aSchool of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UKPay-for-Delay Agreements • March 13th, 2018
Contract Type FiledMarch 13th, 2018Pay-for-delay deals involve a payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a generic maker to delay entry. In return, the generic receives a payment and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable. We combine the first mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic to show when pay-for-delay deals are an equilibrium outcome. We show that limiting a branded firms ability to launch authorized generic prior to an independent generic entry if the latter wins a patent litigation will deter such deals to be made, but removing exclusivity period for first generic will not.
aSchool of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UKPay-for-Delay Agreements • March 13th, 2018
Contract Type FiledMarch 13th, 2018Pay-for-delay deals involve a payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a generic maker to delay entry. In return, the generic receives a payment and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable. We combine the first mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic to show when pay-for-delay deals are an equilibrium outcome. We show that limiting a branded firms ability to launch authorized generic prior to an independent generic entry if the latter wins a patent litigation will deter such deals to be made, but removing exclusivity period for first generic will not.