THE END OF THE LEEGIN SAGA AND THE BEGINNING OF DEVELOPMENT FOR THE RULE OF REASON IN RPM CASESResale Price Maintenance Agreement • April 18th, 2017
Contract Type FiledApril 18th, 2017Resale Price Maintenance (“RPM”) is a type of vertical agreement made among economic entities on the different levels of distribution for the sale of products or services, by setting the minimum price below which the products or services cannot be sold. Generally speaking, vertical restraints of trade have been treated less severely than horizontal restraints of trade, such as price fixing among competitors, which always, or almost always, tend to restrict competition and reduce output without any rewarding virtues. However, the only exception to the lenient rule for the vertical restraints was RPM. RPM had been treated illegal per se, just like horizontal restrains since Dr. Miles in 1911, until the Leegin Court overruled the longstanding precedent in 2007. During that period, many arguments against the per se illegal treatment for RPM had emerged from mostly antitrust economists who regarded promotion of the interbrand competition of different brands as more important compared to int
〔Article〕Resale Price Maintenance Agreement • May 24th, 2012
Contract Type FiledMay 24th, 2012Resale Price Maintenance (“RPM”) is a type of vertical agreement made among economic entities on the different levels of distribution for the sale of products or services, by setting the minimum price below which the products or services cannot be sold. Generally speaking, vertical restraints of trade have been treated less severely than horizontal restraints of trade, such as price fixing among competitors, which always, or almost always, tend to restrict competition and reduce output without any rewarding virtues. However, the only exception to the lenient rule for the vertical restraints was RPM. RPM had been treated illegal per se, just like horizontal restrains since Dr. Miles in 1911, until the Leegin Court overruled the longstanding precedent in 2007. During that period, many arguments against the per se illegal treatment for RPM had emerged from mostly antitrust economists who regarded promotion of the interbrand competition of different brands as more important compared to int