Emphasis added. The Court has found that the Brusers violated the CCD by not paying the Trustee Fee as determined by the state court. Under the CCD, therefore, BOH, as Lessor, is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.10 BOH may also be entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest. “The general rule is that ‘[i]n diversity actions, state law determines the rate of prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest is governed by 10 Given the 7/21/15 Order and the Stipulation, the instant decision addresses a claim brought only by BOH. To the extent that any other parties to this action believe that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, each must file a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Rule 54.3 of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”). federal law.’” Xxx x. Adalian, Civil No. 09-00226 JMS-BMK, 2015 WL 477268, at *7 n.7 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 5, 2015) (alteration in Jou) (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Computer Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Court, however, need not address these issues, or the specific amount of attorneys’ fees, until BOH files the appropriate motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Local Rule 54.3. Likewise, the Court need not address any taxable costs unless and until BOH files the appropriate motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Local Rule 54.2.
Emphasis added. The SME notes that the three aforementioned BSS documents contain helpful information, consistent with the Agreement, to increase BSS workers’ awareness of the shift from residential, and how to access the HCBS to support that redirection. The SME notes one error in the Pathway to Children’s Mental Health document, specific to CMCR in the sub header 3.2 Children’s Crisis and Referral Line and Mobile Mental Health Crisis:
Emphasis added. [89] It is evident that at the time payment was made to LCaribbean GOSL was fully seized of the assignment of the receivables payable from the Project and such these receivables could only have been categorized as a payable to KCL. [90] In First Vancouver Finance v. M.N.R the question for the court was whether a factor was entitled to recover monies paid to the Minister of National Revenue from receivables which were purchased prior to the Minister issuing a request for statutory garnishment, in connection with these receivables. The court ruled that monies owing on accounts factored prior to the date of the request for garnishment were not subject to the garnishment, however accounts factored after that date were effectively intercepted by it. In other words once the receivables were factored before the Minister issued a request to garnish, the National Revenue was prevented from asserting an interest in these invoices. Consequently, a declaration was made confirming the factor’s entitlement to the funds already paid to the Minister. [91] On this point I conclude that the funds paid to LCaribbean were indeed the property of KCL, which ought not to have been utilized as if it were the property of AMSL. Therefore GOSL is liable to pay to KCL the remaining sums under the Notices.
Emphasis added. (See, also, at para. 100 in Xxxxxx, and the Court of Appeal's re-affirmation of this proposition in X. x. Xxxxxxxxx (2006), 213 C.C.C. (3d) 80, at para. 15.) a fit disposition for the first of the offender's four offences. More difficult to operationalize is my parallel conclusion that, upon a balanced application of the controlling principles and in what I find to be the exceptional circumstances that prevail in this case, a sentence served under community supervision is the appropriate and just global disposition with respect to all four offences. The legal challenge, then, is to craft a sentence that secures this global result without torturing or evading the statutory or common law directives that govern the disposition of a case involving the repeated sale of what the Court of Appeal has characterized as "the most addictive, the most destructive and the most dangerous" drug. s. 718.2(c) of the Code) or disproportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender. (See, for example, R. v. C.A.M., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 42.) In practice, I would first decide the offender's appropriate global sentence and then determine the fit allocation for each of the four constituent offences, whether they should then run concurrently with or consecutive to an anchor disposition, and then tailor them to ensure that they aggregated to the sanctioned total penalty. This approach follows the Court of Appeal's instructions in X. x. Xxxxxx (1995), 100 C.C.C. (3d) 270, at 279. (Subsequent cases offer some refinements: X. x. Xxxxxxxxx (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 103 (C.A.); X. x. Xxxxxxxxxxx (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 465 (C.A.), at paras. 8, 32-33); X. x. Xxxxx, 2011 ONCA 748; and R. v. R.B. (2013), 114 O.R. (3d) 465 (C.A.), at para. 30.) 41 In the case at hand, however, a custodial sentence imposed for any of the last three offences, whether structured concurrently or consecutively, would necessarily entail a carceral rather than community-based disposition and thus defeats what I view as the appropriate resolution of this matter. To be clear (and for reasons I will soon develop), I do not find that a custodial disposition for any of the three latter offences is just and appropriate or legally required. I say this mindful of the Court of Appeal's caution in its brief endorsement in R. v. Bankay, 2010 ONCA 799 respecting "disguised" conditional sentences. result in the unusual circumstances of this case. It is also inconsistent with the clear message of a unanimous Supreme Cour...
Emphasis added. 95 Ibid., 15. An additional philosophical conundrum arises from Xxxxxxxx’x distinction between truth and effectiveness. Even as Xxxxxxxx himself is considered one of the twelve “most effective” preachers in the English-speaking world, he insists that he has no concern for listener response. He writes, “Next Sunday, if once again my congregation appears to be unmoved and unimpressed by my homiletical efforts, I intend to ascribe their lack of response to God! Our job as preachers is to stand up and speak the truth as God gives it to us; congregational response is God’s business.”96 Such a statement, even if hyperbolic, proceeds upon the a priori decision to separate truth from effectiveness. Might not an ineffective sermon point just as clearly to truth as falsehood? Compare Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxx preaching during the 1st Great Awakening with the “Word of Faith” prosperity preaching; both are effective by their own standards. Rather than drawing proclamation closer to theology (the Word of God preached is the Word of God), binary commitments unintentionally enforce the very same anthropology that Xxxxxxxx wishes to overcome. He writes, “We preachers are to worry more about what is being said and how well we can replicate that word than we are to worry about whether or not what is being said in the Gospel is being heard in the world.”97 Whatever the cause of our worry, is not such an effort a human effort? Would it not be more theological to bear witness to God’s Word in the biblical text and in the world, to preach God’s Word and trust God to communicate the truth to be found therein as well as any human response? Neither truth nor effectiveness ought to guide preaching because neither is within the confines of human agency.
Emphasis added. A. M. XXXXXXXXX, Autonomia privata procedimentale, La formazione del contratto xxx xxxxx e volontà delle parti, op. cit., p. 3,
Emphasis added. As compared to the former Article 133 EC (post Nice), Article 207 TFEU differs by specifically including ‘the commercial aspects of intellectual property’ among the subject-matters in respect of which ‘[t]he common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles’, whereas Article 133(5) EC, simply provided that Paragraphs 1 to 4 were also to apply ‘to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, in so far as those agreements [we] re not covered by the said paragraphs’, the first of which required that the common commercial policy was to be based on uniform principles. Article 113 EC therefore already covered, in that field and as a matter of principle, the external dimension of the commercial aspects of intellectual property. Article 207 TFEU simply includes them in a direct and comprehensive manner, beyond the mere external dimension. In line with this, Advocate General Xxxxxx considered, in point 63 of her Opinion in Case C-13/07 Commission v Council, that pursuant to Article 133(5) EC the Community had not acquired ‘exclusive competence … in the field of trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property’, but rather that ‘that step [was] completed only in the Treaty of Lisbon: Article 207(1) TFEU henceforward expressly places the “new” fields of commercial policy on the same footing as the conventional fields, and the common commercial policy as a whole is expressly assigned to the exclusive competence of the Union (Article 3(1)(e) TFEU)’. This does not mean, however, that Article 207 TFEU has conferred on the European Union exclusive competence for intellectual property law. 11 –See, inter xxxx, Xxxxxxxx, P, EU External Relations Law, cited above, p. 285; Xxxxxxxxxx, A., ‘The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing parallelism between internal and external economic relations?’, in Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, vol. 4 (2008), pp. 108 and 109; Xxxx, M., ‘Art. 207’, in: Xxxxxxx, C and Xxxxxxx, M., EUV/AEUV, 4th ed., X. X. Xxxx, Munich, 2011, marginal note 2 and 16. 12 – Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267.
Emphasis added. Except as expressly provided herein, the Shareholder Agreement shall continue in full force and effect.
Emphasis added. For the text of the Treaty, see X. X. Xxxxxxxxxx, Iran & Iraq: The Years of Crisis (London, 1984), pp. 244–9.
