Security Result. The protocol presented in the earlier section is provably secure against passive adversaries in the model of [4], from where the notations and definitions are taken. A Theorem 1: Let P be the protocol as defined above. Let be a passive adversary making qex = (qika +qjoin +qdelete) Execute queries to the parties and running in time t. Then Protocol P is a secure GKA protocol. Namely: AdvPA(t, qex) ≤ 2qex ∗ SuccDDH(t′) (Ml) chooses a new random secret, rl, and sends all the blinded secrets to the new group leader , Xx' . The new where t′ ≤ t + qex |P|t |P| exp , texp is the time to perform an 3For each session, one may want to elect a new leader. exponentiation in G and being the maximum number of participants in the protocol.
Appears in 2 contracts
Samples: Research Paper, Research Paper
Security Result. The protocol presented in the earlier section is provably secure against passive adversaries in the model of [4], from where the notations and definitions are taken. A Theorem 1: Let P be the protocol as defined above. Let be a passive adversary making qex = (qika +qjoin +qdelete) Execute queries to the parties and running in time t. Then Protocol P is a secure GKA protocol. Namely: AdvPA(t, qex) ≤ 2qex ∗ SuccDDH(t′) (Ml) chooses a new random secret, rl, and sends all the blinded secrets to the new group leader , Xx' . The new where t′ ≤ t + qex |P|t |P| exp , texp is the time to perform an Pr 0- 3For each session, one may want to elect a new leader. exponentiation in G and being the maximum number of participants in the protocol.
Appears in 1 contract
Samples: Group Key Agreement Protocol