EUROPESE COMMISSIE
PROCEDURES IN VERBaND MET DE UITVOERING VaN HET GEMEENSCHaPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID
EUROPESE COMMISSIE
STEUNMAATREGELEN VAN DE STATEN — OOSTENRIJK
Steunmaatregel C 16/09 — Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA)
Uitnodiging, overeenkomstig artikel 108, lid 2, VWEU, om opmerkingen te maken
(Voor de EER relevante tekst)
(2010/C 266/05)
De Commissie heeft Oostenrijk bij schrijven van 22 juni 2010, dat na deze samenvatting in de authentieke taal is weergegeven, in kennis gesteld van haar besluit tot verlenging van de goedkeuring van de steunmaat regelen die tijdelijk verenigbaar zijn verklaard met de interne markt en tot verdere uitbreiding van de procedure van artikel 108, lid 2, van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie.
Belanghebbenden kunnen hun opmerkingen over de steunmaatregelen ten aanzien waarvan de Commissie de procedure uitbreidt, maken door deze binnen twee weken vanaf de datum van bekendmaking van deze samenvatting en de daarop volgende brief, te zenden aan:
Europese Commissie
Directoraat-generaal Concurrentie Griffie Staatssteun
Kamer: J-70, 03/219
1049 Brussel BELGIË
Fax x00 00000000
Deze opmerkingen zullen ter kennis van Oostenrijk worden gebracht. Een belanghebbende die opmerkingen maakt, kan, met opgave van redenen, schriftelijk verzoeken om vertrouwelijke behandeling van zijn iden titeit.
1. PROCEDURE
Bij besluit van 18 december 2008 gaf de Europese Commissie uit hoofde van artikel 107, lid 3, onder b), VWEU in zaak N 615/08 goedkeuring voor de noodsteun door Duitsland ten gunste van BayernLB, de meerderheidsaandeelhouder in Hypo Group alpe adria (hierna „HGaa” genoemd), in de vorm van een risicoschild van 4,8 miljard EUR, en een kapitaalinjectie van 10 miljard EUR voor een periode van zes maanden dan wel tot indiening van een geloofwaardig en onderbouwd herstructure ringsplan voor de bank. Deze steun stelde BayernLB in staat om 700 miljoen EUR in te brengen in haar dochteronderneming HGaa. In diezelfde maand verleende Oostenrijk een kapitaal injectie voor HGaa ten bedrage van 900 miljoen EUR in het kader van het Oostenrijkse bankenplan.
Op 29 april 2009 meldde Duitsland bij de Commissie een herstructureringsplan aan voor BayernLB met inbegrip van HGaa. Op diezelfde dag verstrekte Oostenrijk een levensvat baarheidplan voor HGaa, hetgeen uit hoofde van het Oosten rijkse bankenplan is vereist voor fundamenteel gezonde banken.
In haar besluit van 12 mei 2009 betreffende steunmaatregel N 254/09 (hierna „het besluit tot inleiding van de procedure” genoemd) formuleerde de Commissie twijfel over de verenig baarheid met de interne markt van de steun voor BayernLB, wierp zij de vraag op of HGaa fundamenteel gezond was en uitte zij twijfel over de verenigbaarheid met artikel 107, lid 3, onder b), VWEU van de door Oostenrijk aan HGaa verleende steun.
Oostenrijk meldde op 18 december 2009 aanvullende steun aan.
In haar besluit van 23 december 2009 betreffende de steun maatregelen C 16/09 en N 698/09 oordeelde de Commissie de in punt 2 omschreven maatregelen ten gunste van HGaa tij delijk verenigbaar met de interne markt uit hoofde van artikel 107, lid3, onder b, VWEU tot de tot indiening van een geloofwaardig herstructureringsplan en de beoordeling daar van door de Commissie, zij het echter voor een periode van uiterlijk zes maanden. Tegelijkertijd werd de procedure van artikel 108, lid 2, VWEU, uitgebreid tot deze aanvullende maat regelen.
In april 2010 diende Oostenrijk een herstructureringsplan voor HGaa in.
Omdat de Commissie doende is het herstructureringsplan en de steun te beoordelen, verzocht Oostenrijk om een verlenging van de tijdelijke goedkeuring van de maatregelen.
2. DE MAATREGELEN TEN BEHOEVE VAN HGAA
HGaa ontving 700 miljoen EUR van BayernLB en 900 miljoen EUR aan Tier 1 Partizipationskapital van Oostenrijk en liquidi teitsgaranties ten bedrage 1,35 miljard EUR voor uitgifte van obligaties op grond van de Oostenrijkse regeling voor nood steun aan banken.
Bovendien werden ten gunste van HGaa de volgende steun maatregelen genomen, die tijdelijk door Commissie werden goedgekeurd bij het besluit van december 2009:
— een tijdelijke garantie van 100 miljoen EUR door Oostenrijk volgens de voorwaarden voor noodlijdende banken in het kader van de Oostenrijkse regeling voor noodsteun aan banken;
— een herkapitalisatie van 200 miljoen EUR door de deelstaat Karinthië, met een dividend van 6 %, voor de eerste keer betaalbaar voor het boekjaar 2013;
— een verdere herkapitalisatie door Oostenrijk volgens de voorwaarden voor noodlijdende banken in het kader van de Oostenrijkse regeling voor noodsteun aan banken voor een maximumbedrag van 350 miljoen EUR;
— liquiditeitsmaatregelen ten bedrage van ongeveer 200 mil joen EUR door de deelstaat Karinthië in de context van bestaande zakelijke relaties.
3. BEOORDELING
De Commissie heeft in haar besluiten van 12 mei 2009 en
23 december 2009 al vastgesteld dat de ten behoeve van HGaa verleende maatregelen staatssteun vormen.
De oorspronkelijke, in de twee voorgaande besluiten geuite twijfel over de verenigbaarheid van de steunmaatregelen is nog niet weggenomen door de indiening van het herstructure ringsplan.
Met betrekking tot het herstel van de levensvatbaarheid twijfelt de Commissie of het algehele bedrijfsmodel van de bank ge schikt is om de levensvatbaarheid te herstellen.
Gelet op de lage rating en te verwachten hoge fundingkosten van HGaa in het licht van het verstrijken van de garanties van
heroriënteren, waarvan met name haar door geringe marges gekenmerkte activiteiten ter zake van overheidsfinanciering te lijden kunnen krijgen.
Voorts is de Commissie van mening dat HGaa zich voor aan zienlijke problemen ziet gesteld ten aanzien van de kwaliteit van haar activa, gezien de lage en nog steeds verslechterende kwa liteit van haar leningenportefeuille en twijfelt zij eraan of de onderliggende problemen met betrekking tot het besluitvor mings- en risicobeheersproces tijdig kunnen worden opgelost.
De Commissie twijfelt er ook aan of de bank in staat zou zijn haar eigen kapitaal te vergoeden zoals vermeld in de herstruc tureringsmededeling, welke een passende rendement op eigen vermogen vereist, overeenkomstig het risicoprofiel van de bank, en of de bank in staat is een passende vergoeding te geven, rekening houdend met normale marktomstandigheden, respec tievelijk het door de staat verschafte kapitaal op termijn terug te betalen.
Daarnaast vraagt de Commissie zich af of het door Oostenrijk in het kader van het Oostenrijkse bankenplan in HGaa inge brachte kapitaal, op passende wijze wordt vergoed aangezien de bank door Oostenrijk ten tijde van de kapitaalinjectie in decem ber 2008 als fundamenteel gezond werd beschouwd en der halve lagere tarieven kon genieten. De Commissie herinnert eraan dat zij in haar besluit van mei 2009 vraagtekens heeft gezet bij het oordeel van Oostenrijk dat de bank fundamenteel gezond is.
Met betrekking tot maatregelen voor het aanpakken van mede dingingsverstoringen, herinnert de Commissie aan haar twijfel of de voorgestelde maatregelen toereikend zijn om de door de steun veroorzaakte verstoringen passend te beperken. Met name lijken de meeste van de activiteiten die HGaa voornemens is af te stoten, zich te concentreren op verliesgevende activiteiten, waarvan de afstoting noodzakelijk is om de levensvatbaarheid te herstellen. Met andere woorden, de Commissie vraagt zich af of er niet meer maatregelen noodzakelijk zijn om de door de steun veroorzaakte mededingingsverstoringen te verhelpen.
TEKST VaN DE BRIEF
„The Commission wishes to inform your authorities that it has further extended the procedure laid down in article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) initiated on 12 May 2009 with its decision C(2009) 3811 final. The Commission also prolongs the authorisation of the aid it has temporarily found compatible with the internal market until it has concluded its examination of the restructuring plan.
1. PROCEDURE
(1) By decision of 18 December 2008 the European Commis sion approved in case N 615/08 emergency State aid from Germany to BayernLB in form of a risk shield of EUR 4,8 billion and a capital injection of EUR 10 billion on the basis of article 107(3)(b) TFEU for a period of six months or until the submission of a credible and substantiated restruc turing plan for the bank (1).
de deelstaat Karinthië en de fundingsteun van BayernLB, de
vroegere eigenaar van HGaa, vraagt de Commissie zich boven dien af of HGaa haar bedrijfsmodel niet ingrijpender moet
(1) Commission Decision of 18 December 2008 in case N 615/08
BayernLB, OJ C 80/4 of 3 april 2009.
(2) In the same month, BayernLB's subsidiary Hypo Group alpe adria (HGaa) received EUR 700 million from Bay ernLB following large write-downs and losses. In addition, HGaa received EUR 900 million in Tier 1 Partizipations kapital (1) from the Republic of austria on the basis of the austrian emergency bank support scheme (2).
(3) On 29 april 2009, Germany notified a restructuring plan for BayernLB (including HGaa) to the Commission. at the same date austria provided a viability plan for HGaa.
(4) In its decision of 12 May 2009 in case N 254/09 (3) the Commission opened the formal investigation procedure, raising doubts about the compatibility of the restructuring aid to BayernLB with the internal market, in particular whether the restructuring plan was apt to restore the via bility of BayernLB (“the opening decision”). In the same decision, the Commission questioned whether HGaa was fundamentally sound and it expressed doubts regarding the compatibility with article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, now article 107(3)(b) TFEU, of the aid granted to HGaa by
2.1. The beneficiary
(10) HGaa is the sixth largest austrian bank with a balance sheet of EUR 41 billion as of 31 December 2009, corres ponding to roughly 15 % of austrian GDP.
(11) HGaa is fully owned by the austrian State after the na tionalisation of 23 December 2009.
(12) HGaa is active in 12 countries (austria, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Ger many, Liechtenstein (in liquidation), Hungary, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine). The business in Liechtenstein is in liquidation. The bank is active in both banking and leasing, but does not pursue both activities in all the countries mentioned above.
(13) HGaa had pursued an aggressive growth strategy, in par ticular aimed at taking advantage of the rapidly growing
markets in South-Eastern Europe. In the past decade,
austria.
HGaa entered Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro,
(5) austria notified additional aid measures on 18 December 2009, including a temporary asset guarantee under the austrian scheme, a capital injection and a provision of liquidity, see below point 19.
(6) In its decision of 23 December 2009 in cases C 16/09 and N 698/09 (4) (“the rescue decision”) the Commission ex tended the procedure in relation to the following measures
Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine. In addition to those markets, the group also entered Hungary and Germany during that period.
(14) The bank has a substantial market shares in some of the South-Eastern European countries in which it is active: its market share in banking amounts to [> 10 %] (*) in Mon tenegro and [> 8 %] in Croatia, and its market share in
in favour of
HGaa
which it at the same time found
leasing amounts to over [> 15 %] in Croatia and Slovenia,
temporarily compatible with the internal market on the basis of article 107(3)(b) TFEU until the submission of a credible restructuring plan and its assessment by the Com mission, but at most for a period of six months: a tem porary guarantee of EUR 100 million, a recapitalisation of EUR 200 million by Land Carinthia, a further recapitalisa tion for a maximum amount of EUR 350 million and the liquidity provided by the Land of Carinthia. The measures are described in detail in paragraph 19.
[> 20 %] in FYRoM and [> 30 %] in Montenegro. The ex pansion strategy of the bank was facilitated by the liability guarantees of the Land (federal State) Carinthia amounting to about EUR 19 billion at the end of 2009, which has enabled the bank to borrow money at favourable conditi ons (5).
(15) Following the prospect of large losses and write-downs,
austria acquired from each of the previous owners all
(7) In view of the ongoing assessment of the restructuring plan and aid by the Commission, by letter dated
shares by contract for the symbolic price of one Euro per owner in December 2009.
15 June 2010
austria
asked for a prolongation of the
temporary approval of the measures.
(8) Given the urgency to obtain a Commission Decision be fore the expiry of the authorisation of the measures, both Germany and austria have exceptionally agreed that the authentic language for this decision should be English.
2. DESCRIPTION
(9) For a detailed description of the beneficiary and the aid measures, reference is made to the opening decision and the rescue decision.
(1) Partizipationskapital has no voting rights.
(2) Commission Decision of 9 December 2008 in case N 557/08, OJ C 3, 8.1.2009, p. 2, Maßnahmen nach dem Finanzmarktstabili
(16) HGaa has a rating below investment grade from Moody's (Baa2/P2/E) with a negative outlook.
2.2. The measures
(17) In December 2008, HGaa received EUR 700 million from its majority owner at the time, BayernLB, which itself had received State aid in the same month from the Free State of Bavaria.
(18) HGaa received EUR 900 million in Tier 1 Partizipations kapital from the Republic of austria and liquidity guaran tees of EUR 1,35 billion for bond issues on the basis of the austrian emergency bank support scheme.
täts- und dem Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz für Kreditinstitute und
Versicherungsunternehmen in Österreich, last prolonged by Com mission Decision of 16 December 2009 in case N 663/09.
(3) OJ C 134, 13.6.2009, p. 31.
(4) OJ C 85, 31.3.2010, p. 21.
(*) Confidential information.
(5) This stems from the previously prevailing State guarantees for new debt (“ausfallshaftung”) from the Land Carinthia which was abolis hed with a transitional period and a grandfathering clause in 2003.
(19) In addition, HGaa received the following aid measures temporarily authorised by the Commission's December 2009 decision:
— a temporary guarantee of EUR 100 million by austria under the conditions for distressed banks under the austrian emergency bank support scheme,
— a recapitalisation of EUR 200 million by the Land Carinthia with a dividend of 6 %, which will be due for the first time for the business year 2013,
— a further recapitalisation by austria under the conditi ons for distressed banks under the austrian emergency bank support scheme for a maximum amount of EUR 350 million,
— liquidity measures amounting to approximately EUR
200 million provided by the Land Carinthia in the context of existing business relationships.
reduction of the risk weighted assets by [> 50] % com pared to the 2008 balance sheet. The reduction is achieved mainly through putting some banks and leasing activities in a run off mode or divesting them as explained in paragraph 20.
(23) The bank also plans to overhaul many of its procedures as regards credit and leasing decisions as well as its overall risk management framework. It intends to start an annual risk review, to assess the risks inherent to any new product it launches and has already started to apply a reworked method of calculating its risk absorption quality on a group level since June 2009. as a result of this process, HGaa claims having already identified its major risk types.
(24) according to the plan the economic problems of HGaa were significantly influenced by the current financial crisis which affected markets in South-Eastern Europe particu larly strongly. HGaa admits in that respect that quality of its assets has deteriorated significantly, with only [< 40] % of its gross exposure having an internal investment grade rating and with the share of problem loans (1) when com pared to gross exposure increasing steadily since the begin ning of 2008, reaching almost [> 15] % of the bank's gross exposure. In 2009, the amount of risk provisions
of HGaa reached almost [> 150] % of the bank's net
3. THE RESTRUCTURING PLAN
(20) according to the submitted restructuring plan the pro blems of HGaa are largely due to its aggressive growth strategy pursued in recent years which in particular aimed at taking advantage of the rapidly growing markets in South-Eastern Europe. The economic conditions of these countries have deteriorated significantly as a prolonged period of strong economic growth has given way to sig nificant declines of real and nominal GDP. Moreover, los ses and in particular the increasingly large share of non- performing loans were to a significant extent caused by a lack of […] proper control mechanisms […].
(21) The submitted restructuring plan states that HGaa will continue doing business in austria, with a strong focus on Carinthia, where it intends to pursue business in the areas of retail clients, SMEs and selective corporate and public finance. The bank envisages maintaining both ban king and leasing activities in [most countries of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. However, it intends to terminate its leasing activities in […]. Leasing and banking activities will be ended in […]. In austria, the bank also plans to discontinue its cross-border financing business and the financing of big ticket projects. HGaa moreover plans to cease its risky project finance activities and tour ism projects as well as large tourism-based financing ac tivities. Leasing activities will focus on small vehicle and other mobile assets. The new business for real estate is planned to focus on selective opportunities only.
(22) The overall aim of the restructuring plan is to focus on small/retail business with less risk than before, which, ac cording to the bank, will enable it to rely on historically grown competences, in which the bank has made profits in the past, including during the financial crisis. The plan provides for a balance sheet reduction amounting to [> 35] % by the end of the restructuring period and a
interest revenues of that year. It has to be noted that the leasing activities were to a significant degree responsible for the encountered asset problems.
(25) The plan is based on the assumption of a significant tur naround in the markets in which the bank is active, fore casting a return to robust rates of growth in the South- Eastern European countries.
4. ASSESSMENT OF THE AID
4.1. Existence of aid
(26) as stated in article 107(1) TFEU, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competi tion by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market, save as otherwise provided in the Treaty.
(27) The Commission recalls that is has already established that the measures granted to HGaa constitute State aid with its Decisions of 12 May 2009 and 23 December 2009.
4.2. Compatibility of the Aid
(28) The Commission must assess the continuation of all emer gency aid measures as restructuring aid, on the basis of the submitted restructuring plan and against the conditions of the Restructuring Communication (2).
(1) Defined as a high likelihood that the borrower cannot repay the loan, or if the payments are more then 90 days overdue. Taking into account the lower payment morale in some of the markets where HGaa operates, the bank has replaced the 90 days criterion with a 180 days criterion in some countries.
(2) Commission Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules (OJ C 195, 19.8.2009, p. 9).
(29) a restructuring plan needs to ensure that the bank is able to restore long-term viability without continued State aid. The restructuring plan also needs to provide for adequate burden sharing, and limit the aid to the minimum neces sary. Finally, proportionate measures need to be taken to limit the distortions of competition caused by the aid.
(30) The original doubts expressed in decision of 23 December 2009 have not yet been allayed by the submission of the restructuring plan described above. Therefore the Commis sion continues to have doubts as regards the compatibility of the aid.
potential losses could well increase still further, in particu lar if the benign view concerning loss-given-default ratios were not to materialise. Moreover, the Commission doubts that the scenarios applied by the external consultants at that time were sufficiently prudent in relation to “a pro tracted global recession” as specified in point 13 of the Restructuring Communication. Therefore, the Commission continues to have these doubts in relation to the return to long-term viability of the rescued HGaa.
(37) In addition to these previously expressed doubts the Com mission is concerned about the seemingly […] deteriora tion of asset quality and considers that this could consti
(31) as regards the restoration of viability the Commission
tute a major threat to HGaa's viability, which is not
firstly has doubts as regards the overall business model of the bank, i.e. whether the presented plan of maintaining some parts of the business in South-Eastern Europe (while divesting or winding down others) combined with the austrian activities will enable the bank to create sufficient profits to ensure long-term viability.
(32) Importantly, the plan does not show in a satisfactory manner that HGaa will indeed, as claimed, concentrate on activities where it has also made profits in the past, including during the financial crisis.
(33) The Commission furthermore questions whether the largely unregulated leasing activities would not need to be scaled down further, given that they seem to have been one of the main sources of HGaa's problems in the past.
(34) In addition, given HGaa's low rating and prospective high funding costs in light of the expiration of the guarantees from the Land Carinthia and funding support from its former owner BayernLB, the Commission questions whe ther HGaa will not have to reorient its business model more profoundly, which might in particular affect its pu blic finance business, which is characterised by relatively low margins.
(35) Furthermore, the Commission considers that HGaa has to cope with significant problems given the low and still deteriorating quality of its asset portfolio. In that regard it can be considered as a difficult task to overhaul many of the basic decision-making processes and its overall risk management processes. The Commission doubts whether such a large task can be implemented timely, given the complexity of HGaa in many countries while avoiding further problem exposures. The Commission also con siders that a significant part of the problems encountered by HGaa were not mainly the result of the deterioration of the economic situation in South-Eastern Europe but rather of deep-rooted management problems.
(36) The Commission recalls that it noted in the rescue decision of 23 December 2009 that the external report commissi oned by HGaa and BayernLB has found serious problems in the credit monitoring procedures of HGaa as well as in its collateral valuation. as a result the previously projected
addressed by the restructuring plan.
(38) Moreover, the Commission questions whether the unsatis factory rating of HGaa can be improved sufficiently over the course of the restructuring period in order to enable the bank to raise both capital and funding on the markets, which is a crucial prerequisite for the proposed business model of the bank. The Commission notes in this respect that the expiry of the liability guarantees of the Land Carinthia entails the risk of rising long-term funding costs for the bank. Furthermore, the Commission has to exa mine whether the submitted underlying economic assump tions included in the plan are prudent enough.
(39) In addition, the Commission doubts that the bank would be able to remunerate its own capital as required under points 13 and 14 of the Restructuring Communication which requires an appropriate return given the risk profile of the bank and a remuneration at normal market con ditions or the repayment of capital over time.
(40) as regards burden sharing, the Commission recalls its doubts as to whether the burden sharing of the owners (in particular BayernLB, Land Carinthia, GRaWE) has been appropriate.
(41) In addition, the Commission questions whether the injec ted capital into HGaa by austria under the austrian bank scheme is appropriately remunerated as the bank had been considered as fundamentally sound by austria and bene fitted therefore from cheaper remuneration rates. The Commission recalls that it has questioned that assessment at the time austria submitted its viability report for the bank and in the opening decision.
(42) as regards measures for addressing competition distorti ons, the Commission recalls its doubts that the proposed measures are sufficient to adequately limit the distortions created by the aid. In particular, most of business HGaa plans to divest seems to concern loss-making activities and be necessary for restoring viability. In other words, the Commission doubts whether not more measures are needed to address the distortions of competition caused by the aid.
5. CONCLUSION
(43) all measures in favour of HGaa constitute State aid. The Commission still doubts the compatibility of the aid mea sures as regards the restoration of long-term viability, bur den sharing and measures to limit distortions of competi tion.
(44) In light of the doubts regarding the compatibility of the aid with the Restructuring Communication, in particular the failure of the current revised restructuring plan to demonstrate the restoration of viability, proper burden sharing and a sufficient degree of mitigation of competi tion distortions, the Commission needs to further investi gate the measures and thus to extend the formal investi gation procedure pursuant to article 108(2) TFEU.
(45) However, the Commission has established that it can aut horise emergency measures temporarily if needed for rea sons of financial stability (1), when it cannot take a final decision due to doubts on compatibility of the measures as restructuring aid. In light of the ongoing fragile situation of the financial markets the Commission bases its assess ment on article 107(3)(b) TFEU as the breakdown of a systematically relevant bank can directly affect the financial markets and indirectly the entire economy of a Member State.
(46) The austrian Central Bank has confirmed that HGaa is a bank with systemic relevance for the financial market in austria but also in certain countries in South Eastern Eu
6. DECISION
In view of the above, the Commission has decided:
— to further extend the procedure as laid down in article 108(2) TFEU initiated with its decision C(2009) 3811 final of 12 May 2009 and extended with its decision C(2009) 10672 final of 23 December 2009, and
— to prolong the authorisation of the aid it has tempo rarily found compatible with the internal market by Decision C(2009) 10672 final until it has concluded the examination of the restructuring plan for Hypo Group alpe adria.
The Commission requests austria to provide all informa tion necessary for the Commission to assess the compati bility of the aid measures. austria is requested to forward a copy of this letter to HGaa immediately.
The Commission warns austria that it will inform interes ted parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful sum mary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTa countries which are signatories to the EEa agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEa Supplement to the Official Journal of the
rope. Therefore the Commission prolongs the authorisa
European Union, and will inform the
EFTa
Surveillance
tion of the aid it has temporarily found compatible with the internal market until it has concluded its examination of the restructuring plan.
authority by sending a copy of this letter. all such inte rested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”
(1) Commission Decision of 13 November in case C 15/08, Hypo RealEstate, not yet published, and Commission Decision of 31 March 2009 in case C 10/09 ING (OJ C 158, 11.7.2009, p. 13).