The Parties’ Arguments Clause Samples
The Parties’ Arguments. The USA contends that the SPS Chapter of the USMCA applies because both of the Measures are (i) SPS measures; and (ii) may affect trade between the Parties.105 88. The USA submits that both Measures are SPS measures because the 2023 Decree’s “main purpose” includes “the rights to health and a healthy environment, native corn, . . . as well as to ensure nutritious, sufficient and quality diet.”106 The USA refers to the Mexican government’s public statements to assert that the Measures are “clearly applied for one or more of the purposes set forth in Annex A, paragraph 1 of the SPS Agreement.”107 In the USA’s view, this is the case irrespective of whether Mexico introduced the Measures to address concerns related to human health or to native corn.108 The USA adds that “[t]he fact that a measure may serve more than one purpose does not alter its classification as an SPS measure.”109
The Parties’ Arguments. Based on Relevant International Standards, Guidelines, or Recommendations or on an Assessment of the risk to human, animal, or plant life or health
The Parties’ Arguments. As spelt out in the EU’s written and oral submissions,406 five claims (comprising seven distinct arguments) are before this Arbitration Panel. The claims relate to (i) the legal basis underlying the safeguard measure; (ii) the data used by ITAC in its safeguard analysis; (iii) ITAC’s causation analysis; (iv) the resulting scope of the safeguard measure; and (v) the information provided to the TDC under Article 34(7)
The Parties’ Arguments. The USA submits that the Measures are inconsistent with Article 2.11 of the USMCA because they (i) constitute a restriction on importation; (ii) were not adopted or maintained “in accordance with Article XI of the GATT 1994”; and (iii) are not “otherwise provided” for in the USMCA.406 244. The USA contends that it is “evident” that the Measures are related to the importation of GM corn because the Article 6.II Measure explicitly states that Mexico’s biosafety authorities “shall revoke and refrain from issuing authorizations for the use of genetically modified corn grain for human consumption.”407 With respect to the Articles 7/8 Measure, the USA points to the “explicit directive” in Article 7 to “conduct the gradual substitution of genetically modified corn for animal feed and industrial use for human consumption,” which in the USA’s view 405 Specifically, Article 2.11.7 states that the prior paragraphs of Article 2.11 (paragraphs 1 through 6) do not apply to the measures set out in Annex 2-A. Annex 2-A in turn states that paragraphs 1 through 4 of Article 2.11 (Import and Export Restrictions) do not apply to certain export measures pursuant to Mexico’s Hydrocarbons Law or certain import prohibitions or restrictions of used tyres, used apparel, non-originating used vehicles and used chassis equipped with vehicle motors. 406 USA IWS, ¶ 199. 407 USA Rebuttal, ¶ 178, citing USA-3, 2023 Decree, Art. 6.II. restricts the importation of all GM corn into Mexico.408 The USA also notes the 2023 Decree’s reference to self-sufficiency in directing its authorities to “abstain from […] promoting and importing genetically modified corn,” and requiring the eventual complete replacement of imported GM corn for any purpose.409 245. For the same reasons, the USA contends that the Measures constitute a “restriction[] . . . on the importation of any product of” the USA under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, satisfying the second part of Article 2.11.410 Finally, with respect to the third element, the USA submits that the Measures are not “otherwise provided” for in the USMCA because they do not fall into any of the exceptions listed in Annex 2-A.411 246. The USA contends that the Measures already have had trade effects, referring inter alia to the decline of white corn exports to Mexico during 2023.412 The USA’s position is that “U.S. farmers and biotechnology companies view Mexican approval of new products as a precondition for U.S. farmers to plant the products.”413 As a resul...
The Parties’ Arguments. The USA claims that the Measures “go well beyond that which is necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health,” and are consequently inconsistent with Article 9.6.6
The Parties’ Arguments. Union Bank disagreed with the CA’s finding that it is claiming ownership over the property through the ejectment action. It claimed that it never lost ownership over the property despite the execution of the contract, since only the right to possess was conceded to Maunlad Homes under the contract; Union Bank never transferred ownership of the property to Maunlad Homes. Because of Maunlad Homes’ failure to comply with the terms of the contract, Union Bank believes that it rightfully rescinded the sale, which rescission terminated Maunlad Homes’ right to possess the subject property. Since Maunlad Homes failed to turn over the possession of the subject property, Union Bank believes that it correctly instituted the ejectment suit. The Court initially denied Union Bank’s petition in its Resolution dated March 17, 2010.13 Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Union Bank, the Court set aside its Resolution of March 17, 2010 (in a Resolution dated May 30, 201114) and required Maunlad Homes to comment on the petition. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ Homes contested Union Bank’s arguments, invoking the rulings of the lower courts. It considered Union Bank’s action as based on the propriety of the rescission of the contract, which, in turn, is based on a determination of whether Maunlad Homes indeed failed to comply with the 13 Rollo, p. 348. 14 Id. at 439. terms of the contract; the propriety of the rescission, however, is a question that is within the RTC’s jurisdiction. Hence, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ Homes contended that the dismissal of the ejectment action was proper.
The Parties’ Arguments. Forest Hills filed the present petition for review on certiorari to assail the CA rulings. It argues that rescission should be allowed only for substantial breaches that would defeat the very object of the parties making the agreement. The delay in the issuance of the stock certificate could not be considered as a substantial breach, considering that Vertex was recognized as, and enjoyed the privileges of, a stockholder. Forest Hills also objects to the CA ruling that required it to return the amount paid by Vertex for the share of stock. It claims that it was not a party to the contract of sale; hence, it did not receive any amount from Vertex which it would be obliged to return on account of the rescission of the contract. In its comment to the petition,15 Vertex disagrees and claims that its compliance with its obligation to pay the price and the other fees called into action the defendants’ compliance with their reciprocal obligation to deliver the stock certificate, but the defendants failed to discharge this obligation. The defendants’ three (3)-year delay in issuing the stock certificate justified 13 ▇▇▇▇▇, p. 45.
The Parties’ Arguments asks the Court to exclude “▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ improper factual narratives 16 including those set forth in his Initial Report at Paragraphs 114-143.” (Doc. 357 at 17.) 17 SiteLock responds that “▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ descriptions of GoDaddy’s payment practices 18 and promotion of SiteLock (before and after acquiring Sucuri) will assist the jury in 19 understanding ▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ opinions that these practices did not comport with SaaS industry
The Parties’ Arguments. The DOTC asserts that its Financial Lease Agreement with Digitel was entered into in pursuit of its governmental functions to promote and develop networks of communication systems. 19