Common Contracts
2 similar Information-Theoretic Key Agreement contracts
Information-Theoretic Key Agreement: From Weak to Strong Secrecy for FreeInformation-Theoretic Key Agreement • September 13th, 2020
Abstract. One of the basic problems in cryptography is the generation of a common secret key between two parties, for instance in order to com- municate privately. In this paper we consider information-theoretically secure key agreement. Wyner and subsequently Csisza´r and Korner de- scribed and analyzed settings for secret-key agreement based on noisy communication channels. Maurer as well as Ahlswede and Csisza´r gen- eralized these models to a scenario based on correlated randomness and public discussion. In all these settings, the secrecy capacity and the secret-key rate, respectively, have been defined as the maximal achiev- able rates at which a highly-secret key can be generated by the legitimate partners. However, the privacy requirements were too weak in all these definitions, requiring only the ratio between the adversary’s information and the length of the key to be negligible, but hence tolerating her to ob- tain a possibly substantial amount of information about the result
Information-Theoretic Key Agreement: From Weak to Strong Secrecy for FreeInformation-Theoretic Key Agreement • March 20th, 2000
Abstract. One of the basic problems in cryptography is the generation of a common secret key between two parties, for instance in order to com- municate privately. In this paper we consider information-theoretically secure key agreement. Wyner and subsequently Csisz´ar and Ko¨rner de- scribed and analyzed settings for secret-key agreement based on noisy communication channels. Maurer as well as Ahlswede and Csisz´ar gen- eralized these models to a scenario based on correlated randomness and public discussion. In all these settings, the secrecy capacity and the secret-key rate, respectively, have been defined as the maximal achiev- able rates at which a highly-secret key can be generated by the legitimate partners. However, the privacy requirements were too weak in all these definitions, requiring only the ratio between the adversary’s information and the length of the key to be negligible, but hence tolerating her to ob- tain a possibly substantial amount of information about the resul
