Multilateral Agreements. 1. Each Party affirms its commitment to the TRIPS Agreement and any other multilateral agreements concluded or administered under the auspices of WIPO to which both Parties are party.
Multilateral Agreements. If, after entry into force of this Agreement, both Parties become party to a multilateral agreement that addresses matters covered by this Agreement, they shall consult to determine whether this Agreement should be revised to take into account the multilateral agreement.
Multilateral Agreements. < Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (signed April 15, 1994) and the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations adopted by the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee on December 15, 1993
Multilateral Agreements. < OECD Agreement on Shipbuilding (December 21, 1994; interested parties evaluating implementing legislation) < Inter-American Mutual Recognition Agreement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment (October 29, 1999) Bilateral Agreements Bahrain < U.S. - Bahrain Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area (signed September 14, 2004) Belarus < Bilateral Investment Treaty (signed January 15, 1994; pending exchange of instruments) Dominican Republic/Central America < U.S. - Dominican Republic - Central America Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area (signed August 5, 2004) El Salvador < Bilateral Investment Treaty (signed March 10, 1999; pending exchange of instruments) Estonia < Trade and Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (April 19, 1994; requires approval by Estonian legislature) Laos < Bilateral Trade Agreement (initialed August 13, 1997) Lithuania < Trade and Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (April 26, 1994; requires approval by Lithuanian legislature) Morocco < U.S.- Morocco Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area (agreement signed on May 18, 2004; entry into force pending) Mozambique < Bilateral Investment Treaty (exchange of instruments took place February 2, 2005 and enters into force March 2, 2005) Nicaragua < Bilateral Investment Treaty (signed July 1, 1995; pending ratification by United States and exchange of instruments of ratification.)
Multilateral Agreements. It is important to note the differences that exist between bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Bilateral trade agreements have the advan- tage of reducing negotiating and enforcement costs by limiting the number of parties involved. Multilateral agreements can reduce costs on a greater scale. By creating a free trade zone which encompasses a number of states, each of the states reaps the benefits of a diversified pool of comparative advantages. Additionally, multilateral treaties make things a little easier on the United States because they create consistent obligations. This benefit can also be achieved through consistent bilateral agreements. So long as the United States’ obligations remain the same throughout, the United States does not worry about having to constantly make sure that its activities are in accordance with numerous standards. 1408 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 83:3 The preferred strategy may be to broker a number of bilateral treaties that are essentially identical. In this context the focus on protecting the rights to organize and bargain collectively becomes even more important because that provides for the contextual flexibility lacking in a system of identical agreements across different countries and regions. The reason this strategy may be preferred is because the negotiation costs are much lower when negotiating an agreement between two parties. Therefore, each agreement will cost less in negotiation. Many of the countries that struggle with problems with labor conditions would benefit significantly by being party to a free trade agreement with the United States, and that potential economic gain would create an incentive for these countries to agree to the terms of the standard agreement.
Multilateral Agreements ff, after the entry into force of this Agreement, both Contracting Parties become bound by a multilateral agreement that addresses matters covered by this Agreement, the provisions of such agreement shall prevail. Both Contracting Parties may hold consultations in accordance with Article 19 of the present Agreement with a view to determine the extent to which the present Agreement is affected by the provisions of such multilateral agreement and whether this Agreement should be revised to take account this multilateral agreement.
Multilateral Agreements. The non-zero-sum nature of sanctions in the international arena is a fundamental difference between international agreements and private contracts, and drives the main results of this paper. When a state violates a commitment it suffers a reputational loss for which there is no offsetting gain to its counter -party. The reputational sanction, however, is not a pure loss. Other states get a benefit in the form of improved information about the 115 None of this is to suggest that the theory advanc ed herein is the only, or even the dominant, determinant of the substantive content of an agreement. The more modest point is that the theory impacts on the substance of international agreements. reputation of the violating state. The more these informational benefits are internalized by the parties to the transaction the more attractive are credibility -enhancing devices. In many bilateral contexts it is reasonable to ignore these informational benefits because the bulk of them go to states that are not party to the agreement. The non - violating state gains on a small fraction of the informational benefits. In a multilateral agreement, however, more of the informational benefits are captured by parties to the agreement. This reduces the cost of a credibility -enhancing device in the event of a violation. In the extreme, a universal organization would capture all of the informational benefits that result from a violation. In that case it seems likely tha t the sanctions, rather than being negative -sum as they are in most bilateral cases, would be zero -sum or perhaps even positive-sum. The notion here is that the violation allows states to form a more accurate view of the violating state’s willingness to comply with commitments, which is valuable. Following a violation, then, states as a group have better information as they seek cooperative arrangements. Though the effect on the violating state is negative, it is reasonable to expect that better informat ion yields a net benefit to all states. 116 The ability to capture the informational benefits of a violation offers an explanation for why agreements with near -universal membership, such as the WTO, sometimes have a formal treaty structure and dispute resolu tion. More generally, the more the parties to an agreement are able to internalize the informational benefits that flow from a violation, the less costly are credibility -enhancing devices. Thus, an agreement whose parties have a great deal of dealings with...
