Common use of CAISO’s Right to Dispatch Clause in Contracts

CAISO’s Right to Dispatch. (a) Subject to the limitations set forth in this Agreement, CAISO shall direct dispatch of a Unit by delivering a Dispatch Notice to Owner’s Scheduling Coordinator in accordance with the CAISO Tariff. (b) Dispatch Notices for Energy, other than Energy associated with Ancillary Services, shall be issued solely for purposes of meeting local reliability needs or managing congestion on non-competitive paths. For purposes of dispatching Energy, local reliability needs do not include Energy required to manage congestion on competitive paths. CAISO shall issue Dispatch Notices to meet local reliability needs or manage congestion on non- competitive paths, whenever market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion or such market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion without taking a bid out of merit order or requiring CAISO to decrement another supplier’s schedule to accommodate the unit which provided the bid. CAISO may not issue a Dispatch Notice to fill a need for imbalance energy. (c) Except as needed for black start or voltage support required to meet local reliability needs, to meet operating criteria associated with the Potrero power plant, or as outlined below, CAISO may issue Dispatch Notices for Ancillary Services only if the available bids in Ancillary Service capacity markets do not provide sufficient capacity to meet CAISO’s requirements. (i) If the CAISO determines on a Trading Day that it needs additional Ancillary Service on that Trading Day, CAISO shall use the following procedures: (A) CAISO shall communicate such needs to all Scheduling Coordinators as quickly as possible after such needs are identified. (B) After completing (A), CAISO shall attempt to procure those additional Ancillary Services from the CAISO’s Real-Time market (in the appropriate region if CAISO is procuring Ancillary Services on a regional basis) that have not closed, subject to the Bid Sufficiency Test described below. (C) CAISO shall not issue a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services for any hour of the Trading Day before the earlier of (a) the time at which the real-time market for that hour closes or (b) if a Start-up would be required to provide the Ancillary Service, such earlier time as is necessary to comply with the applicable Start-up Lead Time and Ramping Constraints on Schedule A. (ii) CAISO shall not be required to accept any bid for an Ancillary Service above applicable bid caps then in effect under the CAISO Tariff before issuing a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services. (iii) Bid Sufficiency Test (A) The Bid Sufficiency Test may only be applied: (1) To purchases from the real-time market; (2) If CAISO has fully complied with its obligation to promptly notify Scheduling Coordinators of its need to acquire additional ancillary services from the real-time market; and (3) To the extent that the approved CAISO Tariff does not preclude such a test. (B) The Bid Sufficiency Test shall be applied on an individual hourly basis and for an individual Ancillary Service type. The test result shall be considered "insufficient" in real-time market if, and only if - (1) bids in the real-time market for the particular Ancillary Service (including any bids that can be used to satisfy that particular Ancillary Services requirement under Section 8.2.3.5 of the CAISO Tariff) represent less than two times such remaining Ancillary Service requirement; or (2) there are fewer than two unaffiliated bidders to provide such remaining Ancillary Service requirement. If the application of the Bid Sufficiency Test results in a determination of “insufficiency”, the CAISO may issue a Dispatch Notice to satisfy its needs for that hour and that individual Ancillary Service. (C) If the result of the Bid Sufficiency Test is a finding that available bids are “insufficient”, CAISO may nonetheless accept available market bids if it determines in its sole discretion that the prices bid and the supply curve created by the bids indicate that the bidders were not attempting to exercise market power.

CAISO’s Right to Dispatch. (a) Subject to the limitations set forth in this Agreement, CAISO shall direct dispatch of a Unit by delivering a Dispatch Notice to Owner’s Scheduling Coordinator in accordance with the CAISO Tariff. (b) Dispatch Notices for Energy, other than Energy associated with Ancillary Services, shall be issued solely for purposes of meeting local reliability needs or managing congestion on non-competitive paths. For purposes of dispatching Energy, local reliability needs do not include Energy required to manage congestion on competitive paths. CAISO shall issue Dispatch Notices to meet local reliability needs or manage congestion on non- non-competitive paths, whenever market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion or such market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion without taking a bid out of merit order or requiring CAISO to decrement another supplier’s schedule to accommodate the unit which provided the bid. CAISO may not issue a Dispatch Notice to fill a need for imbalance energy. (c) Except as needed for black start or voltage support required to meet local reliability needs, to meet operating criteria associated with the Potrero power plant, or as outlined below, CAISO may issue Dispatch Notices for Ancillary Services only if the available bids in Ancillary Service capacity markets do not provide sufficient capacity to meet CAISO’s requirements. (i) If the CAISO determines on a Trading Day that it needs additional Ancillary Service on that Trading Day, CAISO shall use the following procedures: (A) CAISO shall communicate such needs to all Scheduling Coordinators as quickly as possible after such needs are identified. (B) After completing (A), CAISO shall attempt to procure those additional Ancillary Services from the CAISO’s Real-Time market (in the appropriate region if CAISO is procuring Ancillary Services on a regional basis) that have not closed, subject to the Bid Sufficiency Test described below. (C) CAISO shall not issue a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services for any hour of the Trading Day before the earlier of (a) the time at which the real-time market for that hour closes or (b) if a Start-Start- up would be required to provide the Ancillary Service, such earlier time as is necessary to comply with the applicable Start-Start- up Lead Time and Ramping Constraints constraints on Schedule A. (ii) CAISO shall not be required to accept any bid for an Ancillary Service above applicable bid caps then in effect under the CAISO Tariff before issuing a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services. (iii) Bid Sufficiency Test (A) The Bid Sufficiency Test may only be applied: (1) To purchases from the real-time market; (2) If CAISO has fully complied with its obligation to promptly notify Scheduling Coordinators of its need to acquire additional ancillary services from the real-time market; and (3) To the extent that the approved CAISO Tariff does not preclude such a test. (B) The Bid Sufficiency Test shall be applied on an individual hourly basis and for an individual Ancillary Service type. The test result shall be considered "insufficient" in real-time market if, and only if - (1) bids in the real-time market for the particular Ancillary Service (including any bids that can be used to satisfy that particular Ancillary Services requirement under Section 8.2.3.5 of the CAISO Tariff) represent less than two times such remaining Ancillary Service requirement; or (2) there are fewer than two unaffiliated bidders to provide such remaining Ancillary Service requirement. If the application of the Bid Sufficiency Test results in a determination of “insufficiency”, the CAISO may issue a Dispatch Notice to satisfy its needs for that hour and that individual Ancillary Service. (C) If the result of the Bid Sufficiency Test is a finding that available bids are “insufficient”, CAISO may nonetheless accept available market bids if it determines in its sole discretion that the prices bid and the supply curve created by the bids indicate that the bidders were not attempting to exercise market power.

CAISO’s Right to Dispatch. (a) Subject to the limitations set forth in this Agreement, CAISO shall direct dispatch of a Unit by delivering a Dispatch Notice to Owner’s Scheduling Coordinator in accordance with the CAISO Tariff. (b) Dispatch Notices for Energy, other than Energy associated with Ancillary Services, shall be issued solely for purposes of meeting local reliability needs or managing congestion on non-competitive paths. For purposes of dispatching Energy, local reliability needs do not include Energy required to manage congestion on competitive paths. CAISO shall issue Dispatch Notices to meet local reliability needs or manage congestion on non- non-competitive paths, whenever market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion or such market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion without taking a bid out of merit order or requiring CAISO to decrement another supplier’s schedule to accommodate the unit which provided the bid. CAISO may not issue a Dispatch Notice to fill a need for imbalance energy. (c) Except as needed for black start or voltage support required to meet local reliability needs, to meet operating criteria associated with the Potrero power plant, or as outlined below, CAISO may issue Dispatch Notices for Ancillary Services only if the available bids in Ancillary Service capacity markets do not provide sufficient capacity to meet CAISO’s requirements. (i) If the CAISO determines on a Trading Day that it needs additional Ancillary Service on that Trading Day, CAISO shall use the following procedures: (A) CAISO shall communicate such needs to all Scheduling Coordinators as quickly as possible after such needs are identified. (B) After completing (A), CAISO shall attempt to procure those additional Ancillary Services from the CAISO’s Real-Time market (in the appropriate region if CAISO is procuring Ancillary Services on a regional basis) that have not closed, subject to the Bid Sufficiency Test described below. (C) CAISO shall not issue a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services for any hour of the Trading Day before the earlier of (a) the time at which the real-time market for that hour closes or (b) if a Start-Start- up would be required to provide the Ancillary Service, such earlier time as is necessary to comply with the applicable Start-Start- up Lead Time and Ramping Constraints on Schedule A. (ii) CAISO shall not be required to accept any bid for an Ancillary Service above applicable bid caps then in effect under the CAISO Tariff before issuing a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services. (iii) Bid Sufficiency Test (A) The Bid Sufficiency Test may only be applied: (1) To purchases from the real-time market; (2) If CAISO has fully complied with its obligation to promptly notify Scheduling Coordinators of its need to acquire additional ancillary services from the real-time market; and (3) To the extent that the approved CAISO Tariff does not preclude such a test. (B) The Bid Sufficiency Test shall be applied on an individual hourly basis and for an individual Ancillary Service type. The test result shall be considered "insufficient" in real-time market if, and only if - (1) bids in the real-time market for the particular Ancillary Service (including any bids that can be used to satisfy that particular Ancillary Services requirement under Section 8.2.3.5 of the CAISO Tariff) represent less than two times such remaining Ancillary Service requirement; or (2) there are fewer than two unaffiliated bidders to provide such remaining Ancillary Service requirement. If the application of the Bid Sufficiency Test results in a determination of “insufficiency”, the CAISO may issue a Dispatch Notice to satisfy its needs for that hour and that individual Ancillary Service. (C) If the result of the Bid Sufficiency Test is a finding that available bids are “insufficient”, CAISO may nonetheless accept available market bids if it determines in its sole discretion that the prices bid and the supply curve created by the bids indicate that the bidders were not attempting to exercise market power.

CAISO’s Right to Dispatch. (a) Subject to the limitations set forth in this Agreement, CAISO shall direct dispatch of a Unit by delivering a Dispatch Notice to Owner’s Scheduling Coordinator in accordance with the CAISO Tariff. (b) Dispatch Notices for Energy, other than Energy associated with Ancillary Services, shall be issued solely for purposes of meeting local reliability needs or managing congestion on non-competitive paths. For purposes of dispatching Energy, local reliability needs do not include Energy required to manage congestion on competitive paths. CAISO shall issue Dispatch Notices to meet local reliability needs or manage congestion on non- competitive paths, whenever market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion or such market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion without taking a bid out of merit order or requiring CAISO to decrement another supplier’s schedule to accommodate the unit which provided the bid. CAISO may not issue a Dispatch Notice to fill a need for imbalance energy. (c) Except as needed for black start or voltage support required to meet local reliability needs, to meet operating criteria associated with the Potrero power plant, or as outlined below, CAISO may issue Dispatch Notices for Ancillary Services only if the available bids in Ancillary Service capacity markets do not provide sufficient capacity to meet CAISO’s requirements. (i) If the CAISO determines on a Trading Day that it needs additional Ancillary Service on that Trading Day, CAISO shall use the following procedures: (A) CAISO shall communicate such needs to all Scheduling Coordinators as quickly as possible after such needs are identified. (B) After completing (A), CAISO shall attempt to procure those additional Ancillary Services from the CAISO’s Real-Time market (in the appropriate region if CAISO is procuring Ancillary Services on a regional basis) that have not closed, subject to the Bid Sufficiency Test described below. (C) CAISO shall not issue a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services for any hour of the Trading Day before the earlier of (a) the time at which the real-time market for that hour closes or (b) if a Start-up would be required to provide the Ancillary Service, such earlier time as is necessary to comply with the applicable Start-up Lead Time and Ramping Constraints on Schedule A. (ii) CAISO shall not be required to accept any bid for an Ancillary Service above applicable bid caps then in effect under the CAISO Tariff before issuing a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services. (iii) Bid Sufficiency Test (A) The Bid Sufficiency Test may only be applied: (1) To purchases from the real-time market; (2) If CAISO has fully complied with its obligation to promptly notify Scheduling Coordinators of its need to acquire additional ancillary services from the real-time market; and (3) To the extent that the approved CAISO Tariff does not preclude such a test. (B) The Bid Sufficiency Test shall be applied on an individual hourly basis and for an individual Ancillary Service type. The test result shall be considered "insufficient" in real-time market if, and only if - (1) bids in the real-time market for the particular Ancillary Service (including any bids that can be used to satisfy that particular Ancillary Services requirement under Section 8.2.3.5 of the CAISO Tariff) represent less than two times such remaining Ancillary Service requirement; or (2) there are fewer than two unaffiliated bidders to provide such remaining Ancillary Service requirement. If the application of the Bid Sufficiency Test results in a determination of “insufficiency”, the CAISO may issue a Dispatch Notice to satisfy its needs for that hour and that individual Ancillary Service. (C) If the result of the Bid Sufficiency Test is a finding that available bids are “insufficient”, CAISO may nonetheless accept available market bids if it determines in its sole discretion that the prices bid and the supply curve created by the bids indicate that the bidders were not attempting to exercise market power.