In Re L and another. Xxxxxxxx Xxxx also pointed out that justice might require the revisiting of a decision, for no more reason than the judge having a carefully considered change of mind.
In Re L and another. Xxxxxxxx Xxxx also pointed out that justice might require the revisiting of a decision, for no more reason than the judge having a carefully considered change of mind.‖ [337] This application has been made on the basis that the legal principles applicable to the lifting of the corporate veil are relevant to the issues in this case and ought to have been brought to the attention of the court. [338] The wayleave agreement which I have found to be binding between Xx. Xxxxxxx and the defendant was entered into on April 4, 1996. The sum of Jamaican five million dollars (J$5,000,000.00) was paid to him as compensation for the defendant‟s use of an area which was 2700 feet long and 100 feet wide. That sum, according to the pleadings, was given to the first claimant. [339] The first claimant was incorporated on September 11, 1996, which was approximately five (5) months after the agreement was concluded. The New Milns land on which the transmission line was built was acquired by the first claimant on November 4, 1996. The consideration is stated to be Jamaican one million two hundred and ninety thousand dollars (J$1,290,000.00). [340] Where a contract is concluded prior to its incorporation a company cannot be made liable as ratification is not possible where the principal was not in existence at the time. (See Xxxxxx v Xxxxxx (1866) L.R. 2 C.P. 174). The contract will be valid only between the parties who made it. Where the company after formation entered into a new contract the position may be different. (See Xxxxxx v Patent Ivory Manufacturing Co. (1888) 38 Ch. D 156.) [341] In this case, the first claimant in my view could only be bound by the wayleave agreement if its conscience was affected by the undertaking of a new obligation to give effect to the defendant‟s licence, it entered into a new agreement with the defendant or if the corporate veil could be lifted on the basis that it is being used by Xx. Xxxxxxx to avoid ―an existing legal obligation or liability‖.53 I have already found that the first claimant did not undertake any new obligation and as such its conscience was not bound. I also found that the first claimant is a separate legal entity and was therefore not bound by the agreement between the claimant and Xx. Xxxxxxx. That issue was not addressed and in my view ought properly to be ventilated. Should the court exercise its discretion to lift the corporate veil? [342] In this matter it has been asserted by the defendant that Xx. Xxxxxxx interpose...
