Common Contracts
4 similar null contracts
aSchool of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UKNovember 14th, 2021
During patent litigation, pay-for-delay deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic to show when pay-for-delay deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm’s ability to launch an authorized generic prior to entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not.
aSchool of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UKApril 20th, 2020
During patent litigation, pay-for-delay deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic to show when pay-for-delay deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm’s ability to launch an authorized generic prior to entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not.
aSchool of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UKMarch 13th, 2018
Pay-for-delay deals involve a payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a generic maker to delay entry. In return, the generic receives a payment and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable. We combine the first mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic to show when pay-for-delay deals are an equilibrium outcome. We show that limiting a branded firms ability to launch authorized generic prior to an independent generic entry if the latter wins a patent litigation will deter such deals to be made, but removing exclusivity period for first generic will not.
aSchool of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UKMarch 13th, 2018
Pay-for-delay deals involve a payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a generic maker to delay entry. In return, the generic receives a payment and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable. We combine the first mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic to show when pay-for-delay deals are an equilibrium outcome. We show that limiting a branded firms ability to launch authorized generic prior to an independent generic entry if the latter wins a patent litigation will deter such deals to be made, but removing exclusivity period for first generic will not.
