "type": "definition", "offset": [364, 372]}, {"key": "in-advance", "type": "clause", "offset": [373, 383]}], "hash": "39ed8ff01cf95e0b71bb713a4f642a92", "id": 2}, {"samples": [{"hash": "lclbXl9lWFO", "uri": "/contracts/lclbXl9lWFO#mai", "label": "Working Paper", "score": 19.0, "published": true}, {"hash": "2qsXD4cRqg7", "uri": "/contracts/2qsXD4cRqg7#mai", "label": "Working Paper", "score": 19.0, "published": true}], "snippet": "Corollary 2: If B = B\u2217, then the only equilibrium is one where all countries join Proof: See appendix 7. The intuition of Corollary 2 is also straight forward. The benchmark B\u2217 is the value of the rent extraction rate that is chosen by a social planner in a world without information asymmetries. Since the lobbying distortion pushes the desired rent extraction rate below B\u2217, the time inconsistency distortion alone causes a rent extraction rate above B\u2217. However, MAI rule B\u2217 provides to all countries a commitment device to solve the time-inconsistency problem by joining MAI at no cost. Hence, opting out of MAI makes no longer sense. Overall, a weak MAI (large B) is not sharply binding and every country joins MAI to avoid losses from signalling high rent-extraction rates in case of staying out. Next, I compare the incentives of governments to protest against MAI negotiations. Every government objects negotiation if it expects a loss in a world with MAI compared to one without. Proposition 2 Governments of all countries that do not join MAI lose compared to a world without MAI; governments of all countries with \u03c7i > \u03c7 gain. At least some govern- \u02dc ments of countries that join MAI with \u03c7i such that \u03c7\u2217 > \u03c7i > \u03c7 lose. Proof: See appendix 8. This proposition can explain why some countries object other countries to negoti- ate a MAI even though they are neither forced into nor excluded from membership. A partial MAI, i.e. a MAI where some countries join and others opt out, exerts a negative information externality on non-members; outsiders signal that they are inclined to extract large rents from MNEs. The resulting investment diversion harms governments that do not decide to join. It need to be kept in mind, however, that a loss for a government does not necessarily imply a welfare loss of the country, since government objectives are distorted by lobbying groups.24 Proposition 2 can explain the protest storm of some LDCs against the negotiation of MAI by the club of the OECD countries, although they were both free to opt in or out. According to my explanation, they were fearing the information externality that may arise from the decision to opt out. The protest comes from governments that are ex post but not ex ante contra free-market spirited. Again, a quote by the former Commerce Secretary to Government of India supports this model feature: \"Selective and judicious government intervention is therefore widely considered necessary to support or protect domestic industry and technology creation ... Adequate freedom and flexibility to pursue their own policies towards FDI and foreign technology is therefore regarded by developing countries as a matter of fundamental importance ...\" (Ganesan, 1998, p. 5) 3 Endogenous MAI Formation I extend now the game by two additional stages to endogenize which countries start ne- gotiating agreements among themselves. I superimpose on top of the previous stages the choice of countries with which other countries to start negotiation and the choice of each negotiation group of how strict the MAI rule is going to be. The new timing is given in Figure 3. 24 The result in proposition 2 mirrors the one in \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (2001). However, I derive the result analytically in a world of partial MAI while the previous study derived this result for a complete MAI. Government type \u23a2 \u23a5 0, \u03c7 \u03c7 \u2208 \u23a1 _ \u23a4 randomly drawn from uniform dis- tribution (private knowledge) Choosing negotia- tion group C Determi- ning strict- ness of MAI B Government decides to join MAI or stay out Z \u2208{I , O} MNEs decide to locate in t=1 Governments decide on rent extraction rate \u00df MNEs decide to re-locate in t=2\n3.1 Negotiating MAI In this section, I turn to the stage when MAI is negotiated. I assume that there exists a club C of a countable number of countries that starts exclusively negotiating an agreement.25 In particular, this group chooses the threshold B. The club is assumed to have more favorable political-risk characteristics than the world as a whole. All countries are then free to opt in or out after the agreement is written. I assume also that MAI takes the form of a rule \u03b2 \u2264 B. Then the strictness of MAI, i.e. the threshold value B, can be found from a simple Nash bargaining solution where the Nash product is defined as c\u2208C |C| Q [W (\u03c7 ,\u03b2 , B) \u2212 W (\u03c7 ,\u03b2 )] 1 , (19) |C| is the number of group members, and the government objective function of successful negotiation WcI (\u03c7c, \u03b2iM , B) obtains an additional argument B, since the strictness of MAI is now allowed to vary. In addition applies the participation constraint due to the assumption of unanimity among negotiators [WcI (\u03c7c, \u03b2iM , B) \u2212 WcN (\u03c7c, \u03b2iM )] \u2265 0 (20) for all countries c \u2208 C. I denote with \u03c7s the country with the smallest weight on capital 25 By the chosen set-up, Northern home country interests are consistently excluded from shaping the agreement, because MNE profits are zero in any case. Any Northern home country will thus have interests similar to host countries. This feature clearly falls short of reality. Section 5 argues, however, why this particular model feature does not upset the model mechanics. { } income in the negotiation group C, i.e. \u03c7s = min \u03c7c . Likewise, I denote the country c\u2208C { } with the largest weight \u2587\u2587, \u2587.\u2587. \u2587\u2587 = max \u03c7c . Then the constraint (20) is not binding for c\u2208C any country unless it is binding for country \u03c7s, since \u03c7s is the country that is first hit by a welfare loss according to Proposition 2 when the agreement gets too strict. When maximizing the Nash product (19) with respect to MAI strictness B under the participation constraint (20), one obtains the following first order condition WcI (\u03c7c, \u03b2iM , B) \u2212 WcN (\u03c7c, \u03b2iM ) P \u2202WcI (\u03c7c, \u03b2iM , B) 1 c\u2208C", "size": 2, "snippet_links": [{"key": "appendix-7", "type": "definition", "offset": [93, 103]}, {"key": "the-value", "type": "clause", "offset": [180, 189]}, {"key": "the-rent", "type": "clause", "offset": [193, 201]}, {"key": "chosen-by", "type": "clause", "offset": [226, 235]}, {"key": "a-commitment", "type": "definition", "offset": [504, 516]}, {"key": "at-no-cost", "type": "definition", "offset": [579, 589]}, {"key": "opting-out", "type": "clause", "offset": [598, 608]}, {"key": "in-case-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [779, 789]}, {"key": "proposition-2", "type": "definition", "offset": [989, 1002]}, {"key": "appendix-8", "type": "definition", "offset": [1242, 1252]}, {"key": "other-countries", "type": "clause", "offset": [1309, 1324]}, {"key": "negative-information", "type": "clause", "offset": [1498, 1518]}, {"key": "loss-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [1805, 1812]}, {"key": "the-country", "type": "definition", "offset": [1813, 1824]}, {"key": "the-club", "type": "definition", "offset": [1981, 1989]}, {"key": "oecd-countries", "type": "definition", "offset": [1997, 2011]}, {"key": "according-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [2060, 2072]}, {"key": "the-information", "type": "clause", "offset": [2107, 2122]}, {"key": "arise-from", "type": "definition", "offset": [2144, 2154]}, {"key": "the-decision", "type": "clause", "offset": [2155, 2167]}, {"key": "to-opt-out", "type": "clause", "offset": [2168, 2178]}, {"key": "ex-post", "type": "clause", "offset": [2224, 2231]}, {"key": "government-of-india", "type": "definition", "offset": [2328, 2347]}, {"key": "government-intervention", "type": "clause", "offset": [2402, 2425]}, {"key": "developing-countries", "type": "definition", "offset": [2657, 2677]}, {"key": "figure-3", "type": "definition", "offset": [3123, 3131]}, {"key": "in-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [3180, 3184]}, {"key": "group-c", "type": "clause", "offset": [3463, 3470]}, {"key": "c-of-a", "type": "definition", "offset": [3782, 3788]}, {"key": "number-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [3799, 3808]}, {"key": "in-particular", "type": "clause", "offset": [3871, 3884]}, {"key": "more-favorable", "type": "definition", "offset": [3950, 3964]}, {"key": "the-world", "type": "definition", "offset": [4001, 4010]}, {"key": "after-the-agreement", "type": "clause", "offset": [4068, 4087]}, {"key": "form-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [4133, 4140]}, {"key": "threshold-value", "type": "clause", "offset": [4192, 4207]}, {"key": "group-members", "type": "clause", "offset": [4367, 4380]}, {"key": "and-the-government", "type": "definition", "offset": [4382, 4400]}, {"key": "objective-function", "type": "clause", "offset": [4401, 4419]}, {"key": "an-additional", "type": "clause", "offset": [4472, 4485]}, {"key": "in-addition", "type": "clause", "offset": [4550, 4561]}, {"key": "the-participation", "type": "clause", "offset": [4570, 4587]}, {"key": "the-assumption", "type": "clause", "offset": [4606, 4620]}, {"key": "home-country", "type": "clause", "offset": [4822, 4834]}, {"key": "to-host", "type": "definition", "offset": [5000, 5007]}, {"key": "section-5", "type": "clause", "offset": [5064, 5073]}, {"key": "the-model", "type": "clause", "offset": [5140, 5149]}, {"key": "not-binding", "type": "clause", "offset": [5333, 5344]}, {"key": "with-respect-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [5563, 5578]}, {"key": "first-order", "type": "clause", "offset": [5663, 5674]}], "hash": "8f2ce373e5c959d7292a0f0e6ba18424", "id": 3}, {"samples": [{"hash": "cLSN0BsQSIm", "uri": "/contracts/cLSN0BsQSIm#mai", "label": "Treaty", "score": 25.7665982204, "published": true}], "snippet": "36/6-54, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 9 Aug. 1889; Doc. Dipl. 1889\u20131890 XV, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 95 95 Doc. Dipl. 1890\u20131891 XVII, 16if., \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 14 Nov. 1890; 78, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to Minilik, undated memorandum of 23\u201324 Dec. 1890; 85ff., \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to Minilik, undated memo of 26\u201328 Jan. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 96 96 Ibid. 85ff., \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to Minilik, undated memorandum. \u2018As Your Majesty was making the corrections I wrote them step by step in the Italian text and Your Majesty's interpreter [did the same] in the Amharic text. The corrections were so many that the Italian and the Amharic texts were recopied.\u2019. 98 98 Ibid. 16ff., \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 14 Nov. 1890. \u2018Moreover, besides the translation, every article was expounded word for word during the negotiations; all possible explanations were given so that the Emperor might form an exact concept of the obligations into which he entered.\u2019.Google Scholar 99 99 Ibid. 53, Minilik to Salimbeni, Nehas\u00eb 11, 1882 (16 Aug. 1890), and 49ff., \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 29 Aug. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 100 100 Ibid. 31ff., \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, Tir 15, 1883 (22 Jan. 1891). By this time \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 was making use of Mr \u2587\u2587 for his correspondence with Italy and therefore the French language is used. 101 101 Ibid. 41ff., MiniIikto \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, Yekatit 5, 1883 (11 Feb. 1891). 102 102 I have not been able to find the Aniharic or Italian drafts referred to by \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 in the files of \u2587. \u2587. \u2587\u2587\u2587.", "size": 1, "snippet_links": [{"key": "memorandum-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [198, 211]}, {"key": "step-in", "type": "definition", "offset": [431, 438]}, {"key": "the-obligations", "type": "clause", "offset": [853, 868]}, {"key": "french-language", "type": "clause", "offset": [1205, 1220]}], "hash": "141a0f8f127303f37c27ceb2f21a39f8", "id": 4}, {"samples": [{"hash": "YAtDP92jnn", "uri": "/contracts/YAtDP92jnn#mai", "label": "Forbearance Agreement (Mai Systems Corp)", "score": 16.0, "published": true}], "snippet": "acknowledges that Lenders would not enter into this Amendment without MAI's assurance that MAI has no claim against any of Lenders, their parents companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, shareholders, employees, attorneys, agents, professionals and servants, or any of their respective predecessors, successors, heirs and assigns (collectively, the \"Lender Parties\" and each, a \"Lender Party\"). MAI, for itself and on behalf of its officers and directors, and its respective predecessors, successors and assigns (collectively, the \"Releasors\") releases each Lender Party from any known or unknown claims which MAI now has against any Lender Party of any nature, including any claims that any Releasor, or any Releasor's successors, counsel and advisors may in the future discover they would have had now if they had known facts not now known to them, whether founded in contract, in tort or pursuant to any other theory of liability, including but not limited to any claims arising out of or related to the Loan Documents or the transactions contemplated thereby. MAI, FOR ITSELF AND ON BEHALF OF EACH RELEASOR, WAIVES THE PROVISIONS OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 1542, WHICH STATE: A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.", "size": 1, "snippet_links": [{"key": "this-amendment", "type": "clause", "offset": [47, 61]}, {"key": "no-claim", "type": "definition", "offset": [99, 107]}, {"key": "heirs-and-assigns", "type": "clause", "offset": [329, 346]}, {"key": "lender-parties", "type": "definition", "offset": [367, 381]}, {"key": "lender-party", "type": "definition", "offset": [396, 408]}, {"key": "on-behalf-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [432, 444]}, {"key": "officers-and-directors", "type": "clause", "offset": [449, 471]}, {"key": "successors-and-assigns", "type": "definition", "offset": [506, 528]}, {"key": "each-lender", "type": "clause", "offset": [570, 581]}, {"key": "known-or-unknown-claims", "type": "clause", "offset": [597, 620]}, {"key": "counsel-and-advisors", "type": "clause", "offset": [749, 769]}, {"key": "the-future", "type": "clause", "offset": [777, 787]}, {"key": "in-contract", "type": "clause", "offset": [884, 895]}, {"key": "pursuant-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [908, 919]}, {"key": "theory-of-liability", "type": "definition", "offset": [930, 949]}, {"key": "not-limited", "type": "clause", "offset": [965, 976]}, {"key": "arising-out-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [991, 1005]}, {"key": "related-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [1009, 1019]}, {"key": "the-loan-documents", "type": "clause", "offset": [1020, 1038]}, {"key": "contemplated-thereby", "type": "clause", "offset": [1059, 1079]}, {"key": "the-provisions-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [1136, 1153]}, {"key": "california-civil-code-section-1542", "type": "clause", "offset": [1154, 1188]}, {"key": "general-release", "type": "clause", "offset": [1205, 1220]}, {"key": "at-the-time", "type": "clause", "offset": [1313, 1324]}, {"key": "the-release", "type": "clause", "offset": [1338, 1349]}, {"key": "must-have-materially-affected-his-settlement-with-the-debtor", "type": "clause", "offset": [1373, 1433]}], "hash": "b0cc6b786e5ae5e0871b9293208e5f28", "id": 5}, {"samples": [{"hash": "cLSN0BsQSIm", "uri": "/contracts/cLSN0BsQSIm#mai", "label": "Treaty", "score": 25.7665982204, "published": true}], "snippet": "36/2-13; Article 7 in the Italian draft and 6 in the Amharic draft. The Italian text is printed in Doc. Dipl. 1889\u20131890 XV, 143f. The Amharic text of the article runs in full: This is a somewhat complex and obscure sentence, which is not easy to render into acceptable English without paraphrasing it completely. The following is an attempt to convey the meaning of the clause without changing it more than necessary: \u2018When I said: if Your Majesty should wish by Your own will to send messengers to Egypt, to Jerusalem, to the Red Sea [or] anywhere else by the hand [or: under the protection] of the Italian consul, I meant so that anyone who does not know should not maltreat them and that they should return having carried out Your will without lacking food, drink, [and] shelter; if You send whatever You wish by any of the Italian consuls, everything You desire should be done and fulfilled\u2019.Google Scholar 131 131 MAE., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, I, 266f., Originally \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, then stationed at L\u20131890 XV, 128ff. The Amharic text has never been published, and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, the present official historian of Italian political activity in Ethiopia, writing for the \u2018Comitato per la documentazione dell\u2019 opera dell'Italia in Africa', seems to have been ignorant even of the existence of the original of the treaty in the archives. See M.A.E., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, I, 282, n. \u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 132 132 A. S. MAE., Serie V, Trattati, Etiopia No. 2. The Italian text was first published in Doc. DipI. 1889\u201390 XV, iz8ff. The Amharic text has never been published, and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, the present official historian of Italian political activity in Ethiopia, writing for the \u2018Comitato per la documentazione dell'opera dell'Italia in Africa\u2019, seems to have been ignorant even of the existence of the original of the treaty in the archives. See M.A.E., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, I, 282, 51.", "size": 1, "snippet_links": [{"key": "article-7", "type": "definition", "offset": [9, 18]}, {"key": "the-article", "type": "definition", "offset": [150, 161]}, {"key": "meaning-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [355, 365]}, {"key": "political-activity", "type": "clause", "offset": [1124, 1142]}, {"key": "the-original", "type": "definition", "offset": [1293, 1305]}], "hash": "129484bfeb3b4f603ec57e95debe6518", "id": 6}, {"samples": [{"hash": "cLSN0BsQSIm", "uri": "/contracts/cLSN0BsQSIm#mai", "label": "Treaty", "score": 25.7665982204, "published": true}], "snippet": "36/6\u201354, Pro Memoria al Cay. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Dossi, 19 Sep. 1889, by \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587. Printed in Zaghi, op. cit. \u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 108 108 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, op. cit. 108f., diary 15 July 1890, and 148, diary 18 Aug. 1890. See also 123 and 238 for evidence that \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 at times spoke with the Emperor without \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 109 109 Ibid. 177f., Traversi to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 14 Aug. 1890. 110 110 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, op. cit. \u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 111 111 A. S. MAI. 36/7\u201359, Pro Memoria about the audience, undated; printed in Doc. Dipl. 1889\u201390 XV bis, \u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 112 112 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, op. cit. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587., diary 16 July 1890 (italics mine).Google Scholar 113 113 For more evidence that \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 was supposed by his superiors to know \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, see \u2587\u2587\u2587. Dipl. 1889\u201390 XV, 260f., Robilant to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, ii Mar. 1887. It should be noted that \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 already in 1886 had wrong translations corrected, as he says himself, \u2018under my supervision\u2019; Doc. DipI. 1889\u20131890 XV, 214ff., \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to Robilant, \u2018Apr. 1886. On the other hand \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 kept his interpreter \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 with him also during an interview with \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 in 1888, which was so secret that \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 had to swear that he would reveal nothing; A. S. MAI. 36/5-47, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 8 Aug. 1888. The portion about the oath and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587's presence is missing in the document as printed in Doc. Dipl. 1889\u20131890 XV, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 114 114 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, op. cit. 44, n. 1. I do not know when and under what circumstances \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 made this statement. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 does not give the source of his information, and in the Italian papers that I have seen so far I have not been able to discover \u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 115 115 Doc. Dipl. 1890\u20131891 XVII, 63ff., \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 29 Jan. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 116 116 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, op. cit. 186, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 9 Oct. 1890. \u2018Now I understand how one can obtain so eailv such splendid success. One rites a treaty: iii the Italian text one puts what is wanted in Italy, in the Amharic text one puts what \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, and it doesn't matter if the two do not agree. Those who come later will think about it. What a mess, my dear \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, what imbroglios, what lies, what an enormous difference between this king and King \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587!-the same as between the King of Italy and Minilik. I owe much to A\u2026, I cannot pose as his accuser. But when I tried to put the blame for the false translation of Article r of the treaty with \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 on \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, he gave me such details and reasons that he shut my mouth, proving tome that. as not ignorant of the mess.\u2019Google Scholar 117 117 Ibid. 180f., diary Ict. 1890, and 185f., \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to Baratieri, 6 Oct. 1890. That Traversi shared Saliinbenis viev in this respect is evident from his letter to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 16 Oct. 1890; Ibid. 407f. 118 118 P.R.O., F.O. 95/721, Tewodros to Victoria, Tiqimt zo, 1855 (30 Nov. 1862).Google Scholar 119 119 P.R.O., F.O. 78/2500, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to Derby, 7 and 15 Jan. 1876; F.O. 78/2503, Cook-son to Derby, 9 Jun and 22 July \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 120 120 P.R.O., F.O. 78/2503, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to Derby, 20 Oct. 1876; F.O. 78/263 i, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to Derby, 18 Jan. 1877; \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to Derby and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to Derby, 4 Apr. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 121 121 Doc. Dipl. 1890\u20131891 XVII, 41ff., \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, Yekatit 5, 1883 (11 Feb. 1891).Google Scholar 122 122 A. S. MAI. 36/1-8 and Doc. Dipl. 1889\u20131890 XV, 61ff., Depretis to Massaia, I Mar. 1879, with annexed treaty draft. The printed document has Cairoli as sender. For the events connected with the proposed treaty see Ministero degli Affari Esteri, L'Italia in Africa, Serie Storica, Volume Primo, Etiopia/Mar Rosso, 1 (Roma, 1958), \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 123 123 Doc. Dipl. 1889\u20131890 XV, 62f., Trattato di amicizia fra S.M. il Re d'Italia e S.M. il Re di Scioa. 'It shall be within the authority [or option] of H.M. the King of Shewa to use as his address for all letters and communications which he wishes to dispatch to Europe the consulate of H.M. the King of Italy at Aden or any other Italian consular offices which might be established at Zeyla and other places on the coast nearby./1-8 and Doc. Dipl. 1889\u20131890 XV, 63ff., \u2018Memoria ed istruzioni per negoziare un trattato col Re \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2019 with annexed \u2018Progetto di trattato\u2019, Nov. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 124 124 A. S. MAI. 36/1\u20138 and Doc. DipI. 1889\u201390 XV, 63ff., \u2018Memoria ed istruzioni per negoziare un trattato col Re \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2019 with annexed \u2018Progetto di trattato\u2019, Nov. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 125 125 Ibid. Article 18 and comments to this article in \u2018Memoria \u2026\u2019. For the general circumstances connected with the failure of \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to negotiate this proposed treaty see M.A.E., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, I, 575ff. 126 126 M.A.E., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, 1, 263ff. and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 127 127 A. S. MAT. 36/2\u20132 (for Minilik) and A. S. MAT. 36/2\u201313 (for \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587). \u2018It shall be within the authority [or option] of H.M. the King of Shewa [variation: Abyssinia] to avail himself of the Italian consular authorities or of the Royal Govemorate at Aseb for all letters and communications that he might want to send to the governments in Europe with whom the above-mentioned authorities are accredited. The subjects of H.M. the King of Shewa [Abyssinian subjects] may also request the protection of those authorities, both on the coast and in the various countries whither they might go\u2019.Google Scholar 128 128 A. S. MAI. 36/2\u201313, Branchi to \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 9 Nov. 1883. Cf. M.A.E., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, 1, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Scholar 129 129 Although the way of wording the promise is quite different in the two versions the meaning is the same. Italian: \u2018The Italian consuls shall carry out all the requests which H.M. the King might make directly to them.\u2019 Arnharic: \u2018\u2026 if You [i.e. Your Majesty] send whatever You wish by any of the Italian consuls, everything You desire shall be done and fulfilled\u2019.Google Scholar 130 130 A. S.", "size": 1, "snippet_links": [{"key": "that-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [238, 244]}, {"key": "see-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [719, 724]}, {"key": "the-other-hand", "type": "clause", "offset": [989, 1003]}, {"key": "an-interview", "type": "clause", "offset": [1060, 1072]}, {"key": "source-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [1518, 1527]}, {"key": "i-understand", "type": "definition", "offset": [1805, 1817]}, {"key": "what-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [1973, 1979]}, {"key": "do-not-agree", "type": "clause", "offset": [2025, 2037]}, {"key": "the-events", "type": "clause", "offset": [3443, 3453]}, {"key": "the-proposed", "type": "clause", "offset": [3469, 3481]}, {"key": "the-authority", "type": "clause", "offset": [3756, 3769]}, {"key": "article-18", "type": "definition", "offset": [4433, 4443]}, {"key": "this-article", "type": "definition", "offset": [4460, 4472]}, {"key": "the-general", "type": "clause", "offset": [4493, 4504]}, {"key": "to-negotiate", "type": "definition", "offset": [4585, 4597]}, {"key": "for-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [4794, 4799]}, {"key": "send-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [5049, 5056]}, {"key": "protection-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [5223, 5236]}, {"key": "the-promise", "type": "clause", "offset": [5492, 5503]}], "hash": "5c4c3ed3284fcc410b45943461a0b5bc", "id": 7}, {"samples": [{"hash": "lcUakbHTm00", "uri": "/contracts/lcUakbHTm00#mai", "label": "Agreement for Provision of Hiv Services", "score": 16.0, "published": true}], "snippet": "DEFINITION \u2013 The provision of a range of client-centered services that link clients from 12 ethnic groups that are disproportionately represented in the HIV epidemic with health care, 13 psychosocial, and other services. The coordination and follow-up of medical treatments are primary 14 components of medical case management.", "size": 1, "snippet_links": [{"key": "provision-of-a", "type": "clause", "offset": [17, 31]}, {"key": "of-client", "type": "clause", "offset": [38, 47]}, {"key": "ethnic-groups", "type": "definition", "offset": [92, 105]}, {"key": "health-care", "type": "definition", "offset": [171, 182]}, {"key": "and-other-services", "type": "clause", "offset": [201, 219]}, {"key": "medical-treatments", "type": "clause", "offset": [255, 273]}, {"key": "medical-case-management", "type": "definition", "offset": [303, 326]}], "hash": "531b14b11858c2c3a6cf63352e3e73d7", "id": 8}, {"samples": [{"hash": "f49hn1QAbf4", "uri": "/contracts/f49hn1QAbf4#mai", "label": "Multilateral Agreement on Investment", "score": 22.0581793292, "published": true}], "snippet": "An evaluation", "size": 1, "snippet_links": [], "hash": "946c9d8a0ea2d1c6fe537d41d806da87", "id": 9}, {"samples": [{"hash": "f49hn1QAbf4", "uri": "/contracts/f49hn1QAbf4#mai", "label": "Multilateral Agreement on Investment", "score": 22.0581793292, "published": true}], "snippet": "The Road Ahead\na) The MAI fails to tackle the single most important aspect of international investment taxation, the avoidance of double taxation. Since the tax systems of the major home countries are based on worldwide income taxation principles, their multinational companies are frequently subject to some degree of double taxation. This fact not only \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 international investment, but also provides incentives for the use of tax \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 to channel cross-border capital flows (through the incorporation of offshore holding companies). The use of these schemes is detrimental to the home country, but it also affects recipient countries through both reduced tax revenues and through distorted investment inflows.\nb) The developing countries - and the smaller low-income countries in particular - would require considerable assistance if they are to accede to the MAI or any other agreement of this type. Wide and semi-permanent exceptions are not the solution, because these would undermine the very rigour which creates confidence among investors. The issue is thus one of raising domestic standards rather than lowering international requirements.\nc) Such strengthening of domestic standards is a complex, lengthy and expensive undertaking. However, it could bring considerable benefits for foreign as well as domestic firms. In particular, it would involve an overhaul of the system of commercial law - including the courts - and a parallel rationalisation of systems of public registries, accountancy systems, and government regulation. The role of aid donors could be crucial in this regard - providing not just financial support but, more importantly, technical expertise.\nd) The development impact of MAI on poor countries could be positive if special provision for their accession is made. There is sufficient flexibility in the existing proposal to accommodate developing country interests. De facto exclusion may lead to negative effects such as loss of productive investment and a risk of competitive lowering of legal, fiscal, labour and environmental safeguards.\ne) The treatment of environmental standards in the preamble to the MAI contains an adequate commitment to international norms and should be acceptable. The proposed inclusion of binding labour standards, although perhaps desirable in a general sense, may not be feasible in practice for developing countries and would effectively prevent their accession. These issues need to be addressed.\nf) As an essential complement to the MAI, multilateral tax agreements based on the model treaty proposed by the OECD should be established between existing members and acceding developing countries. This is necessary in order to ensure an equitable distribution of the fiscal resources arising from foreign investment.\ng) Another major substantial problem of the draft MAI was its treatment of relatively volatile portfolio investment. Due to the broad definition of investment, portfolio gained the same protection and rights as foreign direct investment. The draft treaty text granted full transferability of all payments relating to an investment. A future international agreement on investment could narrow the definition of investment and treat portfolio investment different from FDI.", "size": 1, "snippet_links": [{"key": "most-important", "type": "clause", "offset": [53, 67]}, {"key": "international-investment", "type": "definition", "offset": [78, 102]}, {"key": "avoidance-of-double-taxation", "type": "clause", "offset": [117, 145]}, {"key": "home-countries", "type": "definition", "offset": [182, 196]}, {"key": "based-on", "type": "clause", "offset": [201, 209]}, {"key": "income-taxation", "type": "clause", "offset": [220, 235]}, {"key": "subject-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [293, 303]}, {"key": "channel-cross", "type": "clause", "offset": [446, 459]}, {"key": "incorporation-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [494, 510]}, {"key": "holding-companies", "type": "clause", "offset": [520, 537]}, {"key": "home-country", "type": "clause", "offset": [587, 599]}, {"key": "recipient-countries", "type": "definition", "offset": 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2539]}, {"key": "the-model", "type": "clause", "offset": [2549, 2558]}, {"key": "the-oecd", "type": "definition", "offset": [2578, 2586]}, {"key": "existing-members", "type": "clause", "offset": [2617, 2633]}, {"key": "in-order-to-ensure", "type": "clause", "offset": [2687, 2705]}, {"key": "distribution-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [2719, 2734]}, {"key": "foreign-investment", "type": "definition", "offset": [2769, 2787]}, {"key": "portfolio-investment", "type": "definition", "offset": [2884, 2904]}, {"key": "and-rights", "type": "clause", "offset": [2986, 2996]}, {"key": "direct-investment", "type": "definition", "offset": [3008, 3025]}, {"key": "treaty-text", "type": "definition", "offset": [3037, 3048]}, {"key": "all-payments", "type": "clause", "offset": [3081, 3093]}, {"key": "relating-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [3094, 3105]}, {"key": "international-agreement", "type": "clause", "offset": [3130, 3153]}, {"key": "the-definition-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [3181, 3198]}], "hash": "b98abbaca1d0a568cc24fc25686009ed", "id": 10}], "next_curs": "CkwSRmoVc35sYXdpbnNpZGVyY29udHJhY3RzcigLEhZDbGF1c2VTbmlwcGV0R3JvdXBfdjU2IgxtYWkjMDAwMDAwMGEMogECZW4YACAA", "clause": {"size": 17, "children": [], "title": "MAI", "parents": [["acronyms", "ACRONYMS"], ["work-authorizations", "WORK AUTHORIZATIONS"], ["parties-obligations", "Parties' Obligations"], ["representations-and-warranties-of-mai", "REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF MAI"], ["authority-relative-to-agreements", "Authority Relative to Agreements"]], "id": "mai", "related": [["qualified-appraiser", "Qualified Appraiser", "Qualified Appraiser"], ["appraisers", "Appraisers", "Appraisers"], ["the-appraisal", "The Appraisal", "The Appraisal"], ["specialist", "Specialist", "Specialist"], ["architect", "Architect", "Architect"]], "related_snippets": [], "updated": "2025-07-07T12:37:48+00:00", "also_ask": [], "drafting_tip": null, "explanation": "The MAI (Market Area Identification) clause defines the specific geographic area or market in which certain contractual rights, obligations, or restrictions apply. In practice, this clause may delineate the territory where a distributor is authorized to sell products, or where a licensee may use intellectual property, often by referencing cities, regions, or countries. By clearly specifying the relevant market area, the clause helps prevent disputes over territorial rights and ensures that both parties understand the scope of their activities under the agreement."}, "json": true, "cursor": ""}}