Homogeneity. Article 105 1 In order to achieve the objective of the Contracting Parties to arrive at as uniform an interpretation as possible of the provisions of the Agreement and those provisions of Community legislation which are substantially reproduced in the Agreement, the EEA Joint Committee shall act in accordance with this Article.
Homogeneity. To measure the homogeneity of the opinion distribution with the network structure, we examined the local distribution of nodes' opinions. We looked at whether each node's opinion was similar to those of its neighbors, which would suggest that it was in line with the overall opinion distribution over the network. The final homogeneity value was close to zero if the distribution of opinions was close to linear. Experimental evaluation. We have developed a Python simulator that can compute the dynamic FJ (rewiring included), and polarization metrics over time based on the given network and initial opinions. To test the model, we ran simulations on a small network comprising 20 nodes and compared the outcomes of the FJ with rewiring to those without rewiring. For the ER network, we used a vector of uniformly distributed opinions over [ -1,1] as the initial opinions. However, for the SBM networks, we employed a different configuration, where the initial opinions were uniformly extracted over the intervals [-0.5,0-0.1] and [0.1,0.5], depending on whether the nodes belonged to one or the other block. In conclusion, this Micro-Project involves the design of a dynamic version of the FJ model for synchronous and asynchronous cases. Additionally, we have developed a new definition of polarization that considers both the distribution of opinions and the network topology. To assess the model's effecti veness, we conducted simulations on two different network types: an ER network and an SBM network. Our findings indicate that the rewiring process has significant effects on polarization, but these effects are dependent on the initial network.
Homogeneity. The blenders, reactors and drop tank will demonstrate proper mixing by loading two miscible liquid chemicals with a viscostiy not greater than 500 cps and blending them for 15 minutes. Samples taken from the top and bottom of the blender will indicate not less than 99% homogeneous. This only needs be demonstrated one time in each vessel to be considered complete.
Homogeneity. A question of bridging the gap? Being accustomed to the ever-increasing widening gap between the union 6 aquis and the Main Part of the EEA Agreement, it is easy to assume that the dif- ferences in wording between Art. 123 EEA and Arts. 346 and 347 TFEU are un- intended and that the homogeneity principle nevertheless calls for uniform in- terpretation. However, Art. 123 EEA does not seem to be based on the provi- sions of the EC Treaty now found in Arts. 346 and 347 TFEU, but rather on the provisions found in the Free Trade Agreements between the individual EFTA States and the EC.13 In addition to the differences in wording between the provisions themselves, 7 Art. 348 TFEU sets out an extraordinary procedure providing that (1) the Com- mission shall examine how measures taken under Arts. 346 or 347 TFEU can be adjusted to the rules laid down in the Treaties in the event they affect the condi- tions of competition in the internal market; and (2), derogating from Arts. 258 and 259 TFEU, that the Commission or any Member State may bring the matter directly for the Court of Justice, ruling in camera, if it considers that a Member State is making improper use of Arts. 346 or 347 TFEU. Neither the EEA Agreement nor the SCA facilitates for a similar procedure. Considering the wording of the provisions in the existing Free Trade Agree- 8 ments, and that the wording of Arts. 346 and 347 TFEU have remained nearly unchanged since the Treaty of Rome it is evident that the Contracting Parties intentionally chose a different wording and scope to Art. 123 EEA than that of (now) Art. 346 and 347 TFEU. Since these differences between Art 123 EEA and Art. 346 and 347 TFEU were by design, the interpretation of Art. 123 EEA and the question of homogeneity is not a question of bridging a widening gap – the gap was there from the beginning. It has still to be resolved whether Art. 123 EEA as result must be interpreted entirely separately from Arts. 346 and 347 TFEU, or whether, for example, at least the criteria for taking measures derogat-
Homogeneity. Article 105
Homogeneity. Please identify the text paragraphs that contain information about this feature) When delivering local shops, La Petite Reine assigns a delivery person (always the same) to the customer’s premises. Low
Homogeneity. 2.1. The coal fed daily to the CEMS and non-CEMS units will be deemed homogeneous with respect to SO2 potential only if the loader operator reclaims coal from consistent general locations within the respective storage piles. For clarity, this means that the operator must build each “ready pile" (one for bituminous and one for sub-bituminous) from coal extracted from one general area of the storage pile. Alternatively, ready piles may consist entirely of newly unloaded coal that has never been taken to long- term storage. Even in this instance, however, the entire ready pile must be composed of new coal, and would probably represent the most homogeneous case available. If it becomes necessary to mix freshly unloaded coal with previously stored coal in building a ready pile, the operator must use the loader bucket to homogenize the pile to the extent practicable.
Homogeneity. When ATL was introduced13 [6] each agent was attributed with an individual set of actions, or action indexes, in each state. They were clearly a (potentially) heteroge- neous bunch. Permitting heterogeneity does not rule out homogeneity, of course; it remains an interesting special case. Similar systems of concurrently acting agents have been discussed in many works. In the work which sexxxxxxx xntroduced social laws in reasoning about concurrent computer processes, the set of agents in the system onto which a normative system would be imposed or implemented, were described explicitly as homogeneous14 [75]: “We make an assumption of homogeneity; specifically, we assume that the sets of states and the available actions are common to all agents”. This form of homogeneity, as we can see, is certainly a constraint in a direction which seems like homogeneity, but two agents which have “the same actions” available might execute these actions differently. As there are no specifications/restrictions of the actions, what happens when one agent performs some action (say “push the blue button”) might be very different from what happens when another agent performs the same action. Perhaps in one case, the agent who pushes the button receives $10, and if the other pushes the button, it will unlock a door. Are these really the same action? Do these agents have the same actions available? If we identify actions extensionally rather than intentionally, we have another notion of “homogeneous agents”. If there is a blue button such that if some agent pushes it, she receives $10, then another agent, which has the same actions available, may also push the same button, yielding $10 to the first agent. The two agents in such a scenario certainly can be said to have the same actions available. In the work presented here (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), this extensional identification of actions will give rise to the homogeneity of main interest. We might also distinguish between these two definitions by calling the former “structural homogeneity” and the latter “strategic homogeneity”. The type, or notion, 13In this thesis we will rely on the Concurrent Game Structure (CGS) semantics introduced in [6], and not the Alternating Transition Systems (ATS) semantics used by the same authors in other articles. 14Presumably, what was intended by “homogeneity” in this quote is a technical simplification which is of little significance for the technical result, except making the exposition simpler. This ...
Homogeneity. Recall from Chapter 1 that a group of agents is homogeneous if the agents have the same strategic ability, i.e., the same ability to bring things about. The outcomes must be invariant under permutations of actions. In games there is as we mentioned a distinction between symmetric and anonymous games. The difference between the two was that in the former, we permuted the outcome, or utility, along with the actions, while in the latter we permuted only the actions. When we move from games with ascribed utilities as used in game theory to more qualitative models, as the CGS models of ATL, we lose the notion of utility. However, as utilities are based on, or part of, the state of affairs, we can still recognize when the utilities of two states are the same. That is, in every case, whenever the states of affairs are the same, the utilities must also be the same. Conversely, in some scenarios any change in the state of affair might constitute a difference of utility. What exactly the relationship between state of affairs and utilities may be is diffi- cult or impossible to give a general answer to.1 In this chapter we will not appeal to utility judgments, and without the mechanism of utility it is difficult or impossible to transfer verbatim the notion of symmetric games into qualitative strategic settings. The condition which defined anonymous games however, carry over since we do not need to “permute the utilities” (whatever they may be). The outcome must be invariant under permutation of action, leaving the description of the state of affairs unchanged. That is, in any state, for any two agents – say agents 1 and 2, for any pair of actions they might have chosen – say 1 chose α and 2 chose β , the state of affairs we end up 1In Chapter 6 we will investigate one possible approach this problem. 40 Representation in, is the same as if they had switched actions among themselves – i.e., if agent 1 chose β and 2 chose α. Two conditions become immediately clear:
