Common use of Damages for shortfall Clause in Contracts

Damages for shortfall. 21.5.1 Upon COD, in the event the excavated and Delivered Coal in any Accounting Year (“Actual Production”) is less than the Annual Capacity for such Accounting Year, other than where such shortfall arises directly on account of (i) Force Majeure; or (ii) a default of the Authority; or (iii) non-Delivery of Coal pursuant to Clause 16.13, the Mine Operator shall be liable to pay the following amounts as Damages for the shortfall in Actual Production of Coal, as indicated below. It is clarified that in respect of the Accounting Year during which the COD or the Transfer Date occurs, the shortfall will be determined with respect to the Actual Production during the number of months in such Accounting Year subsequent to the COD or prior to the Transfer Date (as applicable) and the Annual Capacity for such Accounting Year shall be pro rated for the number of months in such Accounting Year. 100% to 90% Nil 90% to 80% 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between the Actual Production and 90% of the Annual Production Programme. 80% to 70% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); and (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between Actual Production and 80% of the Annual Production Programme. 70% to 50% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 80% and 70% of the Annual Production Programme); and (c) 30% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between Actual Production and 70% of the Annual Production Programme. In addition, the Agreement will be reviewed by a review committee duly constituted by the Authority which may consider termination of the Agreement if the shortfall in Actual Production is for reasons attributable to the Mine Operator. Less than 50% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 80% and 70% of the Annual Production Programme); and (c) 30% of Mining Charge multiplied by 20% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 70% and 50% of the Annual Production Programme). In addition, occurrence of such shortfall in Actual Production shall be deemed to be a Mine Operator Default for the purposes of Clause 37.1.1 and the Authority shall be entitled to appropriate 50% (fifty percent) of the Performance Security and the Mine Operator shall replenish the Performance Security to its original level before such appropriation in accordance with Clause 9.2. In addition to and without prejudice to the foregoing, the Authority shall be entitled to terminate this Agreement in accordance with Article 37 for Mine Operator Default.

Damages for shortfall. ‌ 21.5.1 Upon COD, in the event the excavated and Delivered Coal in any Accounting Year (“Actual Production”) is less than the Annual Capacity for such Accounting Year, other than where such shortfall arises directly on account of (i) Force Majeure; or (ii) a default of the Authority; or (iii) non-Delivery of Coal pursuant to Clause 16.13, the Mine Operator shall be liable to pay the following amounts as Damages for the shortfall in Actual Production of Coal, as indicated below. It is clarified that in respect of the Accounting Year during which the COD or the Transfer Date occurs, the shortfall will be determined with respect to the Actual Production during the number of months in such Accounting Year subsequent to the COD or prior to the Transfer Date (as applicable) and the Annual Capacity for such Accounting Year shall be pro pro-rated for the number of months in such Accounting Year. 100% to 90% Nil 90% to 80% 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between the Actual Production and 90% of the Annual Production Programme. 80% to 70% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); and (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between Actual Production and 80% of the Annual Production Programme. 70% to 50% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 80% and 70% of the Annual Production Programme); and (c) 30% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between Actual Production and 70% of the Annual Production Programme. In addition, the Agreement will be reviewed by a review committee duly constituted by the Authority which may consider termination of the Agreement if the shortfall in Actual Production is for reasons attributable to the Mine OperatorAuthority. Less than 50% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 80% and 70% of the Annual Production Programme); and (c) 30% of Mining Charge multiplied by 20% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 70% and 50% of the Annual Production Programme); and (d) 40% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between Actual Production and 50% of the Annual Production Programme. In addition, occurrence of such shortfall in Actual Production shall the Agreement will be deemed to be reviewed by a Mine Operator Default for the purposes of Clause 37.1.1 and review committee duly constituted by the Authority shall be entitled to take appropriate 50% (fifty percent) of the Performance Security and the Mine Operator shall replenish the Performance Security to its original level before such appropriation in accordance with Clause 9.2. In addition to and without prejudice to the foregoing, the Authority shall be entitled to terminate this Agreement in accordance with Article 37 for Mine Operator Defaultdecision.

Damages for shortfall. ‌ 21.5.1 Upon COD, in the event the excavated and Delivered Coal in any Accounting Year (“Actual Production”) is less than the Annual Capacity for such Accounting Year, other than where such shortfall arises directly on account of (i) Force Majeure; or (ii) a default of the Authority; or (iii) non-Delivery of Coal pursuant to Clause 16.13, the Mine Operator shall be liable to pay the following amounts as Damages for the shortfall in Actual Production of Coal, as indicated below. It is clarified that in respect of the Accounting Year during which the COD or the Transfer Date occurs, the shortfall will be determined with respect to the Actual Production during the number of months in such Accounting Year subsequent to the COD or prior to the Transfer Date (as applicable) and the Annual Capacity for such Accounting Year shall be pro rated for the number of months in such Accounting Year. 100% to 90% Nil 90% to 80% 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between the Actual Production and 90% of the Annual Production Programme. 80% to 70% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); and (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between Actual Production and 80% of the Annual Production Programme. 70% to 50% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 80% and 70% of the Annual Production Programme); and (c) 30% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between Actual Production and 70% of the Annual Production Programme. In addition, the Agreement will be reviewed by a review committee duly constituted by the Authority which may consider termination of the Agreement if the shortfall in Actual Production is for reasons attributable to the Mine Operator. Less than 50% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 80% and 70% of the Annual Production Programme); and (c) 30% of Mining Charge multiplied by 20% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 70% and 50% of the Annual Production Programme). In addition, occurrence of such shortfall in Actual Production shall be deemed to be a Mine Operator Default for the purposes of Clause 37.1.1 and the Authority shall be entitled to appropriate 50% (fifty percent) of the Performance Security and the Mine Operator shall replenish the Performance Security to its original level before such appropriation in accordance with Clause 9.2. In addition to and without prejudice to the foregoing, the Authority shall be entitled to terminate this Agreement in accordance with Article 37 for Mine Operator Default.

Damages for shortfall. 21.5.1 Upon COD, in 20.4.1. In the event of the excavated and Delivered Coal in any Accounting Year (“Actual Production”) monthly MIC production is less than the Annual corresponding Actual Quarter Capacity for such Accounting Year, other than where such shortfall arises directly on account of (ia) Force Majeure; or (iib) a default of the AuthorityHCL; or (iii) non-Delivery of Coal pursuant to Clause 16.13, the Mine Operator MDO shall be liable to pay the following amounts as Damages for the shortfall in Actual Quarterly Production of CoalMIC, as indicated below. 20.4.2. It is clarified that in respect of the Quarter during which the COD or prior to the Transfer Date (as applicable), the shortfall will be determined with respect to the Actual Quarterly Production during the number of days in such Quarter subsequent to the COD or prior to the Transfer Date (as applicable) and the Quarterly Capacity for such Quarter shall be pro-rated for the number of days in such Accounting Quarter. 20.4.3. It is clarified that in respect of the Accounting Year during which the COD or the Transfer Date occurs, the shortfall will be determined with respect to the Actual Production during the number of months in such Accounting Year subsequent to the COD or prior to the Transfer Date (as applicable) and the Annual Capacity for such Accounting Year shall be pro pro-rated for the number of months in such Accounting Year. 100100 % to 9090 % Nil 9090 % to 8080 % 5% of the Performance Security 80 % to 70 % 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between the Actual Production and 90% of the Annual Production Programme. 80% to Performance Security 70% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); and (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between Actual Production and 80% of the Annual Production Programme. 70% to 50% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 80% and 70% of the Annual Production Programme); and (c) 30% of Mining Charge multiplied by the difference between Actual Production and 70% of the Annual Production Programme. below In addition, in the Agreement will be reviewed by a review committee duly constituted by event the Authority which may consider termination of the Agreement if the shortfall in Actual Quarterly Production is for reasons attributable to the Mine Operator. Less than 50% (a) 10% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 90% and 80% of the Annual Production Programme); (b) 20% of Mining Charge multiplied by 10% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 80% and 70% of the Annual Production Programme); and (c) 30% of Mining Charge multiplied by 20% of the Annual Production Programme (being the difference between 70% and 50% of the Annual Production Programme). In additionbelow 75%, occurrence of such shortfall in Actual Quarterly Production shall be deemed to be a Mine Operator MDO Default for the purposes of Clause 37.1.1 33.1 and the Authority HCL shall be entitled to appropriate 50% (fifty percent) of the Performance Security and the Mine Operator MDO shall replenish the Performance Security to its original level before such appropriation in accordance with Clause 9.2. In addition to and without prejudice The Agreement will be reviewed by HCL which may consider termination of the Agreement if the shortfall in Actual Quarterly Production is for reasons attributable to the foregoingMDO. HCL shall reconcile measurement of work done at the end of each completed year, and excess amount of penalty on account of non-achieving quarterly target earlier, deducted earlier from the Authority bills of the successful bidder on quarterly basis during the completed period of the same accounting year, shall be entitled refunded to terminate this Agreement in accordance with Article 37 for Mine Operator Defaultthe successful bidder on achievement of 100% of the annual target.