Common use of Other Grounds Clause in Contracts

Other Grounds. Any motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly dis- covered evidence must be filed within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty. (As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Mar. 9, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 24, 1998, eff. Dec. 1, 1998; Apr. 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002; Apr. 25, 2005, eff. Dec. 1, 2005; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1944 This rule enlarges the time limit for motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, from 60 days to two years; and for motions for new trial on other grounds from three to five days. Otherwise, it substantially continues existing practice. See Rule II of the Criminal Appeals Rules of 1933, 292 U.S. 661. Cf. Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1966 AMENDMENT The amendments to the first two sentences make it clear that a judge has no power to order a new trial on his own motion, that he can act only in response to a motion timely made by a defendant. Problems of dou- ble jeopardy arise when the court acts on its own mo- tion. See United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 (1947). These amendments do not, of course, change the power which the court has in certain circumstances, prior to verdict or finding of guilty, to declare a mistrial and order a new trial on its own motion. See e.g., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); Do num v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). The amendment to the last sentence changes the time in which the motion may be made to 7 days. See the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 29. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1987 AMENDMENT The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—1998 AMENDMENT As currently written, the time for filing a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence runs from the ‘‘final judgment.’’ The courts, in inter- preting that language, have uniformly concluded that that language refers to the action of the Court of Ap- peals. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 49 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1995)(citing cases). It is less clear whether that ac- tion is the appellate court’s judgment or the issuance of its mandate. In Reyes, the court concluded that it was the latter event. In either case, it is clear that the present approach of using the appellate court’s final judgment as the triggering event can cause great dis- parity in the amount of time available to a defendant to file timely a motion for new trial. This would be es- pecially true if, as noted by the Court in Reyes, supra at 67, an appellate court stayed its mandate pending re- view by the Supreme Court. See also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410–412 (1993) (noting divergent treatment by States of time for filing motions for new trial). It is the intent of the Committee to remove that ele- ment of inconsistency by using the trial court’s verdict or finding of guilty as the triggering event. The change also furthers internal consistency within the rule it- self; the time for filing a motion for new trial on any other ground currently runs from that same event. Finally, the time to file a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is increased to three years to compensate for what would have otherwise re- sulted in less time than that currently contemplated in the rule for filing such motions. Changes Made to Rule 33 After Publication (‘‘GAP Re- port’’). The Advisory Committee changed the proposed amendment to require that any motions for new trials based upon newly discovered evidence must be filed within three years, instead of two years, from the date of the verdict. The Committee also incorporated changes offered by the Style Subcommittee. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2002 AMENDMENT The language of Rule 33 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2005 AMENDMENT or the finding of guilty verdict, or within some other time set by the court in an order issued during that same seven-day period. Similar provisions exist in Rules 29 and 34. Courts have held that the seven-day rule is jurisdictional. Thus, if a defendant files a re- quest for an extension of time to file a motion for a new trial within the seven-day period, the court must rule on that motion or request within the same seven- day period. If for some reason the court does not rule on the request within the seven days, it loses jurisdic- tion to act on the underlying substantive motion. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 473–474 (1947) (re- jecting argument that trial court had power to grant new trial on its own motion after expiration of time in Rule 33); United States v. Marquez, 291 F.3d 23, 27–28 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing language of Rule 33, and holding that ‘‘district court forfeited the power to act when it failed to . . . fix a new time for a filing a motion for new trial [sic] within seven days of the verdict’’). glect. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2009 AMENDMENT Former Rules 29, 33, and 34 adopted 7-day periods for their respective motions. This period has been ex- panded to 14 days. Experience has proved that in many cases it is not possible to prepare a satisfactory motion in 7 days, even under the former rule that excluded in- termediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. This led to frequent requests for continuances, and the filing of bare bones motions that required later supple- mentation. The 14-day period—including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays as provided by Rule 45(a)—sets a more realistic time for the filing of these motions.

Other Grounds. Any motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly dis- covered evidence must be filed within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty. (As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Mar. 9, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 24, 1998, eff. Dec. 1, 1998; Apr. 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002; Apr. 25, 2005, eff. Dec. 1, 2005; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1944 This rule enlarges the time limit for motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, from 60 days to two years; and for motions for new trial on other grounds from three to five days. Otherwise, it substantially continues existing practice. See Rule II of the Criminal Appeals Rules of 1933, 292 U.S. 661. Cf. Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1966 AMENDMENT The amendments to the first two sentences make it clear that a judge has no power to order a new trial on his own motion, that he can act only in response to a motion timely made by a defendant. Problems of dou- ble jeopardy arise when the court acts on its own mo- tion. See United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 (1947). These amendments do not, of course, change the power which the court has in certain circumstances, prior to verdict or finding of guilty, to declare a mistrial and order a new trial on its own motion. See e.g., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); Do num v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). The amendment to the last sentence changes the time in which the motion may be made to 7 days. See the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 29. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1987 AMENDMENT The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—1998 AMENDMENT As currently written, the time for filing a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence runs from the ‘‘final judgment.’’ The courts, in inter- preting that language, have uniformly concluded that that language refers to the action of the Court of Ap- peals. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 49 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1995)(citing cases). It is less clear whether that ac- tion is the appellate court’s judgment or the issuance of its mandate. In Reyes, the court concluded that it was the latter event. In either case, it is clear that the present approach of using the appellate court’s final judgment as the triggering event can cause great dis- parity in the amount of time available to a defendant to file timely a motion for new trial. This would be es- pecially true if, as noted by the Court in Reyes, supra at 67, an appellate court stayed its mandate pending re- view by the Supreme Court. See also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410–412 (1993) (noting divergent treatment by States of time for filing motions for new trial). It is the intent of the Committee to remove that ele- ment of inconsistency by using the trial court’s verdict or finding of guilty as the triggering event. The change also furthers internal consistency within the rule it- self; the time for filing a motion for new trial on any other ground currently runs from that same event. Finally, the time to file a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is increased to three years to compensate for what would have otherwise re- sulted in less time than that currently contemplated in the rule for filing such motions. Changes Made to Rule 33 After Publication (‘‘GAP Re- port’’). The Advisory Committee changed the proposed amendment to require that any motions for new trials based upon newly discovered evidence must be filed within three years, instead of two years, from the date of the verdict. The Committee also incorporated changes offered by the Style Subcommittee. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2002 AMENDMENT The language of Rule 33 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2005 AMENDMENT Rule 33(b)(2) has been amended to remove the require- ment that the court must act within seven days after a verdict or finding of guilty if it sets another time for filing a motion for a new trial. This amendment par- allels similar changes to Rules 29 and 34. Further, a conforming amendment has been made to Rule 45(b)(2). Currently, Rule 33(b)(2) requires the defendant to move for a new trial within seven days after the verdict or the finding of guilty verdict, or within some other time set by the court in an order issued during that same seven-day period. Similar provisions exist in Rules 29 and 34. Courts have held that the seven-day rule is jurisdictional. Thus, if a defendant files a re- quest for an extension of time to file a motion for a new trial within the seven-day period, the court must rule on that motion or request within the same seven- day period. If for some reason the court does not rule on the request within the seven days, it loses jurisdic- tion to act on the underlying substantive motion. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 473–474 (1947) (re- jecting argument that trial court had power to grant new trial on its own motion after expiration of time in Rule 33); United States v. Marquez, 291 F.3d 23, 27–28 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing language of Rule 33, and holding that ‘‘district court forfeited the power to act when it failed to . . . fix a new time for a filing a motion for new trial [sic] within seven days of the verdict’’). glect. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2009 AMENDMENT Former Rules 29Page 135 TITLE 18, 33, and 34 adopted 7-day periods for their respective motions. This period has been ex- APPENDIX—RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 35 panded to 14 days. Experience has proved that in many cases it is not possible to prepare a satisfactory motion in 7 days, even under the former rule that excluded in- termediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. This led to frequent requests for continuances, and the filing of bare bones motions that required later supple- mentation. The 14-day period—including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays as provided by Rule 45(a)—sets a more realistic time for the filing of these motions.

Other Grounds. Any motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly dis- covered evidence must be filed within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty. (As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Mar. 9, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 24, 1998, eff. Dec. 1, 1998; Apr. 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002; Apr. 25, 2005, eff. Dec. 1, 2005; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.) NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1944 This rule enlarges the time limit for motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, from 60 days to two years; and for motions for new trial on other grounds from three to five days. Otherwise, it substantially continues existing practice. See Rule II of the Criminal Appeals Rules of 1933, 292 U.S. 661. Cf. Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1966 AMENDMENT The amendments to the first two sentences make it clear that a judge has no power to order a new trial on his own motion, that he can act only in response to a motion timely made by a defendant. Problems of dou- ble jeopardy arise when the court acts on its own mo- tion. See United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 (1947). These amendments do not, of course, change the power which the court has in certain circumstances, prior to verdict or finding of guilty, to declare a mistrial and order a new trial on its own motion. See e.g., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); Do num v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). The amendment to the last sentence changes the time in which the motion may be made to 7 days. See the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 29. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1987 AMENDMENT The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—1998 AMENDMENT As currently written, the time for filing a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence runs from the ‘‘final judgment.’’ The courts, in inter- preting that language, have uniformly concluded that that language refers to the action of the Court of Ap- peals. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 49 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1995)(citing cases). It is less clear whether that ac- tion is the appellate court’s judgment or the issuance of its mandate. In Reyes, the court concluded that it was the latter event. In either case, it is clear that the present approach of using the appellate court’s final judgment as the triggering event can cause great dis- parity in the amount of time available to a defendant to file timely a motion for new trial. This would be es- pecially true if, as noted by the Court in Reyes, supra at 67, an appellate court stayed its mandate pending re- view by the Supreme Court. See also Herrera v. Collins, Page 135 TITLE 18, APPENDIX—RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 34 506 U.S. 390, 410–412 (1993) (noting divergent treatment by States of time for filing motions for new trial). It is the intent of the Committee to remove that ele- ment of inconsistency by using the trial court’s verdict or finding of guilty as the triggering event. The change also furthers internal consistency within the rule it- self; the time for filing a motion for new trial on any other ground currently runs from that same event. Finally, the time to file a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is increased to three years to compensate for what would have otherwise re- sulted in less time than that currently contemplated in the rule for filing such motions. Changes Made to Rule 33 After Publication (‘‘GAP Re- port’’). The Advisory Committee changed the proposed amendment to require that any motions for new trials based upon newly discovered evidence must be filed within three years, instead of two years, from the date of the verdict. The Committee also incorporated changes offered by the Style Subcommittee. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2002 AMENDMENT The language of Rule 33 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2005 AMENDMENT Rule 33(b)(2) has been amended to remove the require- ment that the court must act within seven days after a verdict or finding of guilty if it sets another time for filing a motion for a new trial. This amendment par- allels similar changes to Rules 29 and 34. Further, a conforming amendment has been made to Rule 45(b)(2). Currently, Rule 33(b)(2) requires the defendant to move for a new trial within seven days after the verdict or the finding of guilty verdict, or within some other time set by the court in an order issued during that same seven-day period. Similar provisions exist in Rules 29 and 34. Courts have held that the seven-day rule is jurisdictional. Thus, if a defendant files a re- quest for an extension of time to file a motion for a new trial within the seven-day period, the court must rule on that motion or request within the same seven- day period. If for some reason the court does not rule on the request within the seven days, it loses jurisdic- tion to act on the underlying substantive motion. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 473–474 (1947) (re- jecting argument that trial court had power to grant new trial on its own motion after expiration of time in Rule 33); United States v. Marquez, 291 F.3d 23, 27–28 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing language of Rule 33, and holding that ‘‘district court forfeited the power to act when it failed to . . . fix a new time for a filing a motion for new trial [sic] within seven days of the verdict’’). derlying motion if the court determines that the fail- ure to file it on time was the result of excusable ne- glect. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2009 AMENDMENT Former Rules 29, 33, and 34 adopted 7-day periods for their respective motions. This period has been ex- panded to 14 days. Experience has proved that in many cases it is not possible to prepare a satisfactory motion in 7 days, even under the former rule that excluded in- termediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. This led to frequent requests for continuances, and the filing of bare bones motions that required later supple- mentation. The 14-day period—including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays as provided by Rule 45(a)—sets a more realistic time for the filing of these motions.