Common use of ISO’s Right to Dispatch Clause in Contracts

ISO’s Right to Dispatch. (a) Subject to the limitations set forth in this Agreement, ISO shall direct dispatch of a Unit by delivering a Dispatch Notice to Owner’s Scheduling Coordinator in accordance with the ISO Tariff. (b) Dispatch Notices for Energy, other than Energy associated with Ancillary Services, shall be issued solely for purposes of meeting local reliability needs or managing intra-zonal congestion. For purposes of dispatching Energy, local reliability needs do not include Energy required to manage inter-zonal congestion. ISO shall issue Dispatch Notices to meet local reliability needs or manage intra- zonal congestion whenever market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion or such market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion without taking a bid out of merit order or requiring ISO to decrement another supplier’s schedule to accommodate the unit which provided the bid. ISO may not issue a Dispatch Notice to fill a need for imbalance energy. (c) Except as needed for black start or voltage support required to meet local reliability needs, to meet operating criteria associated with Potrero and Hunters Point power plants, or as outlined below, ISO may issue Dispatch Notices for Ancillary Services only if the available bids in Ancillary Service capacity markets do not provide sufficient capacity to meet ISO’s requirements. (i) The ISO may elect to procure from the day-ahead market less than the amount of an Ancillary Service that it knows to be needed as of the close of that market and instead procure the balance from the hour-ahead markets. Before doing so, the ISO must communicate to all Scheduling Coordinators its intention to procure a portion of its needs from the hour- ahead market. Such communication shall state the projected hourly megawatt amounts of each Ancillary Service it has shifted from day-ahead to hour-ahead procurement. Amounts shifted under this provision are not subject to the Bid Sufficiency Test described below. (ii) If, after the close of the day-ahead market for a Trading Day, but before ISO issues final hour-ahead schedules for the first hour of the Trading Day, ISO determines it needs additional Ancillary Services for the Trading Day, ISO shall use unused, available day-ahead market bids for Ancillary Services for the Trading Day in merit order (and in the appropriate zone, if ISO is procuring Ancillary Services on a zonal basis) to fill its Ancillary Services needs before issuing a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services. (iii) If unused day-ahead Ancillary Services bids are not sufficient to meet the ISO’s Ancillary Service needs for the Trading Day, or if ISO determines on the Trading Day that it needs additional Ancillary Services on the Trading Day, ISO shall use the following procedures: (A) ISO shall communicate such needs to all Scheduling Coordinators as quickly as possible after such needs are identified. (B) After completing (A), ISO shall attempt to procure those additional Ancillary Services from the hour-ahead Ancillary Services markets (in the appropriate zone if ISO is procuring Ancillary Services on a zonal basis) that have not closed, subject to the Bid Sufficiency Test described below. (C) ISO shall not issue a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services for any hour of the Trading Day before the earlier of (a) the time at which the hour-ahead market for that hour closes or (b) if a Start- up would be required to provide the Ancillary Service, such earlier time as is necessary to comply with the applicable Start-up Lead Time and Ramping Constraints on Schedule A. (iv) ISO shall not be required to accept any bid for an Ancillary Service above applicable bid caps then in effect under the ISO Tariff before issuing a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services. (v) Bid Sufficiency Test (A) The Bid Sufficiency Test may only be applied: (1) To purchases from the hour-ahead Ancillary Services market; (2) If ISO has fully complied with its obligation to promptly notify Scheduling Coordinators of its need to acquire additional ancillary services from the hour-ahead market; and (3) To the extent that the approved ISO Tariff does not preclude such a test. (B) The Bid Sufficiency Test may not be applied to Ancillary Service requirements that have been shifted from the day-ahead market to the hour-ahead market at the discretion of the ISO. (C) The Bid Sufficiency Test shall be applied on an individual hourly basis and for an individual Ancillary Service type. The test result shall be considered "insufficient" in an hour-ahead market if, and only if - (1) bids in the hour-ahead market for the particular Ancillary Service (including any unused bids that can be used to satisfy that particular Ancillary Services requirement under Section

ISO’s Right to Dispatch. (a) Subject to the limitations set forth in this Agreement, ISO shall direct dispatch of a Unit by delivering a Dispatch Notice to Owner’s Scheduling Coordinator in accordance with the ISO Tariff. (b) Dispatch Notices for Energy, other than Energy associated with Ancillary Services, shall be issued solely for purposes of meeting local reliability needs or managing intra-zonal congestion. For purposes of dispatching Energy, local reliability needs do not include Energy required to manage inter-zonal congestion. ISO shall issue Dispatch Notices to meet local reliability needs or manage intra- intra-zonal congestion whenever market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion or such market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion without taking a bid out of merit order or requiring ISO to decrement another supplier’s schedule to accommodate the unit which provided the bid. ISO may not issue a Dispatch Notice to fill a need for imbalance energy. (c) Except as needed for black start or voltage support required to meet local reliability needs, to meet operating criteria associated with Potrero and Hunters Point power plants, or as outlined below, ISO may issue Dispatch Notices for Ancillary Services only if the available bids in Ancillary Service capacity markets do not provide sufficient capacity to meet ISO’s requirements. (i) The ISO may elect to procure from the day-ahead market less than the amount of an Ancillary Service that it knows to be needed as of the close of that market and instead procure the balance from the hour-ahead markets. Before doing so, the ISO must communicate to all Scheduling Coordinators its intention to procure a portion of its needs from the hour- hour-ahead market. Such communication shall state the projected hourly megawatt amounts of each Ancillary Service it has shifted from day-ahead to hour-ahead procurement. Amounts shifted under this provision are not subject to the Bid Sufficiency Test described below. (ii) If, after the close of the day-ahead market for a Trading Day, but before ISO issues final hour-ahead schedules for the first hour of the Trading Day, ISO determines it needs additional Ancillary Services for the Trading Day, ISO shall use unused, available day-ahead market bids for Ancillary Services for the Trading Day in merit order (and in the appropriate zone, if ISO is procuring Ancillary Services on a zonal basis) to fill its Ancillary Services needs before issuing a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services. (iii) If unused day-ahead Ancillary Services bids are not sufficient to meet the ISO’s Ancillary Service needs for the Trading Day, or if ISO determines on the Trading Day that it needs additional Ancillary Services on the Trading Day, ISO shall use the following procedures: (A) ISO shall communicate such needs to all Scheduling Coordinators as quickly as possible after such needs are identified. (B) After completing (A), ISO shall attempt to procure those additional Ancillary Services from the hour-ahead Ancillary Services markets (in the appropriate zone if ISO is procuring Ancillary Services on a zonal basis) that have not closed, subject to the Bid Sufficiency Test described below. (C) ISO shall not issue a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services for any hour of the Trading Day before the earlier of (a) the time at which the hour-ahead market for that hour closes or (b) if a Start- Start-up would be required to provide the Ancillary Service, such earlier time as is necessary to comply with the applicable Start-up Lead Time and Ramping Constraints on Schedule A. (iv) ISO shall not be required to accept any bid for an Ancillary Service above applicable bid caps then in effect under the ISO Tariff before issuing a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services. (v) Bid Sufficiency Test (A) The Bid Sufficiency Test may only be applied: (1) To purchases from the hour-ahead Ancillary Services market; (2) If ISO has fully complied with its obligation to promptly notify Scheduling Coordinators of its need to acquire additional ancillary services from the hour-ahead market; and (3) To the extent that the approved ISO Tariff does not preclude such a test. (B) The Bid Sufficiency Test may not be applied to Ancillary Service requirements that have been shifted from the day-ahead market to the hour-ahead market at the discretion of the ISO. (C) The Bid Sufficiency Test shall be applied on an individual hourly basis and for an individual Ancillary Service type. The test result shall be considered "insufficient" in an hour-ahead market if, and only if - (1) bids in the hour-ahead market for the particular Ancillary Service (including any unused bids that can be used to satisfy that particular Ancillary Services requirement under SectionSection 2.5.3.6 of the ISO Tariff) that remain after first procuring the megawatts of the Ancillary Service that the ISO had notified Scheduling Coordinators it would procure in the hour-ahead market pursuant to Section 4.1(c)(i) ("remaining Ancillary Service requirement") represent, in the aggregate, less than two times such remaining Ancillary Service requirement; or (2) there are fewer than two unaffiliated bidders to provide such remaining Ancillary Service requirement. If the application of the Bid Sufficiency Test results in a determination of "insufficiency", the ISO may issue a Dispatch Notice to satisfy its needs for that hour and that individual Ancillary Service. (D) If the result of the Bid Sufficiency Test is a finding that available bids are "insufficient", ISO may nonetheless accept available market bids if it determines in its sole discretion that the prices bid and the supply curve created by the bids indicate that the bidders were not attempting to exercise market power.

ISO’s Right to Dispatch. (a) Subject to the limitations set forth in this Agreement, ISO shall direct dispatch of a Unit by delivering a Dispatch Notice to Owner’s Scheduling Coordinator in accordance with the ISO Tariff. (b) Dispatch Notices for Energy, other than Energy associated with Ancillary Services, shall be issued solely for purposes of meeting local reliability needs or managing intra-zonal congestion. For purposes of dispatching Energy, local reliability needs do not include Energy required to manage inter-zonal congestion. ISO shall issue Dispatch Notices to meet local reliability needs or manage intra- intra-zonal congestion whenever market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion or such market bids cannot be used to meet those needs or manage such congestion without taking a bid out of merit order or requiring ISO to decrement another supplier’s schedule to accommodate the unit which provided the bid. ISO may not issue a Dispatch Notice to fill a need for imbalance energy. (c) Except as needed for black start or voltage support required to meet local reliability needs, to meet operating criteria associated with Potrero and Hunters Point power plants, or as outlined below, ISO may issue Dispatch Notices for Ancillary Services only if the available bids in Ancillary Service capacity markets do not provide sufficient capacity to meet ISO’s requirements. (i) The ISO may elect to procure from the day-ahead market less than the amount of an Ancillary Service that it knows to be needed as of the close of that market and instead procure the balance from the hour-ahead markets. Before doing so, the ISO must communicate to all Scheduling Coordinators its intention to procure a portion of its needs from the hour- hour-ahead market. Such communication shall state the projected hourly megawatt amounts of each Ancillary Service it has shifted from day-ahead to hour-ahead procurement. Amounts shifted under this provision are not subject to the Bid Sufficiency Test described below. (ii) If, after the close of the day-ahead market for a Trading Day, but before ISO issues final hour-ahead schedules for the first hour of the Trading Day, ISO determines it needs additional Ancillary Services for the Trading Day, ISO shall use unused, available day-ahead market bids for Ancillary Services for the Trading Day in merit order (and in the appropriate zone, if ISO is procuring Ancillary Services on a zonal basis) to fill its Ancillary Services needs before issuing a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services. (iii) If unused day-ahead Ancillary Services bids are not sufficient to meet the ISO’s Ancillary Service needs for the Trading Day, or if ISO determines on the Trading Day that it needs additional Ancillary Services on the Trading Day, ISO shall use the following procedures: (A) ISO shall communicate such needs to all Scheduling Coordinators as quickly as possible after such needs are identified. (B) After completing (A), ISO shall attempt to procure those additional Ancillary Services from the hour-ahead Ancillary Services markets (in the appropriate zone if ISO is procuring Ancillary Services on a zonal basis) that have not closed, subject to the Bid Sufficiency Test described below. (C) ISO shall not issue a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services for any hour of the Trading Day before the earlier of (a) the time at which the hour-ahead market for that hour closes or (b) if a Start- Start-up would be required to provide the Ancillary Service, such earlier time as is necessary to comply with the applicable Start-up Lead Time and Ramping Constraints on Schedule A. (iv) ISO shall not be required to accept any bid for an Ancillary Service above applicable bid caps then in effect under the ISO Tariff before issuing a Dispatch Notice for Ancillary Services. (v) Bid Sufficiency Test (A) The Bid Sufficiency Test may only be applied: (1) To purchases from the hour-ahead Ancillary Services market; (2) If ISO has fully complied with its obligation to promptly notify Scheduling Coordinators of its need to acquire additional ancillary services from the hour-ahead market; and (3) To the extent that the approved ISO Tariff does not preclude such a test. (B) The Bid Sufficiency Test may not be applied to Ancillary Service requirements that have been shifted from the day-ahead market to the hour-ahead market at the discretion of the ISO. (C) The Bid Sufficiency Test shall be applied on an individual hourly basis and for an individual Ancillary Service type. The test result shall be considered "insufficient" in an hour-ahead market if, and only if - (1) bids in the hour-ahead market for the particular Ancillary Service (including any unused bids that can be used to satisfy that particular Ancillary Services requirement under SectionSection 2.5.3.6 of the ISO Tariff) that remain after first procuring the megawatts of the Ancillary Service that the ISO had notified Scheduling Coordinators it would procure in the hour-ahead market pursuant to Section 4.1(c)(i) (“remaining Ancillary Service requirement”) represent, in the aggregate, less than two times such remaining Ancillary Service requirement; or (2) there are fewer than two unaffiliated bidders to provide such remaining Ancillary Service requirement. If the application of the Bid Sufficiency Test results in a determination of “insufficiency”, the ISO may issue a Dispatch Notice to satisfy its needs for that hour and that individual Ancillary Service. (D) If the result of the Bid Sufficiency Test is a finding that available bids are “insufficient”, ISO may nonetheless accept available market bids if it determines in its sole discretion that the prices bid and the supply curve created by the bids indicate that the bidders were not attempting to exercise market power.