{"component": "clause", "props": {"groups": [{"snippet": "While the historical record shows that the Federal Reserve attempted to use the nonrate terms of access to control discount window borrowing in the 1920s and early 1930s it is not clear the attempts were successful. Assessing whether changes in credit policy had a material effect on bank borrowing requires empirical tests using a model that can measure the administrative pressure applied at the discount window. A useful starting point in developing such a model is in specifying the costs to banks in meeting a reserve need. Cost-minimizing banks would weigh the cost of borrowing from the discount window against the cost of liquidating assets or borrowing from an alternative source. The cost of borrowing from the Federal Reserve is the interest paid at the discount rate, Rd, plus the implicit costs of supervisory surveillance. These costs are those resulting from the administrative pressure supervisors apply to discourage banks from engaging in arbitrage when discount rates were below market rates of interest, as they were for most of the 1920s and many months in the early 1930s. In this model the implicit costs are represented by a borrowing function in which the marginal surveillance cost of access to the discount window, c(B/K), rises with the amount borrowed, B, relative to bank capital, K. Capital is the appropriate scale variable given that Federal Reserve banks had from the start focused on borrowing relative to capital when seeking to restrain bank borrowing (\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 1932, p. 44). The implicit costs may be thought of as the opportunity costs of providing the collateral for the borrowings or the capital adjustments required by supervisors whose attention is drawn to the bank by the borrowing. The cost of liquidating the assets is the foregone interest on the assets, RA, plus the transactions costs incurred in selling the assets, tc, measured as a portion of the value of the assets. Although a small market for federal funds developed in several cities in the 1920s in which banks could borrow or lend reserves, most banks met reserve drains by liquidating assets \u2014 particularly their holdings of call loans and short- term marketable securities (\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 1938, 93-97 and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 1964) 3-13). The total cost, C, to banks of meeting their reserve need, RN, can be expressed as: where\n(1) C = RdB + c(B/K) + RaA + tcA Rd is the discount rate, c(B/K) is the implicit or surveillance costs involved in borrowing, Ra is the interest rate on the alternative source of funds, For estimation it is necessary to commit to a functional form for the implicit surveillance cost function. One such function in which surveillance costs rise with the level of borrowing relative to capital is:\n(2) c(B/K) = (\u03bbK/2)(B/K) 2 , c\u2019(B/K) = \u03bb(B/K) where \u03bb > 0 measures the degree of administrative or surveillance pressure on the bank. Substituting this explicit cost function into (1), scaling all variables by bank capital and minimizing C subject to the constraint that RN = A + B, letting Spread = Ra - Rd , and solving for B/K, gives the bank\u2019s demand for borrowed reserves as:\n(3) B/K = (1/\u03bb)(Spread + tc), B/K > 0. The demand for borrowed reserves rises with the spread between markets rates and the discount rate, Spread, rises with the transactions costs incurred in obtaining reserves from an alternative source, tc, and falls with an increase in administrative pressure at the discount window, \u03bb. The model described by equation (3) is a static in that describes only current-period borrowing. The Federal Reserve\u2019s repeated avowal to discourage continuous borrowing during the 1920s suggests the implicit costs should be specified as a function of both current and past borrowing, which would make the demand for borrowed reserves the solution to a dynamic optimization involving current, past, and expected future borrowing as in \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (1983). Considerable evidence exists, however, that the sanctions against continuous borrowing were not enforced effectively in the interwar period. A study commissioned by the Federal Reserve found that as of August 1925 found more than 588 member banks had been borrowing steadily for a year or more from the Federal Reserve. Of these, 239 had been borrowing since 1920 and 122 had begun borrowing before that; see \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (1971) pp. 34-35. One Federal Reserve bank was reported to have permitted its members to renew their 15-day loans indefinitely, and as of 1928 had never refused to renew, with some loans running as long as four years (\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 1932,", "snippet_links": [{"key": "historical-record", "type": "definition", "offset": [10, 27]}, {"key": "terms-of-access", "type": "definition", "offset": [88, 103]}, {"key": "to-control", "type": "definition", "offset": [104, 114]}, {"key": "changes-in", "type": "clause", "offset": [234, 244]}, {"key": "credit-policy", "type": "clause", "offset": [245, 258]}, {"key": "material-effect", "type": "definition", "offset": [265, 280]}, {"key": "administrative-pressure", "type": "clause", "offset": [359, 382]}, {"key": "starting-point", "type": "clause", "offset": [424, 438]}, {"key": "to-banks", "type": "clause", "offset": [493, 501]}, {"key": "cost-of-borrowing", "type": "definition", "offset": [567, 584]}, {"key": "liquidating-assets", "type": "definition", "offset": [630, 648]}, {"key": "alternative-source", "type": "definition", "offset": [670, 688]}, {"key": "interest-paid", "type": "clause", "offset": [744, 757]}, {"key": "costs-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [802, 810]}, {"key": "resulting-from-the", "type": "clause", "offset": [859, 877]}, {"key": "engaging-in", "type": "definition", "offset": [945, 956]}, {"key": "discount-rates", "type": "clause", "offset": [972, 986]}, {"key": "rates-of-interest", "type": "clause", "offset": [1005, 1022]}, {"key": "represented-by", "type": "definition", "offset": [1132, 1146]}, {"key": "a-borrowing", "type": "definition", "offset": [1147, 1158]}, {"key": "the-marginal", "type": "clause", "offset": [1177, 1189]}, {"key": "access-to-the", "type": "clause", "offset": [1211, 1224]}, {"key": "given-that", "type": "clause", "offset": [1356, 1366]}, {"key": "federal-reserve-banks", "type": "clause", "offset": [1367, 1388]}, {"key": "the-opportunity", "type": "clause", "offset": [1557, 1572]}, {"key": "the-collateral", "type": "definition", "offset": [1592, 1606]}, {"key": "the-borrowings", "type": "clause", "offset": [1611, 1625]}, {"key": "capital-adjustments", "type": "clause", "offset": [1633, 1652]}, {"key": "required-by", "type": "definition", "offset": [1653, 1664]}, {"key": "to-the-bank", "type": "clause", "offset": [1702, 1713]}, {"key": "the-assets", "type": "clause", "offset": [1756, 1766]}, {"key": "interest-on-the", "type": "clause", "offset": [1783, 1798]}, {"key": "costs-incurred", "type": "definition", "offset": [1833, 1847]}, {"key": "a-portion", "type": "definition", "offset": [1887, 1896]}, {"key": "the-value", "type": "clause", "offset": [1900, 1909]}, {"key": "federal-funds", "type": "definition", "offset": [1953, 1966]}, {"key": "marketable-securities", "type": "definition", "offset": [2166, 2187]}, {"key": "total-cost", "type": "clause", "offset": [2238, 2248]}, {"key": "the-interest-rate", "type": "clause", "offset": [2456, 2473]}, {"key": "source-of-funds", "type": "definition", "offset": [2493, 2508]}, {"key": "by-bank", "type": "clause", "offset": [2927, 2934]}, {"key": "subject-to-the", "type": "definition", "offset": [2960, 2974]}, {"key": "the-solution", "type": "definition", "offset": [3761, 3773]}, {"key": "future-borrowing", "type": "clause", "offset": [3838, 3854]}, {"key": "in-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [3858, 3862]}, {"key": "member-banks", "type": "definition", "offset": [4114, 4126]}, {"key": "year-or-more", "type": "clause", "offset": [4161, 4173]}, {"key": "see-\u2587", "type": "clause", "offset": [4285, 4290]}], "size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "9fhmxXHPaHb", "uri": "/contracts/9fhmxXHPaHb#the-model", "label": "Research Paper", "score": 27.0232243774, "published": true}], "hash": "d3a32a440d0d271db650f06f79a0d7bd", "id": 2}, {"snippet": "7.1.1 RCC and the MOD will operate within a Public / Public partnership. The overriding objective is to ensure that the site is developed in such a way as to deliver the agreed vision for the site. Hence whatever vehicle is adopted it must ensure that RCC and MOD retain control over exactly what gets delivered.\n7.1.2 The MOD will procure a Land Sale Delivery Partner (LSDP) to deliver the project and the development along the same lines as LSDP models used elsewhere for Defence sales", "snippet_links": [{"key": "public-partnership", "type": "definition", "offset": [53, 71]}, {"key": "overriding-objective", "type": "clause", "offset": [77, 97]}, {"key": "to-ensure", "type": "clause", "offset": [101, 110]}, {"key": "the-site", "type": "clause", "offset": [116, 124]}, {"key": "delivery-partner", "type": "definition", "offset": [352, 368]}, {"key": "the-project", "type": "clause", "offset": [387, 398]}, {"key": "the-development", "type": "clause", "offset": [403, 418]}], "size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "hrWF2uzlsSu", "uri": "/contracts/hrWF2uzlsSu#the-model", "label": "Memorandum of Understanding", "score": 21.1149897331, "published": true}, {"hash": "etiM5XF4vK8", "uri": "/contracts/etiM5XF4vK8#the-model", "label": "Memorandum of Understanding", "score": 21.1149897331, "published": true}], "hash": "16a77142e1f0ae207dacfeafba7d7d98", "id": 1}, {"snippet": "We consider a team with n members who take part in a joint production repeat- edly. At the beginning of each period, each team member i simultaneously decide whether or not to participate in the production process. Let dt \u2208 {0, 1} denote the participation decision for each team member i at each period t. For an individual i who is willing to take part in the production at t, we have dt = 1 and dt = 0 otherwise. For the production to take place at period t, we require that all the team member must involve, that is Q dt = 1.1 At the beginning of each period t, the agents sign a court-enforceable agreement, which specifies: the participation decisions for all agents2 and how the final output will be shared among all the participating agents. Let St denotes the sharing rule3. Then each team member takes an unobservable action at \u2208 R+ which incurs a cost ci(at) to the individual i. The cost is increasing, differentiable and convex", "snippet_links": [{"key": "a-team", "type": "definition", "offset": [12, 18]}, {"key": "joint-production", "type": "clause", "offset": [53, 69]}, {"key": "beginning-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [91, 103]}, {"key": "team-member", "type": "definition", "offset": [122, 133]}, {"key": "participate-in", "type": "definition", "offset": [176, 190]}, {"key": "production-process", "type": "definition", "offset": [195, 213]}, {"key": "the-participation", "type": "clause", "offset": [238, 255]}, {"key": "for-an-individual", "type": "clause", "offset": [306, 323]}, {"key": "the-team", "type": "definition", "offset": [481, 489]}, {"key": "the-agents", "type": "definition", "offset": [565, 575]}, {"key": "enforceable-agreement", "type": "clause", "offset": [589, 610]}, {"key": "the-final", "type": "clause", "offset": [681, 690]}, {"key": "the-participating", "type": "clause", "offset": [723, 740]}, {"key": "the-individual", "type": "clause", "offset": [872, 886]}, {"key": "the-cost", "type": "clause", "offset": [890, 898]}], "size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "6vKMavGekE6", "uri": "/contracts/6vKMavGekE6#the-model", "label": "PHD Thesis", "score": 21.0246406571, "published": true}], "hash": "b1c26e3c44ab9abc298217f536240320", "id": 3}, {"snippet": "We assume a supply chain consisting of a single retailer (he) and a single supplier (she). The supplier can ship to the retailer in any period but produces only once every T periods. This is appropriate for a setting in which a supplier may manufacture different goods on a set production schedule so that she can only produce material for a given retailer once every T periods. We assume no bound on the amount produced. Alternatively, one could imagine a supplier which, because of limited availability of necessary raw materials, can produce for a given retailer only once every T periods. There is a large body of literature that discusses the benefits of sequencing multiple jobs that must use common resources over a fixed time interval. These types of problems are collectively referred to as economic lot scheduling problems or lot-sizing problems. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (1978) examines both analytical and heuristic techniques for finding policies under no capacity restrictions. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (1999a) provides additional reasons for using policies with fixed-time-review intervals as well as an excellent review of papers that use this assumption. Other references can be found in \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (1981), which provides a review of production scheduling literature. We further assume that the retailer (under RMI) and the supplier (under VMI) follow a periodic-review inventory policy so that they examine the retailer\u2019s inventory level at the beginning of each period, and that end-user demand occurs only at the retailer. Demand is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to the distribution function \u03a6(\u00b7) and density function \u03c6(\u00b7). Excess demand at the retailer is backlogged. We allow the supplier to outsource in order to obtain material to ship to the retailer in a period in which the supplier cannot produce. In this context outsourcing could represent a form of expediting such as working overtime, producing using less efficient technology, transshipping from another location, or procuring from an outside source. Outsourcing results in an additional cost to the supplier of b0 per unit. When salvage value corresponds to production costs, both salvage value and production costs can be ignored. Therefore, we do not include them in the model. Instead, we model only the premium for outsourced goods, b0. Under both RMI and VMI, as soon as inventory arrives at the retailer, ownership of the inventory is transferred to the retailer. Thus, our situation does not represent a consignment system. The relevant costs for the supplier are hS, the supplier unit holding cost, and b0, the unit cost of outsourcing. For the retailer we consider hR, the retailer unit holding cost, and p, the retailer unit backorder penalty cost. One shortcoming of many investigations of VMI is that there is little attention paid to why or how participating firms enter into such an agreement. If the supplier\u2019s control under VMI were unrestricted, then without some form of penalty costs at the supplier it would be optimal for the supplier to ship an extraordinarily large amount of inventory to the retailer. However, in actuality the supplier\u2019s control is not total (Cachon (1999b)). We have seen that in many instances VMI is initiated under some sort of agreement or contract between the involved parties (see also Aviv and Federgruen (1998) and Copacino (1993)). The contract or agreement may specify a minimum end-user customer service level that must be maintained by the supplier under VMI, and storage space (e.g., shelf space allocated by the retailer) may effectively play the role of an upper limit. Alternatively, the contract may set minimum and maximum retailer inventory levels that the supplier is expected to maintain. Despite many common features, the details of implementation of VMI contracts differ from company to company. Several of our specific experiences with VMI agreements used in practice are listed here. A large semiconductor manufacturer establishes VMI agreements with several of its largest spare parts suppliers. These parts include many different items that are used in a wafer-fabrication process. The end-user customers are the production engineers who demand a part whenever one is needed in the wafer fab because of machine breakdown, replacement, or maintenance. In this particular VMI agreement, each supplier is given access to the semiconductor\u2019s inventory programs so that they can view current inventory levels and \u2587\u2587- \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 histories for the items that they supply.1 The suppliers are then expected to make all decisions on how much and when to ship inventory to the semiconductor manufacturer. The semiconductor firm also communicates suggested minimum inventory levels and reorder points for each of the parts involved in the VMI program as well as maximum inventory levels for some items (usually larger parts that had space constraints). For the most part, these levels are the same as the semiconductor firm uses for its own in-house inventory decision making process. The semiconductor manufacturer and the suppliers have scheduled meetings (monthly at the beginning of the program and less often as the VMI program progresses) to discuss the success of the VMI program and any problems that are occurring. Some of the main factors in evaluating the performance of a supplier in the VMI program is how many stockouts have occurred at the semiconductor manufacturer for its parts and whether the 1If a supplier cannot access the semiconductor firm\u2019s inventory computer system (due to incompatible software or such), then daily or weekly facsimile reports are sent to the supplier showing the supplier\u2019s parts current inventory levels and demand histories. supplier maintained the minimum and the maximum allowable inventory levels. A JIT assembler of electronic devices uses VMI-type agreements with suppliers of more than 85% of its parts \u2013 all of the important components except one supplied by a company considered as a monopolist. The minimum and maximum levels of inventory are expressed as seven and 14 days of production according to the forecast that the assembler publishes. The suppliers do not have any major benefits of scale in the delivery process and typically deliver several times a week (sometimes every day). The performance, in terms of main- taining inventory between seven and 14 days of production, is closely monitored and is used as a significant factor (one of five factors) in a \u201cscorecard\u201d evaluation of all suppliers. The actual parameters of seven and 14 days, when introduced and for a long period afterwards, were identical across all parts (and all suppliers). They were viewed as probably exceeding the actual needs, but maintained due to the weekly routine of updating forecasts (a newly published forecast might dramatically change the actual number of parts needed, and too small a buffer or too small a difference between the minimum and maximum could put the retailer\u2019s inventory outside of the desirable interval). A student team evaluated the appro- priateness of the levels used. As a result of recommendations, the assembler has introduced a pilot program with parameters based on economic considerations (as we describe in this paper) instead of a fixed number of days, independent of product. A producer of furniture that offers some partly customized configurations with two-day production lead time relies on minimum and maximum levels of inventory of all parts. The parts are stored in a nearby warehouse (three miles away) owned by the producer and replenished by the supplier. Lower and upper limits on each item are set by the producer. Increasingly often, we observe evaluation techniques based on a \u201cbalanced scorecard,\u201d which make the inventory performance an important part of the evaluation. In most cases the supplier\u2019s ability to maintain the desired inventory level is collected over the year and becomes a significant factor in next year\u2019s market share and price decisions. The JIT assembler mentioned here performs evaluations on a quarterly basis and its suppliers feel that this puts more weight on being out of the defined inventory range than the assembler cares to admit. Less often, the explicit penalties are collected. Our conversations with the Advanced Supply Chain Solutions Department of an auto manufacturer indicate that this company has considered explicitly setting penalties for falling below the minimum levels (in the spirit of currently collected penalties for any order that is not satisfied) but has not implemented such a system yet. Our work with these firms has led us to define a type of initiating VMI contract, which we call a (z, Z) VMI contract. Under a (z, Z) VMI contract, the retailer sets a minimum inventory level, z, and a maximum inventory level, Z, that represent the lowest and highest inventory levels, respectively, that the retailer wishes his stock to experience when measured after customer demand. The values of z and Z represent either the actual minimum and maximum levels or the implicit values that are tied to inventory turns and customer service levels. The supplier agrees to pay a penalty amount of b\u2212 (b+) per unit to the retailer for every unit of the retailer\u2019s inventory that is less than z (more than Z) after customer demand. In all of the VMI agreements mentioned previously, the penalties are not incurred immediately (i.e., on a daily basis), but are based on long-term (approximately yearly) performance, often as part of \u201cbalanced scorecard\u201d evaluation. The companies that we worked with indicated that these measures and resulting penalties and awards, although often neither contractually enforced or even necessarily explicit, are nevertheless very strong incentives in to trying to remain within the agreed upon inventory levels. VMI agreements effectively serve to transfer part of the demand risk from the retailer to the supplier. While this model does not perfectly correspond to all of the intricacies of the examples given here, it is a useful abstraction of common VMI agreements, which we believe allows us to make a fair evaluation of VMI. We wish to characterize the supplier\u2019s optimal policy under a (z, Z) VMI contract. This means determining how much the supplier should produce once every T periods, and how much the supplier should send to the retailer at the beginning of each period (associated with this decision is the decision of how much to outsource in each period). We assume that there is negligible lead time for shipments from supplier to retailer (an assumption that can be relaxed), but that the decision of how much to outsource must be made by the supplier before demand is experienced at the retailer. We use Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) to characterize the optimal policy for the supplier under VMI. Once the optimal policy for the supplier under a (z, Z) VMI contract is determined, we examine how a retailer would want to structure a (z, Z)-type of VMI contract. We do this by allowing the retailer to choose Z and z values so as to minimize its overall costs. A traditional RMI setting is defined and the optimal policies for the supplier are derived. In both cases we assume that all information is shared (whether it is useful or not), i.e., in addition to actual inventory position, the supplier has full knowledge of the end-user demand distribution as well as the inventory policy being followed by the retailer. We incorporate information sharing into the RMI case so that we can identify those benefits that are offered by VMI in addition to benefits offered by information sharing alone. Once both the supplier\u2019s and the retailer\u2019s operating policies under VMI and RMI have been fully defined, we numerically compare the overall performance of the supply chain under VMI to the supply chain operating under a traditional RMI setting. Infinitesimal perturbation analysis (IPA) is used to determine the retailer\u2019s order up-to values under RMI and the supplier\u2019s optimal levels of replenishing the retailer under VMI as well as her optimal production quantities. The retailer\u2019s best z and Z values are found using a newsvendor-type relation. A computational study also allows us to describe when VMI contracts are most beneficial as well as to define general guidelines for setting the contractual parameters.", "snippet_links": [{"key": "ship-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [108, 115]}, {"key": "the-retailer", "type": "clause", "offset": [116, 128]}, {"key": "a-supplier", "type": "definition", "offset": [226, 236]}, {"key": "production-schedule", "type": "clause", "offset": [278, 297]}, {"key": "availability-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [492, 507]}, {"key": "raw-materials", "type": "definition", "offset": [518, 531]}, {"key": "the-benefits", "type": "clause", "offset": [644, 656]}, {"key": "common-resources", "type": "clause", "offset": [699, 715]}, {"key": "fixed-time", "type": "definition", "offset": [723, 733]}, {"key": "types-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [750, 758]}, {"key": "no-capacity", "type": "clause", "offset": [952, 963]}, {"key": "review-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [1097, 1106]}, {"key": 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"the-evaluation", "type": "clause", "offset": [7779, 7793]}, {"key": "ability-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [7824, 7834]}, {"key": "the-year", "type": "definition", "offset": [7890, 7898]}, {"key": "market-share", "type": "clause", "offset": [7947, 7959]}, {"key": "on-a-quarterly-basis", "type": "definition", "offset": [8035, 8055]}, {"key": "the-defined", "type": "clause", "offset": [8122, 8133]}, {"key": "supply-chain-solutions", "type": "definition", "offset": [8271, 8293]}, {"key": "department-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [8294, 8307]}, {"key": "this-company", "type": "definition", "offset": [8343, 8355]}, {"key": "minimum-levels", "type": "clause", "offset": [8422, 8436]}, {"key": "any-order", "type": "definition", "offset": [8489, 8498]}, {"key": "our-work", "type": "clause", "offset": [8565, 8573]}, {"key": "type-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [8614, 8621]}, {"key": "actual-minimum", "type": "definition", "offset": [8994, 9008]}, {"key": "inventory-turns", 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"offset": [11060, 11073]}, {"key": "all-information", "type": "clause", "offset": [11196, 11211]}, {"key": "in-addition-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [11259, 11273]}, {"key": "inventory-position", "type": "definition", "offset": [11281, 11299]}, {"key": "knowledge-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [11323, 11335]}, {"key": "information-sharing", "type": "definition", "offset": [11448, 11467]}, {"key": "offered-by", "type": "definition", "offset": [11534, 11544]}, {"key": "benefits-offered", "type": "clause", "offset": [11564, 11580]}, {"key": "operating-policies", "type": "definition", "offset": [11655, 11673]}, {"key": "overall-performance", "type": "clause", "offset": [11744, 11763]}, {"key": "determine-the", "type": "clause", "offset": [11910, 11923]}, {"key": "guidelines-for", "type": "clause", "offset": [12279, 12293]}], "size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "sYY0Hgmrvw", "uri": "/contracts/sYY0Hgmrvw#the-model", "label": "Vendor Managed Inventory Contract", "score": 17.0, "published": true}], "hash": "a6fb94726bbd68a8039c68d5b4aa17bf", "id": 4}, {"snippet": "Formally, a dishonest server S\u2217 in the SQOM is modeled as follows.\n1. S\u2217 may reliably store the n-qubit state Hc(w)|x\u27e9 = Hc(w)1 |x1\u27e9 \u2297 \u00b7 \u00b7 \u00b7 \u2297 Hc(w)n|xn\u27e9 received in step (1) of NEWQID.\n2. At the end of the protocol, in step (5), S\u2217 chooses an arbitrary sequence \u03b8 = (\u03b81, . . . , \u03b8n), where each \u03b8i describes an arbitrary orthonormal basis of C2, and measures each qubit Hc(w)i xi in basis \u03b8i to observe Yi F2. Hence, we assume that S\u2217 measures all qubits at the end of the protocol.\n3. The choice of \u03b8 may depend on all the classical information gathered during the execution of the protocol, but we assume a non-adaptive setting where \u03b8i does not depend on Yj for i = j, i.e., S\u2217 has to choose \u03b8 entirely before performing any measurement. Considering complete projective measurements acting on individual qubits, rather than general single-qubit POVMs, may be considered a restriction of our model. Nonetheless, general POVM measurements can always be described by projective measurements on a bigger system. In this sense, restricting to projective mea- surements is consistent with the requirement of single-qubit operations. It seems non-trivial to extend our security proof to general single-qubit POVMs. The restriction to non-adaptive measurements (item 3) is rather strong, even though the protocol from [DFSSo7] already breaks down in this non-adaptive setting. The restriction was introduced as a stepping stone towards proving the adaptive case. Up to now, we have unfortunately not yet succeeded in doing so, hence we leave the adaptive case for future research. We also leave for future research the case of a less restricted dishonest server S\u2217 that can do measurements on blocks that are less stringently bounded in size. Whereas the adaptive versus non-adaptive issue appears to be a proof-technical problem (NEWQID looks secure also against an adaptive S\u2217), allowing measurements on larger blocks will require a new protocol, since NEWQID becomes insecure when S\u2217 can do measurements on blocks of size 2, as we show in Section 5.6.5.", "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-protocol", "type": "clause", "offset": [203, 215]}, {"key": "basis-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [334, 342]}, {"key": "the-execution", "type": "clause", "offset": [563, 576]}, {"key": "a-non", "type": "clause", "offset": [608, 613]}, {"key": "the-requirement", "type": "clause", "offset": [1087, 1102]}, {"key": "to-extend", "type": "clause", "offset": [1152, 1161]}, {"key": "security-proof", "type": "clause", "offset": [1166, 1180]}, {"key": "to-general", "type": "clause", "offset": [1181, 1191]}, {"key": "item-3", "type": "clause", "offset": [1258, 1264]}, {"key": "future-research", "type": "clause", "offset": [1560, 1575]}, {"key": "leave-for", "type": "clause", "offset": [1585, 1594]}, {"key": "the-case", "type": "definition", "offset": [1611, 1619]}, {"key": "technical-problem", "type": "definition", "offset": [1808, 1825]}], "size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "efaKHHUCcsG", "uri": "/contracts/efaKHHUCcsG#the-model", "label": "Doctoral Thesis", "score": 18.4798083504, "published": true}], "hash": "15a2caf8d27ba4584bf5afdab82e47b6", "id": 5}, {"snippet": "The security model used to provide proof, models interaction of the real partic- ipants (modeled as oracles) and an adversary via queries which the adversary makes to the oracles. It is a kind of a \u201cgame\u201d between the adversary and the participants, where the adversary makes some queries and finally tries to distinguish a group key from a random quantity for some session he chooses. The model is defined in details below: Participants. The set of all potential participants is denoted by \u2587 ={\u2587\u2587, \u2587", "snippet_links": [{"key": "security-model", "type": "clause", "offset": [4, 18]}, {"key": "to-provide", "type": "definition", "offset": [24, 34]}, {"key": "the-participants", "type": "clause", "offset": [231, 247]}, {"key": "and-finally", "type": "clause", "offset": [288, 299]}, {"key": "potential-participants", "type": "definition", "offset": [453, 475]}], "size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "38l7f46hk39", "uri": "/contracts/38l7f46hk39#the-model", "label": "Group Key Agreement Protocol", "score": 26.9178644764, "published": true}], "hash": "f30dabc1e2ecdcf3a9fa8105730e2022", "id": 6}, {"snippet": "In this section we refine the formal security model which has been widely used in the litera- ture [12, 8\u201310, 23, 6] to analyze group key agreement protocols. In particular, we incorporate strong corruption [4] into the security model in a different way than the previous approaches by allowing an adversary to ask one additional query, Dump, and we modify the definition of freshness according to the refined model. Section 5 shows that our approach leads to much simpler security proof of the compiler presented by \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 and Yung [23]. U { } Participants. Let = U1, . . . , Un be a set of n users who wish to participate in a group key agreement protocol P . The number of users, n, is polynomially bounded in the security parameter k. Users may execute the protocol multiple times concurrently and thus each user can have many instances called oracles. We use \u03a0s to denote instance s of user Ui. In initialization phase, each user Ui \u2208 U obtains a long-term public/private key pair (PKi, SKi) by running a key generation algorithm G(1k). The set of public keys of all users is assumed to be known a priori to all parties including the adversary A.", "snippet_links": [{"key": "the-formal", "type": "clause", "offset": [26, 36]}, {"key": "security-model", "type": "clause", "offset": [37, 51]}, {"key": "group-key-agreement-protocols", "type": "clause", "offset": [128, 157]}, {"key": "in-particular", "type": "clause", "offset": [159, 172]}, {"key": "the-security", "type": "clause", "offset": [216, 228]}, {"key": "the-definition-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [357, 374]}, {"key": "according-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [385, 397]}, {"key": "section-5", "type": "clause", "offset": [417, 426]}, {"key": "our-approach", "type": "clause", "offset": [438, 450]}, {"key": "proof-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [482, 490]}, {"key": "presented-by", "type": "definition", "offset": [504, 516]}, {"key": "participate-in", "type": "definition", "offset": [610, 624]}, {"key": "number-of-users", "type": "definition", "offset": [664, 679]}, {"key": "the-protocol", "type": "clause", "offset": [755, 767]}, {"key": "initialization-phase", "type": "clause", "offset": [901, 921]}, {"key": "a-long", "type": "clause", "offset": [948, 954]}, {"key": "key-pair", "type": "definition", "offset": [975, 983]}, {"key": "key-generation", "type": "definition", "offset": [1008, 1022]}, {"key": "all-users", "type": "clause", "offset": [1066, 1075]}, {"key": "a-priori", "type": "definition", "offset": [1099, 1107]}, {"key": "all-parties", "type": "definition", "offset": [1111, 1122]}], "size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "60D18q09GGi", "uri": "/contracts/60D18q09GGi#the-model", "label": "Group Key Agreement Protocol", "score": 17.0, "published": true}], "hash": "f400e51d88626f5f1b933cfc13c3753f", "id": 7}, {"snippet": "To explore effects of a PTA in services, this section gives a model of a particular service sector that is imperfectly competitive. In addition to the domestic indigenous firms, there are foreign firms who provide services in the home country. There are, however, barriers protecting the domestic firms from competition with foreign firms. Within this framework, we examine the implications of a PTA which eliminates these barriers and promotes the partner country\u2019s firms access to domestic consumers. In this model, there is the home country (1), a partner country (2), and a non-partner country (3). There are ni identical firms in country i ( i \u2208{1,2,3}) and they provide a particular service in the home country\u2019s market. The inverse demand for the service in the home country is p = x \u2212 y\u2211niqi , (1) i=1 where p is the market price of the service and qi market by a country i based firm. is the quantity supplied to the Indigenous firms in the home country face a constant marginal cost c, while the foreign firm that is based in country i additionally has to pay ti to provide the service to consumers in the home country.3 This cost may reflect not just cross-border tariffs, but all costs stemming from the restrictions to foreign service providers in the home market. Consequently, marginal costs of each firm are", "snippet_links": [{"key": "in-services", "type": "clause", "offset": [28, 39]}, {"key": "service-sector", "type": "definition", "offset": [84, 98]}, {"key": "in-addition-to-the", "type": "clause", "offset": [132, 150]}, {"key": "home-country", "type": "clause", "offset": [230, 242]}, {"key": "the-partner", "type": "definition", "offset": [445, 456]}, {"key": "access-to", "type": "definition", "offset": [473, 482]}, {"key": "a-non", "type": "clause", "offset": [576, 581]}, {"key": "provide-a", "type": "definition", "offset": [668, 677]}, {"key": "price-of-the-service", "type": "clause", "offset": [832, 852]}, {"key": "to-pay", "type": "clause", "offset": [1063, 1069]}, {"key": "provide-the", "type": "clause", "offset": [1076, 1087]}, {"key": "all-costs", "type": "definition", "offset": [1188, 1197]}, {"key": "the-restrictions", "type": "clause", "offset": [1212, 1228]}, {"key": "service-providers", "type": "clause", "offset": [1240, 1257]}, {"key": "home-market", "type": "definition", "offset": [1265, 1276]}, {"key": "costs-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [1301, 1309]}], "size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "aMWCMIxpqYS", "uri": "/contracts/aMWCMIxpqYS#the-model", "label": "Preferential Trade Agreement in Services", "score": 19.0, "published": true}], "hash": "0ba3b77309cfe0538f7676f5b67ab24e", "id": 8}, {"snippet": "We consider a team with n members who take part in a joint production repeat- edly. At the beginning of each period, each team member i simultaneously decide whether or not to participate in the production process. Let dt \u2208 {0, 1} denote the participation decision for each team member i at each period t. For an individual i who is willing to take part in the production at t, we have dt = 1 and dt = 0", "snippet_links": [{"key": "a-team", "type": "definition", "offset": [12, 18]}, {"key": "joint-production", "type": "clause", "offset": [53, 69]}, {"key": "beginning-of", "type": "clause", "offset": [91, 103]}, {"key": "team-member", "type": "definition", "offset": [122, 133]}, {"key": "participate-in", "type": "definition", "offset": [176, 190]}, {"key": "production-process", "type": "definition", "offset": [195, 213]}, {"key": "the-participation", "type": "clause", "offset": [238, 255]}, {"key": "for-an-individual", "type": "clause", "offset": [306, 323]}], "size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "BAt4iPmvLN", "uri": "/contracts/BAt4iPmvLN#the-model", "label": "PHD Thesis", "score": 21.0246406571, "published": true}], "hash": "9688ce28fe42e9a48e3f447b9715f185", "id": 9}, {"snippet": "As mentioned in the Introduction, we follow Brulhart and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (2000) and estimate the following two specifications of an equation designed to account for changes in employment in 3-digit ISIC (Rev.", "snippet_links": [{"key": "to-account", "type": "definition", "offset": [141, 151]}, {"key": "changes-in-employment", "type": "clause", "offset": [156, 177]}], "size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "5a7tuluSEdR", "uri": "/contracts/5a7tuluSEdR#the-model", "label": "Copyright License Agreement", "score": 21.0, "published": true}], "hash": "4588247a0c1f61fb09372dc8596efce8", "id": 10}], "next_curs": "ClISTGoVc35sYXdpbnNpZGVyY29udHJhY3Rzci4LEhZDbGF1c2VTbmlwcGV0R3JvdXBfdjU2IhJ0aGUtbW9kZWwjMDAwMDAwMGEMogECZW4YACAA", "clause": {"parents": [["purpose-of-the-memorandum-of-understanding", "Purpose of the Memorandum of Understanding"], ["introduction", "Introduction"], ["payment", "PAYMENT"], ["conclusions-references-appendix", "Conclusions References Appendix"], ["outline", "Outline"]], "children": [["", ""], ["timeline", "Timeline"], ["court-costs-and-pretrial-agreement-costs", "Court Costs and Pretrial Agreement Costs"], ["generalized-\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587-bargaining-and-the-disagreement-payoffs", "Generalized \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Bargaining and The Disagreement Payoffs"], ["linear-sharing-rule", "Linear sharing rule"]], "title": "The Model", "size": 33, "id": "the-model", "related": [["flexible-work-schedule", "Flexible Work Schedule", "Flexible Work Schedule"], ["model", "Model", "Model"], ["flexible-work-schedules", "Flexible Work Schedules", "Flexible Work Schedules"], ["attachment-c", "ATTACHMENT C", "ATTACHMENT C"], ["financial-model", "Financial Model", "Financial Model"]], "related_snippets": [], "updated": "2025-07-07T12:37:55+00:00"}, "json": true, "cursor": ""}}