INFORMATIE OVER DE EUROPESE ECONOMISCHE RUIMTE

TOEZICHTHOUDENDE AUTORITEIT VAN DE XXX

Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunvraagstukken

(2019/C 177/04)

Door middel van het bovengenoemde besluit, dat na deze samenvatting in de authentieke taal is weergege ven, heeft de Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de XXX Xxxxxxxxx in kennis gesteld van haar besluit tot inleiding van de procedure van artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie ten aan zien van de bovengenoemde steunmaatregel.

Belanghebbenden kunnen hun opmerkingen over de betrokken maatregel binnen één maand vanaf de datum van de bekendmaking indienen bij:

Toezichthoudende autoriteit van de EVA Register

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 00

0000 Xxxxxxx XXXXXX

De opmerkingen zullen ter kennis van de Noorse autoriteiten worden gebracht. Een belanghebbende die opmerkingen maakt, kan, met opgave van redenen, schriftelijk verzoeken om vertrouwelijke behandeling van zijn identiteit.

SAMENVATTING

Procedure

1. De Autoriteit heeft twee klachten ontvangen, een op 14 maart 2017 en een op 27 juli 2017. De klagers hebben om vertrouwelijkheid verzocht.

2. Naar aanleiding van verzoeken heeft de Autoriteit informatie van de Noorse autoriteiten ontvangen bij brieven van 2 juni 2017, 20 september 2017, 1 december 2017, 8 december 2017, 1 februari 2018, 5 februari 2018, 21 februari 2019, 14 maart 2019 en 18 maart 2019.

Beschrijving van de maatregel(en)

3. De vermeende begunstigde van de steun is Trondheim Spektrum AS („TS”).

4. TS is eigenaar en exploitant van Trondheim Spektrum, een multifunctionele faciliteit in het centrum van Xxxxxx xxxx. De faciliteit wordt gebruikt door lokale sportclubs om te trainen en voor kleine en grote sportevenementen en andere evenementen zoals concerten, beurzen en congressen.

5. De gemeente Trondheim („de gemeente”) was en is op dit moment meerderheidsaandeelhouder in TS. De overige aandelen zijn in het bezit van vrijwilligerssportclubs op basis van lidmaatschap („sportclubs”).

6. Het doel van de gemeente is om de inwoners van Trondheim faciliteiten te bieden voor sport- en vrijetijdsactivitei ten. In 2004 heeft de gemeente een principe van kosteloze faciliteiten ten behoeve van de sportclubs van de gemeente geformaliseerd. Deze maatregelen van de gemeente faciliteren de deelname van kinderen en jongeren aan sportactiviteiten, ongeacht het inkomensniveau van individuele gezinnen.

7. De gemeente huurt capaciteit van verschillende faciliteiten, zoals TS, om de capaciteit gratis ter beschikking te stellen van de sportclubs. De verdeling van de capaciteit is toevertrouwd aan de lokale sportraad.

8. Sinds de zomer van 2017 ondergaat TS een belangrijke renovatie en uitbreiding die in 2019 moet zijn afgerond. Het plan is om in 2020 het Europees kampioenschap handbal voor vrouwen en mannen te organiseren.

9. Het besluit heeft betrekking op negen maatregelen 1) gemeentelijke lening, 2) gemeentelijke garantie, 3) erfpacht overeenkomsten, 4) pachtovereenkomsten die zijn gesloten tussen 1999 en 2017, 5) pachtovereenkomst van 2019, die in 2017 is gesloten, 6) kapitaalverhoging die verband houdt met nieuwe en onvoorziene kosten,

7) financiering van infrastructuurkosten, 8) middelen van het Noorse kansspelfonds en 9) impliciete garantie inhe rent aan een leenovereenkomst tussen Nordea en TS.

10. Volgens de klagers heeft TS een voordeel ontvangen door middel van verschillende maatregelen van de gemeente. De klagers hebben aangevoerd dat via de vermeende steunmaatregelen kruissubsidiëring is verleend voor andere activiteiten van TS.

Beoordeling van de maatregelen

11. Volgens de Autoriteit zou elke mogelijke staatssteun die via de maatregelen 1, 2 en 3 wordt toegekend, bestaande steun vormen in de zin van artikel 1, onder b), van deel II van Protocol 3 bij de Toezichtovereenkomst. De Autori teit beoordeelt in haar besluit dan ook niet verder of deze maatregelen als steun moeten worden aangemerkt.

12. In haar besluit komt de Autoriteit tot de voorlopige conclusie dat maatregel 4, de tussen 1999 en 2017 gesloten pachtovereenkomsten, geen deel uitmaakt van een steunregeling in de zin van artikel 1, onder d), van deel II van Protocol 3 bij de Toezichtovereenkomst, zoals de Noorse autoriteiten hadden betoogd.

13. De Autoriteit zal in haar besluit alleen het potentiële steunkarakter beoordelen van de pachtovereenkomsten waar voor de verjaringstermijn niet is verstreken. Op basis van de informatie waarover zij beschikt, is de Autoriteit van oordeel dat de verjaringstermijn voor de pachtovereenkomst die volgens de Noorse autoriteiten van 2007-2008 dateert, niet is verstreken.

14. De Autoriteit is van oordeel dat de middelen die door Norsk Tipping AS aan TS zijn toegekend, hierna maatregel 8 genoemd, een toepassing zijn van een bestaand systeem van staatssteun. De Autoriteit beoordeelt in haar besluit dan ook niet verder of de maatregel als steun moeten worden aangemerkt.

15. De Autoriteit is voorlopig van oordeel dat de pachtovereenkomsten van 2007 tot en met 2017 en de nieuwe pachtovereenkomst van 2019 (maatregelen 4 en 5) TS mogelijkerwijs een voordeel hebben opgeleverd. De klagers hebben aangevoerd dat de pacht boven de marktvoorwaarden ligt en dat de pacht gebaseerd is op de behoeften van TS en niet op de door de gemeente benodigde capaciteit.

16. De Autoriteit is van oordeel dat de kapitaalverhoging, maatregel 6, TS een voordeel oplevert dat overeenkomt met het volledige bedrag van de kapitaalverhoging.

17. De Autoriteit komt tot de voorlopige conclusie dat de verdeling en berekening van de infrastructuurkosten in ver band met de renovatie en uitbreiding van TS (maatregel 7) TS een voordeel kan hebben opgeleverd.

18. Wat de impliciete garantie betreft die inherent is aan de leningsovereenkomst tussen TS en Nordea (maatregel 9), acht de Autoriteit de effecten van de vermeldingen in de leningsovereenkomsten onduidelijk en kan zij in dit sta dium niet uitsluiten dat zij TS een voordeel opleveren in de vorm van een impliciete garantie van de gemeente.

19. De Noorse autoriteiten hebben aangevoerd dat het gebruik van TS-faciliteiten door de sportclubs niet als een eco nomische activiteit kan worden beschouwd, aangezien noch de gemeente, noch TS een vergoeding van de gebrui kers ervan ontvangen.

20. Ook al kan de gemeente worden geacht een niet-economische activiteit uit te oefenen door het aanbieden van gratis faciliteiten voor de sportclubs van de gemeente, dan nog kan het in principe heel goed zijn dat de entiteit die de gemeente van dergelijke faciliteiten voorziet, daarbij economische activiteiten uitoefent.

21. Tegen deze achtergrond kan de Autoriteit in dit stadium niet uitsluiten dat TS een onderneming is, niet alleen bij het organiseren van concerten, grote sportevenementen, beurzen, congressen en andere evenementen, maar ook bij het verhuren van haar faciliteiten aan de gemeente, die vervolgens de ruimte ter beschikking stelt van de sport clubs van de stad. In ieder geval merkt de Autoriteit op dat TS andere economische activiteiten uitoefent en dat een toereikende boekhoudkundige scheiding zou moeten worden aangetoond.

22. De Noorse autoriteiten hebben niet alle maatregelen in kwestie bij de Autoriteit aangemeld. De Autoriteit komt derhalve tot de voorlopige conclusie dat de Noorse autoriteiten hun verplichtingen ingevolge artikel 1, lid 3, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Toezichtovereenkomst niet zijn nagekomen en dat, voor zover de maatregelen 4, 7 en 9 staatssteun inhouden, deze steun onrechtmatig is.

23. De Noorse autoriteiten hebben de nieuwe pachtovereenkomst van 2019, maatregel 5, op 20 november 2018 aan gemeld. De Noorse autoriteiten hebben aangevoerd dat aan de nieuwe pachtovereenkomst de voorwaarde is ver bonden dat deze in overeenstemming is met de marktvoorwaarden. Zij maakt uitdrukkelijk aanpassingen mogelijk om de voorwaarden van de overeenkomst in overeenstemming te brengen met de marktvoorwaarden mocht de Autoriteit dit verlangen. In het licht hiervan is de voorlopige conclusie van de Autoriteit dat, mocht de pachtover eenkomst staatssteun inhouden, de Noorse autoriteiten de vereisten van artikel 1, lid 3, van deel I van Protocol 3 bij de Toezichtovereenkomst in acht hebben genomen.

24. Wat maatregel 6 betreft merkt de Autoriteit op dat de Noorse autoriteiten deze steun aan TS hebben verleend op grond van artikel 55 van de algemene groepsvrijstellingsverordening. De Autoriteit is er echter niet volledig van overtuigd dat met betrekking tot de maatregel aan de vereisten van artikel 6, lid 2, van de algemene groepsvrijstel lingsverordening is voldaan. Verdere beoordeling van de maatregel lijkt vereist. Als de Autoriteit tot de bevinding zou komen dat de maatregel niet aan de vereisten van de algemene groepsvrijstellingsverordening voldoet, is deze steun onrechtmatig.

25. De mogelijke steunmaatregelen in de onderhavige zaak zijn van uiteenlopende aard. De Noorse autoriteiten heb ben aangevoerd dat sommige van de maatregelen verenigbaar zijn. In dit stadium beschikt de Autoriteit niet over de informatie die zij nodig heeft om vast te stellen welk bedrag aan vermeende steun deze maatregelen TS zouden kunnen opleveren. De Autoriteit betwijfelt derhalve of de maatregelen in overeenstemming zijn met het evenredig heidsbeginsel en beperkt blijven tot hetgeen noodzakelijk is om de doelstelling van de staat te bereiken.

26. Bovendien kan de Autoriteit niet uitsluiten dat de vermeende steunmaatregelen kruissubsidiëring van de andere activiteiten van TS inhouden. In het licht van het bovenstaande betwijfelt de Autoriteit of de maatregelen verenig baar zouden kunnen worden geacht onder artikel 61, lid 3, onder c), van de EER-overeenkomst.

Decision No 032/19/COL of 16 April 2019

to open a formal investigation into potential state aid granted to Trondheim Spektrum AS

(Case 83227)

Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries XX Xxx 0000 Xxx

0000 Xxxx XXXXXX

Subject: Trondheim Spektrum

1. Summary

(1) The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’) wishes to inform the Norwegian authorities that it has concerns that the notified measure and some of the measures covered by the complaints related to Trondheim Spektrum AS might entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority furthermore has doubts concerning the compatibility of these measures with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has therefore decided to open a formal investigation (1) into these measures.

(2) The Authority has based its decision on the following considerations.

2. Procedure

2.1. First complaint

(3) On 14 March 2017, the Authority received a complaint (2) alleging that Trondheim municipality (‘the Municipal ity’) has granted unlawful state aid to Trondheim Spektrum AS (‘TS’), a company that owns and operates Xxxxxx xxxx Spektrum, which is a multipurpose sport facility located in Trondheim, Norway. By letter dated 27 March 2017, the Authority invited the Norwegian authorities to comment on the complaint (3). The Norwegian authori ties replied by letter dated 2 June 2017 (4).

(1)	Reference is made to Articles 4(4) and 13(1) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice.
(2)	Documents No 847105 and 848590 to 848601.
(3)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000.
(4)	Documents No 859505, 859499, 859501 and 859503.

2.2. Second complaint

(4) On 27 July 2017, the Authority received a second complaint (5), also alleging that the Municipality has granted unlawful state aid to TS. By letter dated 24 August 2017, the Authority invited the Norwegian authorities to comment (6). In the same letter, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities con cerning their comments to the first complaint. By letter dated 1 September 2017, the Authority forwarded to the Norwegian authorities additional information from the second complainant (7).

(5) By letter dated 20 September 2017, the Norwegian authorities submitted their comments to the second com plaint and provided the information requested by the Authority relating to the first complaint (8). On 29 September 2017, the case was further discussed during the annual package meeting in Oslo. The discussion was subsequently summarised in a follow-up letter (9).

2.3. Request for information

(6) On 20 October 2017, the Authority sent an information request to the Norwegian authorities (10). On 22 November 2017, the Norwegian authorities and the Authority held a video-conference to discuss the informa tion request. By letter of 8 December 2017, the Norwegian authorities responded (11).

2.4. Additional information from the second complainant

(7) On 19 September 2017, the second complainant submitted additional information (12). On 6 November 2017, the second complainant submitted supplementary information (13). On 9 November 2017, the Authority for warded the additional information to the Norwegian authorities (14). On 22 November and 13 December 2017, the Norwegian authorities and the Authority discussed the case during a video-conference. On 1 December 2017, the Norwegian authorities submitted information to the Authority in relation to the meetings (15).

(8) On 26 October 2018, the second complainant submitted additional information (16).

2.5. Further request for information and meeting

(9) On 16 January 2018, the Authority sent an information request to the Norwegian authorities (17), to which they replied by letters dated 1 and 5 February 2018 (18).

(10) On 13 March 2019, the Norwegian authorities and the Authority discussed the case during a video-conference. Following the meeting, the Norwegian authorities submitted further information (19). On 18 March 2019, the Norwegian authorities submitted additional information (20).

2.6. Notification of the 2019 lease agreement

(11) On 29 November 2018 (21), the Norwegian authorities notified a lease agreement (‘the 2019 lease agreement’), which is intended to enter into force on 1 December 2019. By letter dated 28 January 2019, the Authority requested additional information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter of 21 February 2019, the Norwegian authorities responded (22).

(5)	Documents No 867151, 868181 and 868182.
(6)	Document No 870428.
(7)	Document No 870360.
(8)	Documents No 874440 and 874442.
(9)	Document No 876728.
(10)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000.
(11)	Documents No 887522, 887524 and 887526.
(12)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000.
(13)	Document No 881377.
(14)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000.
(15)	Documents No 885827, 885829, 888351 and 888354.
(16)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000.
(17)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000.
(18)	Documents No 896729, 896727, 896725 and 896723.
(19)	Documents No 1059166, 1059170 and 1059171.
(20)	Documents No 1059842 to 1059848.
(21)	Documents No 1040641, 1040643, 1040645, 1040647 and 1040649.
(22)	Documents No 1054292, 1054294, 1054296 and 1054298.

2.7. GBER information sheet regarding capital increase

(12) On 10 December 2018, the Norwegian authorities submitted a GBER (23) information sheet (24), concerning ad hoc aid to TS in the form of a NOK 55 million capital increase (approximately EUR 5,68 million), claiming that this measure was block exempted.

3. Background

(13) TS owns and operates Trondheim Spektrum, a multipurpose facility located in central Trondheim. The facility consists of eight multi-purpose halls. The halls are used as training venues for local sports clubs, small and large sports events and other events such as concerts, trade fairs and congresses.

(14) The company Nidarøhallen was established in 1961 for the purpose of carrying out the construction and opera tion of a sports and exhibition hall in Trondheim. On 5 June 2002, the company name was changed to Xxxxxx xxxx Spektrum AS.

(15) The Municipality has been, and is at present, the majority shareholder in TS. As of October 2018, The Municipal ity holds 96 % of the shares. The remaining shares are held by membership-based volunteer sport clubs (‘sport clubs’).

(16) The construction of the first part of xxx xxxx finished in 1963 (halls A and B). The facility has been expanded four times, in 1971 (hall C), 1980 (hall G), 1988 (halls D and E/H) and 2000 (hall F). The facility now totals 27 000 m2, which, in addition to eight multipurpose halls, consists of 00 xxxxxxx xxxxx xxx x xxxx xxxx of over 1 000 m2.

(17) The Municipality’s objective is to provide facilities for sports and leisure activities to the inhabitants of Trondheim. In 2004, the Municipality formalised a principle of cost-free facilities for the benefit of the Municipality’s sport clubs. This facilitates participation of children and youth in sport activities, irrespective of the income level of individual families. The Municipality owns and operates numerous sport facilities, but also rents facilities owned and operated by third parties. The Municipality rents capacity from such facilities under special rental agreements, and the joint capacity is distributed, free of charge, amongst the sport clubs. The task of distributing the capacity is entrusted to the local Sports Council (Idrettsrådet), which forms part of the organisational structure of the Nor wegian Confederation of Sports (Norges idrettsforbund).

(18) TS generates income from sport activities, trade fairs and concerts. TS hosts a number of fairs, which includes an annual fisheries industry fair. Furthermore, TS generates income from the operation of a kiosk, café and a restaurant.

(19) Since summer 2017, Trondheim Spektrum has been undergoing a significant renovation and extension, to be finalised in 2019. The plan is to host the European Championship in handball for women and men in 2020.

4. The measures

4.1. Introduction

(20) Throughout the years, the Municipality has provided TS with loans, guarantees and other measures that may potentially involve state aid. The following measures are at stake in the present decision.

4.2. Measure 1 – municipal loan

(21) In 1992, the total loan portfolio of TS included nine different loans amounting to a total of NOK 87.8 million (approximately EUR 9,1 million). During the period from 1992 to 1994, TS restructured the debt by borrowing NOK 86.67 million (approximately EUR 8,95 million) from the Municipality (25). The nominal interest rate was set at 7,5 %, and the effective interest rate was at 7,7 %. In 2004, the terms of the loan were modified, lowering the effective interest rate to 4,15 %.

(22) The complainants allege that the intention of the Municipality, by granting the loan, was to grant an advantage to TS, which it would not have obtained otherwise, in the form of lower interest rates. The complainants further allege that later modifications of the loan have turned the alleged aid into new aid.

(23)	Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1), referred to at point 1j of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement, see Joint Committee Decision No 152/2014, published in OJ L 342, 27.11.2014, p. 63 and EEA Supplement No 71, 27.11.2014, p. 61.
(24)	Case No 82883, GBER 30/2018/Sports.
(25)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 6 and Document No 859501, p. 13 and 20.

(23) The Norwegian authorities have not contested the fact that the loan may have entailed state aid. The Norwegian authorities have argued that the interest rates, in particular following the modification in 2004, were broadly in line with market price. However, the Norwegian authorities do not consider it meaningful to investigate further the historical market rates for loans as, in their view, any aid would have to be considered as existing aid, and in any event, the loan has in the meantime been paid back in full (26). The Norwegian authorities have not found any documentation indicating that the loan has been renegotiated as alleged by the complainants, save for the modifi cation of the interest rate in 2004 (27).

4.3. Measure 2 – municipal guarantee

(24) On 7 September 1999, the Municipality granted a guarantee in favour of TS, in order for TS to secure a loan from Nordea. The purpose of the loan was to finance the construction of hall F. The guarantee was limited to 50 % of the loan balance with a limit of NOK 28 million (approximately EUR 2,89 million). The guarantee is of a secondary nature. That is, Nordea would have to initiate a procedure for the liquidation of TS’ assets, before it could have recourse to the guarantee.

(25) According to the Norwegian authorities’ best estimate, the interest rate obtainable without the guarantee corre sponds to an addition of 0.10 – 0.15 percentage points. The Norwegian authorities have explained that this is because TS is viewed by Nordea as a low-risk debtor. On Nordea’s six-point scale, with six representing no risk, TS is and has been rated at five. The reason behind this rating is first, the fact that the majority of the shares in TS is held by a public authority and secondly, TS’ low-risk lease agreement with the Municipality represents a substantial part of its revenues. Further, a guarantee of this nature is of marginal value to the bank, as the mandatory capital requirements are similar for loans without such partial and limited guarantee (28). The guaran tee is still in effect. It expires in 2031 (29). At the end of 2016, it covered the outstanding balance of NOK 9 260 000 (approximately EUR 956 500).

(26) The complainants have alleged that the guarantee was not granted on market terms and therefore provided an advantage to TS.

(27) The Norwegian authorities state that any advantage resulting from the guarantee is at most marginal and further refer to marginal effects of the measure on the conditions of cross-border investment or establishment (30). The Norwegian authorities maintain that the guarantee should be qualified as existing aid as it was granted more than 10 years ago (31).

4.4. Measure 3 – leasehold agreements

(28) In 1980, the Municipality entered into a 40-year leasehold agreement with Trondheim Tennisklubb. The leasehold was transferred to Nidarøhallen A/S (now TS) in 1991. A second leasehold agreement was concluded in 1989. TS has relied on these leasehold agreements as collateral when entering into a loan agreement with Nordea (32).

(29) According to the Norwegian authorities, the leasehold agreements are governed by the Norwegian Ground Lease Act (33) and established case-law.

(30) To offer collateral on a leasehold agreement does not require the permission from the lessor (the owner) under the Ground Lease Act, the Land Registration Act (34) or the leasehold agreement.

(26)	Document No 859501, p. 20.
(27)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 6.
(28)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 14.
(29)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 14.
(30)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 22.
(31)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 23.
(32)	Document 1054294. See section 4.10.
(33)	Lov om tomtefeste (tomtefesteloven) LOV-1996-12-20-106. The Norwegian authorities have explained that the conclusion of leaseh agreements and the contractual relationship between the landowner/lessor and the lessee was regulated for the first time in a st from 1975, which entered into force on 1 January 1976. A new Ground Lease Act was enacted in 1996 and entered into for 1 January 2002.
(34)	Lov om tinglysing (tinglysingsloven) LOV-1935-06-07-2.
(35)	Document No 887522, p. 4.

(31) The Norwegian authorities have stated that the leasehold agreements were concluded before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement (35).

old atute ce on

4.5. Measure 4 – lease agreements concluded from 1999 to 2017

(32) Most of the capacity of Trondheim Spektrum has traditionally been used for the purpose of sport clubs on the basis of lease agreements concluded between TS and the Municipality. The Municipality has leased the facility since it opened in 1963.

(33) The Municipality formalised a principle of cost-free facilities for the benefit of the Municipality’s sport clubs in 2004. This was done to facilitate the participation of sport activities irrespective of the income level of individual families. From then on, the sport clubs did not pay for its use, neither to the Municipality nor to TS.

(34) The Municipality rented the facilities from Trondheim Spektrum for approximately NOK 12 million per year from 1990 until 2002. In 2002, the lease agreement was amended as the Municipality required more capacity. The variations of rent paid is a result of the capacity increase with the construction of hall F, and the implementation of a new model for calculating the agreed utilisation of the facility (36).

(35) The Norwegian authorities have explained that the level of rent takes into account the cost structure of TS. The historical rent was set on the basis of the level established in 1989 and 1990, which historically reflected the required cash flow for TS to pay off debt and continue operations on the proportion of the facility occupied by the sport clubs (37).

(36) The lease agreement was not formalized until February 1995. The lease agreement entered into in 1995 does not specify the number of hours and/or percentage of occupation of the sport clubs’ use of the facility. These speci ficities were introduced and further developed in the agreements entered into for 1999 onwards (38).

(37) The following lease agreements have been concluded since 1999:

a. Lease agreement 2000 – 2002.

b. Lease agreement 2002 – 2006.

c. Lease agreement 2007 – 2008.

d. Lease agreement 2009 – 2010.

e. Lease agreement 2011 (renewed annually) (39).

(38) The Norwegian authorities have provided the following information regarding the leased capacity (40):

Year	Rent paid (NOK)	Hours rented
1999	11 200 000	Not given
2000	11 200 000	13 650
2001	11 200 000	13 650
2002	11 200 000	17 300
2003	14 000 000	17 300
2004	14 000 000	17 300
2005	14 300 000	17 300
2006	14 500 000	17 300

(36)	Document 874440, p. 5.
(37)	Document 874440, p. 10.
(38)	Document 859501, p. 14.
(39)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 14–15. However, it can be observed that there was a reduction in the capacity in 2016. This indicates that amendments were made at least that year. The Norwegian authorities have explained that this is due to the renovation of TS (Docu ment 874440, p. 9).
(40)	Document 859501, p. 15.

Year	Rent paid (NOK)	Hours rented
2007	14 700 000	12 500
2008	14 000 000	12 500
2009	14 300 000	12 500
2010	14 443 000	12 500
2011	14 088 000	12 500
2012	14 234 000	12 500
2013	14 234 000	12 500
2014	14 234 000	12 500
2015	14 679 522	12 500
2016	14 105 196	11 650

(39) According to the terms of the lease agreements, the capacity of Trondheim Spektrum should be reserved for the sport clubs, from 1 September to 1 May each year, during the afternoon on weekdays from 16:00 to 23:00 and on weekends from 09:00 to 22:00. TS can therefore offer Trondheim Spektrum’s capacity outside of these hours and outside the said time of year.

(40) Furthermore, the lease agreements provide that TS can reclaim, subject to the terms laid down in the lease agree ment, up to 2 000 hours annually during the period from 1 September to 1 May. TS can therefore use the facili ties, which are otherwise reserved under the lease agreements for other purposes, for those specific hours. The Norwegian authorities have explained that TS has reclaimed 945 – 2 173 hours annually from 2010 to 2017 (41). The Norwegian authorities explained that there is no mechanism for the reduction of the overall rent when TS reclaims rented hours (42).

(41) The complainants have argued that the rent is above market terms. That is, the rent is based on the needs of TS, and not the capacity needed by the Municipality. The complainants allege that the rental fee has never been based on arm’s length negotiations, but decided unilaterally by the municipal board of the Municipality.

(42) According to the Norwegian authorities, the rent paid to TS by the Municipality has been market conform and thus does not entail state aid. Were the Authority to conclude differently, the Norwegian authorities argue that the lease agreement forms part of an existing aid scheme. Furthermore, any new aid would, in any event, be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

4.6. Measure 5 – lease agreement of 2019 – notification

(43) As set out in paragraph (11) above, the Norwegian authorities have notified the lease agreement of 2019.

(44) TS and the Municipality have concluded a new lease agreement, which is set to enter into force on 1 December 2019. The agreement is conditional upon being in line with market terms. The agreement allows for adaptations by the Municipality, in order to conform to the market economy investor principle, should the Authority so require (43). The agreement will expire on 30 April 2035.

(45) The Norwegian authorities have explained that this lease agreement is based on the same principles underlying previous lease agreements. The Norwegian authorities have further explained that the new lease agreement repre sents a substantial increase in the capacity made available for the sport clubs.

(41)	The Norwegian authorities were not able to provide data from before 2010.
(42)	Document 896727, p. 6.
(43)	Article 12 of the 2019 lease agreement. Norwegian: ‘Denne avtalen forutsettes å være inngått på markedsmessige vilkår. Det tas forbehold om at avtalen vil – forut for og i avtaleperioden – justeres for å tilfredsstille eventuelle føringer/krav fra EFTAs overvåkningsorgan (ESA), og/xxxxx xxxxx offentlige myndigheter. Dette for at avtalen til enhver tid skal tilfredsstille markedsinvestorprinsippet.’ Document No 887522, p. 7.

(46) A total of 16 848 hours yearly is rented under the new lease agreement, compared to 12 500 hours in the past. The new lease agreement represents an increase in the rent per hours from approximately NOK 1 200 to 1 700 (approximately EUR 124 to 176). The reason for this increase is twofold: First, the historical rent paid by the Municipality was set on the basis of the level established in 1989 and 1990, and has not been subject to adjust ments. Second, the construction costs associated with providing flexibility and allowing for multisport-use results in the operating costs per square metre exceeding by far the square metre cost of the existing venue.

(47) Both complainants have argued that the rent in the new lease agreement is above market terms, because it is based on TS’ needs and not the capacity needed by the Municipality. The complainants allege that the rental fee is not based on arm’s length negotiations, but set in order to cover the construction cost of the expansion of Xxxxxx xxxx Spektrum.

(48) One of the complainants has further alleged that the main cost elements of the extension and renovation project is tied to requirements related to activities other than the activities covered by the lease agreements, such as con certs, professional sports events and fairs. One of the complainants claims that the division of costs between the different activities is therefore not correct, as the needs of the sport clubs could have been met with much less costs.

(49) According to the Norwegian authorities, the rent paid to TS by the Municipality under the new lease agreement is market conform, and thus does not entail state aid. Should the Authority be unable to exclude the presence of state aid in the new lease agreement, the Norwegian authorities have notified the lease agreement as compatible aid under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

4.7. Measure 6 – capital increase linked to new and unexpected costs – block exemption

(50) As set out in paragraph (12) above, on 10 December 2018, the Norwegian authorities submitted a GBER infor mation sheet (44), concerning an ad hoc aid to TS for an aid amount of NOK 55 million (approximately EUR 5,68 million) in form of a capital increase. The Norwegian authorities have provided the capital increase to TS under Article 55 of the General Block Exemption Regulation (‘GBER’).

(51) Due, in particular, to an increase in the project scope in 2018, the budget increased to NOK 591 million (approx imately EUR 61,05 million). The Norwegian authorities have explained that TS cannot cover the additional costs through its existing means or through additional market financing. It therefore applied for the capital increase on 6 July 2018.

(52) One of the complainants alleges that the capital increase is not compliant with all of the conditions set out in Chapter I of the GBER.

4.8. Measure 7 – financing of infrastructure costs

(53) On 14 March 2017, the City Council adopted a zoning plan for the area where TS is located and the surrounding park area. The process was initiated by TS with the aim of expanding the facility into a multi-function facility, feasible for concerts and large sport events, and with increased capacity for sport clubs, trade fairs and congresses.

(54) The City Council adopted the principle of full transfer of expenses in 1993, which sets out that building projects must carry all infrastructure costs that are a consequence of the project. Which costs this principle comprises must be in line with Section 17-3, third paragraph of the Planning and Building Act, which regulates what a development agreement must include (45).

(55) The Norwegian authorities have explained that a zoning plan forms the basis for a project such as the expansion of Trondheim Spektrum (46). The zoning plan – including use of procedural orders (47) (rekkefølgekrav) – does not impose any economic obligations on the developer, but provides for the use of the area relating to the project and indicates what (public) infrastructure needs to be in place prior to the implementation of the project (48).

(44)	Case No 82883, GBER 30/2018/Sports.
(45)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 20-25. The detailed zoning plan for part of Nidarø was adopted by the City Council on 14 March 2017 in case 25/17.
(46)	The Norwegian authorities refer to Section 11 of lov om planlegging og byggesaksbehandling (plan- og bygningsloven) LOV-2008-06-27-71.
(47)	‘Procedural orders’ are requirements relating to the order in which work shall be carried out to ensure the establishment of public ser vices, technical infrastructure and green structures before use is made of areas and the point in time when areas may be used for building and construction purposes, including requirements relating to the order in which development works shall be carried out. See Xxxxxxx 00-0 of the Planning and Building Act, referred to in footnote 46.
(48)	The Norwegian authorities refer to section 18 of the Planning and Building Act.

(56) The Planning and Building Act sets limits on the developer’s maximum financial contribution to the public infras tructure measures that are required under the zoning regulations. The main criterion for cost allocation under a development agreement is that the measure must have a direct factual relationship with the development; it must be necessary for the implementation of the project. Consequently, only public infrastructure measures that result from the project may potentially be imposed as obligations on the developer. On the other hand, infras tructure works that the Municipality would need to implement also in the absence of the project, cannot be imposed on the developer (49).

(57) In addition to the first criterion for cost allocation, the contribution from the developer to the measure must be proportionate to the size and the type of the development or project.

(58) The Norwegian authorities have explained that the Municipality will, for each project, cover the costs of measures that would have to be implemented regardless of the project, but for which the project affects the timing of when the measures are implemented. Such costs relate to infrastructure that is of a general character, benefitting the population as a whole.

(59) The Norwegian authorities have explained that a proportionality assessment must be carried out in each case. The eventual conclusion of a development agreement and the allocation of costs entails a degree of discretion on behalf of the Municipality, which must take into consideration the legal framework, as well as the nature of the project (50).

(60) One of the complainants argues that the Municipality has relieved TS from infrastructure costs that a developer would normally have to bear in relation to this type of constructions and has therefore granted an advantage to TS.

(61) The Norwegian authorities have provided information regarding the distribution of the costs between the TS and the Municipality (51).

(62) According to the Norwegian authorities, the connection from Nidarø to Ilen Church will be developed. The Nor wegian authorities have stated that the measure forms part of what may be described as a recreational area net work for the use of the general public and that therefore it cannot legally order the developer to assume the costs in that respect.

(63) The Norwegian authorities have further explained that the upgrade of Klostergata is a direct consequence of the development. However, the Municipality assumes the implementation responsibility and will cover the costs con nected to roads and archaeological excavations; TS will pay a contribution of NOK 20 million. This is because the Municipality would in any case need to renew the water and sewage pipes in parts of the street.

(64) The Norwegian authorities have further explained that green areas and a public park will be developed, i.e. a vegetation belt, a park, a walking path and public squares. The Norwegian authorities have stated that this is TS’ responsibility. The total amount was estimated at NOK 74 million (approximately EUR 7,64 million), but has been lowered to NOK 39 million (approximately EUR 4,03 million). TS’ share of this costs is set at NOK 26 million (approximately EUR 2,66 million), excluding VAT. According to the Norwegian authorities, the calcu lation of TS’ contribution is limited as allowed by Section 17-3, third paragraph of the Planning and Building Act.

(65) In the view of the Norwegian authorities, infrastructure projects financed by the Municipality do not represent financing in violation of the principle of full transfer of costs in light of the modification mandated by Section 17-3, third paragraph of the Planning and Building Act. Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities do not see that the financial contribution by the local authority may be classified as illegal state aid, because the costs could not have been transferred to the developer in any event.

(66) The Norwegian authorities argue that the infrastructure works, to be partly financed by the Municipality, relate to activities that public authorities normally perform in the exercise of their public powers and do not consist in offering goods and services on a market (52). According to the Norwegian authorities, the costs assumed by the Municipality do not entail that TS pays less than legally required. Furthermore, the infrastructure is of a general character and will benefit the population as a whole.

(49)	Document No 1059846, p. 2.
(50)	Document No 1059846, p. 2.
(51)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 20 – 25 and Documents No 1059842 to 1059848. The detailed zoning plan for part of Nidarø was adopted by the City Council on 14 March 2017 in case 25/17.
(52)	The Norwegian authorities refer to paragraph 203 of the Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (‘NoA’), in this regard and Commission Decision of 8.1.2016. State aid No SA.36019 – Belgium – Financing of road infrastructure in the vicinity of a real estate project – Uplace, paragraph 38.

4.9. Measure 8 – funds from the Gaming Fund

(67) The Gaming Fund scheme is administered by Norsk Tipping AS. The funds stemming from Norsk Tipping AS are gaming funds collected, administered and distributed on the basis of the Gaming Act (53) that entered into force on 1 January 1993.

(68) Applications for grants from the Gaming Fund scheme are processed and assessed in accordance with the provi sions laid down by the Ministry of Culture relating to grants and allocations for sports and physical activities. The goal of the scheme is to facilitate sports and physical activities for everyone.

(69) Funds granted for the construction and renovation of sports facilities will contribute to an infrastructure that provides the population with the opportunity to take part in individually organised activities and activities under the supervision of sport clubs.

(70) As from 1994, TS has received grants from the Gaming Fund Scheme (54).

(71) The Norwegian authorities emphasise that the existing Gaming Fund scheme has not been materially altered since it was last assessed by the Authority in the Vålerenga case (55) and that the grants in favour of TS have been awarded in accordance with the provisions of the scheme (56).

4.10. Measure 9 – implicit guarantee inherent in a loan agreement between Nordea and TS

(72) On 11 December 2017, TS signed a loan agreement for NOK 490 million with Nordea (57). Nordea will provide the working capital during the construction period. The Norwegian authorities have explained that the Municipal ity is not a party to the loan agreement nor are there any contractual obligations that require the Municipality to provide financing or capital to TS (58).

(73) However, the loan agreement includes the following statements (59):

‘Nordea has placed considerable weight on the fact that Trondheim Spektrum AS intends to make structural changes in the company or other measures that increase the possibility that the municipality of Trondheim, with out acting contrary to the law, if necessary, can provide a guarantee to Nordea that reduces the risk of cost overruns.’

‘Nordea has also placed great weight on the ownership of Trondheim municipality and the Executive Board’s decision on 25 June 2015 in case 144/14, which states in paragraph two that the municipality of Trondheim, as the majority owner of Trondheim Spektrum, is ready to assume the necessary financial responsibility resulting from the renovation and development of Trondheim Spektrum.’ (Unofficial translation)

(74) These statements relate to a clause in the loan agreement which states under ‘other terms’ (60):

‘The risk resulting from any cost overruns occurring during the construction period and, which the credit cus tomer himself cannot pay: Trondheim Spektrum AS will make structural changes in the company or take other measures, which will make it possible for Trondheim Municipality, without coming into conflict with the legisla tion, if necessary, to provide a guarantee to Nordea.’

(53)	Lov om pengespill (pengespilloven) LOV-1992-08-28-103.
(54)	Document No 859501, p. 16.
(55)	The Authority’s Decision No 225/15/COL of 10 June 2015 raising no objections to aid in the form of a transfer of land to Vålerenga Fotball.
(56)	Document No 887522, p. 6.
(57)	Document No 1054294.
(58)	Document No 1054298, p. 6.
(59)	Document No 1054294, Loan Agreement between Nordea and TS, dated 11 December 2017, page 1, paragraphs 5 and 6. Unofficial translation. Norwegian: ‘Nordea har lagt betydelig vekt på at Trondheim Spektrum AS har til hensikt å gjøre selskapsendringer xxxxx xxxxx tiltak som åpner muligheten for at Trondheim kommune, uten å komme i strid med lovverket, om nødvendig kan stille en garanti overfor Nordea som reduserer risikoen ifm kostnadsoverskridelser.’/‘Nordea har for øvrig lagt sterk vekt på eierskapet fra Trondheim kommune og vedtaket

i formannskapet datert 25. juni 2014 i sak 144/14, hvor det blant annet fremgår av punkt 2 at Trondheim kommune, som største eier av Xxxxxx xxxx Spektrum AS, er innstilt på å ta det nødvendige økonomiske ansvaret som følger av rehabilitering og utvikling av Trondheim Spektrum.’

(60)	Document No 1054294, Loan Agreement between Nordea and TS, dated 11 December 2017, p. 5, ‘Other terms’ – bullet point 3. Unofficial translation. Norwegian: ‘Risikoen som følge av at det oppstår kostnadsoverskridelser i byggeperioden og kredittkunden selv ikke kan

betale disse: Trondheim Spektrum AS vil gjøre selskapsendringer xxxxx xxxxx tiltak som åpner muligheten for at Trondheim kommune, uten å komme i strid med lovverket, om nødvending kan stille garanti overfor Nordea.’

(75) Under the same heading, the following clause states (61):

‘The lease agreement with Trondheim Municipality of 26.10.2017 cannot be changed/reduced without Nordea’s prior written consent.’

(76) Finally, under the heading ‘Change of ownership – mandatory early repayment’ (62) the loan agreement states (63):

‘It is a condition for entering into and maintaining the Construction Loan Agreement that Trondheim Municipal ity owns at least 77,93 % of the credit customer and maintains its ownership unchanged.

In the event that the ownership composition changes, without Nordea’s prior written consent, the Construction Loan and any outstanding amount shall be repaid as specified in clause 11 (early maturity of the construction loan).’

(77) TS and Nordea had previously signed a loan agreement dated 27 July 2017. The agreement contained a condition that any construction cost excess during the construction period should be covered either by TS or the Munici pality. The loan agreement was co-signed by the City Executive of Finance. That agreement therefore contained clauses regarding the Municipality’s responsibility in respect of any project overruns as well as obligations in respect of the lease agreement which at that time had not been finalised (64).

(78) The co-signing of the loan agreement was later deemed a municipal guarantee pursuant to section 51 of the Municipality Act. The City concluded that the guarantee, in order to be effective, required state approval. The guarantee would, for various reasons, probably not obtain such approval and therefore the Chief City Executive was advised to promptly inform Nordea that the Municipality could not be party to the loan agreement. This agreement is void and does not apply between the parties. TS and Nordea therefore signed the current loan agree ment without the official involvement of the Municipality.

5. The presence of state aid

5.1. Introduction – existing vs. new aid

(79) As set out above, several alleged aid measures granted to TS are at stake. However, in the present decision the Authority will not assess further the nature of potential aid measures, which would constitute existing aid – either individual aid or aid schemes – within the meaning of Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘Protocol 3 SCA’).

(80) Existing aid is subject to a different procedural framework compare to new aid (65). Furthermore, existing aid mea sures are not subject to a repayment obligation.

5.1.1. Measure 1 – the municipal loan

(81) The municipal loan was granted to TS in 1992. In case 113/92 (66), the City Council adopted a decision to issue bonds to enable TS, through a new loan, to pay off its existing loans. The Authority therefore considers that any aid entailed in the municipal loan would be individual aid awarded to TS (67). The terms of the loans were modi fied in 2004.

(82) According to Article 15(1) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the powers of the Authority to recover aid shall be subject to a limitation period of 10 years. According to Article 15(3) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, any aid with regard to which the limitation period has expired, shall be deemed to be existing aid (68).

(61)	Document No 1054294, Loan Agreement between Nordea and TS, dated 11 December 2017, p. 5, ‘Other terms’ – bullet point 4. Unofficial translation. Norwegian: ‘Leieavtalen med Trondheim kommunea av 26.10.2017 kan ikke endres/reduseres uten Nordea forutgående skriftlige samtykke.’
(62)	Norwegian: ‘eierskifte – obligatorisk førtidig tilbakebetaling’.
(63)	Document No 1054294, Loan Agreement between Nordea and TS, dated 11 December 2017, p. 4. Unofficial translation. Norwe gian: ‘Det er et vilkår for inngåelse og opprettholdelse av Byggekredittavtalen, at Trondheim Kommune eier minst 77,93 % av Kredittkunden, og

opprettholder sin eierandel uendret. For det tilfellet at eiersammensetningen endres, uten Nordeas forutgående skriftlige samtykke, skal Byggekredit ten og ethvert utestående tilbakebetales som angitt i klausul 11 (Førtidig forfall av byggekreditten).’

(64)	Document No 1054298, p. 5.
(65)	Within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA.
(66)	Documents No 859501, p. 13, and 859503, p. 76.
(67)	According to Article 1(e) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, ‘“individual aid” shall mean aid that is not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme and notifiable awards of aid on the basis of an aid scheme’.
(68)	See also Article 1(b)(iv) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, according to which ‘existing aid’ is ‘aid which is deemed to be existing aid pur suant to Article 15 of this Chapter’.

(83) The limitation period begins on the day on which the unlawful aid is awarded to the beneficiary either as individ ual aid or as aid under an aid scheme (69).

(84) As the municipal loan was granted to TS in 1992, the limitation period has expired. This would be the case even if the limitation period were to be calculated from the date of the last modification of the loan in 2004. Further, the loan was fully repaid in 2014. Any potential aid granted through the measure shall therefore be deemed to be existing aid. Moreover, as the loan was granted to TS in 1992, it would also be aid, which existed before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement and is still applicable after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement. Any potential aid granted through the measure would therefore also be existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA.

5.1.2. Measure 2 – the municipal guarantee

(85) The Authority considers that any aid inherent in the guarantee would be individual aid awarded to TS. The Municipality granted the guarantee to TS in 1999 for TS to secure a loan(s) from Nordea. The guarantee was, according to the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, used in 2000 and 2001. The purpose of the loan was to finance the construction of hall F. The guarantee is still in effect and expires in 2031.

(86) As the municipal guarantee was awarded to TS in 1999, the limitation period of 10 years under Article 15(1) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA has expired (70). According to Article 15(3) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA any potential aid granted through the measure shall therefore be deemed to be existing aid.

5.1.3. Measure 3 – the leasehold agreements

(87) The leasehold agreements were concluded in 1980 and 1989 respectively. The leasehold agreement between Trondheim commune and Nidarøhallen A/S (now TS) was concluded in 1989 for a duration of 50 years. In 1980, the Municipality entered into a 40-year leasehold agreement with Trondheim Tennisklubb. Trondheim Ten nisklubb financed and constructed Hall G of Trondheim Spektrum. The ownership of Hall G, including the lease hold, was transferred to Nidarøhallen A/S (now TS) in 1991 (71).

(88) The Authority considers that any aid granted through these leasehold agreements, including their later use as a collateral, would constitute individual aid, which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement. According to Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the measures would therefore constitute existing aid.

5.1.4. Conclusion – measures 1, 2 and 3

(89) As any potential state aid granted through measures 1, 2 and 3 would seem to constitute existing aid, within the meaning of Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the Authority will not further assess the state aid character of these measures in the present decision.

5.1.5. Measure 8 – aid granted under the Gaming Fund scheme

(90) The funds stemming from Norsk Tipping AS are gaming funds collected, administered and distributed on the basis of the Gaming Xxx 0000 that entered into force on 1 January 1993, before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement.

(91) The Authority considered in its Decision No 537/09/COL of 16 December 2009 (72) that the activities of Norsk Tipping AS constituted an existing aid scheme. The Norwegian authorities have confirmed that no amendments have been made to the scheme since that time. The Authority considers that the funds granted to TS from Norsk Tipping AS are an application of an existing aid system. Existing aid also covers individual aid awards, which have been granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme (73). Therefore, the Authority will not further assess the aid character of the measure in this decision. However, the Authority will take into account the contribution from the gaming funds in any compatibility assessment it may carry out in relation to the measures included in the scope of this decision.

(69)	Article 15(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA.
(70)	This would be the case even if the limitation period would be calculated form the date of when the guarantee was last used in 2001.
(71)	Document No 887522, p. 5.
(72)	Available at xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxx.xxx/xxxxx/xxxxxxxxx/000-00-XXX.xxx. Further, see the Authority’s Decision No 225/15/COL of 10 June 2015 raising no objections to aid in the form of a transfer of land to Vålerenga Fotball, paragraph 57.
(73)	Case X-00/00 Xxxxxxxxxxxx.xx AS v ESA [2011] EFTA Ct. Rep. 266, paragraph 53.

5.1.6. Measure 4 – lease agreements concluded from 1999 to 2017

5.1.6.1. Introduction

(92) The Norwegian authorities have argued that, should the Authority entertain any doubts concerning potential advantages in the lease agreements, the lease agreements concluded from 1999 to 2017 should be considered to form part of an existing aid scheme that predates the EEA Agreement. The Norwegian authorities have stated that the Municipality leased the facilities since its opening in 1963. However, the lease agreements were never for malised before 1995 (74).

(93) One of the complainants has argued that the lease agreements cannot be considered to form part of an existing aid scheme. The complainant refers to the fact that there is no law or regulation that obliges the Municipality to lease facilities for sports. According to the complainant, the recent municipal decision regarding the new and twice as high lease, illustrates the margin of discretion inherent in the conclusion of a new lease agreement. In any case, the new lease would have represented a significant amendment to the aid scheme as it entails twice as much aid as before. The complainant did not elaborate further on this issue since, in its view, the financing of the operation of the premises cannot constitute an existing aid scheme in the first place (75).

(94) The Authority takes the preliminary view that the lease agreements concluded from 1999 to 2017 do not consti tute an aid scheme, for the following reasons.

(95) Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA sets out two definitions of an aid scheme:

‘“aid scheme” shall mean any act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner and any act on the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project may be awarded to one or several undertakings for an indefinite period of time and/or for an indefinite amount’. (emphasis added)

(96) The presence of an aid scheme can be based on either of those two definitions.

5.1.6.2. The f i rst definition under Article 1 ( d) of Part I I of Protocol 3 SCA

(97) The first definition has three cumulative criteria, defining an aid scheme as (i) any act on the basis of which aid can be awarded, (ii) which does not require any further implementing measures, and (iii) which defines the poten tial aid beneficiaries in a general and abstract manner.

(98) The Norwegian authorities first note that the main purpose underlying the construction and ongoing extension of Trondheim Spektrum was to create facilities that the municipality, or more precisely, the local Sports Council, would then distribute among the sport clubs. If not used by the sport clubs, Trondheim Spektrum’s facilities would remain unused throughout most of the year. At the same time, it would be inconceivable for TS to run a balanced budget without receiving the lease income from the Municipality, which acquires this capacity for the sole purpose of providing its citizens with free access to sports and leisure activities.

(99) The Norwegian authorities have referred to an administrative practice and the principles underlying the lease agreements, which have remained unaltered since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement. Those are the leas ing of, in principle, all of Trondheim Spektrum’s suitable capacity during 8 months of the year, the possibility for TS to offer some of this capacity on the market for third parties and at a price that is periodically adjusted to reflect, in particular, extensions of Trondheim Spektrum’s capacity.

(100) In the view of the Norwegian authorities, this mechanism, even if not strictly legally binding, could be regarded as an ‘act’ which also defines the potential aid beneficiary, as required by Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA (76).

(101) The Norwegian authorities have argued that while the Municipality negotiates the new lease contracts with TS upon expiry of the previous one, it could not deviate from the mechanism without endangering its capacity to deliver sports and leisure possibilities to its citizens. As a result, there have only been minor adaptations to the lease agreements over the years. Notwithstanding the fact that the lease agreement falls – through its responsibil ity for the annual budget – under the oversight of the City Council, the possible modifications are rather of a ‘technical application’ based on the principles of the act, and do not, in the view of the Norwegian authorities, convey sufficient discretion upon the Municipality to be considered as implementing measures (77).

(74)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 23.
(75)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 4.
(76)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 24.
(77)	The Norwegian authorities refer to the Authority’s Decision No 519/12/COL of 19 December 2012 closing the formal investigation procedure into potential aid to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, paragraph 180.

(102) As the Norwegian authorities have stated, existing ‘aid schemes’ have been held to encompass non-statutory cus tomary law (78) and administrative practice related to the application of statutory (79) and non-statutory law (80). In one case, the Commission found that an aid scheme relating to Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung was based on the combination of an unwritten old legal principle combined with widespread practice across Germany (81).

(103) In a recent judgment, the General Court made the following observations on the basis of the definition of an aid scheme in Article 1(d) of Regulation (EC) No 2015/1589 (82), as interpreted by case-law (83):

‘First, if individual aid awards are made without further implementing measures being adopted, the essential ele ments of the aid scheme in question must necessarily emerge from the provisions identified as the basis for the scheme.

Secondly, where the national authorities apply that scheme, those authorities cannot have any margin of discre tion as regards the determination of the essential elements of the aid in question and whether it should be awarded. For the existence of such implementing measures to be precluded, the national authorities’ power should be limited to the technical application of the provisions that allegedly constitute the scheme in question, if neces sary after verifying that the applications meet the pre-conditions for benefiting from that scheme.

Thirdly, it follows from Article 1(d) of Regulation (EC) No 2015/1589 that the acts on which the aid scheme is based must define the beneficiaries in a general and abstract manner, even if the aid granted to them remains indefinite.’

(104) In the case at hand, there is no legal obligation on the Municipality to enter into a lease agreement with TS. Nor is there any legislation which provides the framework under which the lease agreements are made. Furthermore, it appears that the Municipality has, at least on some occasions, decided unilaterally how much rent it pays to TS under the lease agreements (84). The complainants allege that the rent has never been based on arm’s length nego tiations but decided unilaterally by the Municipal Board of the Municipality.

(105) The alleged aid measure in question is the rent paid above market terms to TS under the lease agreement. If the Municipality can decide unilaterally the level of the rent, then that affords it the discretion to decide whether to grant TS the alleged aid or not, as well as the amount of the alleged aid.

(106) It thus appears to the Authority, based on the information provided by the Norwegian authorities so far, that the administrative practice and the principles referred to by the Norwegian authorities do not constitute an ‘act on the basis of which aid can be awarded’. Moreover, it appears to the Authority that the Municipality enjoys discre tion when entering into the lease agreements with TS, so that it can determine the essential elements of the potential aid in question. Should that be the case, the second criterion and the first criterion of the first definition under Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA would not be fulfilled.

(107) Finally, the Norwegian authorities have not explained how the third criterion could be fulfilled by the principles and administrative practice in question.

(108) As all conditions of the first definition must be cumulatively fulfilled, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the lease agreements concluded from 1999 to 2017 do not constitute an aid scheme.

5.1.6.3. The second definition under Article 1 ( d) of Part I I of Protocol 3 SCA

(109) The second definition has three cumulative criteria, defining an aid scheme as (i) any act on the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project (ii) may be awarded to one or several undertakings (iii) for an indefi nite period of time and/or for an indefinite amount.

(78)	See the Authority’s Decision No 405/08/COL of 27 June 2008 closing the formal investigation procedure with regard to the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund, section II.2.3.1.
(79)	See Commission Decision No E-45/2000 Fiscal exemption in favour of Schiphol Group (OJ C 37, 11.2.2004, p. 13).
(80)	The Authority’s Decision No 491/09/COL of 2 December 2009 Norsk Film group, Chapter II.2 p. 8. See also the Authority’s Deci sion No 075/16/COL of 20 April 2016 to propose appropriate measures regarding the use of publicly owned land and natural resources by electricity producers in Iceland, paragraph 114, and Decision No 519/12/COL of 19 December 2012 closing the formal investigation into potential aid to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene.
(81)	See Commission Decision No E-10/2000 State guarantees for public banks in Germany (OJ C 150 22.6.2002, p. 7).
(82)	Article 1(d) of Regulation (EC) No 2015/1589 corresponds to Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA.
(83)	Judgment in Belgium v Commission, T-131/16 and T-263/16, EU:T:2019:91, paragraphs 85–88.
(84)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 8.

(110) The Norwegian authorities have not argued that the alleged aid scheme falls within the second definition of Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA. The Authority therefore lacks information to assess this.

(111) However, the Authority notes that in line with the administrative practice and principles referred to by the Nor wegian authorities, the lease agreements have been concluded for a specific time period and expire at a certain date. Moreover, the lease agreements set out the rental price for the facilities rented to the Municipality. It there fore appears to the Authority that the third condition would not be fulfilled.

(112) As all conditions of the second definition must be fulfilled cumulatively, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the lease agreements concluded from 1999 to 2017 do not constitute an aid scheme.

5.1.6.4. Limitation period

(113) Pursuant to Article 15(1) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the powers of the Authority to recover aid are subject to a limitation period of 10 years. The limitation period shall begin on the day on which the unlawful aid is awarded to the beneficiary either as individual aid or as aid under an aid scheme. Any action taken by the Authority, with regard to the unlawful aid shall interrupt the limitation period (85).

(114) In this decision, the Authority will only further assess the potential aid character of the lease agreements for which the limitation period has not expired.

(115) The General Court has confirmed that a request for information constitutes a measure interrupting the 10-year limitation period (86). Furthermore, the General Court stated, in relation to an information request from the Com mission that: ‘When it addresses a request for information to a Member State, the Commission is informing that State that it has in its possession information concerning aid alleged to be unlawful and, if necessary, that that aid will have to be repaid. Accordingly, the simplicity of the request for information does not have the consequence of depriving it of legal effect as a measure capable of interrupting the limitation period’ (87).

(116) By letter dated 27 March 2017, the Authority sent the first complaint in the case to the Norwegian authorities and invited them to comment on the complaint (88). By that letter, the Authority informed the Norwegian author ities that it had in its possession information concerning alleged unlawful state aid and invited them to provide their comments. The Authority therefore considers that by sending the first complaint to the Norwegian authori ties, it took action within the meaning of Article 15(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, and therefore interrupted the limitation period on 27 March 2017.

(117) Accordingly, the lease agreements for which the limitation period has not expired, would appear to be following:

(a) Lease agreement 2007 – 2008;

(b) Lease agreement 2009 – 2010; and

(118) This is because it would seem from the information provided by the Norwegian authorities that the lease agree ment entered into force on 1 January 2008 (89), which in the absence of any indication to the contrary should be taken as the day any aid was granted under the agreement. However, it appears that the lease agreement listed by the Norwegian authorities, as preceding the 2007 – 2008 lease agreement expired on 31 December 2006. The Authority thus lacks information regarding the lease agreement in force during the year 2007. Moreover, the Authority does not have information on when the lease agreement of 2007 – 2008 was signed, and on whether the date of signing could be the date that any aid was granted under the agreement.

(119) The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to submit further information in this regard.

(85)	Article 15(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA.
(86)	See judgment in Xxxxx x Xxxxxxxxxx, T-366/00, EU:T:2003:113, paragraph 60: ‘It follows that the mere fact that the applicant was not aware of the existence of the Commission’s request for information from the French authorities beginning on 17 January 1997 […] does not have the effect of depriving them of legal effect vis-á-vis the applicant. Consequently, the letter of 17 January 1997, sent by the Commission before the initiation of the administrative procedure and requesting further information from the French authorities, constitutes, under Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, a measure interrupting the 10-year limitation period’. Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (no longer in force) corresponds to Article 15 of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA.
(87)	Judgment in Département du Loiret v Commission, T-369/00, EU:T:2003:114, paragraphs 81 and 82.
(88)	Document No 849708.
(89)	Exhibit Q to Document No 859501.

5.1.7. Conclusion – new vs. existing aid

(120) In light of the above findings, the Authority’s further assessment in this decision is limited to potential new aid entailed in measures 4 to 7 and 9, which all post-date the entering into force of the EEA Agreement and where the limitation period has not expired: That is, the lease agreements concluded from 2007 to 2017 (measure 4), the new lease agreement of 2019 (measure 5), the capital increase related to new and unexpected costs (measure 6), the financing of infrastructure costs (measure 7) and the implicit guarantee inherent in the loan agreement between TS and Nordea (measure 9).

5.2. The concept of state aid

(121) Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

(122) The qualification of a measure as aid within the meaning of this provision therefore requires the following cumu lative conditions to be met: the measure must (i) be granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confer an advantage on an undertaking; (iii) favour certain undertakings (selectivity); and (iv) be liable to distort competition and affect trade.

5.3. State resources

(123) Only advantages granted directly or indirectly through state resources can constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. State resources include all resources of the public sector, including municipalities (90).

(124) The transfer of state resources may take many forms, such as direct grants, loans, guarantees, direct investment in the capital of companies, and benefits in kind. A firm and concrete commitment to make state resources available at a later point in time is also considered a transfer of state resources. A positive transfer of funds does not have to occur; foregoing state revenue is sufficient. Waiving revenue which would otherwise have been paid to the State constitutes a transfer of state resources (91).

(125) Measures 4 to 7 and 9 were granted by the Municipality in the form of payments under lease agreements, a capital increase, the reduction of infrastructure costs allegedly borne by a developer and as a potential implicit guarantee inherent in a loan agreement between TS and Nordea. Consequently, the measures entail the transfer of state resources.

5.4. Advantage

5.4.1. Introduction

(126) The qualification of a measure as state aid requires that it confers an advantage on the recipient. An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit, which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions.

5.4.2. Measure 4 – the lease agreements concluded from 2007 to 2017

(127) The Norwegian authorities have argued that the lease agreements concluded from 2007 to 2017 are market con form and therefore do not entail an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Norwegian authorities have not, however, put forward further arguments to the effect that the Municipality acted as a market investor, when entering into the lease agreement with TS.

(128) The EEA legal order is neutral with regard to the system of property ownership and does not in any way preju dice the right of EEA States to act as economic operators. However, when public authorities directly or indirectly carry out economic transactions in any form, they are subject to EEA State aid rules. Economic transactions car ried out by public bodies (including public undertakings) do not confer an advantage on its counterpart, and therefore do not constitute aid, if they are carried out in line with normal market conditions (92).

(90)	Judgment in Germany v Commission, C-248/84, EU:C:1987:437, and NoA, paragraph 48.
(91)	Judgment in France v Ladbroke Racing Ltd and Commission, C-83/98 P, EU:C:2000:248, paragraphs 48 – 51.
(92)	NoA, p. 73 and 74.

(129) The Norwegian authorities have noted that given the different sizes, equipment, design and location of other venues in Norway, it is not possible to identify a fully equivalent venue to Trondheim Spektrum (93). However, the Norwegian authorities have provided information to support its argument that the lease agreements have been market confirm.

(130) The Municipality has provided information on how TS’ pricing to third parties compares to other venues and information on prices for leasing hall capacity for sports and leisure purposes in other venues.

(131) The Norwegian authorities have explained that Trondheim Spektrum disposes of two halls larger than 2 000 m2 (Hall D and Hall F), which are particularly suited for larger fairs, concerts, conferences and similar events. Depending on the type of event, TS charges approximately NOK 70 000 to NOK 85 000 per day for the larger hall D (approximately EUR 7 230 – 8 780), and NOK 59 000 to NOK 70 000 for the somewhat smaller hall F (approximately EUR 6 100 – 7 230).

(132) The Norwegian authorities made a comparison with leasing such facilities in other venues in Trondheim. The freemasons lodge in Trondheim, for example, charges a daily rate of only NOK 15 000 to NOK 18 000 (approxi mately EUR 1 550 – 1 860). This is a somewhat smaller venue, it can accommodate up to 600 persons, whereas Hall F in Trondheim Spektrum has a capacity of more than 1 000 persons.

(133) According to the Norwegian authorities, venues located in Norwegian cities of comparable sizes charge similar rates. In Stavanger, renting of capacity similar to that of Hall F costs just above NOK 200 000 for four days, whereas Grieghallen in Bergen charges approximately NOK 300 000 for four days (approximately EUR 20 100 and 31 000). TS’ prices lie just below Bergen (94).

(134) The Norwegian authorities have further referred to Sotra Arena located in the municipality of Fjell, a 25 minutes drive from the city of Bergen, a venue with 12 000 m2 indoor capacity. In 2016, this venue was used for trade fairs charging approximately NOK 100 000 to 125 000 for three days (approximately EUR 10 300 – 12 900) for approximately 5 000 to 7 000 m2.

(135) In view of this comparison, the Norwegian authorities state that it would appear that TS’ prices for hall capacity, when rented out to third parties, are in line with market prices.

(136) The Municipality purchases capacity from TS, sports clubs with own facilities, other state authorities (in buildings such as high-schools) and to a very limited degree, from private facilities.

(137) The hourly rate paid by the Municipality ranges between NOK 350 and 2 046 per hour (approximately EUR 36 and 211). The hourly rate paid to TS is NOK 1 174 (approximately EUR 121) (95). The Norwegian authorities note that the difference in the prices can be explained by a variety of factors. Also, a number of these venues have been financed (partly) by the State and are contractually bound to provide (some) capacity at fixed rates.

(138) Other factors, which may explain the relatively large differences in prices, are that not all daytimes are similarly valuable and not all venues are as modern, well equipped and centrally located as Trondheim Spektrum. The Norwegian authorities have explained that all of the foregoing considerations are reasons why some of the capac ity that the Municipality purchases from other venues is comparatively cheap (96).

(139) The Norwegian authorities provided examples of the rates charged by Vestlandshallen, a sports centre in Bergen. According to the Norwegian authorities, this venue charges approximately the same price to (non-sport club) users as the Municipality pays to TS. This is based on a calculation whereby one of TS’ ‘hall hours’ is for a surface area of 800 m2 and comprises 60 minutes. A ‘quarter hall’ in Vestlandshallen would be approximately 440 m2 and cost NOK 940 for 90 minutes (approximately EUR 97). This would result in a theoretical price of approxi mately NOK 626 for 60 minutes and hence NOK 1 252 for a slightly larger surface area than the equivalent in TS (approximately EUR 65 and 129).

(140) Moreover, the Norwegian authorities argue that the City of Bergen charges non-preferential users NOK 1 150 for one hour in Haukelandshallen, a venue comparable to Trondheim Spektrum (approximately EUR 119). Further more, the City of Tromsø charges up to NOK 1 940 for one hour of similar surface area in Tromsøhallen (approximately EUR 200).

(93)	Document 859501, p. 17.
(94)	Xxxxxxxx Xx 000000, p. 17–18. The Norwegian authorities have further referred to a management interview with Trondheim Messeselskap AS, a company that organizes fairs all over Norway in which the Municipality was informed that Trondheim Spektrum is not perceived as a particularly cheap location. The Norwegian authorities have referred to this interview for further details on price comparison.
(95)	Presumably by dividing the total price paid by number of hours, 14 679 522/12 500 = 1174.36.
(96)	Document No 859501, p. 18.

(141) The Authority notes that these prices appear to be charged for specific events whereas the assessment in the case at hand concerns an agreed price for a large amount of capacity over a long period of time.

(142) Furthermore, as noted by the Norwegian authorities, there are important differences when it comes to comparing these venues, for example in the rental time (97), the quality of the facilities and the location of the venues within (or outside) the cities. In light of this, the Authority is not convinced that these examples submitted by the Nor wegian authorities provide a sufficient degree of comparability to be able to establish that the lease agreements have conformed to market terms.

(143) In order to establish whether a transaction conforms to market conditions, the transaction can be assessed in the light of the terms under which comparable transactions carried out by comparable private operators have taken place in comparable situations (98).

(144) Benchmarking may not be an appropriate method to establish market prices if the available benchmarks have not been defined with regard to market considerations or if the existing prices are significantly distorted by public interventions (99).

(145) Finally, there are other indications that the lease agreements have not been entered into on market terms, indicat ing a need for further assessment.

(146) First, the Norwegian authorities have explained that, in the past, the rent in the lease agreements has been set, inter alia, on the basis of TS’ cost structure, with a focus on putting TS in a position to pay off its loans and continue operations.

(147) Second, in the past, there are examples where the rent has been reduced unilaterally by the Municipality, due to reasons unrelated to the use of the facilities (100).

(148) Third, the Norwegian authorities have explained that the lease agreements have provided that TS can reclaim up to 2 000 hours annually under the lease agreements. TS can therefore use the facilities, which are otherwise reserved under the lease agreements for other purposes, for those specific hours. The Norwegian authorities have explained that TS has reclaimed 945 – 2 173 hours annually from 2010 to 2017 and that there is no mechanism for the reduction of the overall rent when TS reclaims rented hours. However, the Norwegian authorities have explained that these are hours which the Municipality for distribution purposes gains access to, but never pays for (101).

(149) In the light of the aforementioned considerations, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the lease agree ments from 2007 to 2017 may have granted TS an advantage.

5.4.3. Measure 5 – the lease agreement of 2019

(150) The Norwegian authorities have argued that the lease agreement of 2019 is market conform and therefore does not constitute an advantage in favour of TS. The Norwegian authorities have not presented arguments stating that the Municipality acted as a market investor when entering into the new lease agreement with TS.

(151) The new lease agreement represents an increase in the rent per hour from approximately NOK 1 200 to NOK 1 700 (approximately EUR 124 to 176) (102). The Norwegian authorities have acknowledged that this is at the upper end of the hourly rates they have provided (hourly rates from a sample of sports facilities range from approximately NOK 350 to NOK 2 046 (approximately EUR 36 to 211)) (103).

(97)	As explained by the Norwegian authorities, not all daytimes are equally valuable.
(98)	NoA, paragraph 98.
(99)	NoA, paragraph 99.
100)	Document No 874440, p. 8. In 1994, the rent was reduced by NOK 2 million unilaterally by the City Council. The reason behind this was threefold; (i) overall economic downturn demanding overall cuts in the city budget, (ii) the City Council was focusing on elderly care, and (iii) after refinancing in 1992, TS had reduced their cost of loan-capital and was deemed able to withstand such a cut.
101)	Document No 896727, p. 6.
102)	Numbers from 2017.
103)	See section 5.4.2 of this decision.
104)	Document No 1040641, p. 9.

(152) Trondheim Spektrum will be, following the upgrade, a modern and very centrally located facility in one of Norway’s largest and fastest growing cities. In the Norwegian authorities’ view, for the Authority to conclude that the lease agreement does entail an advantage, the hourly rate would have to be well above the price ranges observed in the market (104).

(

(153) The Norwegian authorities have further stated that the hourly rate for commercial users of Trondheim Spektrum was higher in the past (from NOK 1 000 to 1 800; approximately EUR 103 to 186) than under the municipal lease contract (NOK 1 200; approximately EUR 124). This is also expected to remain the case going forward, with an hourly rate of approximately NOK 1 700 under the new lease agreement (approximately EUR 176).

(154) Consequently, if it were concluded that the Municipality paid a price above market levels, this would necessarily entail that the commercial users of TS would also do that. In the Norwegian authorities’ view, there is no reason to assume that commercial users would pay a price above market level for the renting of hall space in Trondheim Spektrum (105).

(155) The Authority acknowledges that the benchmarks provided by the Norwegian authorities do enable some degree of comparison. However, as the Authority noted with regard to the lease agreements concluded from 1999 to 2017, the lease agreement concerns an annually agreed price for a large amount of capacity, whereas the hourly rates provided for other venues appear to concern situations where the venue is rented for a limited period.

(156) Furthermore, as noted by the Norwegian authorities, the comparison entails important differences, for example in the rental time, the quality of the facilities, and the location of the venues within the cities. The Authority there fore has doubts as to whether the benchmarks provided by the Norwegian authorities can establish that the lease agreement of 2019 conforms to market terms.

(157) The Authority therefore does not share the Norwegian authorities’ view that the hourly rates observed in the market, as described by the Norwegian authorities, are sufficient at this stage, in order to exclude that the lease agreement entails an advantage to TS.

(158) The Authority accordingly draws the preliminary conclusion that the lease agreement of 2019 concluded in 2017 may have granted an advantage to TS.

5.4.4. Measure 6 – capital increase linked to new and unexpected costs – GBER

(159) The Norwegian authorities have granted ad hoc aid to TS in the form of a capital increase for an amount of NOK 55 million (approximately EUR 5,68 million) under Article 55 GBER. The Norwegian authorities have not argued that TS could have obtained the capital increase under normal market conditions. The Norwegian authorities have explained that TS cannot cover these additional costs through its existing means or through additional mar ket financing.

(160) Accordingly, the Authority finds that the capital increase constitutes an advantage to TS, corresponding to the full amount of the capital increase.

5.4.5. Measure 7 – financing of infrastructure costs

(161) The precise form of the measure is irrelevant in establishing whether it confers an economic advantage on the undertaking. Not only the granting of positive economic advantages is relevant for the notion of state aid, also relief from economic burdens can constitute an advantage. The latter is a broad category, which comprises any mitigation of charges normally included in the budget of an undertaking. This covers all situations in which eco nomic operators are relieved of the inherent costs of their economic activities (106).

(162) The notion of an advantage also covers situations where operators do not have to bear costs that other compara ble operators normally do under a given legal order, regardless of the non-economic nature of the activity to which the costs relate (107).

(163) The Norwegian authorities have provided information relating to the infrastructure costs of the expansion and development of TS as described in section 4.8.

(164) The Norwegian authorities have explained that the infrastructure improvements that are (partly) financed by the Municipality relate to measures that the Municipality would have to implement, but the project affects the timing for when the measures are implemented. Further, the Norwegian authorities have stated that it would be dispro portionate to require the developer to bear these costs and would thus be contrary to Section 17-3(3) of the Planning and Building Act (108). Moreover, they have stated that this approach is consistent with the Municipality’s practice in other comparable projects (109).

(105)	Document Nos 1040641, p. 10, and 1054298, p. 5.
(106)	NoA, paragraph 68.
(107)	NoA, paragraph 68.
(108)	Lov om planlegging og byggesaksbehandling (plan- og bygningsloven) LOV-2008-06-27-71, available at xxxxx://xxxxxxx.xx/ dokument/NL/lov/0000-00-00-00.
(109)	Document No 1059170.

(165) The Norwegian authorities have explained that in order to ensure proportionality of the cost allocation, the total costs that the developer must bear are benchmarked against other projects and practice (cost of contribution to public infrastructure per m2 BRA (110)). For a typical housing development, which tends to be a highly profitable development, experience shows that an acceptable expense per m2 BRA is around NOK 2 000 (approximately EUR 207). In TS’ case, there is a cost of NOK 2 081 per m2 BRA (approximately EUR 215).

(166) However, the Norwegian authorities have not provided information underlying the calculations of the division of costs and have not specified whether these calculations are based on objective criteria. The benchmark used by the Norwegian authorities does not provide full comparability as it refers to a different type of project, that is, a housing development, whereas the case at hand concerns a multifunctional infrastructure. Furthermore, it is not clear how this benchmark has been applied to other projects. The Authority therefore sees a need for a further assessment of the practice of calculating costs for these types of projects. Consequently, the Authority cannot, at this point, exclude the existence of an advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

(167) The Authority thus draws the preliminary conclusion that the division and calculation of infrastructure costs, with regard to the renovation and extension of TS, may have granted TS an advantage.

5.4.6. Measure 9 – implicit guarantee inherent in a loan agreement between Nordea and TS

(168) On 11 December 2017, TS signed a loan agreement for NOK 490 million (approximately EUR 50,67 million) with Nordea (111). Nordea will provide the working capital during the construction period. The Norwegian author ities have explained that the Municipality is not a party to the loan agreement, nor are there any contractual obligations that require the municipality to provide financing or capital to TS (112).

(169) One of the complainants has alleged that the Municipality has granted state aid to TS through the loan with Nordea, in the form of a guarantee.

(170) As described in section 4.10, the loan agreement contains clauses, which mention the possibility for the Munici pality, without acting contrary to the legislation, if necessary, to issue a guarantee for Nordea, in relation to the risk which follows any cost overruns in the construction period (113).

(171) The loan agreement further contains clauses, which state that the lease agreement between TS and the Municipal ity cannot be changed, without Nordea’s prior written approval (114). Furthermore, the loan agreement contains a condition that the Municipality owns at least 77,93 % of TS (115).

(172) The Norwegian authorities have emphasised that the Municipality is not a party to the loan agreement and that it is Nordea that takes into account certain factual circumstances in its risk assessment and that these clauses and statements do not bind the Municipality. More specifically, the Norwegian authorities have stated that the poten tial structural changes in the company and potential political guidelines do not constitute a firm and concrete legal obligation that could bind the Municipality.

(173) Similarly, the Norwegian authorities have argued that the section in the loan agreement that states that the lease agreement with the Municipality cannot be changed without Nordea’s prior written consent, does not bind the Municipality. Were the lease agreement to be changed, it would be for TS to ensure that it obtains the consent of its creditor, i.e. Nordea.

(174) As to the condition for granting and maintaining the construction loan that the Municipality owns at least 77,93 % of TS, the Norwegian authorities recall that the board of TS, which entered into the loan agreement, does not have the authority to bind its shareholders and thereby the Municipality, including a potential future sale of shares. The loan agreements reflect that Nordea is well aware of the fact that the agreement cannot bind the Municipality, given that the second section provides that change in the ownership structure without consent implies a breach of contract by TS (116).

(175) However, the Authority finds the effects of the statements in the loan agreements unclear and can, at this point, not exclude that they provide an advantage to TS in the form of an implicit guarantee from the Municipality.

(176) The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to submit further information in this regard.

(110)	The Authority understands that ‘BRA’ stands for ‘area of use’.
(111)	Document No 1054294.
(112)	Document No 1054298, p. 6.
(113)	Document No 1054294, Loan Agreement between Nordea and TS, dated 11 December 2017, page 5, ‘Other terms’ – bullet point 3.
(114)	Document No 1054294, Loan Agreement between Nordea and TS, dated 11 December 2017, page 5, ‘Other terms’ – bullet point 4.
(115)	Document No 1054294, Loan Agreement between Nordea and TS, dated 11 December 2017, page 4, ‘Change of ownership – mandatory mandatory early repayment’ – first paragraph.
(116)	Document No 1054298, p. 7.

5.5. The notion of undertaking

(177) In order to constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an advantage on an undertaking. Undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (117). Consequently, the public or private status of an entity or the fact that an entity is partly or wholly publicly owned has no bearing as to whether or not that entity is an ‘undertaking’ within the meaning of state aid law (118).

(178) Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (119). Conversely, entities that are not commercially active in the sense that they are not offering goods or services on a given market do not constitute undertakings. In general, both the construction and operation of an infrastructure constitute an eco nomic activity in itself (and are thus subject to state aid rules) if that infrastructure is, or will be used, to provide goods or services on the market (120). State aid may be granted at several levels: construction, operation and use of the infrastructure (121).

(179) A single entity may carry out a number of activities, both economic and non-economic activities, provided that it keeps separate accounts for the different funds that it receives, so as to exclude any risk of cross-subsidisation of its economic activities by means of public funds received for its non-economic activities (122).

(180) Trondheim Spektrum is a multifunctional facility, which hosts, inter alia, concerts, large sport events, fairs, and congresses. Further, Trondheim Spektrum is scheduled to host in 2020 the European Championship in handball for men and women. TS also rents out facilities to the Municipality, which in turn makes them available to the sport clubs.

(181) It is undisputed that TS carries out economic activities, when hosting concerts, large sport events, fairs, con gresses and other such events. Consequently, TS constitutes an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, with regard to those activities.

(182) However, the Norwegian authorities have argued that the use of TS’ facilities by sport clubs cannot be considered as an economic activity, given that neither the Municipality nor TS receives any remuneration from its users. On this basis, the Norwegian authorities have argued that TS provides its services on a market on a commercial basis only in so far as it is offering its spare capacity on the markets for trade fairs, concerts and other such activities. All other activities should be classified as non-economic (123).

(183) Even if the Municipality can be considered to be carrying out a non-economic activity by offering cost-free facili ties for the Municipality’s sport clubs, in principle, the entity supplying the Municipality with such facilities, might very well be carrying out economic activities when doing so. The non-economic activities relate to the services provided to the sport clubs, that is, the relationship between the Municipality and the sport clubs.

(184) Against that background, the Authority cannot exclude, at this point, that TS is an undertaking, not only when hosting concerts, large sport events, fairs, congresses and other events, but also when renting out its facilities to the Municipality, which then provides xxx xxxx space for the Municipality’s sport clubs.

(185) In any event, TS carries out other economic activities and the Norwegian authorities have admitted that, at least in the past, no strict separation of accounts has been maintained as regards what had been considered economic and non-economic activities (124).

(186) Still, the Norwegian authorities have submitted to the Authority a model developed by BDO for the separation of accounts in TS, both for the future and regarding the past. This model has now been implemented by TS.

(187) However, the Authority does not have sufficient information at this point, based on the BDO cost allocation model and the cost projection for the future, to be convinced that the revenue from each activity covers their own set of costs.

(117)	Judgment in Höfner and Xxxxx v Macrotron, Case C-41/90, EU:C:1991:161, paragraphs 21 – 23 and
(118)	Judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v Ayuntamiento de Getafe, Case C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 42.
(119)	Judgment in Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, Case C-222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraph 108.
(120)	Judgment in Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle v Commission, Case C-288/11 P, EU:C:2012:821, paragraphs 40 – 43.
(121)	The Authority’s Decision No 496/13/COL of 11 December 2013 concerning the financing of Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre, paragraph 50.
(122)	Judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v Ayuntamiento de Getafe, Case C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, paragraph 51.
(123)	Document No 859501, p. 20.
(124)	Document No 859501, p. 19.

(188) Consequently, even if the renting out of TS’ facilities to the Municipality for the purposes of providing cost-free facilities to the Municipality’s sport clubs were to be considered non-economic, the Authority is not convinced that TS has excluded the risk that the public funds received could cross-subsidise economic activities.

(189) In light of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that the measures assessed in this decision have provided an advantage to TS’ economic activities.

5.6. Selectivity

(190) To be characterised as state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must also be selective in that it favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. Not all measures which favour economic operators fall under the notion of aid, but only those which grant an advantage in a selective way to certain undertakings, categories of undertakings or to certain economic sectors.

(191) The potential aid measures at issue here are individual measures addressed only to TS. The measures are therefore selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

5.7. Impact on trade and distortion of competition

(192) Public support to undertakings only constitutes state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, if it ‘distorts or threatens to distort competition’ and only insofar, as it is liable to ‘affect trade’ between EEA States.

(193) According to settled case-law, the mere fact that a measure strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, is considered sufficient to conclude that the measure is likely to affect trade between EEA States and distort competition between undertakings established in other EEA States (125).

(194) To the extent that the measures assessed in this decision have not been carried out in line with normal market conditions, they have conferred an advantage on TS, which strengthens its position compared to other undertak ings that it competes with.

(195) The Authority must further consider whether the measures are liable to affect trade between EEA States. In this regards, the Union Courts have ruled that ‘where State financial aid strengthens the position of an undertaking as compared with other undertakings competing in intra-[Union] trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by the aid’ (126).

(196) The City of Trondheim is the third largest city in Norway located about an hour’s drive from the scarcely popu lated areas of mid-Sweden. Trondheim Spektrum has the capacity to host large and mid-size international events, which may also be held outside the region (127).

(197) On the other hand, the Norwegian authorities have submitted that taking into consideration that the majority of the activities carried out in Trondheim Spektrum are of local character and in light of the limited extent of the activities of TS in a market, as well as the marginal aid intensity, if any, it can consequently not be foreseen that the measures would have more than, at most, a marginal effect on the conditions of cross-border investment or establishment (128).

(198) The Authority notes that an effect on trade cannot be merely hypothetical or presumed. It must be established why the measure distorts or threatens to distort competition and is liable to have an effect on trade between EEA States, based on the foreseeable effects of the measure (129).

(199) The Authority and the Commission have in a number of decisions considered that certain activities and measures, in view of their specific circumstances, have a purely local impact and consequently no effect on trade between EEA States. In those cases, the Authority and the Commission ascertained, in particular, that the beneficiary pro vided services to a limited area within an EEA Sate and was unlikely to attract customers from other EEA States and that it could not be foreseen that the measure would have more than marginal effect on the conditions of cross-border investments or establishments. Some of these decisions concerned sports and leisure facilities serving predominantly a local audience and unlikely to attract customers or investment from other EEA States (130).

(125)	Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 76, paragraph 59; and judgment in Xxxxxx Xxxxxx v Commission, C-730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11.
(126)	Judgment in Eventech v The Parking Adjudicator, C-518/13, EU:C:2015:9, paragraph 66.
(127)	Document No 859501, p. 22.
(128)	Document No 859501, p. 22.
(129)	See, for instance, judgment in AITEC and others v Commission, T-447/93, T-448/93 and T-449/93, EU:T:1995:130, paragraph 141.
(130)	See, for instance, Commission Decisions in cases N 258/2000 Leisure Pool Dorsten (OJ C 172, 16.6.2001, p. 16); Commission Decision 2004/114/EC of 29 October 2003 on measures in favour of non-profit harbours for recreational crafts, the Netherlands (OJ L 34, 6.2.2004, p. 63); SA.37963 – United Kingdom – Alleged State aid to Glenmore Lodge (OJ C 277, 21.8.2015, p. 3); XX.00000 – Xxxxxx Xxxxxxx – Alleged State aid to UK member-owned golf clubs (OJ C 277, 21.8.2015, p. 4); the Authority’s Deci sion No 459/12/COL of 5 December 2012 on aid to Bømlabadet Bygg AS for the construction of the Bømlabadet aqua park in the Municipality of Bømlo; and Decision No 20/19/COL of 2 April 2019 Leangbukten Båtforenings Andelslag.

(200) In the case at hand, the Authority notes that even though some of the activities carried out by TS are of local character, TS also hosts events such as trade fairs, which attract foreign customers. Moreover, TS will host the European handball Championship in 2020, which can be assumed to attract foreign customers.

(201) Finally, the market for organising international events is open to competition between venue providers and event organisers, which generally engage in activities that are subject to trade between EEA States (131).

(202) In light of the above, at this stage, the Authority considers that the measures at issue threaten to distort competi tion and are liable to effect trade between EEA States.

6. Conclusion on the presence of aid

(203) The Authority takes the preliminary view that measures 4 to 7 and 9, as specified above, may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

7. Procedural requirements

(204) Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in suffi cient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. […] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

(205) The Norwegian authorities have not notified all of the measures in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, and that to the extent measures 4, 7 and 9 entail state aid, that aid is unlawful.

(206) The Norwegian authorities notified the new lease agreement of 2019, measure 5, on 29 November 2018 (132). The new lease agreement was signed by TS and the Municipality on 25 September and 26 October 2017 respec tively and will enter into force on 1 December 2019. The Norwegian authorities have argued that the new lease agreement is conditional upon being in line with market terms (133). It explicitly enables adaptations to bring the conditions of the agreement in line with market terms should the Authority so require. In light of this, the Authority’s preliminary conclusion is that, should the lease agreement entail state aid, the Norwegian authorities have respected the requirement set out in Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. However, finding this conclu sion less than certain, the Authority specifically invites the Norwegian authorities to submit further information in this regard.

(207) Furthermore, as regards measure 6, the capital increase, the Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have granted this aid to TS under Article 55 of the GBER (134). State aid measures fulfilling all the requirements of Chapter I of the GBER, as well as the specific conditions for the relevant category of aid laid down in Chapter III of the GBER, shall be exempted from the notification requirement. However, as further explained below in section 8 of this decision, the Authority is not fully convinced that the requirements set out in Article 6(2) GBER are fulfilled in relation to this measure. Further assessment of the measure seems required. If the Authority would find that measure 6 does not fulfil the requirements of the GBER it would qualify as unlawful aid.

8. Compatibility of any aid

(208) Should the measures 4 to 7 and 9 entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the Authority must assess whether the aid can be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. It is up to the Norwegian authorities to invoke possible grounds of compatibility and to demonstrate that the con ditions for such compatibility are met (135).

(209) Should the Authority consider that the measures at issue entail elements of (new) aid, the Norwegian authorities are of the view that they would in any event be compatible with the EEA Agreement.

(131)	See to that effect the Authority’s Decision No 496/13/COL of 11 December 2013 concerning the financing of Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre, paragraph 75.
(132)	See further section 2.6. The Authority requested additional information from the Norwegian authorities on 28 January 2019, which the Norwegian authorities provided on 21 February 2019.
(133)	Article 12 of the new lease agreement of 2019 states (in Norwegian): ‘Denne avtalen forutsettes å være inngått på markedsmessige vilkår. Det tas forbehold om at avtalen vil – forut for og i avtaleperioden – justeres for å tilfredsstille eventuelle føringer/krav fra EFTAs overvåkningsorgan (ESA), og/xxxxx xxxxx offentlige myndigheter. Dette for at avtalen til enhver tid skal tilfredsstille markedsinvestorprinsippet.’
(134)	See section 4.7 above.
(135)	Judgment in Italy v Commission, C-364/90 EU:C:1993:157, paragraph 20.

(210) The Norwegian authorities have noted that the Authority has recognised the promotion of sport as a common objective in a number of decisions (136). Similarly, the European Commission has authorised a large number of aid measures in support of sports and multipurpose facilities (137).

(211) Further, the Norwegian authorities refer to Article 55 of the GBER which allows for aid for the construction of sports – or multipurpose infrastructure. In the Norwegian authorities’ view, to some extent, TS arguably also fulfils objectives relating to culture, another well-established objective of common interest (138).

(212) The Norwegian authorities have submitted that TS will not break even without revenue from the lease agreement. The Norwegian authorities consider that there is a demonstrated need for state intervention both as regards the provision of hall capacity to sport clubs and as regards the financing of sports facilities themselves.

(213) The Norwegian authorities submit that in their view, there is no other policy instrument that would have been equally suited to attain the objective and which would be less distortive. The only other option would be for the Municipality to construct, own and operate a similar infrastructure itself, which, in the Norwegian authorities’ view, would hardly be less distortive.

(214) The Norwegian authorities refer to previous decisions of the Authority and state that in the absence of the lease agreement, the sport clubs would evidently not gain access to free hall time in TS. Even a lower level of the lease would put the entire operation of TS at risk and thereby jeopardise both the provision of hall capacity to sport clubs and the existence of TS as such (139).

(215) As regards the incentive effect of the lease agreements, TS could not finance the projects absent the revenue stream from the municipal lease agreement. In that regard, the Norwegian authorities recall that the lease agree ments, while intended to be entered into on market terms – also took account of TS’ cost structure. Lower income from the Municipality would have left a hole in TS’ balance sheet that other – commercial – activities may not have been able to fill. The infrastructure would also have been designed in a different manner and not have taken account of the needs of various kinds of amateur sport. In view of the forgoing, the Norwegian authorities consider that any potential aid clearly has an incentive effect (140).

(216) The Norwegian authorities further refer to the compatibility criteria under Article 55 of the GBER and state that the actual aid element must necessarily be lower than the thresholds in the GBER and that higher amounts could, in any event, be approved under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, in particular, if that aid does not lead to more than a reasonable profit, which according to current projections, is not the case. In view of this, the Norwe gian authorities consider that any potential aid, inherent in the lease agreement, is proportionate and limited to the minimum necessary.

(217) The Norwegian authorities have further stated that if any of the measures addressed would be found to constitute state aid it would be equally clear that those measures would be proportionate. The aid element would be minor in comparison to the costs of constructing and operating Trondheim Spektrum. The Norwegian authorities do not consider it meaningful to calculate a precise potential aid intensity, as undoubtedly, the vast part if not all of the public financing has benefitted TS’ non-economic activities.

(218) In any event, it is apparent from TS’ income statement that it generates a large percentage of its income from sales to third parties and the Municipality takes full account of TS’ other revenues when negotiating the lease agreements. As a result, the aid is limited to the minimum necessary.

(136)	The Norwegian authorities refer to the Authority’s Decision No 357/15/COL of 23 September 2015 to close the formal investigation into State aid in favour of Sandefjord Fotball AS, Decision No 225/15/COL of 10 June 2015 raising no objections to aid in the form of a transfer of land to Vålerenga Fotball, and Decision No 13/18/COL of 29 January 2018 – Templarheimen II – Aid for the con struction and operation of the sports facility Templarheimen.
(137)	The Norwegian authorities refer to Commission Decision in case SA.33728 on the financing of a new multiarena in Copenhagen.
(138)	The Norwegian authorities refer to Article 53 of the GBER, in particular paragraph 2 thereof, and the Authority’s Decision No 496/13/COL of 11 December 2013 concerning the financing of Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre.
(139)	Document No 1046041, p. 13.
(140)	Document No 1040641, p. 14.

(219) The Norwegian authorities further refer to the BDO report and state that no cross-subsidisation of the commer cial activities occurs. Even if the Authority refuses to exclude the presence of aid in the lease agreement, based on the benchmarks submitted by the Norwegian authorities, these benchmarks prove that the lease agreement’s pric ing falls within the range of what is customary in this market in Norway. In that regard, the Municipality notes that the Authority has previously accepted such benchmarks in an infrastructure case as a means to ensure the proportionality of the aid (141).

(220) The Norwegian authorities consider that, as any aid amount would be insignificant and as TS does not under charge its commercial users, any effect on trade between EEA States or distortion of competition would be insignificant at most. The Norwegian authorities therefore submit that a balancing test would need to result in finding any potential aid to TS compatible with the EEA Agreement (142).

(221) The Norwegian authorities state that TS in its present form is a cornerstone of the sports and cultural offer avail able in Trondheim, in particular, as regards free amateur sports. As for the negative effects, the BDO report sup ports the claim that any aid is used to finance activities of local (and most likely non-economic) character, with no spill-over to the commercial, market oriented activities that TS also performs.

(222) According to the Norwegian authorities, it would appear common ground that private investment into facilities such as TS is rare and, in any event, insufficient. In the Norwegian authorities’ view, the aid would therefore not be capable of crowding out private investment.

(223) Further, Trondheim is geographically very isolated by European standards and thus unlikely to compete (directly) with other similar venues in Norway, or even less likely, in other EEA States. Even if that would be the case, that does not seem to have led the Authority or the Commission to question the compatibility of aid to such infras tructures. In addition, the Norwegian authorities have shown that TS does not undercharge its commercial users.

(224) The Authority notes that aid to promote sport and culture, including aid to sport and multi-purpose infrastruc ture, can be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement under certain conditions, as illus trated by Article 55 of the GBER and the decisional practice of the European Commission (143) and the Authority (144).

(225) The possible aid measures at hand vary in nature. At this stage, the Authority does not have the information to enable it to set out the total possible amount of alleged aid granted to TS that would result from these measures. The Authority must thus conclude that it has doubts as to whether the measures would respect the principle of proportionality and be limited to what is necessary to achieve the stated objective.

(226) Furthermore, the Authority does not have sufficient information at this point, based on the BDO cost allocation model and the cost projections for the future, to be convinced that the revenue from each activity covers their own set of costs. Consequently, the Authority cannot exclude cross-subsidization from the alleged aid measures to the other activities carried out by TS.

(227) As to the claims of unlawful state aid granted to TS in the form of the implicit guarantee alleged to be granted in relation to the loan agreement and the alleged relief of infrastructure costs, the Norwegian authorities have not put forward any arguments, regarding possible compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, in case these measures are found to constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to submit information in this regard.

(228) As regards the capital increase, referred to as measure 6 in this decision, the Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have granted this aid to TS under Article 55 of the GBER (145). The Norwegian authorities have pro vided information relating to the increased and extra costs pertaining to the extension and renovation of Xxxxxx xxxx Spektrum, which led to the capital increase being granted to TS (146). In previous correspondence between the Authority and the Norwegian authorities, the Authority had raised the issue of whether the measure fulfilled the criteria set out in Article 6(2) of the GBER. The Norwegian authorities have stated that TS cannot complete the expansion without the requested capital. The Norwegian authorities therefore consider that the aid complies with Article 6 GBER.

(141)	Document No 1040641, p. 15.
(142)	Document No 859501, p. 25.
(143)	See e.g. Commission Decision in case SA.33728 Financing of a new multiarena in Copenhagen, Commission Decision in case SA.33618 Sweden – Uppsala arena, Commission Decision in case SA.47683 Finland – Tampere Arena.
(144)	The Authority’s Decision No 357/15/COL of 23 September 2015 to close the formal investigation into State aid in favour of Sande fjord Fotball AS, Decision No 225/15/COL of 10 June 2015 raising no objections to aid in the form of a transfer of land to Vålerenga Fotball, and Decision No 13/18/COL of 29 January 2018 – Templarheimen II – Aid for the construction and operation of the sports facility Templarheimen.
(145)	See section 4.7 above.
(146)	Document No 930813. Letter from the Norwegian authorities dated 21 September 2018.

(229) Article 6(1) GBER states that the Regulation shall only apply to aid, which has an incentive effect. According to Article 6(2) GBER: ‘Aid shall be considered to have an incentive effect if the beneficiary has submitted written application for the aid to the Member State concerned before work on the project or activity starts. The applica tion for the aid shall contain at least the following information: a) undertaking’s name and size; b) description of the project, including its start and end dates; c) location of the project; d) list of project costs; type of aid (grant, loan, guarantee, repayable advance, equity injection or other) and amount of public funding needed for the project’.

(230) The Norwegian authorities have explained that originally the project costs were estimated to be approximately NOK 536 million (approximately EUR 55,37 million). However, the expectation now is that they will be approxi mately NOK 591 million (approximately EUR 61,05 million), due, in particular, to the fact that the scope of the project increased. The increased costs of NOK 55 million (approximately EUR 5,68 million) can be attributed two both, as described by the Norwegian authorities, new costs (increased scope of the project) and unexpected costs (budget overruns).

(231) As explained by the Norwegian authorities in relation to the measure, Trondheim Spektrum has been undergoing a significant renovation and extension project since summer 2017. TS applied for a capital increase of NOK 55 million (approximately EUR 5,68 million) on 6 July 2018, and was granted the aid on 5 December 2018. It therefore seems that the aid was granted after the work on the renovation and extension project started.

(232) In light of the above, the Authority has doubts, at this point, as to whether the measure fulfils the criteria set out in Article 6(2) GBER. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide further information in this regard.

(233) The Norwegian authorities have not presented arguments concerning compatibility of the measure directly under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, in the event that it would be considered that the GBER would not be applicable to the measure. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide information in this regard.

(234) Consequently, following its preliminary assessment, the Authority has doubts as to whether the measures could be deemed compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

9. Conclusion

(235) As set out above, the Authority considers that measures 4 to 7 and 9, as described above, may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

(236) The Authority has doubts as to whether these measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

(237) Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures do not constitute state aid, or that any aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

(238) The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by Monday, 20 May 2019, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules.

(239) The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Trondheim Spektrum AS.

(240) The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiary will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

(241) If this letter contains confidential information which should not be disclosed to third parties, please inform the Authority by 13 May 2019, identifying the confidential elements and the reasons why the information is consid ered to be confidential. In doing so, please consult the Authority’s Guidelines on Professional Secrecy in State Aid Decisions (147). If the Authority does not receive a reasoned request by that deadline, you will be deemed to agree to the disclosure to third parties and to the publication of the full text of the letter on the Authority’s website: xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxx.xxx/xxxxx-xxx/xxxxx-xxx-xxxxxxxx/.

Done in Brussels, 16 April 2019.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Xxxxx XXXXXX-XXXXXX

President Responsible College Member

Xxxxx X. XXXXXX

College Member

Xxxxx XXXXXXXXXXXX

College Member

Xxxxxxx XXXXXXXXX

Countersigning as Director Legal and Executive Affairs

(147)

OJ L 154, 8.6.2006, p. 27 and EEA Supplement No 29, 8.6.2006, p. 1.

Document Metadata

Table of Contents

INFORMATIE OVER DE EUROPESE ECONOMISCHE RUIMTE

Document Metadata