PROPRIETY OF COLLATERAL ATTACK. Having determined that Xxxxx’x attack on the Commission’s decision in this case is a collateral attack, our third task is to determine whether Xxxxx’x collateral attack can succeed. This requires us to answer two questions. First, did the Commission have the authority to revoke the tax exemption certificates retroactively? As outlined above, we conclude that it did not. Second, did the Commission have subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke the tax exemption certificates? Clearly it did. Xxxxx contends not that the Commission lacked the general authority to revoke the exemption certificates, but that the Commission acted outside its statutory authority in making its order retroactive. As we have outlined, we agree with that contention. But we still must consider whether an action outside an agency’s authority is subject to collateral attack at any time, even after the expiration of the relevant direct appeal period, or whether it may only be attacked by way of a direct appeal. We start with the proposition that a wrong decision is not void; it is merely voidable.40 And only void decisions are subject to collateral attack.41 Again, as we have outlined, we conclude that the Commission’s and the trial court’s retroactivity decisions were wrong. But this conclusion does not directly address the contention that the Commission’s decision was void (and subject to collateral attack at any time), rather than merely voidable (and therefore subject to attack only by direct appeal). In Lake Township v Xxxxxx, the plaintiffs sought to declare drain proceedings “fraudulent and void.”42 The drain in that case did not fall within the statutory definition of a drain, but was instead a sewer.43 The defendants contended that “plaintiffs not having attacked the regularity of the proceedings here involved by certiorari, are estopped from questioning their regularity in this proceeding.”44 The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed on the grounds that the drain commissioner lacked legal authority to construct a sewer and therefore his actions exceeded his 39 MCL 205.735(1); Parkview Mem Ass’n v City of Livonia, 183 Mich App 116, 118-120; 454 NW2d 169 (1990). 40 Xxxxxx x Xxxxxx, 253 Mich 334, 337; 253 NW 174 (1931). 41 Id.; Jackson City Bank & Trust Co v Xxxxxxxx, 271 Mich 538, 544; 260 NW 908 (1935). 42 Lake Twp v Xxxxxx, 257 Mich 135, 137; 241 NW 237 (1932). 43 Id. at 139. 44 Id. at 141. authority under the statute.45 It therefore determined that the drain commissioner’s collateral- estoppel arguments had no merit because [t]he rule is that errors and irregularities in drain proceedings must be taken advantage of by certiorari, but an entire want of jurisdiction may be taken advantage of at any time. The drain commission had no jurisdiction to construct a sewer any more than to construct a Covert road. The proceedings are void for want of jurisdiction.[46] This case is somewhat similar to the proceedings in Xxxxxx. As stated above, the Commission did not have statutory authority to issue a retroactive decision and its actions did not fall within its statutory authority. This conclusion, however, still does not end our inquiry. A collateral attack “is permissible only if the court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons or the subject matter.”47 In a somewhat analogous situation, the Supreme Court in Xxxxx v Arder held that “while an error in the exercise of a court’s jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack, want of jurisdiction renders a judgment void.”48 Thus, collateral attack is proper only against those decisions that are void because of a lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction. A tribunal’s subject-matter jurisdiction depends on the kind of the case before it, not on the particular facts of the case: Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over a class of cases, not the particular case before it; to exercise the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending. The question of jurisdiction does not depend on the truth or falsity of the charge, but upon its nature: it is determinable on the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry. Jurisdiction always depends on the allegations and never upon the facts.[49] 45 Id. at 141-142. 46 Id. at 142. 47 Xxxxxxx v Xxxxxxxx, 334 Mich 355, 358; 54 NW2d 684 (1952); see also Xxxxxx v Xxxxxx, 197 Mich App 467, 472-473; 495 NW2d 826 (1992). 48 Xxxxx v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 56; 490 NW2d 568 (1992) (emphasis added); see also Jackson City Bank, 271 Mich at 545 (“Want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction has once attached, mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings, however grave, although they may render the judgment erroneous and subject to be set aside in a proper proceeding for that purpose, will not render the judgment void, and until set aside it is valid and binding for all purposes and cannot be collaterally attacked.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 49 Xxxxxx, 197 Mich App at 472 (citations omitted). Once a tribunal has subject-matter jurisdiction, it has jurisdiction to make an incorrect decision.50 There is a difference between a court’s having no jurisdiction to take an action and having no legal right to take the action.51 At the commencement of the action, the Commission had the abstract power to determine whether to revoke XxxXxxxxx’x exemption certificates. There is no question that the Commission has the power generally to determine whether to revoke exemption certificates. However, the Commission then erred in its exercise of that jurisdiction: it determined that it had the legal right to revoke the exemption certificates retroactively when it actually had no right to do so. This, however, did not render the Commission’s decision void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the Commission had subject-matter jurisdiction over this type of case, its decision is not subject to collateral attack. We conclude that the Commission’s decision—incorrect, improper, and outside its statutory authority to issue—was subject to direct attack on appeal, but was not properly the subject of a collateral attack because the Commission had subject-matter jurisdiction. Since Xxxxx’x appeal is a collateral attack, it cannot succeed.
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PROPRIETY OF COLLATERAL ATTACK. Having determined that Xxxxx’x attack on the Commission’s decision in this case is a collateral attack, our third task is to determine whether Xxxxx’x collateral attack can succeed. This requires us to answer two questions. First, did the Commission have the authority to revoke the tax exemption certificates retroactively? As outlined above, we conclude that it did not. Second, did the Commission have subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke the tax exemption certificates? Clearly it did. Xxxxx contends not that the Commission lacked the general authority to revoke the exemption certificates, but that the Commission acted outside its statutory authority in making its order retroactive. As we have outlined, we agree with that contention. But we still must consider whether an action outside an agency’s authority is subject to collateral attack at any time, even after the expiration of the relevant direct appeal period, or whether it may only be attacked by way of a direct appeal. We start with the proposition that a wrong decision is not void; it is merely voidable.40 And only void decisions are subject to collateral attack.41 Again, as we have outlined, we conclude that the Commission’s and the trial court’s retroactivity decisions were wrong. But this conclusion does not directly address the contention that the Commission’s decision was void (and subject to collateral attack at any time), rather than merely voidable (and therefore subject to attack only by direct appeal). In Lake Township v Xxxxxx, the plaintiffs sought to declare drain proceedings “fraudulent and void.”42 The drain in that case did not fall within the statutory definition of a drain, but was instead a sewer.43 The defendants contended that “plaintiffs not having attacked the regularity of the proceedings here involved by certiorari, are estopped from questioning their regularity in this proceeding.”44 The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed on the grounds that the drain commissioner lacked legal authority to construct a sewer and therefore his actions exceeded his 39 MCL 205.735(1); Parkview Mem Ass’n v City of Livonia, 183 Mich App 116, 118-120; 454 NW2d 169 (1990). 40 Xxxxxx x Xxxxxx, 253 Mich 334, 337; 253 NW 174 (1931). 41 Id.; Jackson Xxxxxxx City Bank & Trust Co v Xxxxxxxx, 271 Mich 538, 544; 260 NW 908 (1935). 42 Lake Twp v Xxxxxx, 257 Mich 135, 137; 241 NW 237 (1932). 43 Id. at 139. 44 Id. at 141. authority under the statute.45 It therefore determined that the drain commissioner’s collateral- estoppel arguments had no merit because [t]he rule is that errors and irregularities in drain proceedings must be taken advantage of by certiorari, but an entire want of jurisdiction may be taken advantage of at any time. The drain commission had no jurisdiction to construct a sewer any more than to construct a Covert road. The proceedings are void for want of jurisdiction.[46] This case is somewhat similar to the proceedings in Xxxxxx. As stated above, the Commission did not have statutory authority to issue a retroactive decision and its actions did not fall within its statutory authority. This conclusion, however, still does not end our inquiry. A collateral attack “is permissible only if the court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons or the subject matter.”47 In a somewhat analogous situation, the Supreme Court in Xxxxx v Arder held that “while an error in the exercise of a court’s jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack, want of jurisdiction renders a judgment void.”48 Thus, collateral attack is proper only against those decisions that are void because of a lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction. A tribunal’s subject-matter jurisdiction depends on the kind of the case before it, not on the particular facts of the case: Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over a class of cases, not the particular case before it; to exercise the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending. The question of jurisdiction does not depend on the truth or falsity of the charge, but upon its nature: it is determinable on the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry. Jurisdiction always depends on the allegations and never upon the facts.[49] 45 Id. at 141-142. 46 Id. at 142. 47 Xxxxxxx v Xxxxxxxx, 334 Mich 355, 358; 54 NW2d 684 (1952); see also Xxxxxx v Xxxxxx, 197 Mich App 467, 472-473; 495 NW2d 826 (1992). 48 Xxxxx v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 56; 490 NW2d 568 (1992) (emphasis added); see also Jackson Xxxxxxx City Bank, 271 Mich at 545 (“Want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction has once attached, mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings, however grave, although they may render the judgment erroneous and subject to be set aside in a proper proceeding for that purpose, will not render the judgment void, and until set aside it is valid and binding for all purposes and cannot be collaterally attacked.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 49 Xxxxxx, 197 Mich App at 472 (citations omitted). Once a tribunal has subject-matter jurisdiction, it has jurisdiction to make an incorrect decision.50 There is a difference between a court’s having no jurisdiction to take an action and having no legal right to take the action.51 At the commencement of the action, the Commission had the abstract power to determine whether to revoke XxxXxxxxx’x exemption certificates. There is no question that the Commission has the power generally to determine whether to revoke exemption certificates. However, the Commission then erred in its exercise of that jurisdiction: it determined that it had the legal right to revoke the exemption certificates retroactively when it actually had no right to do so. This, however, did not render the Commission’s decision void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the Commission had subject-matter jurisdiction over this type of case, its decision is not subject to collateral attack. We conclude that the Commission’s decision—incorrect, improper, and outside its statutory authority to issue—was subject to direct attack on appeal, but was not properly the subject of a collateral attack because the Commission had subject-matter jurisdiction. Since Xxxxx’x appeal is a collateral attack, it cannot succeed.
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PROPRIETY OF COLLATERAL ATTACK. Having determined that Xxxxx’x attack on the Commission’s decision in this case is a collateral attack, our third task is to determine whether Xxxxx’x collateral attack can succeed. This requires us to answer two questions. First, did the Commission have the authority to revoke the tax exemption certificates retroactively? As outlined above, we conclude that it did not. Second, did the Commission have subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke the tax exemption certificates? Clearly it didis a proper collateral attack. Xxxxx contends not that the Commission lacked the general authority to revoke the exemption certificates, but that the Commission acted outside its statutory authority in making its order retroactive. As we have outlinedoutlined above, we agree with that contention. But we still must consider whether an action outside an agency’s authority is void and subject to collateral attack at any time, even after subsequent to the expiration of the relevant direct appeal period, or whether it may only be attacked by way of a direct appeal. We start with the proposition that a wrong decision is not void; it is merely voidable.40 And only void decisions are subject to collateral attack.41 Again, Again as we have outlinedoutlined above, we conclude that the Commission’s and the trial court’s retroactivity decisions were wrong. And we have concluded that the Commission’s attempt to apply its order retroactively to a date prior to its actual signing was a nullity. But this conclusion does these conclusions do not directly address the contention that the Commission’s decision was void (and subject to collateral attack at any time)void, rather than merely voidable voidable. We conclude that the Commission’s decision was void as a matter of law because the Commission lacked statutory jurisdiction to render its decision. An order that a tribunal enters without jurisdiction is void.42 37 MCL 207.565. 38 See MCL 207.570; MCL 24.304(1). 39 MCL 205.735(1); Parkview Mem Ass’n v City of Livonia, 183 Mich App 116, 118-120; 454 NW2d 169 (and therefore subject to attack only by direct appeal1990). 40 Xxxxxx, 253 Mich at 337. 41 Xxxxxx x Xxxxx, 253 Mich 334, 337; 253 NW2d 174 (1931); Xxxxxxx City Bank & Trust Co v 42 In re Hague, 412 Mich 532, 544; 315 NW2d 524 (1982). In Lake Township v Xxxxxx, 257 Mich 135, 137; 241 NW 237 (1932), the plaintiffs sought to declare drain proceedings “fraudulent and void.”42 ” The drain in that case did not fall within the statutory definition of a drain, but was instead a sewer.43 The defendants contended that “plaintiffs not having attacked the regularity of the proceedings here involved by certioraricertiorari [ ], are estopped from questioning their regularity in this proceeding.”44 The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed on the grounds that the drain commissioner lacked legal authority to construct a sewer sewer, and therefore his actions exceeded his 39 MCL 205.735(1); Parkview Mem Ass’n v City of Livonia, 183 Mich App 116, 118-120; 454 NW2d 169 (1990). 40 Xxxxxx x Xxxxxx, 253 Mich 334, 337; 253 NW 174 (1931). 41 Id.; Jackson City Bank & Trust Co v Xxxxxxxx, 271 Mich 538, 544; 260 NW 908 (1935). 42 Lake Twp v Xxxxxx, 257 Mich 135, 137; 241 NW 237 (1932). 43 Id. at 139. 44 Id. at 141. authority under the statute.45 It therefore determined that the drain commissioner’s collateral- collateral estoppel arguments had no merit because [t]he rule is that errors and irregularities in drain proceedings must be taken advantage of by certiorari, but an entire want of jurisdiction may be taken advantage of at any time. The drain commission had no jurisdiction to construct a sewer any more than to construct a Covert road. The proceedings are void for want of jurisdiction.[46] jurisdiction.46 This case is somewhat similar to the proceedings in XxxxxxLake Township. As in Lake Township, Xxxxx has contended, successfully, that the proceedings were void for lack of statutory jurisdiction. As stated above, the Commission did not have statutory authority to issue a retroactive decision and its actions did not fall within its statutory authority. Therefore, the Commission’s decision was void. This conclusion, however, still does not end our inquiry. A collateral attack “is permissible only if the court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons or the subject matter.”47 In a somewhat analogous situation, the Supreme Court in Xxxxx v Arder held that “while [W[xxxx an error in the exercise of a court’s jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack, want of jurisdiction renders a judgment void.”48 Thus, collateral attack is not permissible against any void decision; collateral attack is proper only against those decisions that are void because of a lack of personal or subject-subject matter jurisdiction. A tribunal’s subject-subject matter jurisdiction depends on the kind of the case before it, not on the particular facts of the case: Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over a class of cases, not the particular case before it; to exercise the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending. The question of jurisdiction does not depend on the truth or falsity of the charge, but upon its nature: it is determinable on the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry. Jurisdiction always depends on the allegations and never upon the facts.[49] 45 Id. at 141-142. 46 Id. at 142. 47 Xxxxxxx v Xxxxxxxx, 334 Mich 355, 358; 54 NW2d 684 (1952); see also Xxxxxx v Xxxxxx, 197 Mich App 467, 472-473; 495 NW2d 826 (1992). 48 Xxxxx v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 56; 490 NW2d 568 (1992) (emphasis added); see also Jackson City Bank, 271 Mich at 545 (“Want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction has once attached, mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings, however grave, although they may render the judgment erroneous and subject to be set aside in a proper proceeding for that purpose, will not render the judgment void, and until set aside it is valid and binding for all purposes and cannot be collaterally attacked.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 49 Xxxxxx, 197 Mich App at 472 (citations omitted). Once a tribunal has subject-matter jurisdiction, it has jurisdiction to make an incorrect decision.50 There is a difference between a court’s having no jurisdiction to take an action and having no legal right to take the action.51 At the commencement of the action, the Commission had the abstract power to determine whether to revoke XxxXxxxxx’x exemption certificates. There is no question that the Commission has the power generally to determine whether to revoke exemption certificates. However, the Commission then erred in its exercise of that jurisdiction: it determined that it had the legal right to revoke the exemption certificates retroactively when it actually had no right to do so. This, however, did not render the Commission’s decision void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the Commission had subject-matter jurisdiction over this type of case, its decision is not subject to collateral attack. We conclude that the Commission’s decision—incorrect, improper, and outside its statutory authority to issue—was subject to direct attack on appeal, but was not properly the subject of a collateral attack because the Commission had subject-matter jurisdiction. Since Xxxxx’x appeal is a collateral attack, it cannot succeed.The
Appears in 1 contract
PROPRIETY OF COLLATERAL ATTACK. Having determined that Xxxxx’x attack on the Commission’s decision in this case is a collateral attack, our third task is to determine whether Xxxxx’x collateral attack can succeed. This requires us to answer two questions. First, did the Commission have the authority to revoke the tax exemption certificates retroactively? As outlined above, we conclude that it did not. Second, did the Commission have subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke the tax exemption certificates? Clearly it didis a proper collateral attack. Xxxxx contends not that the Commission lacked the general authority to revoke the exemption certificates, but that the Commission acted outside its statutory authority in making its order retroactive. As we have outlinedoutlined above, we agree with that contention. But we still must consider whether an action outside an agency’s authority is void and subject to collateral attack at any time, even after subsequent to the expiration of the relevant direct appeal period, or whether it may only be attacked by way of a direct appeal. We start with the proposition that a wrong decision is not void; it is merely voidable.40 And only void decisions are subject to collateral attack.41 Again, Again as we have outlinedoutlined above, we conclude that the Commission’s and the trial court’s retroactivity decisions were wrong. And we have concluded that the Commission’s attempt to apply its order retroactively to a date prior to its actual signing was a nullity. But this conclusion does these conclusions do not directly address the contention that the Commission’s decision was void (and subject to collateral attack at any time)void, rather than merely voidable voidable. We conclude that the Commission’s decision was void as a matter of law because the Commission lacked statutory jurisdiction to render its decision. An order that a tribunal enters without jurisdiction is void.42 37 MCL 207.565. 38 See MCL 207.570; MCL 24.304(1). 39 MCL 205.735(1); Parkview Mem Ass’n v City of Livonia, 183 Mich App 116, 118-120; 454 NW2d 169 (and therefore subject to attack only by direct appeal1990). 40 Xxxxxx, 253 Mich at 337. 41 Xxxxxx x Xxxxx, 000 Xxxx 000, 000; 000 XX0x 000 (1931); Jackson City Bank & Trust Co v 42 In re Hague, 412 Mich 532, 544; 310 XX0x 000 (1982). In Lake Township v XxxxxxMillar, 257 Mich 135, 137; 241 NW 237 (1932), the plaintiffs sought to declare drain proceedings “fraudulent and void.”42 ” The drain in that case did not fall within the statutory definition of a drain, but was instead a sewer.43 The defendants contended that “plaintiffs not having attacked the regularity of the proceedings here involved by certioraricertiorari [ ], are estopped from questioning their regularity in this proceeding.”44 The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed on the grounds that the drain commissioner lacked legal authority to construct a sewer sewer, and therefore his actions exceeded his 39 MCL 205.735(1); Parkview Mem Ass’n v City of Livonia, 183 Mich App 116, 118-120; 454 NW2d 169 (1990). 40 Xxxxxx x Xxxxxx, 253 Mich 334, 337; 253 NW 174 (1931). 41 Id.; Jackson City Bank & Trust Co v Xxxxxxxx, 271 Mich 538, 544; 260 NW 908 (1935). 42 Lake Twp v Xxxxxx, 257 Mich 135, 137; 241 NW 237 (1932). 43 Id. at 139. 44 Id. at 141. authority under the statute.45 It therefore determined that the drain commissioner’s collateral- collateral estoppel arguments had no merit because [t]he rule is that errors and irregularities in drain proceedings must be taken advantage of by certiorari, but an entire want of jurisdiction may be taken advantage of at any time. The drain commission had no jurisdiction to construct a sewer any more than to construct a Covert road. The proceedings are void for want of jurisdiction.[46] jurisdiction.46 This case is somewhat similar to the proceedings in XxxxxxLake Township. As in Lake Township, Xxxxx has contended, successfully, that the proceedings were void for lack of statutory jurisdiction. As stated above, the Commission did not have statutory authority to issue a retroactive decision and its actions did not fall within its statutory authority. Therefore, the Commission’s decision was void. This conclusion, however, still does not end our inquiry. A collateral attack “is permissible only if the court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons or the subject matter.”47 In a somewhat analogous situation, the Supreme Court in Xxxxx v Arder held that “while [W[xxxx an error in the exercise of a court’s jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack, want of jurisdiction renders a judgment void.”48 Thus, collateral attack is not permissible against any void decision; collateral attack is proper only against those decisions that are void because of a lack of personal or subject-subject matter jurisdiction. A tribunal’s subject-subject matter jurisdiction depends on the kind of the case before it, not on the particular facts of the case: Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over a class of cases, not the particular case before it; to exercise the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending. The question of jurisdiction does not depend on the truth or falsity of the charge, but upon its nature: it is determinable on the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry. Jurisdiction always depends on the allegations and never upon the facts.[49] 45 Id. at 141-142. 46 Id. at 142. 47 Xxxxxxx v Xxxxxxxx, 334 Mich 355, 358; 54 NW2d 684 (1952); see also Xxxxxx v Xxxxxx, 197 Mich App 467, 472-473; 495 NW2d 826 (1992). 48 Xxxxx v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 56; 490 NW2d 568 (1992) (emphasis added); see also Jackson City Bank, 271 Mich at 545 (“Want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction has once attached, mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings, however grave, although they may render the judgment erroneous and subject to be set aside in a proper proceeding for that purpose, will not render the judgment void, and until set aside it is valid and binding for all purposes and cannot be collaterally attacked.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 49 Xxxxxx, 197 Mich App at 472 (citations omitted). Once a tribunal has subject-matter jurisdiction, it has jurisdiction to make an incorrect decision.50 There is a difference between a court’s having no jurisdiction to take an action and having no legal right to take the action.51 At the commencement of the action, the Commission had the abstract power to determine whether to revoke XxxXxxxxx’x exemption certificates. There is no question that the Commission has the power generally to determine whether to revoke exemption certificates. However, the Commission then erred in its exercise of that jurisdiction: it determined that it had the legal right to revoke the exemption certificates retroactively when it actually had no right to do so. This, however, did not render the Commission’s decision void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the Commission had subject-matter jurisdiction over this type of case, its decision is not subject to collateral attack. We conclude that the Commission’s decision—incorrect, improper, and outside its statutory authority to issue—was subject to direct attack on appeal, but was not properly the subject of a collateral attack because the Commission had subject-matter jurisdiction. Since Xxxxx’x appeal is a collateral attack, it cannot succeed.The
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