In AT&. T SOUTHEAST REGION 9-STATE, if OE-LEC does not choose Access Tandem interconnection at every AT&T SOUTHEAST REGION 9-STATE Access Tandem within a LATA, OE-LEC must utilize AT&T SOUTHEAST REGION 9-STATE’s MTA Interconnection. To utilize MTA, OE-LEC must establish an interconnection trunk group(s) at a minimum of one AT&T SOUTHEAST REGION 9-STATE Access Tandem within each LATA as required.
In AT&. The action of all the team members at = (at , at , . . . , at ) ∈ R+ jointly n determines the final output Y t according to a production function f : R+ → R+. The production function f is increasing, differentiable and concave in the team members’ actions at.4 At the same time, each team member’s action produces a noisy signal li which is publicly observable but cannot be verified by a third party. 1This is not uncommon in partnerships where every member is crucial. However, in multi- agent models it may not be the case. 2If an agent decides to participate in the production in period t, then positive effort is expected from this agent and we assume there exist technology to tell whether an agent xxxxxx completely (0 contribution). 3Here we would treat the generation of the sharing rule as an external procedure which will not be considered in the game. It can possibly suggested by one agent or several agents jointly, or it can be an outcome of group negotiation. 4Here we implicitly assume that the production function is stationary through out the time period. Assume the signals following the same conditional density function g(li|ai) among all team members, with c.d.f G(li|ai). The outside option for each individual is denoted by π¯i. At each period t, each team member observes the output Y t but cannot observe others’ actions. The production function, the sharing rule and each member’s cost functions are common knowledge. Each team member i’s pay-off under a sharing rule St is given by: i i πt = st(Y t) − ci(at) (3.1) The total surplus of the team is given by: i Πt = Y t − Σ ci(at) (3.2) In each period, the greatest surplus the team will be able to achieve is: Π∗ = xxx X x − Σi ci(at), we denote this surplus as the first best surplus and the action
