Conservation Agreements: Relational Contracts with Endogenous MonitoringConservation Agreements • March 5th, 2020
Contract Type FiledMarch 5th, 2020This analysis pertains only to the parties’ joint value. If at the beginning of the entire game, the parties negotiate subject to an exogenously fixed disagreement point (such as the “business as usual” Nash equilibrium of the stage game), then the NGO’s shared interest in the Community having bargaining power is tempered by the fact that the initial share of surplus is sensitive to the parties’ relative bargaining weights. To be more precise, as a thought exercise let us start by imagining πC = 0 and πN = 1. In this case, cooperation
Conservation agreements: Relational contracts with endogenous monitoringConservation Agreements • March 5th, 2020
Contract Type FiledMarch 5th, 2020This analysis pertains only to the parties’ joint value. If at the beginning of the entire game, the parties negotiate subject to an exogenously fixed disagreement point (such as the “business as usual” Nash equilibrium of the stage game), then the NGO’s shared interest in the Community having bargaining power is tempered by the fact that the initial share of surplus is sensitive to the parties’ relative bargaining weights. To be more precise, as a thought exercise let us start by imagining πC = 0 and πN = 1. In this case, cooperation
Conservation Agreements:Conservation Agreements • January 8th, 2020
Contract Type FiledJanuary 8th, 2020This section describes two variants of the basic model, one dealing with the monitoring technology and another introducing a resource stock.