Verification Phase it is initiated by INT, who interacts with Signer and the verifiers to ensure that he holds a se- P cret S˙ and a corresponding authentication information, which will be later accepted by every (honest) verifier in during the revelation phase. The secret S˙ and the cor- responding authentication information, which INT holds at the end of this phase13 is called Xxxxxx’s IC signature P on S˙, denoted as ICSig(Signer, INT, , S˙). P
Verification Phase this phase is initiated by INT, where INT interacts with Signer and the verifiers to ensure that the secret S→ received from Signer will be later accepted by each (honest) verifier in during the revelation phase. During the interaction, Xxxxxx has the option of replac- ing the secret S→, as well as the authentication informa- tion and the verification information (by sending new values for them) . The secret S→, along with the authenti- cation information, which is finally possessed by INT at the end of this phase is called Signer’s IC signature on S→, denoted as ICSig(Signer, INT, , S→), given to INT by Signer. P P P P
Verification Phase single hashes of all common minutiae, H1(gt ), and every- s,i × | | At the verification stage, three different fingerprint images of the same finger are used. As in the enrollment phase, the minutiae points are extracted from these fingerprints. Similarly, at most Tdist-away minutiae are mapped to one minutia by selecting the one with the smallest y-coordinate value. After that, three fingerprint templates are put on top of each other and the most reliable minutiae are selected. In order to mask the genuine minutiae points at the user side, (10 Gu ) fake minutiae points are generated randomly. Fake minutiae point generation is an important process, since the fake points should not leak any information to the attacker. For this reason, a fake point must be indistinguishable from a genuine minutia point from an attacker’s point of view. Since we make sure that all of the genuine minutiae points are at least Tdist-away from each other, fake minutiae points must be Tdist-away from all the other points as well. Therefore, the fake minutiae points thing is rehashed to generate Ksu, which is the key to be used while communicating with the user. In order to make sure that the user will generate the same key, the server computes the HMAC of a predefined message msg using Ksu s | | and transmits this value together with the number of common found minutiae, Gt , to the user. Upon receiving the message, the user generates a key using one of the possible subsets of the genuine minutiae whose size is the same as the number of found minutiae on the server side. If the user can verify the HMAC using this generated key, (s)he sends a positive acknowledgment to the server. Otherwise, the user generates another key using another subset, until either the HMAC is verified or all possible subsets are exhausted. In the case that the HMAC is not verified, RETRY message is transmitted to the server. s If the protocol continues with the RETRY message, the must also preserve the T dist -neighborhood relation. server computes the similarity score using |Gt |−1 as the num- || || After the fake minutiae point generation process ends, each minutia point’s (genuine and fake) x-coordinate, y-coordinate and type are concatenated. Each value is double hashed as follows: H2(x y type). As the key will be generated using single hashed values of the genuine minutiae, the user keeps H1(x||y||type) only for the genuine minutiae. Note that in ber of common minutiae. If the score is above the accep...
Verification Phase. In the verification stage, three different iris scans of the same eye are provided by the user. Iriscodes are extracted and most reliable bits are selected, as in the enrollment stage, which yields a 9600 bit iriscode divided into 25 blocks. For hiding the genuine blocks, fake blocks are generated randomly at the user side. In order to distribute fake blocks uniformly, a fake block generation constant, X, is defined. Before and after each genuine block, a uniformly distributed random number is generated in the interval [0 .. X], say x. After that, x different random blocks are put in that place. As a result, uniformly distributed, approximately |Gu| × X fake blocks are inserted index, and we are searching for the ith genuine block, then new window would be [k + (i r) .. k + (i r) (X + 1)]. For instance, if the first block is definitely on the 5th index (r : 1, i : 2, k : 5), the second block can be between 6th and (X + 6)th indexes. In other words, we do not need to search for the second element until the (2X + 2)th element. − − × After finding the genuine blocks, a similarity score is calculated [6]. If the similarity score is above the predefined acceptance threshold, Tsim, the protocol continues with the key generation phase. Otherwise, the user is rejected and the protocol ends. In the key generation phase, the server concatenates all common found blocks sent by the user and hashes the final concatenation. The hash result is the key, Ksu, to be used in the communication. The server calculates an HMAC value on a predefined message using Ksu as the key. After that, the server sends the HMAC value and the number s | | of common blocks used in the key generation, Gt , to the user. s
Verification Phase. Once the pruning phase is complete, the location coordinates of candidate and influ- ence cells are retrieved from DBloc. After retrieving candidate and influence points, a verification check is applied on them to refine the candidate points and obtain the final query results. Candidate Verification A candidate point cnd cannot be in the RkNN set of the query q, if the range query centered at cnd with radius of Dist(cnd, q) contains greater than or equal to k points. When final results are determined, actual data points along with their complete information are retrieved from DBdtl through pointers stored in DBloc.
Verification Phase. The process of determining compliance of the evolving IS specification, design, or code with the security requirements and approach agreed on by the users, acquisition authority, and DAA. Vulnerability. Weakness in an IS, system security procedures, internal controls, implementation that could be exploited. Vulnerability Assessment. Systematic examination of an IS or product to determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies, provide data from which to predict the effectiveness of proposed security measures, and confirm the adequacy of such measures after implementation. Appendix C References Xxxxx Xxxxxx, UCCS, Implementing a Paillier Threshold Cryptography Scheme as a Web Service xxxx://xxx.xxxx.xxxx.xxx/ISSEC/COURSES/Ditscap.ppt xxxx://xxx.x-xxxxxx.xxx/ xxxx://xxxx.xxxx.xxx/ditscap/index.php/Image:DITSCAP.pdf xxxx://xxxx.xxxx.xxx/ditscap/index.php/Image:DITSCAP_Application_Manal.pdf xxxx://xxxx.xxxx.xxx/ditscap/index.php/Image:SSAA_Guidance.doc STIGS xxxx://xxxx.xxxx.xxx/stigs/stig/database-stig-v7r2.pdf xxxx://xxxx.xxxx.xxx/stigs/stig/network-stig-v6r4.pdf xxxx://xxxx.xxxx.xxx/stigs/stig/src-stig-v1r2.pdf xxxx://xxxx.xxxx.xxx/stigs/stig/applicationsecurityrequirements.pdf xxxx://xxx-000.xxx.xxx/jct03001c/services/learning/ites.wss/us/en?pageType=course_description&courseCode=TN170#3 xxxxx://xxxxxx.xxxxxx.xxxx.xxx/Navseacity/Summary_Att.aspx?iDataPrimeID=18924&iContentID=3040&bReadMore=true xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxx/whitepapers/Firewalls_Complete__Firewall_Maintenance.html Appendix D System Concept of Operations The application security requirements identified in this document are intended to be used as a first step to designing security into applications to reduce application vulnerabilities. Some of the common vulnerabilities found and its mitigation would be as follows : Inadequate identification and authentication This identification of the user is most often achieved through the use of a unique machine-readable name associated with the user. Insufficient access control Role-Based Access Control, Inclusion of authorization extensions in the user’s X.509 certificate, Incorrect interfaces between the application and any cryptographic mechanisms it relies upon. Encrypt the data and/or the network connection over which the data are transmitted, with only authorized parties having access to the keys required for decryption
Verification Phase. QUALIFIED PROVIDER will, within 30 days of project completion, verify installation against specifications. QUALIFIED PROVIDER will work with Designer and Subcontractor to correct any abnormalities.
Verification Phase. 5.1 Project Completion plus not to exceed 30 days EXHIBIT J INSURANCE COVERAGE QUALIFIED PROVIDER shall purchase, at its sole cost and expense, from and maintain in a company or companies lawfully authorized to do business in the jurisdiction in which the Project is located such insurance as will protect QUALIFIED PROVIDER from claims which may arise out of or result from QUALIFIED PROVIDER’s operations under the Agreement and for which QUALIFIED PROVIDER may be legally liable. The insurance required by this Exhibit J shall be written for not less than the limits of liability specified below or required by law, whichever is greater. QUALIFIED PROVIDER’s coverage, whether written on an occurrence or claims-made basis, shall be maintained without interruption from the date of commencement of the Work until the date of final payment and termination of any coverage required to be maintained after final payment. Subcontractor required term of coverage is outlined below. DISTRICT, CESA, and any party so designated by the DISTRICT shall be named as additional insured’s on all general liability policies. QUALIFIED PROVIDER shall purchase and maintain the following insurance:
Verification Phase. (1) GWN first checks the validity of the time-stamp |T1j − T1| < ∆T. GWN computes k = h(h(IDi||xa)||T1) and decrypts Dk(Ai) = {IDi, R1, T1}. GWN then compares IDi and T1 with the received values. If this condition is satisfied, GWN acknowledges the legitimacy of the Ui and proceeds with the next step. Otherwise, it terminates this phase.
Verification Phase. This phase executes several steps to achieve mutual authentication which is to test all transmitted message for judging the legitimacies of a Ui, GWN, and sensor node. As well as a session key agreement between all parties involved within the network. When GWN receives the login request message from the Ui, the verification phase begins. The following describes this process in detail.
