社会契约论 The Social Contract
(中英对照)
陕西人民出版社
( 陕) 新登字 001 号
社会契约论 The Social Contract
原 著: [ 法] Xxxx Xxxxxxx Rousseau xx
主 编: 方华文
编 译: 方华文
出版发行: 陕西人民出版社 (西安北大街 147 号 邮编: 710003)
印 刷:
开 本: 787mm ×10 94mm 18 开 11 印张 2 插页
字 数: 136 千字
版 次: 2006 年 5 月第 1 版 2006 年 5 月第 1 次印刷
印 数: 1—5000
书 号: ISBN 7 -224 -
定 价: 元
有几岁年纪的人对出版物匮乏的时期当记忆犹新。 其时, 拿本不容易轮到手的书日以继夜地捧读者有之; 把册学术著作从头至尾抄下来者有之; 抱着套抢购来的文集泪雨滂沱者有之……哪能想到出版物堆得满坑满谷、 睹之让人目眩、 择之让人无所措手足的今天!
彼时至今, 发生了一个我们能读什么书和我们该读什么书的转换。
政治的经济的社会的文化的理论的实践的……浩如烟海地铺排在我们面前, 我们该怎么办? 轻取直入的、 蜻蜓点水的甚至短平快的精神快餐, 倒也不妨去读, 一是我们总得先顾住眼前的柴米油盐, 二是日趋加快的生活节奏, 我们还不得疏散疏散? 只是要切实有效地拓宽自己的视野, x积自己的学养, 提高自己的生存竞争力,那就不是一个随意拿起、 轻轻放下、 等闲视之的问题了。 切入的角度甚多, 但要说潜下心来, 读一点儿被时代潮水筛选出来的经典名著, 是一个上上策, 想来是不会听到什么异议的。
正是出于这个考虑, 我们编辑了一套英汉对照的影响世界历史进程的书。 第一辑计有五个品种: ⑤ 枟国富论枠 ③ 枟论法的精神枠 ④ 枟精神分析引论枠 ① 枟君主论枠 ② 枟社会契约论枠。
影响世界历史进程的书! 什么样的突破, 什么样的影响力, 才能使它们获此殊荣?
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枟君主论枠 的作者xxxxx, 乍看起来, 活脱脱一个离经叛道者! 他一反 “ 以德治国” “ 以德服人” 的社会基调, 主张 “ 目的总是为手段服务” , 统治者必须同时是一个伟大的骗子和伪君子。 这样另类的观点, 甫出世便引起一片大哗, 数代人激烈的论争中, 人们终于看出了xxxx里的前瞻性: “ 许多人曾经幻想那从未有人见过更没有人知道曾经在哪里存在过的共和国和君主国。 可是从人们实际上怎样生活到人们应当怎样生活, 其距离是如此之大, 以致一个人要是为了应当怎样而忘记了实际怎样, 那么他不但无法生存, 而且会自取灭亡。” 原来, 他的论点不是凭空而起, 而是对历代现实分析综合的升华! 想通了其实不难理解, 即如所有的君主都希望落一个仁慈的美名, 但比起坐视混乱从而危害整个社会的过分仁慈来说, 能够创造秩序和统一的残酷实际上要仁慈多了。
天才的xx是自然之子。 写作 枟社会契约论枠 的初衷, 正是有感于本真的人在不合理社会中的异化。 一如他在 枟社会契约论枠 中所叹息的, 这些异化了的人 “ 就像格老古斯的雕像一样, 天气、 大海和风暴已经大大地损毁了它的容貌, 以至于它更像一头凶猛的野兽而不是一尊神” 。 什么样的原则能够引导近代民族摆脱堕落, 走向澄明幸福的境界呢? 他在书中这样回答: 以一种新的契约形式来恢复和保障人的自由和平等, 主权在于人民, 政府当是主权体的公仆。 这些指向封建专制制度和特权的尖锐的锋芒, 为资产阶级法律制度的确立提供了理论基础, 美国的 枟独立宣言枠与法国的 枟人权宣言枠, 都把这些观点写了进去。
xxxx把他辽阔的视野、 xx的学识、 精辟的创见带进了 枟论法的精神枠。 什么精神呢? 和同为启蒙思想家的xx有相似点, 那就是从皇权向人权转化的历史时期中, 人的价值、 人的尊严与人的自由的精神! 只是侧重点不同, 一个偏于权, 一个偏于法。 行政、 立法和司法三权分立、 相互制衡, 以充分保障公民权利的理论,
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是xxx鸠对民主社会机制的绝大贡献。 枟人权宣言枠 就直截了当地指出, 没有三权分立就没有宪法。 他著名的 “ 地理说”, 认为地理环境尤其是气候、 土壤等因素与人的性格发生直接的关系, 为法律所不可忽视, 又展现着怎样的人性的光辉!
好释梦的xxx德, “ 是有史以来第一位正视人类心灵问题的人”。 他打破了理性主义的传统, 肯定了非理性因素在行为中的作用, 换句话说, 他把潜意识的概念引进到向被意识心理学所盘踞的领域。 就其深广意义而言, 他 枟精神分析引论枠 的影响遍及各个方面———心理学、 医学、 人类学、 哲学以及文学艺术。
枟国富论枠 何以维持它经久不衰的辉煌呢? 作为政治经济学古典学派的创立者,xx· x密总结了近代初期各国资本主义发展的经验, 对整个国民经济的运动过程做了系统的明白的描述, 提出了自由放任的主张: 自由经营, 自由贸易, 充分利用完全竞争的市场机制。 书甫出版, 就被有识之士把它和同年问世的 枟美国独立宣言枠并列, 称之为 “ 产业自由宣言书”。 迄今为止, 斯密的经济自由主义和xxx的国家干预主义, 仍然是影响西方经济思潮与经济政策的两大思潮。
这些经典著作之能永不过时, 常读常新, 不仅因为它得出的结论, 也在于它被
推导出的过程。 写作者既有强大的分析能力, 能对他所触及的材料进行筛选; 又有强大的综合能力, 能按照新的和引人注目的方式将其重新组合。 这种新的组合和升华, 我们就谓之为创新!
还有英文呢, 我们采用的是英汉对照的方式, 篇幅短的 枟君主论枠 枟社会契约
论枠 全文对照, 另外三本, 为了保持其原貌, 我们采取节译, 重要的推导和结论,可说是一字不少。 一边是英文, 一边是中文对照; 一边是文章精华, 一边是双语培训, 这样, 你在阅读中的收效之大, 就不言而喻了!
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Contents
Foreword
……………………………………………………………………………
Book Ⅰ
( 8 )
Chapter 1 The Subject of Book Ⅰ …………………………………………………
Chapter 2 The First Societies ………………………………………………………
Chapter 3 The Right of the Strongest ………………………………………………
( 10 )
( 12 )
( 14 )
Chapter 4 Slavery …………………………………………………………………
( 16 )
Chapter 5 That We Must Always Go Back to an Original Covenant ………………
( 22 )
Chapter 6 The Social Pact Chapter 7 The Sovereign
…………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………
( 24 )
( 28 )
Chapter 8 Civil Society ……………………………………………………………
( 30 )
Chapter 9 Of Estate ………………………………………………………………
Book Ⅱ
( 32 )
Chapter 1 That Sovereignty Is Inalienable …………………………………………
( 38 )
Chapter 2 That Sovereignty Is Indivisible …………………………………………
( 40 )
Chapter 3 Whether the General Will Can Err ……………………………………
( 42 )
Chapter 4 The Limits of Sovereign Power …………………………………………
( 44 )
Chapter 5 The Right of Life and Death ……………………………………………
( 50 )
Chapter 6 On Law …………………………………………………………………
( 52 )
Chapter 7 The Lawgiver ……………………………………………………………
Chapter 8 The People ………………………………………………………………
Chapter 9 The People: Continued …………………………………………………
( 58 )
( 62 )
( 66 )
Chapter 10 The People: Continued Chapter 11 Various Systems of Law
………………………………………………
………………………………………………
( 70 )
( 74 )
Chapter 12 Classification of Laws
…………………………………………………
Book Ⅲ
( 76 )
Chapter 1 Of Government in General
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……………………………………………
( 80 )
作者前言 | ………………………………………………………………………… | ( 9 ) | |
第一卷 | |||
第一章 | 开卷之主题 | ……………………………………………………………… | ( 11 ) |
第二章 | 早期的社会 | ……………………………………………………………… | ( 13 ) |
第三章 | x者的权利 | ……………………………………………………………… | ( 15 ) |
第四章 | 论奴役 …………………………………………………………………… | ( 17 ) | |
第五章 | 必须时时回顾原始的契约 ……………………………………………… | ( 23 ) | |
第六章 | 论社会契约 ……………………………………………………………… | ( 25 ) | |
第七章 | 主权体 …………………………………………………………………… | ( 29 ) | |
第八章 | xx社会 ………………………………………………………………… | ( 31 ) | |
第九章 | 论财产权 ………………………………………………………………… | ( 33 ) | |
第二卷 | |||
第一章 | 主权不容放弃 …………………………………………………………… | ( 39 ) | |
第二章 | 主权体不容分割 ………………………………………………………… | ( 41 ) | |
第三章 | 公众的意志是否会出错 ………………………………………………… | ( 43 ) | |
第四章 | 主权的局限性 …………………………………………………………… | ( 45 ) | |
第五章 | 决定生与死的权力 ……………………………………………………… | ( 51 ) | |
第六章 | 论法律 …………………………………………………………………… | ( 53 ) | |
第七章 | 论立法者 ………………………………………………………………… | ( 59 ) | |
第八章 | 论人民 …………………………………………………………………… | ( 63 ) | |
第九章 | 论人民( 续) ……………………………………………………………… | ( 67 ) | |
第十章 | 论人民( 续) ……………………………………………………………… | ( 71 ) | |
第十一章 形形色色的立法体系 ………………………………………………… | ( 75 ) | ||
第十二章 法律的分类 …………………………………………………………… | ( 77 ) |
第一章 概论政府
第三卷
…………………………………………………………………
( 81 )
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Chapter 2 The Constitutive Principle of the Different Forms of Government …… ( 88 )
Chapter 3 Classification of Governments …………………………………………
( 92 )
Chapter 4 Democracy ………………………………………………………………
Chapter 5 Aristocracy ………………………………………………………………
( 94 )
( 98 )
Chapter 6 Monarchy ………………………………………………………………
(100)
Chapter 7 Mixed Forms of Government ……………………………………………
(108)
Chapter 8 That All Forms of Government Do Not Suit All Countries ……………
(110)
Chapter 9 The Signs of a Good Government ………………………………………
(118)
Chapter 10 The Abuse of Government and Its Tendency to Degenerate …………
(120)
Chapter 11 The Death of the Body Politic …………………………………………
Chapter 12 How the Sovereign Authority Maintains Itself …………………………
Chapter 13 The Same -Continued …………………………………………………
Chapter 14 The Same -Continued …………………………………………………
(122)
(124)
(126)
(128)
Chapter 15 Deputies or Representatives …………………………………………
(130)
Chapter 16 That the Institution of the Government Is Not a Contract ……………
(134)
Chapter 17 The Institution of the Government ……………………………………
(136)
Chapter 18 Means of Preventing the Usurpation of Government …………………
Book Ⅳ
(138)
Chapter 1 That the General Will Is Indestructible ………………………………
(144)
Chapter 2 The Suffrage ……………………………………………………………
(148)
Chapter 3 Elections ………………………………………………………………
(152)
Chapter 4 The Roman Comitia ……………………………………………………
(154)
Chapter 5 The Tribunate Chapter 6 Dictatorship
…………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………
(170)
(174)
Chapter 7 The Censorial Tribunal …………………………………………………
(180)
Chapter 8 The Civil Religion ………………………………………………………
(182)
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第二章 各种政府的组织原则
……………………………………………………
( 89 )
第三章 政府的分类
………………………………………………………………
( 93 )
第四章 民主制第五章 贵族制第六章 君主制
……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………
( 95 )
(100)
(101)
第七章 混合政府
…………………………………………………………………
(109)
第八章 任何政府的形式都并非适合于所有国家
………………………………
(111)
第九章 好政府的标志
……………………………………………………………
(119)
第十章 政府滥用权力及其堕落的倾向
…………………………………………
(121)
第十一章 政治实体的死亡
………………………………………………………
(123)
第十二章 主权体如何维护自身的权力
…………………………………………
(125)
第十三章 续第十四章 续
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
(127)
(129)
第十五章 代理人或代表
…………………………………………………………
(131)
第十六章 政府的制度并非契约
…………………………………………………
(135)
第十七章 政府的体制
……………………………………………………………
(138)
第十八章 防止政府篡权的措施
…………………………………………………
第四卷
(139)
第一章 普遍意志不可摧毁
………………………………………………………
(145)
第二章 投票第三章 选举
………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………
(150)
(153)
第四章 xx的公众议事集会
……………………………………………………
(155)
第五章 护民官署
…………………………………………………………………
(171)
第六章 独裁
………………………………………………………………………
(175)
第七章 监察法庭
…………………………………………………………………
(181)
第八章 民间的宗教
………………………………………………………………
(183)
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Foreword
This little treatise is part of a larger work which I undertook many years ago without thinking of the limitations of my powers,and have long since abandoned.Of the various frag唱 ments that might have been taken from what I wrote,this is the most considerable,and the one I think the least unworthy of being offered to the public.The rest no longer exists.
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Foreword
作者前言
可笑我自不量力, 竟不知能力有限, 多年之前率尔操觚写大部头的著作, 该书早已中途而止, 所剩墨迹只是些残章断简, 其余已荡然无存。 取其中精华部分汇集为这部小册子, 我认为会对世人有借鉴的价值。
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BOOK Ⅰ
My purpose is to consider if, in political society, there can be any legitimate and sure principle of government, taking men as they are and laws as they might be.In this inquiry I shall try always to bring together what right permits with what interest prescribes so that jus唱 tice and utility are in no way divided.
I start without seeking to prove the importance of my subject.I may be asked whether I am a xxxxxx or a legislator that I should be writing about politics.I answer no: and indeed that that is my reason for doing so.If I were a xxxxxx or a legislator I should not waste my time saying what ought to be done; I should do it or keep silent.
Born as I was the citizen of a free state and a member of its sovereign body, the very right to vote imposes on me the duty to instruct myself in public affairs, however little influ唱 ence my voice may have in them.And whenever I reflect upon governments, I am happy to find that my studies always give me fresh reasons for admiring that of my own country.
Chapter 1 The subject of Book I
Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains.Those who think themselves the masters of others, are indeed greater slaves than they.How did this transformation come about? I do not know.How can it be made legitimate? That question I believe I can answer.
If I were to consider only force and the effects of force, I should say: “ So long as a people is constrained to obey, and obeys, it does well; but as soon as it can shake off the yoke, and shakes it off, it does better; for since it regains its freedom by the same right as that which removed it, a people is either justified in taking back its freedom, or there is no justifying those who took it away.” But the social order is a sacred right which serves as a basis for all other rights.And as it is not a natural right, it must be one founded on cove唱 nants.The problem is to determine what those covenants are.But before we pass on to that question, I must substantiate what I have so far said.
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我的意图是研究政治风云变幻的社会, 看有哪种政体以及稳固的施政纲领既考虑到人的本性, 又顾及到法律的实质。 在这一探索的过程中, 我将一如既往地综合论述权力的范围以及利益的表现形式。 如此分析, “ 义” 和 “ 利” 便浑然不可分矣。
落笔开篇, 我并无意先把该书的重要性加以论证。 也许有人会问我: 你是君主还是立法者, 为何要撰文评论政治? 我的回答是否定的, 其实这也正是我评论政治的原因。 假如我是君主或立法者, 我就没必要浪费时间发表议论了; 我会身体力行的, 或者索性缄口不语。
我生为一个自由国度的公民, 而且也是一个主权国家的成员, 虽然人微言轻,但享有投票选举的权利, 这就要求我负有关心公众事务的义务。 每当我虑及政府的问题, 通过研究我总能找到新的理由热爱我自己国家的政府, 这给我以幸福感。
第一章 开卷之主题
人, 生来自由之身, 却无处不披枷戴锁。 那些自以为是主子的人, 实际上却奴性更强。 这种变化是怎么发生的呢? 对此我无从得知。 这一点如何能够合法化呢?这个问题我自以为可以回答。
倘若只考虑强权以及强权所施加的影响, 我会说: “ 一个民族被迫屈从他人, 只要它认命了, 那就很好; 但它一旦有能力挣脱枷锁, 而且这样做了, 那就更好了。因为别人有权剥夺一个民族的自由, 而这个民族也同样有权重获自由。 这说明它重新夺回自由是合情合理的, 或者说别人没有理由剥夺它的自由。” 社会制度是一种神圣的权利, 是所有其他权利的基础。 这并非自然的权利, 必须建立在契约的基础上。问题是怎样才能确定其中究竟是什么样的契约呢? 在回答这个问题之前, 我们很有必要梳理清楚以上xx的各点。
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Chapter 2 The First Societies
The oldest of all societies, and the only natural one, is that of the family; yet children remain tied to their father by nature only so long as they need him for their preservation.As soon as this need ends, the natural bond is dissolved.Once the children are freed from the obedience they owe their father, and the father is freed from his responsibilities towards them,both parties equally regain their independence.If they continue to remain united, it is no longer nature, but their own choice, which unites them; and the family as such is kept in being only by agreement.
This common liberty is a consequence of man摧s nature.Man摧s first law is to watch over his own preservation; his first care he owes to himself; and as soon as he reaches the age of reason, he becomes the only judge of the best means to preserve himself; he becomes his own master.
The family may therefore perhaps be seen as the first model of political societies: the head of the state bears the image of the father, the people the image of his children, and all, being born free and equal, surrender their freedom only when they see advantage in do唱 ing so.The only difference is that in the family, a father摧s love for his children repays him for the care he bestows on them, while in the state, where the ruler can have no such feeling for his people, the pleasure of commanding must take the place of love.
Grotius① denies that all human government is established for the benefit of the gov唱 erned, and he cites the example of slavery.His characteristic method of reasoning is always to offer fact as a proof of right.It is possible to imagine a more logical method, but not one more favourable to tyrants.
According to Grotius, therefore, it is doubtful whether humanity belongs to a hundred men, or whether these hundred men belong to humanity, though he seems throughout his book to lean to the first of these views, which is also that of HobbesⒸ.These authors show us the human race divided into herds of cattle, each with a master who preserves it only in order to devour its members.
Just as a shepherd possesses a nature superior to that of his flock, so do those shep唱 herds of men, their rulers, have a nature superior to that of their people.Or so, we are told
① 格洛蒂斯:(1583—1645)荷兰著名的xxx、法学家和人文主义者。
Ⓒ 霍布斯:(1588—1679) 英国哲学家和政治思想家。
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在所有的社会形态中, 最为古老的社会, 即唯一自然的社会就是家庭。 子女在天性上依附于父亲, 这只是因为他们的生存需要依赖他。 一旦这种需要不复存在,他们的自然契约便自动解除了。 子女获得了自由, 不再服从于父亲, 而他们的父亲也不再对他们负有责任, 双方都平等地获得了独立。 如果他们仍然相互依存, 那就不再是自然形态的了, 而是他们自己的选择, 使他们联合在一起。 家庭处于这种状态, 完全是靠双方的契约维持的。
这种共同的自由是人性所产生的结果。 人类的第一法则就是关心自身的生存,最需要照料的就是人类自己。 一个人到了懂事的年龄, 就能够判断怎样才是保护自己的最佳方式, 于是他就成了自身的主人。
因此, 我们可以将家庭视为政治社会的原始模型。 国家首脑具有父亲的形象,而人民则是子女的形象。 所有的人生来都是自由和平等的, 只有看到有利可图时,才把他们的自由主动交出去。 唯一的区别是: 在家庭中, 父亲爱他的子女, 对他们关怀备至, 而国家的统治者对人民却缺乏这种感情, 发号施令的乐趣取代了爱。
格洛蒂斯否认人世间所有的政府都是为了被统治者的利益而建立的。 他举出了奴隶制的例子。 他在推理时方法独特, 总是推出事实以正视听。 我们也许可以想出更为合乎逻辑的方法, 但唯有他的观点恐怕对暴君最为有利了。
根据格洛蒂斯的看法, 究竟是全人类属于一百个领头人, 还是这一百个领头人属于全人类, 是让人怀疑的。 不过, 他在他的书中似乎更倾向于第一种观点, 这也是霍布斯的观点。 这些大作家们认为: 人类就是牛群, 而每一群牛都有一个主人;主人照管牛群, 只是为了把牛一只只吃掉。
正如牛倌在本质上优越于牛群一样, 人类的统治者在本质上也比人民高一筹。费罗指出,xxxxx帝也曾有过这种类比, 并做出了合理的结论: 要么君主是天
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by Philo①, the Emperor CaligulⒸ argued, concluding, reasonably enough on this same a唱 nalogy, that kings were gods or alternatively that the people were animals.
The reasoning of Caligula coincides with that of Hobbes and Grotius.Indeed Aristotle, before any of them, said that men were not at all equal by nature, since some were born for slavery and others born to be masters.
Aristotle was right; but he mistook the effect for the cause.Anyone born in slavery is born for slavery -nothing is more certain.Slaves, in their bondage, lose everything, even the desire to be free.They love their servitude even as the companions of UlyssesⒸ loved their life as brutes.But if there are slaves by nature, it is only because there has been slav唱 ery against nature. Force made the first slaves; and their cowardice perpetuates their slavery.
I have said nothing of the Xxxx Xxxx or of the Emperor Noah,Ⓐ father of the three great monarchs who shared out the universe among them, like the children of Saturn, with whom some authors have identified them.I hope my readers will be grateful for this modera唱 tion, for since I am directly descended from one of those princes, and perhaps in the eldest line, how do I know that if the deeds were checked, I might not find myself the legitimate xxxx of the human race? However that may be, there is no gainsaying that Xxxx was the xxxx of the world, as was Robinson Crusoe of his island,precisely because he was the sole inhabitant; and the great advantage of such an empire was that the monarch, secure upon his throne, had no occasion to fear rebellions, wars or conspirators.
Chapter 3 The Right of the Strongest
The strongest man is never strong enough to be master all the time, unless he trans唱 forms force into right and obedience into duty.Hence “ the right of the strongest” -a “ right” that sounds like something intended ironically, but is actually laid down as a princi唱 ple.But shall we never have this phrase explained? Force is a physical power; I do not see how its effects could produce morality.To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will; it is at best an act of prudence.In what sense can it be a moral duty?
① 费罗:( 公元前20—公元25 年) 犹太人出身的希腊哲学家。
Ⓒ xx古拉:(12—41)xx皇帝,以残暴出名。
Ⓒ xxxx:荷马史诗枟奥德赛枠中的主人公。 他和同伴们途经女巫的妖岛,被变成了猪。
Ⓐ 亚当即枟圣经枠中人类的始祖。 挪亚在枟圣经枠中是洪水的幸存者。 挪亚的三个儿子即闪、
含和雅弗,洪水之后,他们都繁衍了后代,各随各的方言,宗族立国。
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神, 要么人民就是牲畜。
xxxxx理论与霍布斯及格洛蒂斯的观点不谋而合。 其实, 早在他们之前,亚里士多德就曾说过: 人在天性上根本就是不平等的, 有的生就当奴隶的命, 而有的天生就是主宰他人的。
亚里士多德的话是对的, 但他错将结果当成了原因。 凡是在奴役下出生的人,呱呱堕地就是奴隶, 这是再明白不过的道理。 奴隶们披枷戴锁, 丧失掉了一切, 甚至也丧失了对自由的渴望。 他们甚至就像xxxx的同伴们喜欢当牲畜一样, 喜欢被别人奴役。 不过, 如果说有人按天性就是奴隶, 那只是因为奴隶制是违背人的天性的。 最初的奴隶是强权的产物, 而他们的懦弱又使他们永远为奴。
至此, 我还只字未提xx国王, 也未提挪亚皇帝的情况。 挪亚皇帝是瓜分世界的三大君主的父亲。 一些舞文弄墨的人把这三大君主比作xx神话中农神的儿子。我写文章是有节制性的, 希望读者对此存有感激之心。 因为我就是那三大君主之一的直系后裔, 或许还是他们中长子的后裔呢。 如果细加考证, 说不定我还是人类合法的君主哩。 谁知道呢? 不管情况怎样, 反正没人会否认xxxx是这个世界的君主, 就像鲁滨逊曾是荒岛上的国王一样。 确切的原因即: 他曾是唯一的居民。 统治那样一个王国, 有一个很大的优势是: 他稳坐王位, 根本不用害怕叛乱、 战争或阴谋诡计。
第三章 x者的权利
x者也不会永远都是强者, 自始至终地主宰别人, 除非他把武力变为权利, 将别人的服从转为义务。 “ 强者的权力” 就是由此而诞生的。 “ 权利” 一词听上去颇具讽刺意味, 但实际已作为规则确定了下来。 可是, 这个词难道永远都解释不清吗?武力是一种实力, 我看不出它怎么会对道德观产生影响。 向武力屈服是条件所迫,并非出自于个人意愿, 充其量也只是权宜之计。 这在哪一方面能跟道德义务相提并论呢?
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Let us grant, for a moment, that this so唱called right exists.I suggest it can only produce a tissue of bewildering nonsense;for once might is made to be right, cause and effect are re唱 versed, and every force which overcomes another force inherits the right which belonged to the vanquished.As soon as man can disobey with impunity, his disobedience becomes legit唱 imate; and as the strongest is always right, the only problem is how to become the strongest. But what can be the validity of a right which perishes with the force on which it rests? If force compels obedience, there is no need to invoke a duty to obey, and if force ceases to compel obedience, there is no longer any obligation.Thus ,the word “ right” adds nothing to what is said by “ force”;it is meaningless.
“ Obey those in power.” If this means “ yield to force” the precept is sound, but super唱 fluous; it has never, I suggest, been violated.All power comes from God, I agree; but so does every disease, and no one forbids us to summon a physician.If I am held up by a rob唱 ber at the edge of a wood, force compels me to hand over my purse.But if I could somehow contrive to keep the purse from him, would I still be obliged in conscience to surrender it? After all, the pistol in the robber摧s hand is undoubtedly a power.
Surely it must be admitted, then, that might does not make right, and that the duty of obedience is owed only to legitimate powers.Thus we are constantly led back to my original question.
Chapter 4 Slavery
Since no man has any natural authority over his fellows, and since force alone bestows no right, all legitimate authority among men must be based on covenants.
Grotius says: “ if an individual can alienate his freedom and become the slave of a mas唱 ter, why may not a whole people alienate its freedom and become the subject of a xxxx ?” In this remark there are several ambiguous words which call for explanation; but let us confine ourselves to one -to “ alienate” .To alienate is to give or sell.A man who becomes the slave of another does not give himself, he sells himself in return for at least a subsistence.But in return for what could a whole people be said to sell itself? A xxxx, far from nourishing hi唱 ssubjects, draws his nourishment from them; and kings, according to Rabelais①,need more than a little nourishment.Do subjects, then, give their persons to the xxxx on condition that he will accept their property as well? If so, I fail to see what they have left to preserve.
① 拉伯雷:(1494—1553) 法国著名作家,代表作是枟巨人传枠。
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我们可以暂时假设这种所谓的权利是存在的。 我认为这种现象只会生出令人不知所云的xx乱语。 因为一旦武力变成了权利, 原因与结果便会前后倒置, 一种强权征服了另一种强权, 便会继承属于消亡者的那部分权利。 违抗者只要可以逍遥法外, 不受惩罚, 那么这种行为很快便会合法化。 强者总是对的。 可是, 问题在于如何才能成为强者呢? 随着一个政权的灭亡, 依附在上边的权利也消失了, 又怎能提到它的效力呢? 既然武力可以强迫别人服从, 就没必要倡导服从的义务了。 假如不是靠武力强迫别人服从, 别人也就没有义务非得服从了。 因而, “ 权利” 一词是毫无意义的, 没有对 “ 实力” 的解释增加一丝一毫的内容。
服从掌握实力的人吧! 如果说此话的意思是 “ 向武力低头”, 倒是合情合理的警言妙句, 不过也是多余的。 我认为, 还没有人违背过这条道理。 一切权力都来自于上帝, 这我承认, 但所有的疾病也都来自于上帝呀。 没有人禁止我们寻医问药呀!假如我在森林边遇到强盗拦路抢劫, 在武力的强迫下, 我会乖乖地交出钱包。 可是,倘若我能够想方设法保住钱包, 我还会为良心所迫, 将钱包递给对方吗? 不管怎样,强盗手中的枪毫无疑问就是 “ 实力”!
所以, 我们必须承认, 靠武力是不能产生权利的, 人们只有义务服从合法的权力。 在讨论中, 我们不时地要回到最初的问题上。
第四章 论奴役
鉴于任何人对自己的同类都不拥有自然的权力, 而且单凭武力根本无法产生权利, 所以人世间所有合法的权力都必须建立在契约的基础上。
格洛蒂斯说: “ 如果一个人可以放弃自由, 成为主人的奴隶, 为什么一个民族就不能够放弃自由, 臣服于一位君主呢?” 这段话中有几个词意思含混, 需要做出解释。 此处我们仅仅澄清 “ 放弃” 一词的含义就行了。 “ 放弃” 包含着 “ 给予” 或 “ 卖” 的意思。 一个人沦落为他人的奴隶, 绝不是把自己 “ 给” 了人, 而是 “ 卖”掉了自己, 至少是为了换取生计。 可是, 说把一个民族卖掉, 能换回些什么呢? 君主根本不是施财于民, 而是取财于民; 根据拉伯雷的说法, 他们需要的钱财绝非小数目字。 这么说, 臣民们把自己献给君主时, 难道会要求君主同时接纳他们的财产作为条件吗? 倘若出现这种情况, 我看不出他们自己还能剩下什么了。
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It will be said that a despot gives his subjects the assurance of civil tranquillity.Very well, but what does it profit them, if those wars against other powers which result from a despot摧s ambition, if his insatiable greed, and the oppressive demands of his administration, cause more desolation than civil strife would cause? What do the people gain if their very condition of civil tranquillity is one of their hardships? There is peace in dungeons, but is that enough to make dungeons desirable? The Greeks lived in peace in the cave of Cyclops awaiting their turn to be devoured.
To speak of a man giving himself in return for nothing is to speak of what is absurd, un唱 thinkable; such an action would be illegitimate, void, if only because no one who did it could be in his right mind.To say the same of a whole people is to conjure up a nation of lu唱 natics; and right cannot rest on madness.
Even if each individual could alienate himself, he cannot alienate his children.For they are born men; they are born free; their liberty belongs to them; no one but they them唱 selves has the right to dispose of it.Before they reach the years of discretion, their father may, in their name, make certain rules for their protection and their welfare, but he cannot give away their liberty irrevocably and unconditionally, for such a gift would be contrary to the natural order and an abuse of paternal right.Hence, an arbitrary government would be legitimate only if every new generation were free to accept or reject it, and in that case the government would cease to be arbitrary.
To renounce freedom is to renounce one摧s humanity, one摧s rights as a man and equally one摧s duties.There is no possible quid pro quo for one who renounces everything; indeed such renunciation is contrary to man摧s very nature; for if you take away all freedom of the will, you strip a man摧s actions of all moral significance.Finally, any covenant which stipu唱 lated absolute dominion for one party and absolute obedience for the other would be illogical and nugatory.Is it not evident that he who is entitled to demand everything owes nothing? And does not the single fact of there being no reciprocity,no mutual obligation, nullify the act? For what right can my slave have against me? If everything he has belongs to me,his right is my right, and it would be nonsense to speak of my having a right against myself.
Grotius and the rest claim to find in war another justification for the so唱called right of
slavery.They argue that the xxxxxx摧s having the right to kill the vanquished implies that the vanquished has the right to purchase his life at the expense of his liberty -a bargain thought to be the more legitimate because it is advantageous to both parties.
But it is clear that this so唱called right to kill the vanquished cannot be derived from the
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可以说, 专制者给予臣民的是过太平日子的保障。 这话说得倒是漂亮。 可是,如果专制者野心膨胀, 对其他的政权发动战争, 如果他欲望无穷, 朝臣们鱼肉百姓,其蹂躏甚于民间的纷争所造成的灾难, 臣民们从中又能得到什么好处呢? 如果人民为了过平静的日子, 要以面临灾难作为代价, 那么利在何处? 在地牢里过日子倒是很平静, 但单凭这一点就能使地牢成为人们的向往之地吗? 希腊人曾经安安静静地待在独眼巨人的岸洞里, 还不是在等待着被一个个地吃掉。
要说一个人平白无故地将自己送给别人, 一分钱也不要, 那可是不可思议的荒唐行为。 这种行为是不合法的, 无效的, 因为脑子正常的人是绝不会如此行事的。要说整个民族都这样做, 就等于在指一个民族的人都是疯子, 而权利不能基于疯狂的行为之上。
即便一个人可以出卖自己, 也不能够出卖他的子女。 因为他的子女生来是人,应该有自由之身。 他们的自由属于他们自己, 除他们之外, 任何人都无权支配他们的自由。 他们未到责任年龄之前, 他们的父亲可以代表他们制定一些规矩保护他们,维护他们的利益, 然而却不能无可挽回地、 无条件地将他们的自由送给别人, 因为这种赠送会违背自然秩序, 是滥用父亲的权力。 所以, 一个专制的政府要成为合法的政府, 就必须让每一代年轻人都可以自由地决定是接受它还是拒绝它; 如果做到这一点, 该政府就不再是专制的政府了。
一个人放弃了自由, 就等于放弃了人格, 放弃了作为人的权利, 也同样放弃了自己的义务。 对于一个放弃了一切的人, 就不可能再有补救之药了。 其实, 这种放弃是违背人的天性的; 若是丧失了意志的自由, 一个人的行为就完全没有道德意义了。 任何契约, 如果规定一方拥有绝对的统治权, 另一方必须绝对服从, 就是不合乎逻辑的, 是无效的。 谁要是什么都索取, 便什么也得不到, 这难道还不明显吗?没有对等的交换, 没有共同的义务, 单凭这一点到头来还不是一场空吗? 我自己的奴隶能有什么权利跟我讨价还价呢? 他的一切都是属于我的, 他的权利也是属于我的, 如果我拥有了这种权利却和我自己过不去, 岂不成了大笑话。
格洛蒂斯之流叫叫嚷嚷, 说在战争中又找到了一种理由为所谓的奴役权开脱。他们声称, 胜利者有权处死战败者, 而战败者可以用自己的自由为价码赎买他的生命。 他们认为这种交易是比较合法的, 因为这样对双方都有好处。
但显而易见的是:这种处死战败者的权利是无法从战争状态获得的。人们生活
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state of war.For this reason alone,that men living in their primitive condition of independ唱 ence have no intercourse regular enough to constitute either a state of peace or a state of war; and men are not naturally enemies.It is conflicts over things, not quarrels between men which constitute war, and the state of war cannot arise from mere personal relations, but only from property relations.
Private wars between one man and another can exist neither in a state of nature, where there is no fixed property, nor in society, where everything is under the authority of law.Pri唱 vate fights, duels, encounters, do not constitute any kind of state; and as for the private wars that were permitted by the ordinances of Xxxxx IX, Xxxx of France, and suspended by the Peace of God①,these were no more than an abuse of feudal government, an irrational system if there ever was one, and contrary both to natural justice and to all sound polity.
War, then, is not a relation between men, but between states; in war individuals are enemies wholly by chance, not as men, not even as citizens, but only as soldiers; not as members of their country, but only as its defenders.In a word,a state can have as an enemy only another state, not men,because there can be no real relation between things possessing different intrinsic natures.
This principle conforms to the established rules of all times and to the constant practice of every political society.Declarations of war are warnings not so much to governments as to their subjects.The foreigner -whether he is a xxxx, a private person or a whole people 唱 who robs, kills or detains the subjects of another xxxxxx without first declaring war against that xxxxxx, is not an enemy but a brigand.Even in the midst of war, a just xxxxxx, seizing what he can of public property in the enemy摧s territory, nevertheless respects the persons and possessions of private individuals; he respects the principles on which his own rights are based.Since the aim of war is to subdue a hostile state, a combatant has the right to kill the defenders of that state while they are armed; but as soon as they lay down their arms and surrender, they cease to be either enemies or instruments of the enemy; they become simply men once more, and no one has any longer the right to take their lives.It is sometimes pos唱 sible to destroy a state without killing a single one of its members, and war gives no right to inflict any more destruction than is necessary for victory.These principles were not invented by Grotius, nor are they founded on the authority of the poets; they are derived from the na唱 ture of things; they are based on reason.
① 教会颁布的法令,为保护非战争人员及其财产的安全,禁止一切贵族间的敌对交战。
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在独立的原始条件下时, 往来并不频繁, 不足以构成和平状态或战争状态, 单单这一点就说明, 人们并非生来就是敌人。 在人与人之间, 挑起战争的原因不是相互之间的争吵, 而是对财物的抢夺。 仅仅人之间的关系是不能构成战争状态的, 而只有财物的利害关系才会构成战争状态。
人与人之间的私人战争不能存在于自然状态中, 因为此处没有固定的财产; 它也不能存在于社会里, 因为这儿的一切都处于法律的威慑之下。 私人的纷争、 决斗和冲突不会构成任何一种状态; 至于法国国王xxxxxx法令所允许, 后又被 “ 上帝之和平法令” 禁止的私人战争, 那纯粹是封建政府滥用权力的结果, 是不合理制度的产物, 是违背自然正义法则的, 也是跟公道的政策唱对台戏的。
战争涉及到的不是人与人之间的关系, 而是国与国之间的关系。 在战争中, 人们完全是出于偶然才相互为敌; 他们不是作为个人, 甚至不是以国民的身份, 而是作为士兵卷入了战争; 他们已经不再是祖国的成员了, 而成了祖国的捍卫者。 换而言之, 一个国家只能和另一个国家为敌, 不能与个人为敌, 因为本质不同的事物之间是不会有任何真正的关系的。
这一原则和古往今来所有的制度都是一致的, 也符合所有政治社会的一贯行为。宣布开战与其说是对敌国政府的警告, 倒不如说是在告诫对方的人民。 外来入侵者不预先宣战, 就劫掠、 杀戮或拘禁别国君主的臣民, 不管这个入侵者是国王、 单个的人还是一个民族, 都已经不是战士了, 而成了土匪。 即便在战争的胶着期, 一位公正的君主也会尽自己的能力获取敌对国的公共财物, 然而却尊重敌对国的人民以及私人财产; 他尊重的是他本人的权利赖以存在的原则。 鉴于战争的目的是征服敌对国, 只要敌对国的保卫者拿着武器, 战士们就有权杀死他们。 然而, 对方只要一缴械投降, 就不再是敌人了, 也不再是敌人的工具了; 他们又成了普通人, 此时任何人都不再拥有剥夺他们生命的权利。 有的时候, 无需杀戮一兵一卒就可以摧毁一个国家。 为了夺取胜利, 破坏是不可避免的, 但战争无权造成过多的破坏。 这种原则并非格洛蒂斯的发明创造, 也不是基于诗人的构想, 而是从事物的本质中提取出来的, 以推理作为基础的。
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The right of conquest has no other foundation than the law of the strongest.And if war gives the conqueror no right to massacre a conquered people, no such right can be invoked to justify their enslavement.Men have the right to kill their enemies only when they cannot enslave them, so the right of enslaving cannot be derived from the right to kill.It would therefore be an iniquitous barter to make the vanquished purchase with their liberty the lives over which the xxxxxx has no legitimate claim.An argument basing the right over life and death on the right to enslave, and the right to enslave on the right over life and death, is an argument trapped in a vicious circle.
Even if we assumed that this terrible right of massacre did exist, then slaves of war, or a conquered people, would be under no obligation to obey their master any further than they were forced to do so.By taking an equivalent of his victim摧s life, the xxxxxx shows him no fa唱 vour; instead of destroying him unprofitably, he destroys him by exploiting him.Hence,far from the xxxxxx having acquired some further authority beside that of force over the van唱 quished, the state of war between them continues; their mutual relation is the effect of war, and the continuation of the rights of war implies that there has been no treaty of peace.An agreement has assuredly been made, but that agreement, far from ending the state of war, presupposes its continuation.
Thus, however we look at the question, the “ right” of slavery is seen to be void; void, not only because it cannot be justified, but also because it is nonsensical, because it has no meaning.The words “ slavery” and “ right” are contradictory,they cancel eaeh other out. Whether as between one man and another, or between one man and a whole people, it would always be absurd to say: “ I hereby make a covenant with you which is wholly at your expense and wholly to my advantage; I will respect it so long as I please and you shall re唱 spect it so long as I wish.”
Chapter 5 That We Must Always Go Back To an Original Covenant
Even if I were to concede all that I have so far refuted, the champions of despotism would be no better off.There will always be a great difference between subduing a multitude and ruling a society.If one man successively enslaved many separate individuals, no matter how numerous, he and they would never bear the aspect of anything but a master and his slaves, not at all that of a people and their ruler; an aggregation,perhaps, but certainly not an association, for they would neither have a common good nor be a body politic.Even if such a man were to enslave half the world, he would remain a private individual, and his in唱
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征服权的基础并非它物, 而是强者的法则。 如果战争并未赋予胜利者屠戮战败国人民的权利, 那他也无权、 无理由对他们实行奴役。 只有在无法奴役敌人的时候,参战者才有权将他们杀死, 所以, 奴役他人的权利是无法从杀戮权那儿产生的。 让战败者用自由为代价去赎买胜利者没有合法权利进行支配的生命, 是一种不公平的交易。 将生与死的支配权建立在奴役权之上, 又将奴役权建立在生与死的支配权之上, 这样的观点就陷入了恶性循环的怪圈。
即使我们假设一下世上果真有这种可怕的杀戮权的存在, 那么, 战争产生的奴隶, 或战败方的人民, 除过被迫服从主子之外, 再不会承担别的义务。 胜利者索取到了跟战败者生命等值的东西, 所以并未施恩于对方。 他摧毁了战败者, 但不是采取无利可图的方式, 而是对其进行了剥削。 胜利者以武力征服了战败方, 但他并未获得其他的权利, 而且远远没有获得, 所以战争状态仍在双方之间持续着。 他们之间共同的关系是战争导致的结果, 战争权的延续表明他们之间不存在和平协约。 他们倒是达成了某种协议, 但这种协议丝毫没有消除战争状态, 却意味着战争状态在持续下去。
所以, 无论怎么看待这一问题, “ 奴役权” 都是 “ 镜花水月”, 这不仅仅因为奴役权不能够证实是合理的, 也因为它完全是一派xx, 是根本没有任何含义的。 “ 奴役” 一词跟 “ 权利” 一词是相互矛盾的, 也是相互排斥的。 无论是在人与人之间,还是在一个人与一个民族之间, 如下的语言听起来都会十分荒唐: “ 我跟你订一项契约, 一项完全要你做出牺牲, 而由我受益的契约。 这项契约我愿意遵守就遵守, 而你一定要服从我的意愿, 让你遵守你就得遵守。”
第五章 必须时时回顾原始的契约
即便让我退一步, 同意我在上文中驳斥的观点, 专制主义的吹鼓手们也照样会站不稳脚跟的。 降服民众和统治社会之间总会存在着极大的差异。 如果一个人陆陆续续奴役了许多独立的个人, 不管他们的数量有多大, 他和被奴役者也只会以主人和奴隶的形象出现, 让世人丝毫看不出他们是统治者和人民的关系。 他们可能是一群乌合之众, 但肯定不是一个团体, 因为他们既没有共同利益, 也不会成为一个政治实体。这样的一个人, 即便奴役了世界上一半的人口, 也只是孤家寡人; 他的利
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terest, always at variance with that of the others, would never be more than a personal inter唱 est.When he died, the empire he left would be scattered for lack of any bond of union, e唱 ven as an oak crumbles and falls into a heap of ashes when fire has consumed it.
“ A people,” says Grotius, “ may give itself to a xxxx.” Therefore, according to Groti唱 us a people is a people even before the gift to the xxxx is made.The gift itself is a civil act; it presupposes public deliberation.Hence, before considering the act by which a people submits to a xxxx, we ought to scrutinize the act by which people become a people, for that act, being necessarily antecedent to the other, is the real foundation of society.
Indeed, if there were no earlier agreement, then how, unless the election were unani唱 mous, could there be any obligation on the minority to accept the decision of the majority? What right have the hundred who want to have a master to vote on behalf of the ten who do not? The law of majority唱voting itself rests on a covenant, and implies that there has been on at least one occasion unanimity.
Chapter 6 The Social Pact
I assume that men reach a point where the obstacles to their preservation in a state of nature prove greater than the strength that each man has to preserve himself in that state.Be唱 yond this point, the primitive condition cannot endure,for then the human race will perish if it does not change its mode of existence.
Since men cannot create new forces, but merely combine and control those which xx唱 ready exist, the only way in which they can preserve themselves is by uniting their separate powers in a combination strong enough to overcome any resistance, uniting them so that their powers are directed by a single motive and act in concert.
Such a sum of forces can be produced only by the union of separate men, but as each man摧s own strength and liberty are the chief instruments of his preservation, how can he merge his with others摧without putting himself in peril and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, which brings me back to my present subject, may be expressed in these words:“ How to find a form of association which will defend the person and goods of each member with the collective force of all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before.” This is the fundamental problem to which the social contract holds the solution.
The articles of this contract are so precisely determined by the nature of the act, that the slightest modification must render them null and void; they are such that, though per唱
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益与他人的利益总是格格不入, 所以永远都属于个人利益的范畴。 他一旦命赴xx,他遗留下的帝国就会失去凝聚力, 很快便会分崩离析, 就像一棵橡树被火焚毁, 轰然倒地化为灰烬一样。
格洛蒂斯说过 “ 一个民族可以把自己献给一位君主”。 根据格洛蒂斯的这句话,这个民族在尚未把自己献给君主之前就已经形成了。 献礼本身是一种民间的行为,需要公众做出决议。 我们可以先不考虑这个民族委身君主的行为, 而应该细细琢磨一下人民究竟是通过什么样的行为才形成了一个民族的。 因为这一行为发生在献礼这前, 是社会名符其实的基石。
的确, 倘若先前没有契约的存在, 那么, 此时除非在投票中大家一致通过, 否则少数人有什么义务非得接受多数人的决定呢? 这个群体中有一百个人想依附于一个主人, 可他们有什么权利代表另外十个不愿依附主子的人投票呢? 多数人投票通过一项制度这本身就是建立在契约之上的, 这表明以前至少有一次表决是大家一致通过的。
第六章 论社会契约
据本人拙见, 如果人类在自然状态中生存遇到的障碍超过了个人在同一状态生存所需要的能力, 那么原始的条件就无法再持续下去了。 人类如不改变生存的方式,就会遭到灭顶之灾。
鉴于人们没有能力创造出新的力量, 而只可以联合及操纵现存的力量, 那他们保证生存的唯一途径就是将分散的力量合在一起, 克服任何一种阻力。 这种凝聚在一起的力量, 由同一动机协调指挥, 共同采取行动。
只有若干个人联合起来, 才可以产生这种综合的力量; 然而, 一个人的力量及自由是维持他自身生存的主要手段, 那么, 怎样才可以将他的力量与别人的力量聚合在一起, 又不至于把自己置于危境中, 而且不至于忽视自身的利益呢? 这一困难触及的正是本章的主题, 可以用以下的话加以阐述: “ 力求寻找到一种联盟, 以集体的力量保护每一成员的人身及财产的安全。 每一个人都与其他的人联合在一起, 自己就是自己的主人, 依然跟从前一样是自由之身。” 这是一个根本性的问题, 从社会契约那儿能找到答案。
契约的各条款都非常精确, 由契约的性质所决定, 哪怕是最微小的变更都会令契约变成一纸无效的空文。这些条款虽然从不做正式的表述,但无处不在起着效用,
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haps never formally stated, they are everywhere the same, everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized; and if ever the social pact is violated, every man regains his original rights and, recovering his natural freedom, loses that social freedom for which he exchanged it.
These articles of association, rightly understood, are reducible to a single one, namely the total alienation by each associate of himself and all his rights to the whole community. Thus, in the first place, as every individual gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all, and precisely because they are the same for all, it is in no one摧s interest to make the conditions onerous for others.
Secondly, since the alienation is unconditional, the union is as perfect as it could be, and no individual associate has any longer any rights to claim; for if rights were left to indi唱 viduals,in the absence of any higher authority to judge between them and the public, each individual, being his own judge in some causes, would soon demand to be his own judge in all; and in this way the state of nature would be kept in being, and the association inevitably become either tyrannical or void.
Finally, since each man gives himself to all, he gives himself to no one; and since there is no associate over whom he does not gain the same rights as others gain over him, each man recovers the equivalent of everything he loses, and in the bargain he acquires more power to preserve what he has.
If, then, we eliminate from the social pact everything that is not essential to it, we find it comes down to this: “ Each one of us puts into the community his person and all his pow唱 ers under the supreme direction of the general will; and as a body, we incorporate every member as an indivisible part of the whole.”
Immediately, in place of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of as唱 sociation creates an artificial and collective body composed of as many members as there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act that body acquires its unity, its common ego, its life and its will.The public person thus formed by the union of all other persons was once called the city,and is now known as the republic or the body politic.In its passive role it is called the state, when it plays an active role it is the sovereign; and when it is compared to others of its own kind, it is a power.Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of a people, and call themselves individually citizens, in so far as they share in the sovereign power, and subjects, in so far as they put themselves under the laws of the state. However, these words are often confused,each being mistaken for another; but the essential thing is to know how to recognize them when they are used in their precise sense.
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得到人们普遍的默认。 如果社会契约的规矩遭到破坏, 每个人都会重新获得他原始的权利以及自然的自由, 然而却失去了他当初用自然的自由所换取的社会自由。
契约的诸条款, 根据我们的理解, 可以归纳为一条, 即每一个成员都把自身以及他所有的权利交给了整个社会。 首先, 因为每一个人都做出了彻底的奉献, 所以条件对大家都是一样的; 正是因为条件对大家全都一样, 所以也就没有人乐意为他人制造麻烦了。
其次, 由于这种奉献是不讲条件的, 所以缔结的联盟就是完美无缺的, 每一个成员都不再强调他的权利。 如果人人都得到权利, 在个人与公众之间又没有权威裁断是非, 于是在某些事情上个人便成了自身的裁判, 他很快就会要求事事都自己做主。 这样一来, 社会又处于自然状态了, 联盟势必会成为暴君的工具, 或者不复存在。
最后, 鉴于每一个人都将自己奉献给了大家, 也就等于没有奉献给任何人。 每一个成员都对他人拥有权利, 而别的人也对他拥有权利; 每个人都获得了跟他失去的一切等值的东西, 而且在这场交易中他获得了更大的力量以保护自身的利益。
倘若我们把社会契约中所有非本质性的东西全部删掉, 最后便会看到这样的词句: “ 我们每一个人都加入到社会之中, 把自身以及我们全部的力量都置于公众意志的英明领导之下; 我们是一个整体, 每一个成员都是其中一个不可分割的组成部分。”
在缔结了这种盟约之后, 每一个缔约方的个人便不见了, 取而代之的是一个虚构的、 联合的整体, 其成员的人数与选举中投票的人数相等; 这个整体是团结的,具有共同的利益, 而且有自己的生活及意志。 由众人联合起来组成的这一公众团体曾经被叫作 “ 城邦”; 现在, 它成了人们熟知的共和国或政治实体。 它担任消极的角色时, 叫作 “ 国家”, 担任积极的角色时, 则被称为 “ 主权体”; 与其他同类的团体做比较, 它就成了 “ 实力”。 团体里的成员合在一起叫做 “ 人民”; 由于他们参与主权体的事务, 就有了 “ 公民” 的名号; 因为接受国家法律的约束, 他们又是 “ 臣民”。 这些名词常常搅在一处, 被人们张冠李戴。 不过, 重要的是: 当这些名词表现出确切的含义时, 我们应该明察秋毫、 了然于胸。
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Chapter 7 The Sovereign
This formula shows that the act of association consists of a reciprocal commitment be唱 tween society and the individual,so that each person, in making a contract, as it were, with himself, finds himself doubly committed, first, as a member of the sovereign body in rela唱 tion to individuals, and secondly as a member of the state in relation to the sovereign.Here there can be no invoking the principle of civil law which says that no man is bound by a con唱 tract with himself, for there is a great difference between having an obligation to oneself and having an obligation to something of which one is a member.
We must add that a public decision can impose an obligation on all the subjects towards the sovereign, by reason of the two aspects under which each can be seen, while, contrari唱 wise, such decisions cannot impose an obligation on the sovereign towards itself; and hence it would be against the very nature of a political body for the sovereign to set over itself a law which it could not infringe.The sovereign, bearing only one single and identical aspect, is in the position of a private person making a contract with himself, which shows that there neither is, nor can be, any kind of fundamental law binding on the people as a body, not e唱 ven the social contract itself.This does not mean that the whole body cannot incur obliga唱 tions to other nations, so long as those obligations do not infringe the contract; for in relation to foreign powers, the body politic is a simple entity, an individual.
However, since the body politic, or sovereign, owes its being to the sanctity of the con唱 tract alone, it cannot commit itself, even in treaties with foreign powers, to anything that would derogate from the original act of association; it could not, for example, alienate a part of itself or submit to another sovereign.To violate the act which has given it existence would be to annihilate itself; and what is nothing can produce nothing.
As soon as the multitude is united thus in a single body, no one can injure any one of the members without attacking the whole, still less injure the whole without each member feeling it.Duty and self唱interest thus equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other mutual aid; and the same men should seek to bring together in this dual relationship, all the advantages that flow from it.
Now, as the sovereign is formed entirely of the individuals who compose it, it has not, nor could it have, any interest contrary to theirs; and so the sovereign has no need to give guarantees to the subjects, because it is impossible for a body to wish to hurt all of its members, and, as we shall see, it cannot hurt any particular member.The sovereign by the mere fact
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以上的情况表明: 缔结契约就使得社会与个人相互之间有了承诺。 每一个人在订约时, 都会发现自己的承诺是双方面的: 首先, 他作为主权体的成员对别人做出承诺; 其次他作为国家的一个子民对主权体做出承诺。 此处不能实施这样的民法准则———任何人都可以不受自我契约的束缚, 因为对自身承担义务和对自己所属的团体承担义务之间, 有着天壤之别。
我们必须补充说明, 通过公众的决议, 可以要求所有的臣民对主权体承担义务,因为每一个人都可以置于以上两个概念的范围内; 然而从相反的角度说, 公众决议却无法要求主权体对自身承担义务。 所以, 主权体不会用自身无法违反的法律对它自己进行约束, 那可是与政治实体的本质背道而驰的。 主权体只具有一个统一的形象, 类似与自身订约的个人, 这表明世上没有, 也不可能有任何一种基本法对整个民族实行约束, 就连社会契约本身也做不到。 这并不意味着整个实体不能把义务强加给别的民族, 其实这种义务只要不违背契约就行。 在对外关系上, 政治实体是一个单一的实体, 是作为个体存在的。
然而, 完全是由于契约的神圣不可侵犯性, 才产生了政治实体或主权体, 所以政治实体不能做任何背离契约初衷的事, 甚至在对外签订协约时也不行。 譬如, 它不能将自身的一个部分舍弃掉, 也不能屈服于另一个主权体。 违背了它赖以生存的契约, 等于自取灭亡; 一个形同虚设的空架子, 是不会有任何作为的。
一旦民众团结起来形成一个整体, 伤害其中的任何一个成员都等于冒犯了整体,而伤及整体, 每个成员更会有切肤之痛。 职责以及自身的利益要求订约的双方同舟共济、 相互帮助; 人们在这种互助互利的关系中, 应该将由此而产生的好处都集中在一起加以利用。
主权体完全是由个体构成的, 所以它的利益与成员的利益并不冲突, 也不可能冲突。 因而, 主权体没有必要信誓旦旦地向臣民做出保证, 因为一个实体不可能着意去伤害自己的成员。 我们有目共睹, 它不可能做危害任何一个成员的事情。 主权体完全由自身的性质决定, 总是在履行自己应尽的义务。
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that it is, is always all that it ought to be.
But this is not true of the relation of subject to sovereign.Despite their common inter唱 est, subjects will not be bound by their commitment unless means are found to guarantee their fidelity.
For every individual as a man may have a private will contrary to, or different from, the general will that he has as a citizen.His private interest may speak with a very different voice from that of the public interest; his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him regard what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which would be less painful for others than the payment is onerous for him; and fancying that the artificial person which constitutes the state is a mere rational entity ( since it is not a man), he might seek to enjoy the rights of a citizen without doing the duties of a subject. The growth of this kind of injustice would bring about the ruin of the body politic.
Hence, in order that the social pact shall not be an empty formula, it is tacitly implied in that commitment -which alone can give force to all others -that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body, which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to the nation, secures him against all personal dependence, it is the condition which shapes both the design and the working of the political machine, and which alone bestows justice on civil contracts -without it, such contracts would be absurd, tyrannical and liable to the grossest abuse.
Chapter 8 Civil Society
The passing from the state of nature to the civil society produces a remarkable change in man; it puts justice as a rule of conduct in the place of instinct, and gives his actions the moral quality they previously lacked.It is only then, when the voice of duty has taken the place of physical impulse, and right that of desire, that man, who has hitherto thought only of himself, finds himself compelled to act on other principles,and to consult his reason rath唱 er than study his inclinations.And although in civil society man surrenders some of the ad唱 vantages that belong to the state of nature, he gains in return far greater ones; his faculties are so exercised and developed, his mind is so enlarged, his sentiments so ennobled,and his whole spirit so elevated that, if the abuse of his new condition did not in many cases lower him to something worse than what he had left , he should constantly bless the happy hour that lifted him for ever from the state of nature and from a narrow, stupid animal made a creature
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但是, 臣民对主权体的关系却并非如此。 尽管双方有着共同的利益, 但除非能找到办法来确保臣民们的忠诚, 否则他们不会信守自己的承诺。
每个人都有私心, 这种私心不同于他作为公民所应该服从的公众意志, 甚至与之格格不入。 他的个人利益表现出来, 可能与公众利益有着很大的差异; 他那绝对自然的、 独立的生存方式会使他将自己对公众事业应尽的义务视为无偿的奉献, 不做奉献不会危及他人, 做了奉献却是自身的负担。 他会觉得构成国家的因素是虚拟出的人, 仅仅是理念上的团体 ( 该团体并非一个人), 所以他竭力享受公众的权利,却不愿尽臣民的义务。 这种有失公道的现象蔓延下去, 就会导致政治实体的毁灭。
因此, 为了使社会契约不至于成为一纸空文, 在双方的承诺中都应该心照不宣地含有这样的内容 ( 唯有此才可以给其他的条约威力): 无论谁拒绝服从公众意志,整个实体都会强迫他服从。 这一点没有别的含义, 只说明他将被迫保持自身的自由。因为这是每一个公民献身于国家时的条件, 也保障他本人不依附于他人; 该条件构成了政治机器的框架和运行轨道, 只有它才可以对民间契约进行仲裁, 否则民间契约就会是荒唐的、 暴虐的, 很可能遭到滥用。
第八章 xx社会
人类从自然状态步入xx社会, 自身发生了翻天覆地的变化。 公理作为行为标准取代了人类的本能, 使人类的行为具有了道德性, 而这在以前是没有的。 只有在这时, 当义务的概念取代了生理的冲动, 权利取代了欲望的时候, 以前仅仅关心自身的人才被迫按其他的原则行事, 凡事都讲道理, 而不是将自己的意图放在前边。在xx社会里, 人类舍弃了处于自然状态时的一些好处, 但它得到的好处却更多。人们的能力得到锻炼和发展, 思想开阔了, 情操变得高尚了, 整个精神面貌都得到了升华———如若他们不在诸多场合滥用新的条件, 使自己沦落到比以前更低的位置,那他们一定会永远地称颂使他们彻底摆脱自然状态的幸福时刻, 因为就是在这一时刻, 他们从狭隘、 愚蠢的动物变成了理性的生物, 变成了人。
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of intelligence and a man.
Suppose we draw up a balance sheet, so that the losses and gains may be readily com唱 pared.What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and the absolute right to anything that tempts him and that he can take; what he gains by the social contract is civil liberty and the legal right of property in what he possesses.If we are to avoid mistakes in weighing the one side against the other, we must clearly distinguish between natural liberty, which has no limit but the physical power of the individual concerned, and civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and we must distinguish also between possession, which is based only on force or“ the right of the first occupant”, and property, which must rest on a legal title.
We might also add that man acquires with civil society, moral freedom, which alone makes man the master of himself; for to be governed by appetite alone is slavery, while obe唱 dience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom.However, I have already said more than enough on this subject, and the philosophical meaning of the word “ freedom” is no part of my subject here.
Chapter 9 Of Estate
Every member of the community gives himself to it at the moment it is brought into be唱 ing just as he is -he himself,with all his resources, including all his goods.This is not to say that possession by this act changes its nature in changing hands and becomes property in the grasp of the sovereign;but rather, that as the resources of the nation are incomparably greater than those of an individul, public possession is in simple fact more secure and more irrevocable than private possession, without being any more legitimate -at any rate, in the eyes of foreigners; for the state, vis唱a唱vis its own members,becomes master of all their goods by virtue of the social contract, which serves, within the state, as the basis of all other rights; while vis唱a唱vis other nations, the state has only the “ right of the first occupant”, which it derives from individuals.
The “ right of the first occupant”, although more real than the “ right of the strongest”, does not become a true right until the institution of property.Every man has a natural right to what he needs; but the positive act which makes a man the proprietor of any estate ex唱 cludes him from everything else.His share having once been settled, he must confine himself to it , and he has no further right against the community .Thus we see how “ the right of the first occupant”, weak as it is in the state of nature, compels in political society the respect
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假如我们画一份xx表, 便很容易比较得与失了。 有了社会契约, 人们失去的是其自然的自由, 以及他们愿拿什么就拿什么的绝对的权利; 通过社会契约, 他们得到的是xx的自由以及对自己所拥有的财物的法定权。 在权衡利弊的时候, 如果要避免出现错误, 我们必须清楚地辨明什么是自然的自由以及什么是xx的自由
———自然的自由只受到个人实际力量的限制, 而xx的自由却受到公众意志的限制。而且, 我们还必须区分什么是占有权, 什么是财产权———占有权完全以实力或所谓的 “ 第一占有者的权利” 为基础, 而财产权则必须依赖归属权。
我们还可以补充一点: 步入xx社会, 人类获得了道德自由, 仅这一点就使人类成了自身的主宰。 只受欲念的支配是奴性的表现, 然而一个人只有服从法律才算获得了自由。 对于这个题目我用的笔墨已经够多的了, 关于 “ 自由” 一词的哲学含义不是此处讨论的内容。
社会形成之时, 每一个成员都把自己连同他所有的东西 ( 包括他所有的财物) ,都献给了这个社会。 这并不是说: 通过这一行为, 所有权在更换物主时就改变了性质, 成了主权体的掌中之物。 国家的财富与私人的财产相比较, 简直要多得多, 所以实际上公众所有权比私人所有权稳固得多, 安全得多, 但在合法性上二者却是一样的, 起码在外国人的眼里就是如此。 对于本国的人民, 国家通过社会契约的作用成了所有财产的主人, 因为在一国之内社会契约是一切权利的基础; 可是对于其他的国家, 该国仅仅具有从私人手中得到的 “ 第一占有者的权利”。
“ 第一占有者的权利” 虽然比 “ 强者的权利” 更为真实, 但只有在确立了财产权之后才可以成为实实在在的权利。 每个人对自己需要的东西都有自然的权利, 但他成了自己财产的拥有者之后, 由于契约的作用, 就不能再凯觎别人的东西了。 他拥有的份额一经确定, 就必须满足于此, 再无权向社会索取更多的东西。 由此可以看出, “ 第一占有者的权利” 在自然状态下是软弱的, 而到了政治社会却要求所有的
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of all men.What this right makes one aware of is less what belongs to others than what does not belong to oneself.
As a general rule, to justify the right of the first occupant to any piece of land whatev唱 er, the following conditions must obtain: first, that the land shall not already be inhabited by anyone else; secondly, that the claimant occupies no more than he needs for subsistence; thirdly, that he takes possession, not by an idle ceremony, but by actually working and cul唱 tivating the soil -the only sign of ownership which need be respected by other people in the absence of a legal title.
It can, indeed, be said that tying “ the right of the first occupant” to need and work is stretching it as far as it will go.Can one really avoid setting limits on the right? Is it enough to put one摧s feet on a piece of common land in order to claim it at once as one摧s own? Is it e唱 nough to have the power to keep other men off for one moment in order to deprive them of the right ever to return? How could a man or a people seize a vast territory and keep out the rest of the human race except by a criminal usurpation -since the action would rob the rest of mankind of the shelter and the food that nature has given them all in common? When Nunez Balbao① stood on the shore and took possession of the southern seas and of South A唱 merica in the name of the crown of Castille, was that enough to dispossess all the inhabitants and to exclude all the other princes of the world? If so, such idle ceremonies would have had no end; and the Catholic Xxxx might without leaving his royal chamber have taken posses唱 sion of the whole universe, only excepting afterwards those parts of his empire already be唱 longing to other princes.
We can see how the lands of private persons, when they are united and contiguous, be唱 come public territory; and how the right of sovereignty, extending from the subjects to the soil they occupy, covers both property and persons; it makes the owners all the more de唱 pendent, and turns their own strength into the guarantee of their fidelity.This advantage seems to have eluded the ancient monarchs, who, in calling themselves simply the Xxxx of the Persians or the Scythians or the Macedonians, appear to have regarded themselves rather as rulers of men than as masters of their countries.Monarchs of the present day call them唱 selves more shrewdly the Xxxx of France, or of Spain, or of England and so on; in holding thus the land, they are very sure of holding the inhabitants.
① xxx· xx博亚:(1475—1517) 西班牙航海家,1513 年发现南美洲及太平洋,宣布其为西班牙的领土和领海。
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人都对之表示尊重。 该权利要求人们尊重的与其说是属于别人的东西, 倒不如说是并非属于自己的东西。
按一般的规矩, 要确立第一占有者对任何一块土地的权利, 都必须符合以下的条件: 第一, 这片土地上尚无任何人居住; 第二, 所占土地数量不超过生存所需;第三, 占有土地并非装样子走过场, 而是实实在在地劳作、 耕耘———在不具有合法归属权的情况下, 只有这种占有的形式才会受到其他人的尊重。
其实可以说, 把 “ 第一占有者的权利” 与生活所需以及劳动联系在一起, 就等于无可限量地扩大了它的范围。 对这种权利, 难道真的不能加以限制吗? 难道一个人踏上一块公众的土地, 就可以立刻宣称自己拥有了这块土地吗? 难道我们用武力迫使别人暂时离开, 就可以剥夺他们重新返回这片土地的权利吗? 一个人或者一个民族只有靠强硬的手段才能占领大片的疆域, 使别的人无法涉足该地; 这是罪恶的行径, 因为他们剥夺了别人的居住权及食物, 而这些是大自然恩赐给全人类的。 当年xxx· xx博亚站在海岸上, 以xxxx亚国王的名义宣布占领了南太平洋和南美洲, 难道这样就可以迫使当地居民背井离乡, 将这个世界上其他的君主全都拒之于门外吗? 假如情况果真如此, 这种恶作剧就会无止境地演下去了。 那么天主教的国王在王宫里足不出户, 就可以占领全世界, 只需事后把属于别国君主的土地再从他的版图上划出就行。
我们可以看到, 私人的土地合在一起, 连结成片, 成为公众的地产, 而主权体的范围既包括臣民也包括他们的土地, 将财产与人都收罗在其中。 这就使原来的地主更加依附于公家, 将他们的力量转化为忠诚的保证。 古代的君主们似乎并未明白这一益处, 而只是将自己称为波斯人的国王、 斯基泰人的国王或马其顿人的国王,他们似乎将自己视为人的统治者, 而非国家的主宰。 如今的君主则比较精明, 把他们自己称为法国国王、 西班牙国王或英国国王, 等等。 他们将国土控制在手心里,自然也就掌握住了国土上的居民。
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What is unique about the alienation entailed by the social contract is that the communi唱 ty in accepting the goods of an individual is far from depriving him of them; on the contrary it simply assures him of their lawful possession; it changes usurpation into valid right and mere enjoyment into legal ownership.Since every owner is regarded as a trustee of the pub唱 lic property, his rights are respected by every other member of the state, and protected with its collective force against foreigners; men have, by a surrender which is advantageous to the public and still more to themselves, acquired,so to speak, all that they have given up -a paradox which is easily explained by the distinction between the rights which the sovereign has and which the owner has over the same property, as will be seen later.
It may also happen that men begin to unite before they possess anything, and spreading over a territory large enough for them all, proceed to enjoy it in common, or, alternatively, divide it among themselves either equally or in shares determined by the sovereign.In what唱 ever manner this acquisition is made, the right of any individual over his own estate is xx唱 ways subordinate to the right of the community over everything; for without this there would be neither strength in the social bond nor effective force in the exercise of sovereignty.
I shall end this chapter -and Book I -with an observation which might serve as a basis for the whole social system:namely, that the social pact, far from destroying natural equali唱 ty, substitutes, on the contrary, a moral and lawful equality for whatever physical inequality that nature may have imposed on mankind; so that however unequal in strength and intelli唱 gence,men become equal by covenant and by right.
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社会契约规定的转让权有一奇特之处———社会只是接受了私人的财产, 而根本不是剥夺他们的财产; 相反, 它确定私人对财产享有合法的拥有权, 于是将占有转化为有效的权利, 将单纯的使用权变作合法的拥有权。 鉴于每一个拥有者都被视为公共财产的受托人, 所以他的权利不但受到国内全部成员的尊重, 而且受到集体力量的保护, 使其免受外国人的侵害。 人们的转让有益于公众, 更有益于他们自己;他们将自己让出去的又全部收了回来。 下文可以看到, 倘若把主权体以及拥有者对同一财产的权利加以区分, 就很容易能解释清这一怪现象。
也许, 还会出现这么一种情况: 人们在一无所有的情况下便联合了起来。 他们分布在足够他们用的辽阔的疆域里, 大家共同拥有土地, 或者平均地将土地分掉,要不然就按主权体规定的份额享有自己的一份。 不管人们通过什么样的方式获得拥有权, 私人对自己地产的拥有权都永远从属于公家对一切财产的拥有权。 否则, 社会契约就不会有约束力, 行使主权时也不会产生效力。
本章以及本卷已近尾声, 我在此处的结束语也许可以成为整个社会制度的基础:社会契约根本不会摧毁自然的平等关系, 相反, 它还会以道德及法律规定的平等取代上天可能给人类造成的任何生理的不平等。 于是, 人们虽然在体力和智力上是不平等的, 但在契约和权利的作用下他们就变成了平等的人。
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BOOK Ⅱ
Chapter 1 That Sovereignty is Inalienable
The first and most important consequence of the principles so far established is that the general will alone can direct the forces of the state in accordance with that end which the state has been established to achieve -the common good; for if conflict between private in唱 terests has made the setting up of civil societies necessary, harmony between those same in唱 terests has made it possible.It is what is common to those different interests which yields the social bond; if there were no point on which separate interests coincided, then society could not conceivably exist.And it is precisely on the basis of this common interest that society must be governed.
My argument, then, is that sovereignty, being nothing other than the exercise of the
general will, can never be alienated; and that the sovereign, which is simply a collective being, cannot be represented by anyone but itself -power may be delegated, but the will cannot be.
For indeed while it is not impossible for a private will to coincide with the general will on some point or other, it is impossible for such a coincidence to be regular and enduring; for the private will inclines by its very nature towards partiality, and the general will towards equality.It is even more inconceivable that there should be a guarantee of harmony between the private and the general will, even if it were to “ continue always, for such lasting harmo唱 ny would be the result of chance and not of design.The sovereign could say: ” What I want at present is precisely what this man wants,or at least what he says he wants; but no sover唱 eign could say:“ What this man is going to want tomorrow I too shall want”,for it is absurd that anyone should wish to bind himself for the future, and it is a contradiction in terms to say that any human being should wish to consent to something that is the reverse of his own good.If a people promises simply and solely to obey, it dissolves itself by that very pledge; it ceases to be a people; for once there is a master, there is no longer a sovereign, and the body politic is therefore annihilated.
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截至现在, 我们所确立的各项原则产生了一种最直接、 最重要的影响, 即只有公众意志可以操纵国家的力量, 这符合为公众谋福利的建国宗旨。 如果说私人利益之间出现的冲突使我们有必要建立xx的社会, 那么, 私人利益之间的和谐性则令这种必要成为可能。 不同的利益也有着共同之处, 而正是这种共同之处产生了社会的融合。 分散的利益之间假如没有共同点, 社会就不可能存在下去。 所以, 社会的治理必须完全以这种共同的利益为基础。
我认为, 主权体并非它物, 而只是公众意志的体现, 永远也不容放弃; 主权是集体的主权, 不能由任何人代表———权力可以有代表, 但公众的意志却不能。
实际上, 私人的意愿在某些方面与公众的意志是一致的, 这并非不可能, 但这种一致性却不是有规律的, 不是长久的; 因为私人的意愿就其性质而言难免有偏颇之处, 而公众意志向往的是公正。 即便私人的意愿和公众的意志之间产生的一致性能永远持续下去, 也不可能为之提供保障, 因为这种一致性是偶然产生的, 并非谋划出来的。 主权体也许会说: “ 目前我之所求正是这个人想得到的, 或者至少是他声称他想得到的。” 然而, 没有哪个主权体会说: “ 这个人明天想得到的是我将需求的。” 谁愿意因为将来的事束缚住自己? 简直荒唐透顶! 有哪个人愿干与自己的利益背道而驰的事? 这是矛盾的。 如果一个民族承诺要不折不扣地服从某人, 那么它会因为这一承诺而解体; 因为一旦出现了主宰一切的人, 主权体就不复存在了, 政治实体也随之化为乌有。
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This is not to say that the commands of leaders may not pass for the general will if the sovereign, being free to oppose them, does not do so.In such a case the silence of the peo唱 ple permits the assumption that the people consents.This will be explained more fully in a later chapter.
Chapter 2 That Sovereignty is Indivisible
Just as sovereignty is inalienable, it is for the same reason indivisible; for either the will is general or it is not; either it is the will of the body of the people, or merely that of a part.In the first case, a declaration of will is an act of sovereignty and constitutes law; in the second case, it is only a.declaration of a particular will or anact of administration, it is at best a mere decree.
Nevertheless, our political theorists, unable to divide the principle of sovereignty, di唱 vide it in its purpose; they divide it into power and will, divide it, that is, into executive and legislative, into the rights of levying taxation, administering justice and making war, in唱 to domestic jurisdiction and the power to deal with foreign governments.Sometimes our theo唱 rists confuse all the parts and sometimes they separate them.They make the sovereign a creature of fantasy, a patchwork of separate pieces, rather as if they were to construct a man of several bodies -one with eyes, one with legs, the other with feet and nothing else.It is said that Japanese mountebanks can cut up a child under the eyes of spectators, throw the different parts into the air, and then make the child come down, alive and all of a piece. This is more or less the trick that our political theorists perform -after dismembering the so唱 cial body with a sleight of hand worthy of the fairground,they put the pieces together again anyhow.
The mistake comes from having no precise notion of what sovereign authority is, and
from taking mere manifestations of authority for parts of the authority itself.For instance, the acts of declaring war and making peace have been regarded as acts of sovereignty, which they are not; for neither of these acts constitutes a law, but only an application of law, a particular act which determines how the law shall be interpreted and all this will be obvious as soon as I have defined the idea which attaches to the word “ law”.
If we were to scrutinize in the same way the other supposed divisions of sovereignty, we should find that whenever we thought that sovereignty was divided, we had been mis唱 taken,for the rights which are taken to be part of that sovereignty prove in fact to be subor唱 dinate to it, and presuppose the existence of a supreme will which they merely serve to put
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这并不等于说, 领袖的命令就不能被视为公众的意志, 其实只要主权体有权反对并不执行他们的命令就可以了。 遇到这种情况时, 只要人民保持沉默, 便可以推定他们同意了。 关于这一点, 在后边的章节再做详细的解释。
第二章 主权体不容分割
正如主权体不容放弃一样, 出于同样的原因, 主权体也是不容分割的。 主权体的意志或者带有普遍性, 或者不具备普遍性; 也许这是民族这一团体的意志, 要么就仅仅是一部分人的意志。 在第一种情况下, 公开表明意志是主权体的一种行为,并因此构成了法律。 至于第二种情况, 表明的则只是一种特殊的意志, 或者是一种行政手段, 所以充其量也仅仅是法令而己。
可是, 我们的政治理论家们由于无法肢解主权体的原则, 于是便按其目的对它进行分割, 先把它分解为实力和意志, 再分解成行政权及立法权, 分解成税收权、司法权和战争权, 还分解成内政权和外交权。 有的时候, 我们的理论家们把所有这一切都混为一谈, 有时又将它们分别看待。 他们把主权体弄得就像是许多碎片拼凑起来的怪物; 更确切地说, 他们仿佛要用若干个人拼凑成一个人的形象———分别用的是不同人的眼睛、 腿和脚, 情况正是如此。 据说, 日本的江湖术士可以在众目睽睽之下将一个小孩肢解掉, 再将他的肢体抛到空中, 等到小孩落到地上时, 却安然无损, 肢体一样也不短缺。 这与我们的政治理论家们玩的把戏几乎如出一辙———他们用一种堪和市场魔术相媲美的手段将社会实体肢解后, 不知用什么方法把碎片又拼集了起来。
这种现象错就错在, 我们对于什么是主权的权威性并没有明确的概念, 竟然将权威的一些表面形式当成了权威的组成部分。 例如, 对外宣战以及签订和约被视为主权体的行为, 其实不是。 因为这两种行为无论哪一种都不是法律本身, 而只是对法律的运用, 是一种特殊的行为, 决定着将如何理解法律。 与 “ 法律” 一词关联的观念一经阐述清楚, 这一点就会明朗化了。
另外还有一些现象被认为是对主权体的分割, 如果我们以同样的方式对之进行细致的研究, 就会发现我们的观点是错误的。 其实, 我们错把一些权利当成了主权体的组成部分, 而它们经证实是从属于主权体的, 是以一种至高无上的意志为先决条件的; 这些权利只是帮助至高无上的意志产生效用罢了。
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into effect.
This want of precision has obfuscated immeasurably the conclusions of our legal theo唱 rists when they have come to apply their own principles to determine the respective rights of kings and of peoples.Every reader of the third and fourth chapters of the first Book of Groti唱 us can see how that learned man and his translator, Barbeyrac, are trapped in their own sophisms, frightened of saying either too much or alternatively too little ( according to their prejudices) and so offending the interests they wish to flatter.Grotius, a refugee in France, discontented with his own country and out to pay court to Xxxxx XIII, to whom his book is dedicated, spares no pains to rob peoples of all their rights and to invest those rights, by ev唱 ery conceivable artifice, in kings.This would have been very much to the taste of Barbey唱 rac, who dedicated his translation of Grotius to the Xxxx of England, Xxxxxx I.But unfortu唱 nately the expulsion of Xxxxx II -which Barbeyrac calls an “ abdication” -obliged him to speak with a marked reserve, to hesitate and equivocate, so as not to suggest that Xxxxxxx
Ⅲ was a usurper.If these two writers had adopted sound principles, all their difficulties would have vanished,and their arguments would have been logical; but then they would, a唱 las for them, have told the truth and paid court only to the people.The truth brings no man a fortune; and it is not the people who hand out embassies, professorships and pensions.
Chapter 3 Whether the General Will Can Err
It follows from what I have argued that the general will is always rightful and always tends to the public good; but it does not follow that the decisions of the people are always e唱 qually right.We always want what is advantageous but we do not always discern it.The people is never corrupted, but it is often misled; and only then does it seem to will what is bad.
There is often a great difference between the will of all [ what all individuals want] and the general will; the general will studies only the common interest while the will of all stud唱 ies private interest, and is indeed no more than the sum of individual desires.But if we take away from these same wills,the pluses and minuses which cancel each other out, the sum of the difference is the general will.
From the deliberations of a people properly informed, and provided its members do not have any communication among themselves, the great number of small differences will xx唱 ways produce a general will and the decision will always be good.But if groups, sectional as唱 sociations are formed at the expense of the larger association, the will of each of these groups
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我们的法律理论家运用自己的原则确定君主和人民的权利时, 由于缺乏精确性,所得出的结论乱成了一团麻。 凡是看过格洛蒂斯的书, 看过书中第一卷的第三、 第四章的读者都会发现那位饱学之士, 连同该书的译者巴贝拉克一道陷入了自己的诡辩之中不能自拔, 说话既怕过言又担心不足, 惟恐冒犯了他们渴望巴结的人。 格洛蒂斯对他的国家心怀不满, 跑到法国避难, 特意将他的书献给xx十三王。 为了取悦于对方, 他在书中不遗余力地将人民的权利剥夺一空, 想尽一切办法将人民的权利全都拱手献给君主。 这一做法很对巴贝拉克的胃口, 于是他翻译了格洛蒂斯的书,将译本献给了英国国王xxxx。 但不幸的是, 巴贝拉克虽然把xxxxxxx驱逐说成是 “ 退位”, 但他在言语上吞吞吐吐、 含糊其词, 前怕狼后怕虎, 生怕将xxxxxx成一个篡位者。 假如这两位大文豪坚持正确的原则性, 一切困难都会迎刃而解, 他们的论点也会富于逻辑性。 不过, 那可就难为他们了, 因为他们讲的那可是实话, 只会让人民欢欣。 讲实话并不能给人带来财富; 能给他们提供大使、 教授的身份以及俸禄的, 并不是人民。
根据我前边的论述, 公众意志总是正确的, 总是有利于公众的利益; 但这并不等于说, 人民做出的决定也都是正确的。 我们总是想做对我们有利的事, 但我们并非总能明辨是非。 人民永远也不会堕落的, 但常常被人引入歧途。 只有在这个时候,公众的意志似乎是不良的。
所有人的意志 ( 所有个人的倾向) 和公众意志之间往往存在着很大的区别; 公众意志涉及到的是普遍的利益, 所有人的意志则涉及的是个人利益, 其实指的不过是个人愿望的总和。 不过, 如果把相互抵触的两种极端的观点从这种意志中剔除掉,剩下的所谓个人愿望也就是公众意志了。
一个知识层次高、 善于思考的民族, 假如它的成员互无往来, 势必会产生许许多多细小的分歧, 结果往往会达成公众意志, 他们所做出的决定一般都是明智的。不过, 倘若不去实行广泛的联盟, 而是进行区域联合, 形成一个个的团体, 那么每
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will become general in relation to its own members and private in relation to the state; we might then say that there are no longer as many votes as there are men but only as many votes as there are groups.The differences become less numerous and yield a result less gen唱 eral.Finally, when one of these groups becomes so large that it can dominate the rest, the result is no longer the sum of many small differences,but one great divisive difference; then there ceases to be a general will, and the opinion which prevails is no more than a private o唱 pinion.
Thus if the general will is to be clearly expressed, it is imperative that there should be no sectional associations in the state,and that every citizen should make up his own mind for himself -such was the unique and sublime invention of the great Lycurgus.①But if there are sectional associations, it is wise to multiply their number and to prevent inequality among them, as SolonⒸ, NumaⒸ and ServiusⒶ did.These are the only precautions which can en唱 sure that the general will is always enlightened and the people protected from error.
Chapter 4 The Limits of Sovereign Power
If the state, or the nation, is nothing other than a legal person the life of which consists in the union of its members and if the most important of its cares is its own preservation, it must have a universal and compelling power to move and dispose of each part in whatever manner is beneficial to the whole.Just as nature gives each man an absolute power over all his own limbs, the social pact gives the body politic an absolute power over all its members; and it is this same power which, directed by the general will, bears, as I have said, the name of sovereignty.
However, we have to consider beside the public person those private persons who com唱 pose it, and whose life and liberty is naturally independent of it.Here we have to distin唱 guish clearly the respective rights of the citizen and of the sovereign, and distinguish those duties which the citizens have as subjects from the natural rights which they ought to enjoy as men.
We have agreed that each man alienates by the social pact only that part of his power, his goods and his liberty which is the concern of the community; but it must also be admitted
① 利格古斯:传说中斯巴达的立法者。 相传神曾向他启示了斯巴达宪法。
Ⓒ 梭伦:( 公元前640—558)雅典立法者和诗人。
Ⓒ 努马:( 公元前715—672)传说中xx的第二位国王。
Ⓐ xxxxx:( 公元前578—535)相传为xx的第六位国王。
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一个团体都有其意志, 这种意志对团体内的成员而言是公众意志, 对国家而言则成了个体意志。 此时, 我们可以说选票的数量不能和人数划等号了, 而应该和团体的数量划等号。 分歧倒不是那么繁杂了, 可由此产生的决议的公众性则会减弱。 最终,当其中的一个团体势力大增, 可以主宰其他的团体时, 那许许多多细小的分歧就会不复存在, 结果会产生唯一的矛盾重重的大意志。 于是, 公众意志成了历史, 如今横行的其实只是个体的意志。
倘若要清楚地xx公众的意志, 国内就不该有帮派联盟; 每一位公民都应该表达自己的看法。 这就是伟大的利格古斯独特的惊世宏论。 但如果国内有了帮派联盟,那聪明的做法就是增加他们的人数, 避免他们之间出现不xx的现象, 就像梭伦、努马和xx维乌斯那样。 只有采取这样的措施, 才能确保公众的意志总是开明的,确保人民不至于犯错误。
第四章 主权的局限性
假如国家或民族不是别的, 而是一个法人, 其生命力就在于内部成员的团结奋斗, 而它最关心的莫过于自身的生存, 那么它一定会动用全部的强制力, 以对全体有利的方式安排局部的利益。 正如上天给每个人以绝对的力量支配自己的四肢一样,社会契约也给予这个政治实体一种绝对的力量控制它的成员们。 正是这种力量在公众意志的指挥之下, 如上文所言, 被冠以 “ 主权” 的名号。
然而, 除过想到 “ 公家”, 我们还必须考虑到它的私人成员———私人的生活及自由在本质上是独立的。 所以, 必须区分清楚公民以及主权体各自的权利, 区分清公民作为臣民应履行的义务以及他们作为人应享受的自然的权利。
我们认为, 根据社会契约, 每个人对于自己的权利、 财物及自由, 只需放弃其中社会所需要的部分; 但也必须承认, 究竟社会需要的是哪部分, 只能由主权体判
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that the sovereign alone is judge of what is of such concern.
Whatever services the citizen can render the state, he owes whenever the sovereign de唱 mands them; but the sovereign, on its side, may not impose on the subjects any burden which is not necessary to the community; the sovereign cannot, indeed, even will such a thing, since according to the law of reason no less than to the law of nature nothing is with唱 out a cause.
The commitments which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them a man cannot work for others without at the same time working for himself.How should it be that the general will is always rightful and that all men constantly wish the happiness of each but for the fact that there is no one who does not take that word “ each” to pertain to himself and in voting for all think of him唱 self? This proves that the equality of rights and the notion of justice which it produces derive from the predilection which each man has for himself and hence from human nature as such. It also proves that the general will, to be truly what it is, must be general in its purpose as well as in its nature; that it should spring from all and apply to all; and that it loses its natu唱 ral rectitude when it is directed towards any particular and circumscribed object -for in jud唱 ging what is foreign to us, we have no sound principle of equity to guide us.
For, indeed, whenever we are dealing with a particular fact or right, on a matter which has not been settled by an earlier and general agreement, that question becomes conten唱 tious.It is a conflict in which private interests are ranged on one side and the public interest on the other; and I can see neither the law which is to be followed nor the judge who is to arbitrate.It would be absurd in such a dispute to seek an express decision of the general will; for a decision could only be a conclusion in favour of one of the contending parties, and it would be regarded by the other party as an alien, partial will, a will prone to error and liable in such circumstances to fall into injustice.So we see that even as a private will cannot represent the general will, so too the general will changes its nature if it seeks to deal with an individual case; it cannot as a general will give a ruling concerning any one man or any one fact.When the people of Athens, for example, appointed or dismissed its leaders, awarding honours to one, inflicting penalties on another, and by a multitude of particular decrees indiscriminately exercised all the functions of an administration,then the people of Athens no longer had what is correctly understood as a general will and ceased to act as sov唱 ereign and acted instead as magistrate.All this may seem at variance with commonly accept唱 xx notions; but I must be given time to expound my own.
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断。
每当主权体要求公民效力的时候, 公民都应该竭尽全力为国家服务。 但在主权
体那方面, 则不应该对臣民增加对社会没有用处的负担。 说实在的, 主权体甚至都不该有这样的念头, 因为无论是根据理性法则还是自然法则, 做任何事情都不应该是无缘无故的。
把我们跟社会实体绑在一起的承诺应该具有强制性, 因为它们是双方之间的承诺。 根据承诺的实质而言, 履行了承诺, 一个人在为他人谋福利的同时, 势必也会有益于自身。 公众的意志总是正确的, 所有的人都希望每个社会成员生活幸福, 这只是因为大家都觉得 “ 每个社会成员” 也指的是自己, 为别人投票也是为了自己。由此证明: 权利的平等性以及它带来的公义概念, 全都源自于每个人对自身的关爱,也源自于人的本性。 这也说明, 公众意志要做到有名有实, 其宗旨和实质都必须是为了公众, 必须做到来自公众又为公众服务。 一旦公众意志偏向于哪个特定的个人,便失去了它本来的公正性; 因为在判断超出公众利益之外的事物时, 我们就丧失了作为行动指南的平等的原则。
实际上, 每当牵扯到某件特定的事情或权利时, 如果先前没有达成共同的协议,人们之间便会出现争端。 对于这种争端, 私人利益和公众利益形成对峙的两方。 此处, 既无法律可循, 也不可能有法官评判是非。 要让公众意志做出明确的决议解决争端, 纯属荒唐之举; 因为这样的决议只能是对争端中其中一方有利的结论, 而势必会被另一方认为是偏颇的, 不能容忍的; 这样的意志很可能是错误的, 在这种情况下很可能是不公正的。 我们可以看到, 个人意志不能代表公众的意志, 而公众意志如果刻意去处理有关于个人的事件, 也会改变性质。 作为公众意志, 是不能够对某一个人或某一件事做出裁决的。 例如, 如果雅典人当年只是任命或罢黜他们的领袖, 给这个人颁发荣誉, 对那个人判刑, 运用名目繁多的法令不加区别地履行政府的所有职责, 那他们就不会再拥有我们所说的公众意志了, 就不会再作为主权体发挥作用了, 而成了地方官的角色。 这种看法也许与普遍接受的观点有抵触之处, 但请大家给我时间, 容我细加xx。
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It should nevertheless be clear from what I have so far said that the general will deri唱 vesits generality less from the number of voices than from the common interest which unites them -for the general will is an institution in which each necessarily submits himself to the same conditions which he imposes on others; this admirable harmony of interest and justice gives to social deliberations a quality of equity which disappears at once from the discussion of any individual dispute precisely because in these latter cases there is no common interest to unite and identify the decision of the judge with that of the contending parties.
Whichever way we look at it, we always return to the same conclusion: namely that the
social pact establishes equality among the citizens in that they all pledge themselves under the same conditions and must all enjoy the same rights.Hence by the nature of the compact, every act of sovereignty, that is,every authentic act of the general will, binds or favours all the citizens equally, so that the sovereign recognizes only the whole body of the nation and makes no distinction between any of the members who compose it.What then is correctly to be called an act of sovereignty? It is not a covenant between a superior and an inferior, but a covenant of the body with each of its members.It is a legitimate covenant, because its ba唱 sis is the social contract; an equitable one, because it is common to all; a useful one, be唱 cause it can have no end but the common good; and it is a durable covenant because it is guaranteed by the armed forces and the supreme power.So long as the subjects submit to such covenants alone, they obey nobody but their own will; and to ask how far the respec唱 tive rights of the sovereign and the citizen extend is to ask how far these two can pledge themselves together, each to all and all to each.
From this it is clear that the sovereign power, wholly absolute, wholly sacred, wholly inviolable as it is, does not go beyond and cannot go beyond the limits of the general cove唱 nants; and thus that every man can do what he pleases with such goods and such freedom as is left to him by these covenants; and from this it follows that the sovereign has never any right to impose greater burdens on one subject than on another, for whenever that happens a private grievance is created and the sovereign摧s power is no longer competent.
Granted these distinctions, it becomes manifestly false to assert that individuals make any real renunciation by the social contract; indeed, as a result of the contract they find themselves in a situation preferable in real terms to that which prevailed before; instead of an alienation, they have profitably exchanged an uncertain and precarious life for a better and more secure one; they have exchanged natural independence for freedom, the power to destroy others for the enjoyment of their own security ; they have exchanged their own
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从我的千言万语中, 诸位应该清楚地看到, 公众意志之所以具有 “ 公众性”, 与其说是因为投票的人数众多, 倒不如说是因为有一种公众的利益将投票人维系在了一起。 在公众意志这种框架里, 每个人都应该跟别人一样遵守约定的条件。 利益和公义达到了令人叹服的和谐, 使得社会意愿有了一种公平的特点; 但一涉及到个人争端, 这种公平性就消失了, 因为此时已没有了共同的利益可以将法官的判决与当事双方的看法融和及归纳在一处。
无论持什么样的看法, 我们总会返回同一结论: 社会契约在公民中间建立起平等的关系, 大家受同样条件的约束, 享受同样的权利。 根据契约的性质, 主权体的每一行为, 也就是说公众意志的每一个具有权威性的行为, 对所有的公民都具有约束力, 或者可以为他们带来益处; 主权体眼里只有国家这一整体, 而对国内的任何成员都不另眼相看。 那么, 究竟是什么才能被正确地称为主权体的行为呢? 它不是尊者和卑者之间的约定行为, 而是整体与每一个成员之间的契约。 它是合法的契约,因为它以社会契约为基础; 它是平等的契约, 因为它对所有的人都一视同仁; 它是有益的契约, 因为它的宗旨只是为公众谋福利; 它又是固若金汤的契约, 因为它有军队和至高无上的权力作保障。 臣民们服从这样的契约, 其实就等于服从自己的意志。 如果问主权体和公民各自的权利究竟有多大, 就等于在问这两方彼此之间有多么大程度的承诺———应该是一人为大家, 大家为一人。
有一点是很清楚的: 主权体有着绝对的权威, 是非常神圣的, 根本不容践踏,但它并非超过, 也不能超过公众契约的界限。 所以, 每一个人都可以随心所欲地享受这种契约赋予他的财物和自由; 也正因为如此, 主权体永远也无权给一位臣民分较重的负荷, 给另一位却分的较轻; 因为一旦出现这种现象, 抱怨之声便会响起,主权的资格也就不复存在了。
有了这些特点, 如果再硬说个人通过社会契约的作用损失了什么实际利益, 显然就是假话了。 其实, 由于这种契约的影响, 他们的处境实实在在比从前好; 他们并没有受到损失, 而是用朝不保夕的不稳定的生活换来了优越的稳定生活, 用自然的独立性换来了自由,用伤害他人的威胁力换来了自身的平安,用随时都可能被别
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strength which others might overcome for a right which the social union makes invincible. Their very lives, which they have pledged to the state, are always protected by it; and even when they risk their lives to defend the state, what more are they doing but giving back what they have received from the state? What are they doing that they would not do more often, and at greater peril, in the state of nature, where every man is inevitably at war and at the risk of his life, defends whatever serves him to maintain life? Assuredly, all must now fight in case of need for their country, but at least no one has any longer to fight for himself.And is there not something to be gained by running, for the sake of the guarantee of safety, a few of those risks we should each have to face alone if we were deprived of that assurance?
Chapter 5 The Right of Life and Death
It will be asked how individuals, who have no right whatever to take their own lives, can transfer to the sovereign a right they do not possess.This question looks difficult to an唱 swer only because it is badly formulated.Every man has the right to risk his own life in or唱 der to preserve it.Has it ever been said that a man who leaps out of a window to escape from a fire is guilty of suicide? Would the same crime be imputed to a man who perishes in a storm on the grounds that he knew of the danger when he embarked?
The purpose of the social treaty is the preservation of the contracting parties.Whoever wills the end wills also the means, and certain risks, even certain casualties are inseparable from these means.Whoever wishes to preserve his own life at the expense of others must give his life for them when it is necessary.Now, as citizen, no man is judge any longer of the danger to which the law requires him to expose himself, and when the xxxxxx says to him: “ It is expedient for the state that you should die”, then he should die, because it is only on such terms that he has lived in security as long as he has and also because his life is no longer the bounty of nature but a gift he has received conditionally from the state.
The death唱penalty inflicted on criminals may be seen in much the same way: it is in or唱 der to avoid becoming the victim of a murderer that one consents to die if one becomes a murderer oneself.Far from taking one摧s life under the social treaty, one thinks only of assur唱 ing it, and we shall hardly suppose that any of the contracting parties contemplates being hanged.
Moreover, since every wrongdoer attacks the society摧s law,he becomes by his deed a rebel and a traitor to the country;by violating its law, he ceases to be a member of it; in唱 deed,he makes war against it.And in this case, the preservation of the state is incompatible
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人制服的力量换来了由于社会的联盟而使之不可战胜的权利。 他们把生命交给了国家, 时时刻刻受到国家的保护。 甚至在冒着生命的危险保卫国家时, 他们也没有吃亏, 而只是在报答国家施予他们的恩泽。 保卫自身作为生命屏障的国家又吃什么亏呢? 在每个人都势必会卷入战争, 把生命置于危境的自然状态中, 他们要打的仗难道不是更多, 遇到的危险不是更大吗? 的确, 如今祖国一旦需要, 每个人都必须浴血奋战, 但最起码没有人再需要为自身的安危作战了。 为了这种安全的屏障, 我 们冒一些危险是值得的; 一旦失去了这种屏障, 我们当中的每个人还不都得单独地面对同样的危险吗?
第五章 决定生与死的权力
有人会问, 个人是没有任何权利支配自己的生命的, 那他们怎么能把自己并不拥有的权利转交给主权体呢? 这个问题看上去难以回答, 只是因为提的方式不对。每个人都有权冒生命的危险以保全自己的性命。 一个人在火灾中跳出窗户逃生, 谁又能说他犯了自杀罪呢? 一个人登船时明明知道有危险, 结果在暴风雨中丧了命,难道也能指控他犯了自杀罪吗?
社会契约的宗旨是保证签约方的安全。 谁要想实现宗旨, 也必须想到采取某种手段, 而采取手段时不可避免地会有一些危险, 甚至还会有伤亡出现。 凡是希望能以别人的牺牲保全自己性命的人, 在需要的时候, 也应该为了别人献出他自己的生命。 如今, 作为公民, 对于法律要求自己冒的险, 任何人都不能够再犹豫不决了。君主对他说 “ 为了国家的利益, 你必须献出生命”, 那他就应该为国捐躯。 因为只有遵守这种条件, 他才能够xx安安地生活; 也因为他的生命此时已不再是上天的恩赐, 而是国家有条件馈赠给他的礼物了。
也可以用同样的眼光看待对罪犯执行死刑。 如果是为了不死在杀人犯的手中,一个人出手杀了人, 那他会心甘情愿走上刑场。 一个人受到社会契约的约束, 绝对不会想到轻生, 而只想确保自己的生命安全。 我们简直难以想象: 签订的双方会想到上绞架的结局。
再说, 每一个犯罪的人都践踏了社会的法律, 就其行为本身已成为国家的叛逆者; 由于他违犯了国家的法律, 就不再是国家的一个成员了, 其实是在对自己的祖国开战。此时, 国家的利益和他的利益已经变得水火不相容, 不是你死就是我亡。
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with his preservation; one or the other must perish; and when the guilty man is put to death, it is less as a citizen than as an enemy.Trial and judgement are the proof and decla唱 ration that he has broken the social treaty,and is in consequence no longer a member of the state.And since he has accepted such membership, if only by his residence,he must either be banished into exile as a violator of the social pact or be put to death as a public enemy: such an enemy is not a fictitious person, but a man, and therefore the right of war makes it legitimate to kill him.
But, it will be said, the condemnation of a criminal is an individual act.Agreed; and it follows that such duties do not pertain to the sovereign; condemnation of criminals is a right the sovereign can confer but not exercise himself.All my ideas hold together, but I cannot elaborate them all at once.
In any case, frequent punishments are a sign of weakness or slackness in the govern唱 ment.There is no man so bad that he cannot be made good for something.No man should be put to death, even as an example, if he can be left to live without danger to society.
As for the right of pardon, or of exempting a guilty man from the penalty prescribed by law and imposed by a judge, this belongs only to that entity which is superior to both the judge and the law, namely the sovereign; but even this right is not entirely clear and it must be exercised very seldom.In a well governed state there are few penalties, not because there are many pardons but because there are few criminals.In a decaying state the very multi唱 plicity of crimes assures impunity.Under the Roman Republic neither the senate nor the con唱 suls ever attempted to pardon criminals; nor did the people do so,though they sometimes re唱 voked their own sentences.Frequent pardons signalize that crimes will soon need no pardon; and anyone can see what that must lead to.However, I can feel my heart whispering and re唱 straining my pen; let us leave the discussion of these questions to the just man who has nev唱 er erred and has therefore had no need of pardons.
Chapter 6 On Law
We have given life and existence to the body politic by the social pact; now it is a mat唱 ter of giving it movement and will by legislation.For the primitive act by which the body politic is formed and united does not determine what it shall do to preserve itself.
What is good and in conformity with order is such by the very nature of things and inde唱 pendently of human agreements.All justice comes from God, who alone is its source;and if only we knew how to receive it from that exalted fountain, we should need neither govern唱
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当罪犯被处死时, 他已不是公民, 而是敌人了。 审判和裁决就是证据, 他被宣称破坏了社会契约, 因而就不再是国家的一个成员了。 由于他接受了国籍, 哪怕是因为居住在该国而享有国籍, 他也会被作为社会契约的破坏者遭到流放, 或者作为公众的敌人被处死。 这个敌人可不是虚构出来的人, 而是实实在在的人, 因而根据战争权可以合法地将他处死。
可有人会说, 处决罪犯是一种个别的行为, 这我同意。 这也就是说, 主权体不承担这类责任。 主权体虽然不能行使处决罪犯的权力, 但它可以把权力授予别人。我的观点是有根有据的, 然而我三言两语无法阐述得清。
不管怎样, 频繁地使用刑罚是政府的一种懦弱和懈怠的表现。 一个人再坏, 也可以改造过来, 成为某一方面的有用之才。 任何罪犯, 只要活着不会危害社会, 就不应该将他处死, 哪怕能杀一儆百也不行。
至于赦免权或者免除罪人接受法律规定及法官判决的刑罚之权力, 则属于那个高高在上的实体———主权体, 它的权威高于法官及法律。 但是, 甚至连这种权力的范围也并非泾渭分明, 所以必须尽量少行使为妙。 在一个政通人和的国家少有刑罚,不是因为频频赦免所致, 而是因为犯罪的人非常少。 在一个运势日薄西山的国家,犯罪的人多如牛毛, 定会出现法不责众的现象。 在xx共和国里, 无论元老院还是执政官对罪犯从不手软, 对他们从不赦免; 人民对罪犯也是不赦免的, 只不过有的时候他们会撤回自己的判决。 一而再、 再而三地赦免, 则预示着罪犯会逍遥法外,很快就不需要再得到赦免了。 任何人都能看得出这会导致什么样的局面。 我可以感觉得到我的心在悄悄低语, 要求我就此收笔。 对于这些问题, 还是交给那位铁面无私的人议论吧, 他从来就没有出错的时候, 因而不需要得到赦免。
第六章 论法律
社会契约把生命给了政治实体, 赋予了它生存的权利; 现在的问题是如何通过立法使它行动起来, 给它以意志了。 政治实体是根据原始的约定形成并联合起来的,但那一约定没有说明它怎样才能保证自身的生存。
善而有道的事物之所以如此, 完全是本身的性质使然, 与人类的协议风马牛不相及。 一切正义都来自上帝, 只有上帝才是正义的源泉。 只要我们知道如何从那神圣的源泉获取正义的真理, 就不需要政府及法律了。正义毫无疑问带有普遍性, 完
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ments nor laws.There is undoubtedly a universal justice which springs from reason alone, but if that justice is to be admitted among men it must be reciprocal.Humanly speaking, the laws of natural justice, lacking any natural sanction, are unavailing among men.In fact, such laws merely benefit the wicked and injure the just, since the just respect them while others do not do so in return.So there must be covenants and positive laws to unite rights with duties and to direct justice to its object.In the state of nature, where everything is common, I owe nothing to those to whom I have promised nothing, and I recognize as be唱 longing to others only those things that are of no use to me.But this is no longer the case in civil society,where all rights are determined by law.
Yet what, in the last analysis, is law? If we simply try to define it in terms of meta唱 physical ideas, we shall go on talking without reaching any understanding; and when we have said what natural law is, we shall still not know what the law of the state is.
I have already said that the general will cannot relate to any particular object.For such a particular object is either within the state or outside the state.If it is outside, then a will which is alien to it is not general with regard to it; if the object is within the state, it forms a part of the state.Then there comes into being a relationship between the whole and the part which involves two separate entities, the part being one, and the whole, less that parti唱 cular part, being the other.But a whole less a particular part is no longer a whole; and so as long as this relationship exists there is no whole but only two unequal parts, from which it follows that the will of the one is no longer general with respect to the other.
But when the people as a whole makes rules for the people as a whole, it is dealing on唱 ly with itself; and if any relationship emerges, it is between the entire body seen from one perspective and the same entire body seen from another, without any division whatever. Here the matter concerning which a rule is made is as general as the will which makes it. And this is the kind of act which I call a law.
When I say that the province of the law is always general, I mean that the law considers all subjects collectively and all actions in the abstract; it does not consider any individual man or any specific action.Thus the law may well lay down that there shall be privileges, but it may not nominate the persons who shall have those privileges; the law may establish several classes of citizen, and even specify the qualifications which shall give access to those several classes, but it may not say that this man or that shall be admitted; the law may set up a royal government and an hereditary succession, but it may not elect a xxxx or choose a royal family -in a word, no function which deals with the individual fills within the province
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全是合乎情理的; 如果正义要在人们之间得到承认, 就必须顾及到各方面的利益。从人性的角度讲, 具有自然正义性的法律, 如不具有自然的约束力, 那在人们中间就成了一纸空文。 其实, 这样的法律只会令善者痛恶者快, 因为善心得不到好报,恶行却肆无忌惮。 所以, 必须有契约及公正的法律将权利和义务结合起来, 使正义得到申张。 在自然状态中, 一切东西都是天下共有的; 我没有做出承诺, 所以也就没有任何义务; 对于那些于我无用的东西, 我才承认属于别人。 但到了xx社会,这种现象就不复存在了, 所有的权利都是由法律规定的。
可是, 我们再最后分析一下, 法律究竟为何物? 如果我们试图以形而上学的观点给出定义, 就只会是空谈, 仍然让人无法理解。 对于自然法律是什么, 是可以讲得清的, 但我们仍不知国家的法律为何物。
上文做过交待, 公众的意志不能针对某种具体的对象。 这种具体的对象不是存在于国内就是存在于国外。 假如是在国外, 那么国内的意志和它就是不相容的, 而这种意志就不是公众意志了。 倘若这种对象出现在国内, 那便是国家的一个组成部分了。 此时便产生了整体与局部的关系, 涉及到的是两个独立的方面———一个方面是这个独立的部分, 而另一个方面则是将该部分除外的整体。 可是, 既然剔除掉了一个部分, 所谓的整体就不再完整了。 只要双方的关系存在, 那它所涉及到的就仅仅是两个平等的方面, 而已经没有整体的概念了。 于是, 一方的意志对于另一方而言已不再是公众的意志了。
然而, 人民作为整体制订规矩约束作为整体的人民时, 他们所涉及的只是其本身。 如果此时产生某种关系的话, 则是整体与整体之间的关系, 只不过观察的角度不同罢了, 其实中间没有任何分别。 他们制订的规矩此时便和公众意志一样具有了普遍性。 我把这种有着约束力的规矩称为法律。
之所以说法律的范围总是带有普遍性, 我指的是法律综合考虑所有臣民的利益,并且以抽象的眼光看待一切行为; 它关注的不是哪一个个人或者哪一件具体的行为。法律可以做出规定, 确立一些特权, 但是不能够指定哪些人可以享有这些特权; 法律可以为公民确定等级, 甚至可以阐明各等级应该具有的资格, 但是却不能够具体地说哪个人应划入哪个等级。 法律可以确立xx政府以及世袭制度, 然而却不能够推选国王或者指定王室。 总而言之, 处理个人的问题不属于立法的权力范围。
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of the legislative power.
On this analysis, it is immediately clear that we can no longer ask who is to make laws, because laws are acts of the general will; no longer ask if the xxxxxx is above the law,be唱 cause he is a part of the state; no longer ask if the law can be unjust, because no one is un唱 just to himself; and no longer ask how we can be both free and subject to laws, for the laws are but registers of what we ourselves desire.
It is also clear that since the law unites universality of will with universality of the field of legislation, anything that any man, no matter who, commands on his own authority is not a law; even what the sovereign itself commands with respect to a particular object is not a law but a decree, not an act of sovereignty but an act of government.
Any state which is ruled by law I call a “ republic”, whatever the form of its constitu唱 tion; for then, and then alone, does the public interest govern and then alone is the “ public thing” -the republica -a reality.All legitimate government is “ republican”, I shall ex唱 plain later what government is.
Laws are really nothing other than the conditions on which civil society exists.A peo唱 ple, since it is subject to laws, ought to be the author of them.The right of laying down the rules of society belongs only to those who form the society; but how can they exercise it? Is it to be by common agreement, by a sudden inspiration? Has the body politic an organ to de唱 clare its will? Who is to give it the foresight necessary to formulate enactments and proclaim them in advance, and how is it to announce them in the hour of need? How can a blind mul唱 titude, which often does not know what it wants, because it seldom knows what is good for it, undertake by itself an enterprise as vast and difficult as a system of legislation? By them唱 selves the people always will what is good, but by themselves they do not always discern it. The general will is always rightful, but the judgement which guides it is not always enlight唱 ened.It must be made to see things as they are, and sometimes as they should be seen; it must be shown the good path which it is seeking, and secured against seduction by the de唱 sires of individuals; it must be given a sense of situation and season, so as to weigh immedi唱 ate and tangible advantages against distant and hidden evils.Individuals see the good and reject it; the public desires the good but does not see it.Both equally need guidance.Indi唱 viduals must be obliged to subordinate their will to their reason; the public must be taught to recognize what it desires.Such public enlightenment would produce a union of understand唱 ing and will in the social body,bring the parts into perfect harmony and lift the whole to its fullest strength.Hence the necessity of a lawgiver.
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分析至此, 一切都很明显了, 我们不能再问是谁制订法律了, 因为法律是公众意志的产物; 不能再问君主是否能凌驾于法律之上了, 因为他是国家的一个分子;不能再问法律是否会具有不公正性了, 因为没有人会对自己不公正的; 不能再问我们怎么可以既享有自由又受法律的约束了, 因为法律是我们愿望的化身。
同样明显的是: 法律将意志的普遍性与立法内容的普遍性结合了起来; 任何人,不管他是谁, 凭着权威发布的命令都不是法律; 甚至连主权体发布的命令, 只要针对的是特定的对象, 也不是法律, 而是法令, 不是主权体应有的行为, 而是一种政府行为。
我把任何法制的国家都称为 “ 共和国”, 不管它采用的是什么形式的政体都是如此。 因为在这里, 也只有在这里, 是公众的利益在治国, 也只有在这里, “ 公众的事务” 呈现出 “ 共和” 现象。 一切合法的政府都实行 “ 共和制”。 至于政府是什么一种情况, 容我以后再做解释。
说穿了, 法律其实只是xx社会赖以生存的条件。 既然人民要服从法律, 那他们就应该是法律的制订者。 为社会制订规矩的权利只属于构成社会的成员们。 但是,他们如何才能行使这种权利呢? 是要靠民众们商量好了去行使, 还是灵机一动就行使起来了呢? 政治实体是否设有机构表明自己的意志呢? 谁能使政治实体高屋建瓴,预先就制订和颁布法规呢? 这些法规怎样才能在必要的时候公布于众呢? 盲目的民众经常不知所需, 因为他们不太了解怎么样才对自身有好处。 那么, 他们如何才能完成确立法律体系这般伟大和艰巨的使命呢? 人民本身总是有着良好的意愿, 但凭借着自身的力量他们并非总能够区分善恶。 公众意志历来都是正确的, 但引导公众意志的决策并非总是英明的。 必须让公众看到事物的本来面目, 有时应向其展示事物应该是怎么一种样子; 必须向公众指明他们应该沿循的是康庄大道, 不要被某些个人的私欲导入歧途。 必须让民众认清形势、 明白潮流的导向, 保住眼前切实的利益, 不受远处隐藏的邪恶之盅惑。 个人看得清真理却置之不理, 民众追求真理却辨别不清, 双方都需要加以引导。 个人必须让自己的愿望服从理智, 公众必须学会识别究竟什么才是他们渴望得到的。 普遍地进行这种启蒙教育, 就会在社会实体中使理智和意志达到统一, 令局部达到完美的和谐, 从而整体也就力量倍增。 此时, 就需要立法者发挥作用了。
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Chapter 7 The Lawgiver
To discover the rules of society that are best suited to nations,there would need to exist a superior intelligence, who could understand the passions of men without feeling any of them,who had no affinity with our nature but knew it to the full,whose happiness was inde唱 pendent of ours, but who would nevertheless make our happiness his concern, who would be content to wait in the fullness of time for a distant glory,and to labour, in one age to enjoy the fruits in another.Gods would be needed to give men laws.
The same reasoning which Caligula used empirically,Plato used philosophically in his dialogue The Statesman to reach a definition of civil or kingly man.But if it is true that great princes seldom appear, how much more rare must a great lawgiver be? A xxxxxx has only to follow a model which the lawgiver provides.The lawgiver is the engineer who invents the machine; the xxxxxx is merely the mechanic who sets it up and operates it.Montesquieu says that at the birth of political societies, it is the leaders of the republic who shape the in唱 stitutions but that afterwards it is the institutions which shape the leaders of the republic.
Whoever ventures on the enterprise of setting up a people must be ready, shall we say, to change human nature, to transform each individual, who by himself is entirely complete and solitary, into a part of a much greater whole, from which that same individual will then receive, in a sense, his life and his being.The founder of nations must weaken the structure of man in order to fortify it, to replace the physical and independent existence we have all received from nature with a moral and communal existence.In a word each man must be stripped of his own powers, and given powers which are external to him, and which he can唱 not use without the help of others.The nearer men摧s natural powers are to extinction or anni唱 hilation, and the stronger and more lasting their acquired powers, the stronger and more per唱 fect is the social institution.So much so, that if each citizen can do nothing whatever except through cooperation with others, and if the acquired power of the whole is equal to, or grea唱 ter than, the sum of the natural powers of each of the individuals, then we can say that law唱 making has reached the highest point of perfection.
The lawgiver is, in every respect, an extraordinary man in the state.Extraordinary not only because of his genius, but equally because of his office, which is neither that of the government nor that of the sovereign.This office which gives the republic its constitution has no place in that constitution.It is a special and superior function which has nothing to do with empire over men ; for just as he who has command over men must not have command
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要找出最适合于国情的社会规则, 就必须有一种高于一切的智慧之星: 它理解人们的喜怒哀乐却不为之所动; 它与我们的本性无任何瓜葛却对之了如指掌; 它的幸福跟我们的幸福无关, 然而它却为我们的幸福呕心沥血; 它愿意在漫长的岁月里等待, 以憧憬那遥远的荣誉; 它情愿在一个世纪卧薪尝胆, 而在另一个世纪享受胜利的果实。 我们需要神的力量把法律赐给人类。
xxxxx实际经验的角度, 柏拉图从哲学的角度都做过同样的推理。 柏拉图在他的问谈录 枟xxx枠 一书中, 试图对普通人和君主做出定义。 如果说伟大的君主的确是旷世之才, 那么, 伟大的立法者恐怕更是人世间少有了吧? 立法者构画蓝图, 君主只需要照着做就行了。 立法者是机器的发明家, 而君主只不过是安装机器和开机器的机械师。 孟德斯鸠曾说过: 在政治实体诞生之际, 共和国的领袖们为法规提供了框架, 而以后则是法规规范领袖们的行为。
每一个不畏艰险、 披荆斩棘地力求缔造一个民族的人, 恐怕都必须要做好改变人性的准备, 准备改造每一个就其本身而言是十分完整和独立的个人, 使他成为一个庞大的整体中的一个组成部分; 在某种意义上, 个人的生命及存在都将依赖于这个整体。 民族的缔造者必须削弱人类的结构, 为的是以别的形式进一步加固它, 以道德的共同存在取代大自然赋予人类的生理的独立存在。 简而言之, 必须剥夺每一个人自身的力量, 赋予他一种外部的力量, 一种不靠别人的帮助就无法使用的力量。人们固有的力量越是接近毁灭或消亡, 他们后来获得的力量就越强大、 越长久, 而社会的法规也就更完善。 结果, 倘若每一位公民不跟别人合作就什么事也做不了。倘若整体获得的力量等于或大于个体自然力量的总和, 那我们就可以说: 立法已抵达巅峰, 已完善至美。
从各个方面看, 立法者都是国内出类拔萃的人物。 他出类拔萃, 不仅因为他天赋超群, 也同样因为他身肩大任, 那可不是政府或主权体的行政工作。 他的使命是为共和国提供法规, 然而他却并不染指于法规。 这是一种特殊的、 崇高的职责, 与统治人没有一丝一毫的关系。 正所谓, 治人者不该立法, 立法者不该治人。 否则,
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over laws, neither must he who has command over laws have command over men; other唱 wise,the laws, in ministering to the legislator摧s passions, would often merely perpetuate his injustices, and partial judgements would inevitably vitiate the sanctity of his works.
When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he began by abdicating his monarchical func唱 tions.It was the habit of most Greek cities to confer on foreigners the task of framing their laws.The modern republics of Italy have often copied this custom; the republic of Geneva did so, and found that it worked well.Rome in its摧happiest age saw all the crimes of the Tyranny authority within its borders, and came near to perishing simply because it had put both the legislative revived and the sovereign power in the same hands.
And yet even the decemvirs themselves never arrogated the right to make any law on唱 their own authority alone.“ Nothing we propose to you,” they said to the people, “ can be唱 come law without your consent.Romans, be yourselves the authors of the laws which are to ensure your happiness.”
Thus the man who frames the laws ought not to have any legislative right, and the peo唱 ple itself cannot, even should it wish, strip itself of this untransferable right; for,according to the fundamental compact, it is only the general will which compels individuals and there can be no assurance that an individual will is in conformity with the general will until it has submitted to the free suffrage of the people -I have said this already, but it is worth repeat唱 ing.
And so we find in the work of the lawgiver two things which look contradictory -a task which is beyond human powers and a non唱existent authority for its execution.
There is another difficulty which deserves mention.Those sages who insist on speaking in their own language to the vulgar instead of in the vulgar language will not be understood. For there are thousands of ideas which cannot be translated into the popular idiom.Perspec唱 tives which are general and goals remote are alike beyond the range of the common herd; it is difficult for the individual, who has no taste for any scheme of government but that which serves his private interest, to appreciate the advantages to be derived from the lasting auster唱 ities which good laws impose.For a newly formed people to understand wise principles of politics and to follow the basic rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become the cause; the social spirit which must be the product of social institutions would have to preside over the setting up of those institutions; men would have to have already become before the advent of law that which they become as a result of law.And as the lawgiver can for these reasons employ neither force nor argument, he must have recourse to an authority of another
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法律受到立法者情感的影响, 常常会表现出一定程度的不公正, 而偏颇的内容势必会亵渎立法工作的神圣性。
当年利格古斯为他的国家制订法律时, 一开始就先让出了他的王位。 把制订法律的使命委托外国人完成, 这对大多数希腊城邦而言已形成了习惯。 近代的意大利诸共和国常常仿效这种做法。 日内瓦共和国也如法炮制, 发现效果很好。 在xx的鼎盛时期, 暴政在国内滋生了种种的罪恶, 几乎导致亡国, 这全是因为一伙人将立法权和主权都一股脑儿握在了自己的手里。
其实, 就连那十大执政官也从未单凭自己的威势僭越权力去制订法律。 他们对罗马人民说: “ 我们的提议若没有经过你们同意, 是不能够成为法律的。 xx人啊,为了确保你们自己的幸福, 还是由你们制订法律吧。”
所以, 为法律提供框架的人是不应该拥有立法权的。 人民即便想放弃这种不可转让的权利, 也是不能够这么做的。 唯有公众意志才能约束个人, 这是基本契约所规定的; 只有通过人民的表决, 才能确保个人意志符合于公众意志。 这一点我已谈论过, 但此处值得再强调一下。
对于立法者的工作, 有两点看上去是矛盾的———立法是超越人类能力的使命,而且不存在权威对立法的运行实行监管。
另外还有一种困难值得一提。 圣贤们不是用大众化的语言跟大众讲话, 而是执意要用他们自己的语言, 所以没有人理解他们。 有成千上万的观念都无法用民众的话表达出来。 概括性强的理念以及遥远的目标都是老百姓接受不了的。 一个只关心自身利益, 对政府的规划不闻不问的人, 很难理解进步的法律要求他们长期厉行节约究竟有什么好处。 要让刚刚组织在一起的国民明白政治的乖巧原则, 让他们遵守国家事务的基本规矩, 就等于把结果和原因来了个前后倒置。 社会精神原本应该是社会法规的产物, 而这一下却要由它督管制订法规。 还没等法律出现, 人们就已经成了法律应该将他们塑造成的那种模样。 鉴于这些原因, 立法者既不能动用武力也不可以以理压人, 于是就必须求助于另外一种类型的权威, 一种不xxx、 不辩自
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order, one which can compel without violence and persuade without convincing.
It is this which has obliged the founders of nations throughout history to appeal to divine intervention and to attribute their own wisdom to the Gods; for then the people, feeling sub唱 ject to the laws of the state as they are to those of nature,and detecting the same hand in the creation of both man and the nation, obey freely and bear with docility the yoke of the public welfare.
A sublime reason, which soars above the heads of the common people, produces those rules which the lawgiver puts into the mouth of the immortals, thus compelling by divine au唱 thority persons who cannot be moved by human prudence.But it is not for every man to make the Gods speak, or to gain credence if he pretends to be an interpreter of the divine word.The lawgiver摧s great soul is the true miracle which must vindicate his mission.Any man can carve tablets of stone, or bribe an oracle, claim a secret intercourse with some di唱 vinity, train a bird to whisper in his ear, or discover some other vulgar means of imposing himself on the people.A man who can do such things may conceivably bring together a com唱 pany of fools, but he will never establish an empire, and his bizarre creation will perish with him.Worthless authority may set up transitory bonds, but only wisdom makes lasting ones. The Law of the Hebrews, which still lives,and that of the child of Ishmael① which has ruled half the world for ten centuries, still proclaim today the greatness of the men who first enun唱 ciated them; and even though proud philosophy and the blind spirit of faction may regard them as nothing but lucky impostors, the true statesman sees, and admires in their institu唱 tions, the hand of that great and powerful genius which lies behind all lasting things.
Even so, we must not conclude from this, with Warburton,Ⓒthat religion and politics have the same purpose among men;it is simply that at the birth of nations, the one serves as the instrument of the other.
Chapter 8 The People
Just as an architect who puts up a large building first surveys and tests the ground to see if it can bear the weight, so the wise lawgiver begins not by laying down laws good in them唱 selves, but by finding out whether the people for whom the laws are intended is able to sup唱 port them.Such reasoning led Plato to refuse to provide laws for the Arcadians or the Cyre唱
① 伊斯美:根据传说,此人是沙漠阿拉伯人的祖先。
Ⓒ 瓦xx:(1698—1779) 英国神学家。
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服的权威。
正是这一点, 在历史的长河中, 各国的缔造者无不求助于神力, 将他们自己的智慧归结为神谕。 在这种情况下, 人民觉得应该遵守国家的法律, 就像遵守自然法则一样。 他们认为创造了人类以及国家的都是神的力量, 于是他们俯首帖耳, 驯顺地承受着公众利益的约束。
一种凌驾于芸芸众生之上的至高无上的智慧制订了法规, 而立法者将其归为神谕, 靠着神的权威强迫那些凭着人的力量无法约束的人去服从。 然而, 并非人人都能让神为自己说话, 也不是人人假装解释神谕就可以让别人相信自己。 立法者那伟大的灵魂是真正的奇迹, 一定能将自己的使命昭示于世。 任何人都可以刻石碣、 买神谕, 声称自己和神进行了秘密的沟通, 也可以训练小鸟在他的耳畔低语, 或想出别的鬼把戏愚弄人民。 通过招摇撞骗倒是可以纠集一群乌合之众, 但绝对不能缔造一个帝国, 他那荒唐的把戏终将和他一道消失。 弄虚作假的人只能制订出昙花一现的法规, 唯有智者制订的法规才是永恒的。 希伯莱人的法典至今仍散发着活力, 伊斯美之子制订的法律统治着半个世界长达千年, 现在仍在诉说着立法人的丰功伟绩。虽然高傲的哲学家以及盲从的宗派思想家会把那些伟人看作走运的骗子, 而真正的xxx却对伟人们佩服得五体投地, 他们在伟人的法典中看到的是杰出、 勃发的天赋, 是缔造了一切永恒事物的天赋。
即便如此, 我们也不能和瓦xx一样从中得出这样的结论: 世界上的宗教和政治有着同样的宗旨。 我们认为: 国家诞生之际, 宗教只是充当了政治的工具。
第八章 论人民
建筑师在建筑高楼大厦的时候, 首先要察看和勘测地面, 看是不是能承受住大厦的重量。 审时度势的立法者也并不是一开始便制订出就本身而言很不错的法律,而是要调查民意, 看法律所针对的人民是否会持支持的态度。 出于这种原因, 柏拉图曾经拒绝为阿卡狄亚人以及昔xx人制订法律,因为他很清楚,那是两个富有的
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neans, because he well knew that those peoples, being xxxx, would not tolerate equality. Crete, too, provides an example of good laws and bad men, for the people Milos① tried to discipline were dominated by their vices.
The world has seen a thousand splendid nations that could not have accepted good laws, and even those that might have accepted them could have done so only for short peri唱 ods of their long history.Nations, like men, are teachable only in their youth; with age they become incorrigible.Once customs are established and prejudices rooted, reform is a xxx唱 gerous and fruitless enterprise; a people cannot bear to see its evils touched, even if only to be eradicated; it is like a stupid,pusillanimous invalid who trembles at the sight of a physi唱 cian.
I am not denying that just as certain afflictions unhinge men摧s minds and banish their memory of the past, so there are certain violent epochs and revolutions in states which have the same effect on peoples that psychological shocks may have on individuals; only instead of forgetting the past, they look back on it in horror, and then the state, after being con唱 sumed by civil war, is born again, so to speak, from its own ashes, and leaps from the arms of death to regain the vigour of youth.Such was the experience of Sparta at the time of Ly唱 curgus,of Rome after the Tarquins,Ⓒ and, in the modern world, of Holland and Switzerland after the expulsion of the tyrants.
But such events are unusual; they are exceptional cases to be explained by the special constitution of the states concerned.It could not even happen twice to the same people; be唱 cause although a people can make itself free while it is still uncivilized, it cannot do so when its civil energies are worn out.Disturbances may well destroy a civil society without a revolu唱 tion being able to restore it, so that as soon as the chains are broken, the state falls apart and exists no longer; then what is needed is a master, not a liberator.Free peoples, re唱 member this maxim: liberty can be gained, but never regained.
For nations, as for men, there is a time of maturity which they must reach before they are made subject to law; but the maturity of a people is not always easily recognized; and something done too soon will prove abortive.Peoples differ; one is amenable to discipline from the beginning; another is not, even after ten centuries.The Russians have never been effectively governed because the attempt to govern them was made too early.Xxxxx the Great
① 弥诺斯:希腊神话中的xx特岛的英雄,克诺索斯之王。
Ⓒ 塔xx乌斯王朝:公元前7 世纪至公元前6 世纪统治xx的一个王朝,公元前509 年被人
民推翻,建立了共和国。
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民族, 不会容忍平等的观念。 xxxx情况也是一例, 那儿的法律虽好, 但那儿的人却不良善, 弥诺斯企图统治的是一些罪行累累的人。
在这个世界上有许多显赫的民族都无法接受好的法律, 即便能接受好法律的民族, 将之付诸实行也只是短短的一段时期。 一个民族就跟人一样, 只有在年轻的时候可以对其施教, 随着岁月的流逝, 它就变得不可调教了。 习惯一旦养成, 偏见一旦变得根深蒂固, 要改变就会遇到危险, 必将无果而终。 人们就怕别人揭短, 甚至是为他们自己割毒瘤也不行, 就像是愚蠢、 胆小的病人, 见了医生便发抖一样。
我并不否认, 有些病痛可以搅乱人的大脑, 消除他们对过去的回忆; 某些动乱的年代以及各国发生的革命对人民的影响和病痛对个人的心理产生的震动是一样的。只不过, 人民非但忘不了过去, 而且一回首往事便胆战心惊; 饱受内战之患的国家从灰烬中获得再生, 挣脱死神的怀抱, 重新焕发出青春的活力。 利格古斯时期的斯巴达以及塔xx乌斯王朝垮台后的xx都有过这种经历, 而现代的荷兰和瑞士在驱逐了暴君之后也有过这种情况。
但这并非寻常的现象, 而是非同一般的特殊情况, 是由一些国家的特殊环境造成的。 甚至可以说, 这种情况同一个民族绝不会遇到两次。 尚未沐浴xx曙光的民族可以为自己争取到自由, 可一旦精力耗尽, 就不能维持自由之身了。 动乱完全可以摧毁一个xx的社会, 就是发生革命也无法使它恢复原样。 束缚一旦打破, 国家就成了一盘散沙, 不复存在了。 此时, 它需要的是一个主宰, 而非救星。 自由的人们, 请记住这句警言吧: “ 自由可得, 但不可失而复得。”
民族就和个人一样, 是有成熟期的, 必须到了成熟期, 它们才会遵纪守法。 然而, 一个民族是否成熟, 并不总是能很容易就识别出来的。 操之过急, 事情肯定会半途流产。 民族和民族也是不同的, 有的一开始就服从调教, 有的则桀骜不驯, 甚至过一千年也旧习不改。 从来没有人能有效地统治俄罗斯人, 因为试图管束他们的企图有些操之过急。xx大帝具有仿效的才能, 却不是个真正的天才, 因为天才的
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had the talent of a copyist;he had no true genius, which is creative and makes everything from nothing.Some of the things he did were sound; most were misguided.He saw that his people was uncivilized, but he did not see that it was unready for government; he sought to civilize his subjects when he ought rather to have drilled them.He tried to turn them into Germans or Englishmen instead of making them Russians.He urged his subjects to be what they were not and so prevented them from becoming what they might have been.This is just how a French tutor trains his pupil to shine for a brief moment in his childhood and then grow up into a nonentity.The Russian Empire would like to subjugate Europe and will find itself subjugated.The Tartars, its subjects or neighbours, will become its masters—and ours.Such a revolution seems to me inevitable.All the kings of Europe are labouring in concert to hasten its coming.
Chapter 9 The People: continued
Just as nature has set bounds to the stature of well唱formed man, outside which he is ei唱 ther a giant or a dwarf, so, in what concerns the best constitution for a state, there are limits to the size it can have if it is to be neither too large to be well governed nor too small to maintain itself.In the body politic there is a maximum of strength which must not be excee唱 ded,and which is often fallen short of as a result of expansion.The more the social bond is stretched, the slacker it becomes; and in general a small state is relatively stronger for its size than a large one.
A thousand considerations bear witness to the truth of this.First, administration be唱 comes more difficult over great distances, just as a weight becomes heavier at the end of a long lever.Government becomes more burdensome as the area is enlarged, for each town has its own administration, which the people pays for, and each region has its administra唱 tion, which the people also pays for, then each province has one, and so on up to the grea唱 ter governments, the satrapies, the viceroyalties, each costing more the higher they rise and always paid for by the unfortunate populace; and then on top of all comes the supreme ad唱 ministration, bearing down on everyone.Such a great number of charges added to charges continually exhausts the subjects; and far from being better governed by this hierarchy of or唱 ders, they are much worse off than they would be if they had only one administration over them.As it is, there is hardly any public revenue available for emergencies, and when the state is faced with such a need, it trembles on the verge of ruin.
Nor is this all.Not only is the government less vigorous and swift in enforcing respect
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特点是富于创造性,一切都是凭空创造出来的。 有些事他做得还不错,但他大多数的事情都犯有方向性的错误。 他看到他的人民尚未开化,但他没有看到他的人民还没有成熟,没有做好接受统治的准备。 他原应该使他的臣民接受磨练,可是他却想方设法教化他们。 应该让俄罗斯人具有民族特性,然而他却企图使他们脱胎换骨变成德国人或英国人。 他强迫他的子民改变天性,阻止他们按自己的天性去发展。 法国教师就是这样培养小学生的,学生虽然在儿童时期显赫一时,长大了却一事无成。 俄罗斯帝国企图控制欧洲,到头来却只会受挫于人。 它的属国或邻邦鞑靼人势必会成为它的主宰,也将统治我们。 我认为,这种变革是不可避免的。 欧洲各国的君主都在朝这方面努力,加快变革的进程。
第九章 论人民 ( 续)
自然对一个发育正常人的身高做了限定, 过则为巨人, 不足则是侏儒; 同样,在一个国家的体制方面, 其规格也是有所限制的; 国家太大, 就管理不好, 太小了就无法自保其身。 在实体政治上, 对政体的力量有一种不能够超越的限度, 一味扩张的结果往往导致实力的不足。 一个国家的社会联系越广泛, 约束力就越松散。 大体而言, 小国就因为规格小反而比大国实力强。
有无数现象都能证明这一真理。 首先, 距离越远, 就越难管理, 这就好比杠杆越长, 其末端就越重。 行政区域一扩大, 治理起来就比较麻烦。 每个城镇都有自己的行政机构, 需要人民出钱养活, 每一地区也有其政府, 亦需人民负担, 再往上还有更高一级的行政长官, 有总督, 有王侯; 官阶越大, 所需的费用便越高, 一切负担都由可怜的民众承受。 最高一级的行政机构居于金字塔的顶端, 将芸芸众生压在底下。 苛捐杂税多如牛毛, 榨取着人民的血汗。 由这样的等级制度治理国家根本治理不好, 远不如只由一个政府治理的好。 实际上, 这样的国家几乎没有应付紧急情况的储备力量; 一旦面临危机, 国家便会摇摇欲坠。
弊端还不止这些。不仅这样的政府缺乏活力, 不能雷厉风行地贯彻法律, 使人
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for the law, in preventing nuisances, correcting abuses and thwarting any seditious move唱 ments that may arise in distant quarters, but at the same time the people has less feeling for governors whom it never sees, for a homeland that seems as vast as the world, and for fel唱 low唱citizens who are mostly strangers.The same laws will not suit so many various prov唱 inces, which, with their different customs and contrasting climates, cannot tolerate the same form of government.Having different laws only creates misunderstanding and confusion a唱 mong peoples who live under the same governors and are in continuous communication with one another; they intermingle and intermarry, but if different sets of rules prevail, they will not even know if what they call their patrimony is really their own.Talents are hidden, vir唱 tues are ignored and vices remain unpunished when such a multitude of men, who do not know one another,is brought together in the same place by one single seat of supreme ad唱 ministration.The governors have too much to do to see everything for themselves; their clerks rule the state.And the measures needed to maintain a general authority, which so many scattered officials try to evade or exploit, absorb all political attention, so none is left to study the people摧s happiness, and hardly any left for its defence in case of need.This body which is too big for its constitution collapses and perishes,crushed by its own weight.
On the other hand, a state if it is to have strength must give itself some solid founda唱 tion, so that it can resist the shocks that it is bound to experience and sustain the exertions that it must make to preserve itself; for all peoples generate a kind of centrifugal force, by which they brush continuously against one another, and they all attempt to expand at the ex唱 pense of their neighbours, like the vortices of Descartes① Thus the weak are always in xxx唱 ger of being swallowed up, and indeed no people can well preserve itself except by achieving a kind of equilibrium with all the others which makes the pressure everywhere the same for
all.
This shows us that there are reasons for expansion and reasons for contraction; and in唱 deed it is not the least part of political wisdom to judge, as between the one and the other, the precise balance which is most conducive to the preservation of the state.In general one might say that any reasons for expansion, which are exterior and relative, ought to be less compelling than the reasons for contraction, which are internal and absolute.A strong and healthy constitution is the first thing to look for because the strength which comes from good government is more reliable than the resources which large territories yield.
① 笛xx(1596—1650),法国哲学家。
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们遵纪守法, 防患于未然, 纠正陋习积弊, 挫败在远方有可能出现的挑衅行为, 同时, 人民对从来都见不上面的长官、 对疆域无边的祖国以及形同路人的同胞也无感情可言。 各个省都有其不同的风俗习惯和迥然有异的气候, 不能容忍一种方式的统治, 所以用一部法典去约束那么多形形色色的省份是不恰当的。 在同一行政长官治理下的人民相互接触频繁, 采用异于他们的法律加以管理, 只会引起误会和制造混乱; 人民原来融为一体、 彼此通婚, 可一旦推行新法, 他们便惶惶不知他们称之为遗产的东西是否还真正属于他们。 由一个至高无上的政府统治, 无数素昧平生的人聚集在一处, 英才被埋没, 美德得不到彰显, 恶行也不受惩罚。 统治者杂事缠身,不能亲自督办一切, 于是便由官吏治理国家。 分散于各处的官吏想方设法敷衍, 能逃避就逃避, 能利用就利用, 为维持总统治者的统治而机关用尽, 耗尽了政客们的心机, 所以他们无力顾及人民的利益, 不能在人民需要时保护他们。 这样的国家结构过于臃肿, 往往不堪重负轰然倒塌, 走上灭亡之路。
另一方面, 国家必须具有牢固的基础, 掌握实力, 这样便能够抵御必将发生的社会震荡, 能够做出为保住江山所必须付出的努力。 国内所有的人都会发出离心力,不断地相互排斥, 就像笛xx的 “ 动乱中心” 理论讲的那样, 谁都想发展自身, 不惜以牺牲他人的利益为代价。 于是, 弱者总是处于危境, 随时都会被吞掉。 说实在的, 所有的人都应该与他人保持均衡的关系, 各地的人都应该平均分担压力, 否则就不能自保其身。
显而易见, 无论是xx还是退缩都有其理由。 如何维持人们之间的均衡关系,以确保国家的长治久安, 并不是xxx稍用智谋就能判断得出来的。 总体而言, xxxxx外部的相互关系, 而退缩是内部的、 独立的, 所以前者不应该高于后者。我们首先应该寻求坚实、 健康的国家结构, 因为这样的国力源自治理有方, 比广阔的疆域所提供的资源更为可靠。
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One may add that there have been states whose political structure was such that the ne唱 cessity of conquest was part of their very constitution, states which, in order to maintain themselves at all, were obliged to enlarge themselves unceasingly.Possibly they have con唱 gratulated themselves on this,as a fortunate necessity; but reflection on the same necessity must also have shown them that at the end of their greatness lay the inevitable moment of their fall.
Chapter 10 The People:Continued
There are two ways of measuring a body politic, by the extent of its territory and by the number of its people; and there must be a certain balance between these two dimensionsif the state is to achieve its best size.Men make the state and the soil nourishes men; thus the right balance requires that there be land enough to feed the inhabitants and as many inhabit唱 ants as the land can feed.It is in this proportion that the maximum strength of a given num唱 ber of persons is brought forth; for if there is too much territory, defence is burdensome, cultivation inadequate and produce excessive;and this soon becomes the cause of defensive wars; while if,on the other hand, there is too little land, the state must live on what it can import at the discretion of its neighbours,and this soon becomes the cause of offensive wars. Any people which has to choose between commerce and war is essentially weak; it depends on its neighbours; it depends on contingencies; it will never have more than a short, uncer唱 tain existence; either it conquers and ends its predicament, or it is conquered and exists no more.It can safeguard itself in freedom only by means of littleness or bigness.
One cannot specify the exact mathematical proportion there should be between the area of the land and the number of inhabitants, because of the different characteristics of different places, differences in degrees of fertility, in the nature of the produce, in the effects of cli唱 mate; and also because of the differences there are between the temperaments of men who inhabit the different territories, some consuming little in a fertile country and others living well off a frugal soil.Again we should have to consider the greater or lesser fecundity of the women, the distinctive features of the land, whether more or less favourable to population; the number of immigrants that the lawgiver might hope to attract by his institutions.From this it follows that he must make his decisions in the light not of what he sees, but of what he foresees, calculating not so much the number of the existing population as the number which the population must naturally reach.Finally, there are a thousand occasions when some particular accident of situation demands or allows the assimilation of more land than
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应该补充的是, 有些国家必须去征服别的国家, 这是它们体制的一个组成部分,政权结构使然。 为了保全自身, 它们必须不断增加版图。 它们侥幸一时, 也许会洋洋得意, 但一细想就会发现一时侥幸的后果———达到辉煌之后, 它们势必会败落下来。
第十章 论人民 ( 续)
衡量一个政治实体有两种方法: 一是通过其领土, 二是通过人口数量衡量。 国家的规模要达到完美状态, 两种方法之间就必须取得某种xx。 国家由人组成, 而人要由土地养活。 于是, 要达到合适的xx标准就要求有足够的土地养活人, 土地能养活多少人, 就应该有多少人口。 按这一比例, 一定数量的人口之实力就会达到最高点。 领土过多, 防御就成了问题, 土地不能精耕, 物产过剩, 这很快就会引发卫国战争; 但从另一方面讲, 如果土地太少, 国家就得仰仗领国的鼻息, 靠进口过日子, 不久就会导致战争, 去进攻别国。 任何一个必须在贸易和战争之间做出选择的民族, 本质上都是虚弱的。 它依赖于别的民族, 依赖于突发事件, 其根基犹如浮萍, 寿命一定短暂。 它要么就去征服别人, 改变困境, 要么就被别人征服, 不复存在。 国家要小就微不足道, 要大就威镇四方, 唯此才可安然无恙, 享受自由。
我们很难确定领土的规模和人口数量之间到底应该有多大的比例, 因为各处土地的状况、 土壤的肥沃程度、 物产的性质以及气候影响的大小都千差万别; 也因为各地区居民的性格是有差异的———有些丰裕之乡的人勤俭节约, 而有些贫瘠之地的居民却铺张浪费。 另外, 我们还应考虑女人生育能力的大小, 考虑土地的特点———适合于当地居民还是不适合, 考虑立法者希望靠立法吸引多少侨民。 鉴于此因, 立法者做出决定时不是着眼于现在, 而必须展望未来, 不是仅仅考虑现在的人口数量,更要考虑人口势必会达到的数量。 最后, 还会出现许许多多这样的情况: 由于地区特殊, 要求或允许人们拥有多于眼前的土地。 山区里的人们在森林里和牧场上劳作,
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appears necessary.In a mountainous country, where the type of cultivation -woodland and pastures -requires less work,where the women are shown by experience to be more fecund than in the plains, and where the steep slopes of hills leave only a marginal degree of that flat land which alone can be relied on for vegetation, men will spread out more widely.The contrary is the case on the edge of the sea, where men will draw together in a small area, e唱 ven among rocks and sands that are almost barren; for fishing can make up for much of the deficiency of agricultural produce; and being close together enables such men the better to resist pirates; and they can easily rid themselves by overseas settlement of any surplus popu唱 lation.
There is yet another condition for the institution of a people, one condition which no other can replace and without which all the rest are unavailing: a plenitude of peace must be enjoyed; for the period of the formation of a state, like that of the lining up of a regiment, is the time when it is least capable of resistance and most open to destruction.A state can de唱 fend itself more effectively amid total chaos than during the time of fermentation, when eve唱 ryone is thinking about his own position and not about the common danger.If there is a war, famine or sedition during this critical period, the state will inevitably be overthrown.
It is true that many governments have been set up during such disturbances, but then it is the governments themselves which destroy the state.Usurpers always choose troubled times to enact, in the atmosphere of general panic, laws which the public would never adopt when passions were cool.One of the surest ways of distinguishing the work of a lawgiver from that of a tyrant is to note the moment he chooses to give a people its constitution.
Which people, then, is fit to receive laws? I answer: a people which, finding itself xx唱 ready bound together by some original association, interest or agreement, has not yet borne the yoke of law; a people without deep唱rooted customs or superstitions; one which does not fear sudden invasion, and which, without intervening in the quarrels of its neighbours,can stand up to any of them, or secure the help of one to resist another; a people in which every member may be known to all; where there is no need to burden any man with more than he can bear; a people which can do without other peoples and which other peoples can do with唱 out; one which is neither xxxx nor poor, but has enough to keep itself;and lastly one which combines the cohesion of an ancient people with the malleability of a new one.What makes the task of the lawgiver so difficult is less what has to be established than what has to be de唱 stroyed ;and what makes success so rare is the impossibihty of finding the simplicity of na唱 ture together with the needs that society creates.It is difficult to combine all these condi 唱
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工作量不大, 而且经验证明山区妇女比平原上的妇女生育力强, 同时山坡陡峭, 只留下小片的平地可种粮食, 所以居民们只好散居各处。 海边的情况正相反, 人们聚居在一小块地区, 甚至居住在几乎寸草不生的岩石间和沙滩上, 因为捕鱼可以大大弥补农产品的不足; 集中居住可以更有效地抵御海盗的侵袭, 居民们还可以通过移民海外以解决人口过剩的问题。
国家在订立制度时还必须有一个条件, 一个任何情况下都不能取代的条件, 没有了这个条件, 其他的条件都不顶用, 即必须有太平日子可过。 草创一个国家, 就如拉起一支队伍, 此时的抵抗能力最弱, 最容易被摧毁。 一个国家在天下大乱时反而比在风雨欲来时更能有效地保卫自己, 因为遇到后一种情况时, 人人都斤斤计较自身的利益, 全然不考虑公众的安危。 值此危难之际, 一旦出现战争、 饥馑或叛乱,国家政权肯定会被颠覆。
许多政府都是在多事之秋建立的, 这倒是事实, 可是毁掉国家的也是政府自身。篡权者总是混水摸鱼, 利用人心惶惶的气氛推出一些法规, 而待人心平定之后, 公众是绝对不会接受这些法规的。 区分什么是立法者的工作, 什么是暴君的花招, 最可靠的方法之一就是注意他们选择什么样的时候制订法规。
那么, 什么样的民族才适合于接受法律的约束呢? 依我之见应该是原已由联盟、利益或协约维系在一起, 但尚未套上法律枷锁的民族; 是没有根深蒂固习俗或迷信观念的民族; 是不惧怕突然的入侵、 不介入邻邦的纷争、 能够起而抵御任何邻邦、能够争取到支援以抗击外侮之敌的民族; 也是这样一个民族, 其成员都彼此熟悉,不让任何人承担超出自己能力的负荷; 是一个不依赖他人, 而别人也不依赖它的民族; 是既不富有也不贫穷, 然而能够自给自足的民族; 最后, 是能够将古代人的团结精神与现代人坚忍不拔的精神融为一体的民族。 立法者的使命之艰辛不在于创立新法, 而在于废除旧法。 成功的例子极为罕见, 是因为他们无法既保持法律的xx性又照顾到社会的种种需要。 这些条件很难都凑在一起, 所以法制状态良好的国家
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tions; and that is why so few well constituted states exist.
There is still one country in Europe which is fit to receive laws, and that is the island of Corsica.The valour and fidelity with which this brave people has recovered and defended its freedom entitle it to be taught by some wise man how to preserve that freedom.I have a pre唱 sentiment that this little island will one day astonish Europe.
Chapter 11 Various Systems of Law
If we enquire wherein lies precisely the greatest good of all, which ought to be the goal of every system of law, we shall find that it comes down to two main objects, freedom and e唱 quality: freedom because any individual dependence means that much strength withdrawn from the body of the state, and equality because freedom cannot survive without it.
I have already explained what civil freedom is; as for equality, this word must not be taken to imply that degrees of power and wealth should be absolutely the same for all, but rather that power shall stop short of violence and never be exercised except by virtue of au唱 thority and law, and, where wealth is concerned, that no citizen shall be xxxx enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself;this in turn implies that the more ex唱 alted persons need moderation in goods and influence and the humbler persons moderation in avarice and covetousness.
Such equality, we shall be told, is a chimera of theory and could not exist in reality. But if abuse is inevitable, ought we not then at least to control it? Precisely because the force of circumstance tends always to destroy equality, the force of legislation ought always to tend to preserve it.
However, these general objectives of all institutions must be modified in each country to meet local conditions and suit the character of the people concerned.It is in the light of such factors that one must assign to each people the particular form of constitution which is best, not perhaps in itself, but for that state for which it is destined.For example, is your soil meagre and barren or the territory too narrow for its inhabitants? Then look to industry and crafts, so that manufactured goods may be exchanged for the natural resources that are lacking.Suppose, on the other hand, you have xxxx plains and fertile slopes, good land too little inhabited.Then concentrate on agriculture, to increase the population, and eschew ar唱 tisanry, which invariably depopulates the countryside and brings the few inhabitants there are together in certain urban centres.Have you a long and convenient coastline? Then fill the sea with ships, develop trade and navigation, and you will have a brilliant if short exist唱
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欧洲还有一个国家也适合于接受法律的约束, 那就是科西嘉岛国。 这个勇敢的民族靠着无畏的精神和忠诚的行为恢复和捍卫了它的自由, 所以它有资格接受智者的教导以巩固自由。 我有一个预感: 这个小小的岛国终有一日会叫整个欧洲为之震惊。
第十一章 形形色色的立法体系
如果要寻觅究竟什么才是全体人民的最大利益, 即每一法律体系努力的目标,我们就会发现: 归结起来, 不外乎两个重点———自由和平等。 强调自由, 是因为个体受到限制就意味着国家力量的大大削弱; 强调平等, 则是由于没有平等, 亦无自由。
我已经解释了什么是社会自由。 至于平等, 我们不能把该名词理解为所有的人都应该享有绝对相等的权力和财富, 而应该理解为: 权力不能演变为暴力, 必须通过权威机构和法律行使权力。 在涉及财富之处, 公民再有钱也不能购买他人之身,再穷困也不能强迫他卖掉自己。 这也就意味着: 地位显赫的人需要节制财富和势力,而卑贱的人则要克制贪婪的欲望。
据我们所知, 这种关于平等的理论只是幻想罢了, 实际上是行不通的。 不过,如果滥用权力的现象无法避免, 难道我们不应该至少加强控制吗? 可是由于客观的力量总是要葬送掉平等, 立法机构才应该致力于维护平等。
这是法律制度的总体目标, 但针对各个国家, 一定要适合当地的情况、 适合于当地居民的特性, 对这些目标加以修改。 考虑到这些因素, 各个民族都应该有自己独特的法律制度, 也许就其本身而言并非是最出色的, 但对于接受这种制度的国家来说却是最佳的。 举例来说罢。 你们的土地贫瘠吗? 地稀人稠吗? 那就应该把目光投向工业和手工业, 用生产出来的产品去换取你们所缺乏的自然资源。 换个角度讲,如果你们那儿有富饶的平原、 肥沃的坡地, 有良田美地却人口稀少, 那就应该集中发展农业以增加人口, 而不是提倡人们从事手工艺劳动, 因为手工艺势必会使农村人口减少, 将原本就很少的居民吸引至城镇中心。 你们有漫长、 便利的海岸线吗?那就让轮船布满海面, 发展贸易和航海业罢, 这种事业即使不能长久, 也将辉煌一
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ence.Does the sea, along your shores, wash against almost inaccessible rocks? Then remain ichthyophagous barbarians; you will live more peacefully, better perhaps, and certainly more happily.In short, apart from those principles which are common to all, each people has its own special reasons for ordering itself in a certain way and for having laws that are fit唱 xxx to itself alone.Thus it was, in the past, that the Hebrews, and more recently the Ar唱 abs, took religion as their chief object, while the Athenians had literature, Carthage and Tyre trade, Rhodes seafaring,Sparta war, and Rome civic virtue.The author of L摧Esprit des lois has shown with scores of examples how the art of the lawgiver directs the constitution to唱 wards each of its ends.
What makes the constitution of a state really strong and durable is such a close observ唱 ance of conventions that natural relations and laws come to be in harmony on all points, so that the law, shall we say, seems only to ensure, accompany and correct what is natural. But if the lawgiver mistakes his object and builds on principles that differ from what is de唱 manded by the circumstances; if his principle tends towards servitude while circumstances tend towards liberty, the one towards wealth and the other towards increased population,the one towards peace and the other towards conquest, then the laws will be weakened imper唱 ceptibly, the constitution will deteriorate, and the state will continue to be disturbed until it is finally destroyed or transformed, and invincible Nature regains her empire.
Chapter 12 Classifcation of Laws
For everything to be well ordered and the best possible form given to the republic, there are various relations to be considered.First, there is the action of the whole body politic on itself, that is to say, the relation of all with all, or of the sovereign with the state, and this relation, as we shall see, is made up of relations between intermediate terms.
The laws which regulate this relation bear the name of Political Laws, and are also called Fundamental Laws -not unreasonably, if the laws are wise ones.For if in each state there is only one good way of regulating it, the people which has found that way ought to keep to it.But if the established order is bad, why should the laws which prevent its being good be regarded as fundamental? Besides, a people is in any case entirely at liberty to alter its laws, even its best laws;and if it chooses to do itself an injury, who has the right to pre唱 vent it from doing so?
The second relation is that of the members of the body politic among themselves, or of each with the entire body:their relations among themselves should be as limited, and rela唱
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时。 你们的海岸边全都是无法靠近的岩石吗? 那就维持打鱼的生活, 做野蛮人罢。你们将安居乐业, 也许会生活得更加美好, 而且肯定会很幸福。 简而言之, 除过普天之下都接受的原则之外, 各个民族都有其特殊的情况, 以某种方式制订自己的规则, 同时制订只适合于自己的法律。 于是, 古代的希伯莱人以及现今的阿拉伯人都以宗教为主要目标, 而雅典人重视的是文学, 迦太基和提尔重视贸易, xx岛重视航海, 斯巴达青睐于战争, xx则崇尚公德。 枟论法的精神枠 的作者举出了几十种事例, 阐述立法者如何运筹帷幄, 将法律制度导引向它的各个目标。
只有严格照章行事, 使自然关系与法律在方方面面都达到和谐统一, 使法律看上去仅仅是在保障、 辅助和改善自然关系, 一个国家的法律制度才能真正牢固和持久。 然而, 如果立法者选错了目标, 他所遵循的原则与当地情况的要求背道而驰,如果他的原则倾向于奴役, 而实际情况却倾向于自由, 如果一方要积累财富, 另一方要增加人口, 如果一方致力于和平, 另一方倡导打仗, 那么, 法律会在不知不觉中受到削弱, 制度会走向衰败, 国家将永无宁日, 最终会毁于一旦, 或出现改朝换代的情况。 那时, 不可战胜的自然之神会重新君临天下。
第十二章 法律的分类
必须将各种各样的关系都考虑周全, 才能使一切事物都井井有条, 才能给公众提供最佳的政权形式。 首先要考虑整个政治实体对自身的作用, 也就是指所有人彼此间的关系, 或主权体与国家的关系。 我们将会看到, 这一关系由中间各因素的诸般关系组成。
约束这一关系的法规叫政治法, 同时也叫作基本法———如果所立的是贤明的法律, 这般称呼便不是没有道理的。 如果在一个国家只有一种好的方式约束这种关系,那么人们一旦找到它, 就应坚定不移地执行。 不过, 假如所建立的是糟糕的秩序,那么, 在其中起到不好作用的法律怎么能被视为基本法呢? 再说, 作为人民, 在任何情况下都完全有自由改变法律, 甚至也可以去改变最好的法律。 倘若人民愿意做伤害自身的事, 谁也没有权力加以阻止。
第二种关系讲的是政治实体成员之间或成员与整个实体之间的关系。 成员之间的关系应该尽可能受到限制, 成员与整个实体的关系则应尽量广泛; 这样, 每位公
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tions with the entire body as extensive, as possible, in order that each citizen shall be at the same time perfectly independent of all his fellow citizens and excessively dependent on the republic -this result is always achieved by the same means,since it is the power of the state alone which makes the freedom of its members.It is from this second relationship that Civil Laws are born.
We may consider a third kind of relation between the person and the law, namely that of disobedience and its penalty.It is this which gives rises to the establishment of Criminal Laws, though at bottom these are less a specific kind of law than the sanction behind all laws.
To these three sorts of law must be added a fourth, the most important of all, which is inscribed neither on marble nor brass, but in the hearts of the citizens, a law which forms the true constitution of the state, a law which gathers new strength every day and which, when other laws age or wither away,reanimates or replaces them; a law which sustains a na唱 tion in the spirit of its institution and imperceptibly substitutes the force of habit for the force of authority.I refer to morals,customs and, above all, belief: this feature, unknown to our political theorists, is the one on which the success of all the other laws depends; it is the feature on which the great lawgiver bestows his secret care, for though he seems to confine himself to detailed legal enactments, which are really only the arching of the vault, he knows that morals, which develop more slowly, ultimately become its immovable keystone.
Among these various classes of law, it is only Political Laws,which constitute the form of government, that are relevant to my subject.
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民都是完全独立的, 不依附于其他的公民, 而同时却极度依赖于国家。 这种结果总是通过同样的途径产生, 因为只有国家的力量才会给公民带来自由。 正是由于这第二种关系的存在, 才诞生了民法。
我们还可以考虑一下人与法之间的第三种关系, 即犯罪和惩罚的关系。 由于这种情况, 便产生了刑法。 不过从根本上来说, 刑法并非一种特定的法律类型, 而是对所有法律的支撑。
除过这三种法律, 还应该加上第四种, 也是最为重要的一种。 这种法律不是刻在石头上或青铜上, 而是镌刻在公民的心中, 它构成了国家真正的框架, 每一天都获得新的力量; 当别的法律老化或衰败时, 它就给那些法律注入活力或取而代之;它以法制精神支撑起国家, 潜移默化地用习惯的力量取代权威之力。 我此处所指的是道德、 习俗, 尤指信仰。 这一点, 我们的政治理论家茫然不知; 这一点, 是所有其他法律成败的基础。 伟大的立法者已在偷偷注意这一点, 虽然, 他们似乎只关心具体的法律条文, 但他们知道法律条文其实只是穹窿顶的临时支架, 而道德的力量会慢慢加大, 最终将成为不可摇撼的拱石。
在这五花八门的法律中, 只有政治法才与我的话题有关, 它是构成政府形式的要素。
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BOOK Ⅲ
Before speaking of the various forms of government, let us try to fix the precise meaning of this word, which has not hitherto been very well explained.
Chapter 1 Of Government in General
I must warn the reader that this chapter should be read with care, for I have not the skill to make myself clear to those who do not wish to concentrate their attention.
Every free action has two causes which concur to produce it, one moral -the will which determines the act, the other physical -the strength which executes it.When I walk towards an object, it is necessary first that I should resolve to go that way and secondly that my feet should carry me.When a paralytic resolves to run and when a fit man resolves not to move, both stay where they are.The body politic has the same two motive powers -and we can make the same distinction between will and strength, the former is legislative power and the latter executive power.Nothing can be, or should be, done in the body politic without the concurrence of both.
We have seen that the legislative power belongs, and can only belong, to the people. On the other hand, it is easy to see from principles established above [ Book Ⅱ, Chapters 4 and 6] that executive power cannot belong to the generality of the people as legislative or sovereign, since executive power is exercised only in particular acts which are outside the province of law and therefore outside the province of the sover -eign which can act only to make laws.
The public force thus needs its own agent to call it together and put it into action in ac唱 cordance with the instructions of the general will, to serve also as a means of communication between the state and the sovereign, and in a sense to do for the public person what is done for the individual by the union of soul and body.This is the reason why the state needs a government, something often unhappily confused with the sovereign, but of which it is really only the minister.
What , then , is the government ? An intermediary body established between the subjects
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在谈论政府的各种形式之前, 让我们还是弄清 “ 政府” 一词的确切含义吧, 因为直至现在我们还未很好地解释该词。
第一章 概论政府
我必须提醒读者, 读本章节时一定要细心, 因为对于不愿专心读书的人, 我可无法让他们明白我的观点。
每一种自由行为的发生都由两种原因促成: 一是精神方面的, 即决定实施该行为的意志, 二是具体的, 即实施行为的力量。 我向一个目标迈近时, 首先我必须有向彼处前进的决心, 其次我的双脚得将我送至那儿。 一个瘫痪病人想奔跑, 一个健康人不想奔跑, 其结果是他们二者都留在了原地。 政治实体也有两种动力, 我们可以按同样方式区分, 将其列为意志和力量———前者指立法权, 后者指执法权。 在政治实体中, 没有二者的协作就什么事情都做不成, 也不应该做任何事情。
我们看到: 立法权属于人民, 而且只能属于人民。 另一方面, 根据以上确立的原则 ( 见第二卷的第四章和第六章) 显而易见: 执法权不能像立法权或主权那样交给全体人民, 因为执法权的行使只针对个体行为, 而这种行为越出了法律的范围,因而也越出了只负责制订法律的主权体的权限。
这样, 公众就需要有自己的代表, 以便将公众的力量集中起来, 根据公众意志的要求加以运用。 此举可作为联络方式, 在国家与主权体之间进行沟通, 在某种意义上对待公众就像对待个人的情况一样, 要使精神和肉体结合起来。 鉴于此因, 国家就需要有一个政府。 遗憾的是, 人们常常将政府与主权体混为一谈, 然而实际上政府只是主权体的代理者。
那么, 政府究竟是怎样的呢? 它是臣民与主权体之间的桥梁, 起着沟通关系的
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and the sovereign for their mutual communication, a body charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of freedom, both civil and political.
The members of this body are called magistrates or kings,that is to say governors, and the whole body bears the name of xxxxxx.Thus, those theorists who deny that the act by which a people submits itself to leaders is a contract are wholly correct.For that act is noth唱 ing other than a commission, a form of employment in which the governors, as simple of唱 ficers of the sovereign, exercise in its name the power it has placed in their hands, a power which the sovereign can limit, modify and resume at pleasure, since the alienation of such a right would be incompatible with the nature of the social body and contrary to the purpose of the social union.
I therefore call “ government” or “ supreme administration” the legitimate exercise of the executive power, and I call“ xxxxxx” or “ magistrate” the man or the body charged with that administration.
It is in the government that we may discern those intermediary forces whose relations constitute those of all with all,or of the sovereign with the state.This last relation can be de唱 picted as one between the extremes of a continuous proportion, of which the geometrical mean is the government.The government receives from the sovereign the orders which it gives to the people; and if the state is to be well balanced, it is necessary, all things being weighed, that the product and power of the government considered in itself should equal the product and power of the citizens who are sovereign in one sense and subjects in another.
Furthermore, no one of these three factors can be changed without destroying the bal唱 ance.If the sovereign seeks to govern, or if the magistrate seeks to legislate, or if the sub唱 jects refuse to obey, then order gives way to chaos, power and will cease to act in concert, and the state, disintegrating, will lapse either into despotism or into anarchy.Lastly, as there is only one geometrical mean between two extremes, there is only one good government possible for any state; but as a thousand events may change the relations within a nation, different governments may not only be good for different peoples, but good for the same peo唱 ple at different times.
To try to give some idea of the various relations which may exist between the two ex唱 tremes, I shall take as an example the number of the people, as this is a relation easily ex唱 pressed.
Suppose the state is made up of ten thousand citizens.The sovereign can only be con唱 sidered collectively and as a body, but every member as a subject has to be considered as an
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作用, 负责执行法律、 维护人民的自由和政治自由。
这一实体的成员或称行政官, 或称国王, 也就是统治者; 整个实体的名称是 “ 行政院”。 所以, 那些否认人民服从于领袖人物的约定是一种契约的理论家, 观点是完全正确的。 因为这种约定仅仅是一种委托、 是一种任务, 统治者作为主权体的普通官员以主权体的名义行使主权体赋予他们的权力。 如权力发生转移, 就会与社会本身的实质不相容、 与社会联盟的目的背道而驰。 主权体随时都可以限制、 更改、收回权力。
因而, 我把合法行使执法权的机构称为 “ 政府” 或 “ 最高行政院”, 而将担负行政职责的人或实体叫作 “ 君主” 或 “ 行政官”。
我们会发现在政府里包含着那些中间的调节力量, 它们调节着人与人、 主权体与国家的关系。 这种关系可以理解为一种比例两端之间的关系; 这是不断出现的比例, 政府在其中起着规范而系统的作用。 政府从主权体接受命令, 再传达给人民。如果一个国家要很好地保持xx, 一切都得加以权衡, 应该让政府的作用和权力与公民 ( 公民从某种意义上讲是主权体, 另一方面也是臣民) 的作用和权力相等。
另外, 这三个因素中改变任何一个, 势必会破坏xx。 假如主权体企图行使统治权, 或者行政长官企图去立法, 或者臣民拒绝服从管理, 秩序就会毁掉, 造成天下大乱, 权力和意志不再协调行为, 国家变成一盘散沙, 进入专制或无政府状态。最后, 由于两个端点之间只有一条佳径, 所以一个国家只能有一个好的政府。 不过,世事变幻, 也许会改变国内的关系; 不同的政府不仅适合于不同的人民, 而且在不同的时候也能适合相同的人民。
我想让诸位了解一下两个端点之间所可能出现的各种关系, 不妨以人口的数量为例加以阐述, 因为这样的关系容易解释清。
假设一个国家由一万名公民组成。 主权体只能被视为团体和实体, 而国内的每一个成员作为臣民, 应该被看作个体。这样, 主权体与一位臣民的比例就是一万比
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individual.Thus the sovereign is to the subject as ten thousand is to one, that is to say, each single member of the state has for his own share only a ten唱thousandth part of the sover唱 eign authority, although he submits himself entirely to it.Now if the people is increased to a hundred thousand men, the position of the subject is unaltered, for each bears equally with the rest the whole empire of the laws, while as sovereign his share of the suffrage is reduced to one hundred唱thousandth, so that he has ten times less influence in the formulation of the laws.Hence, as the subject remains always one single individual, the ratio of sovereign to subject increases according to the number of citizens.Whence it follows that the more the state is enlarged, the more freedom is diminished.
When I say that the ratio increases, I mean that it is farther removed from parity.So the greater the ratio in the geometrical sense, the smaller the ratio in the popular sense; for in the former, the ratio, considered according to quantity, is measured by the quotient, whereas in the latter, the ratio,considered according to identity, is judged by similarity.
The smaller the ratio between the particular wills and the general will, that is, between the people摧s morals and the law,the more will repressive force have to be employed.Hence, for the government to be good, its strength must be increased to the extent that the people is more numerous.
In proportion as the enlargement of the state means offering the holders of public au唱 thority more temptations and more opportunities to abuse their power, it follows that the more power the government needs to control the people, the more power the sovereign needs, in its turn, to control the government.I am speaking here not of an absolute power, but of the relative power of the different elements in the state.
It follows from this double ratio that the continuous proportion between sovereign, xxxxxx and people is by no means an arbitrary idea, but a necessary consequence of the na唱 ture of the body politic.It follows further that since one of the extremes, namely the people as subject, is represented by unity, every time the double ratio is increased or diminished, the simple ratio increases or diminishes in the same way, and the middle term is in conse唱 quence changed.This shows that there is no one unique and absolute constitution of govern唱 ment, but that there may be as many different kinds of government as there are states of dif唱 ferent sizes.
If anyone, wishing to ridicule this system, suggested that in order to find the geomet唱 rical mean and construct the body of the government one need only on my view take the square root of the number of the people, I should reply that I am here using that number on唱
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一, 也就是说, 国家的每一个成员虽然完全服从于国家, 但他只拥有万分之一的主权。 倘若人口的数量增至十万, 臣民的地位并不会变化, 每一位公民仍承担全部的法律义务, 然而在主权方面, 他的选举权却降至十万分之一, 所以他在立法上的影响力较前小了十倍。 臣民永远是一位独立的个体, 而臣民的主权却因公民人数的变化而变化。 其结果是: 国家越大, 公民的自由便越小。
我说比例发生变化, 意思是指它更加偏离平等。 所以, 比例在几何意义上越大,那它在普通意义上便越小。 按几何意义衡量, 要根据数量考虑比例, 而按普通意义,则要根据相同性看待比例, 根据相似性衡量比例的大小。
个别意志与公众意志之间, 即人民的道德与法律之间的比例越是失调, 就越需要动用弹压的力量。 于是, 政府要取得高效, 就得随着人口数量的增加而加强自身的力量。
国家越是壮大, 就会有越多的诱惑和机会使得执掌公众权力的人滥用职权。 因而, 政府控制人民的权力越大, 主权体就应该有更大的权力控制政府。 此处我讲的并非绝对的权力, 而是国家内部诸因素的相对的权力。
从这一双重的比例可以看出, 主权体、 君主及人民之间连续性的比例关系绝对不是随意的概念, 而是政治实体的性质所导致的必然结果。 我们还可以看到: 鉴于比例的一端, 即作为臣民的人民, 是由一个统一体为代表的, 每一次双重比例升与降, 单一比例也会同样升降, 而且中间环节最终亦发生变化。 这表明: 独一无二的、绝对的政治体制是不存在的, 有多少大小不等的国家, 就有多少种政府。
如果有人想嘲笑这种计算方法, 声称如欲找到几何方式, 只需用我的观点, 给人口的数字加上平方根就行了, 那我的回答是: 本人此处不过只用了数量作例子罢
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ly as an example; and the ratios of which I speak are not measured merely by the number of men but more generally by the amount of activity, which results from the concurrence of in唱 numerable causes; I should add that although I have borrowed momentarily for the sake of expressing myself in fewer words, the language of geometry, I am still well aware that geo唱 metrical precision has no place in moral calculations.
The government is in small what the body politic ( which includes it) is in large.It is a fictitious person endowed with certain faculties, active like the sovereign, passive like the state; and it can be broken down into similar relations; in consequence these relations yield a new ratio; and within each we can continue the process of analysis according to the order of the magistracies until we reach a single indivisible middle term, that is, a single chief or supreme magistrate, who may be shown at the centre of this pattern, as the unity between the series of fractions and the series of whole numbers.
Without burdening ourselves with such a multiplication of terms, let us simply consider the government as a new body within the state, distinct from both people and sovereign and intermediary between the two.
There is this essential difference between the two bodies -the state exists in itself while the government exists only through the sovereign.Thus the dominant will of the xxxxxx is, or ought to be, only the general will or the law, and his force nothing other than the public force concentrated in his hands; as soon as he resolves to perform on his own authority some absolute and independent act, the union of all begins to slacken.And if in the end it comes about that the xxxxxx has a particular will more active than that of the sovereign, and if,to enforce obedience to this particular will, he uses the public force which is in his hands, with the result that there are, so to speak, two sovereigns, one de jure and the other de facto, then the social bond vanishes at once and the body politic is dissolved.
Even so, for the body of the government to have an existence, a real life distinct from the body of the state, and for all its members to be able to act in concert and serve the pur唱 pose for which the government has been set up, it must have a particular ego, a conscious唱 ness common to its members, a force, a will of its own tending to its preservation.Such a particular existence implies assemblies, councils, a power to deliberate and determine rights, titles, and privileges which belongs exclusively to the xxxxxx, and which should make the position of the magistrate the more honourable in proportion to the extent to which it is the more arduous.The difficulty is to find a method of ordering this subordinate whole within the greater whole, so that it does not weaken the general constitution while strengthe唱
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了。 我所说的比例并不是仅用人数衡量的, 而更为普遍的方法是用活动量加以衡量
———活动量则是诸多因素综合作用的结果。 我应该补充说: 我为了能用xx的语言把问题讲清而暂时借用了几何学的术语, 但我心里明白, 解释抽象的概念是用不上精确的几何学的。
庞大的政治实体包括政府, 而政府是其缩影。 政府是虚设的法人, 掌握着一定的功能, 像主权体一样活跃, 但又像国家一样也有被动的一面。 政府可以分解为一些相似的关系, 产生新的比例。 按照各关系, 我们可以根据行政权的次序继续进行分析, 直至找到一个无法再分解的中间因素———独一无二的领袖或最高行政官。 我们可以将这位人物摆在图表的中央位置, 作为夹裹在无数组分数和无数组整数之间的单位元素。
我们不必再纠缠于这许许多多的术语了, 还是简简单单地将政府视为国家内部的一个新实体吧, 它游离于人民和主权体之外, 在二者之间起联络作用。
国家与政府这两个实体有着本质的区别———国家独立存在, 而政府只能靠主权体才可以生存。 所以, 君主的主导意志只能是公众的意志或法律, 而他的权力只不过是集中在他手上的公众权。 一旦他强调自身的权威, 决定我行我素地采取专制的行动, 那么所有人组成的联盟就会趋于瓦解。 假如最后出现这样的情况: 君主个人的意志高于主权体的意志, 他动用手中的公众力量强迫人们服从他的意志, 结果导致两个主权体的出现———一个是权力上的主权体, 另一个是事实上的主权体; 那么,社会契约会立刻土崩瓦解, 政治实体会烟消云散。
即便如此, 政府实体要想生存下去, 获得独立于国家实体的真正生命力, 要想使政府的所有成员能够步调一致地工作, 服务于政府建立时的宗旨, 它就得有自己的精神———一种政府成员所共有的觉悟、 一种力量、 一种为自身生存而奋斗的意志。这样的一种状况就意味着政府应有议会、 顾问团, 应拥有研究和决策的权力, 以便决定人们的权利、 头衔以及君主所独享的特权; 行政官的工作越是繁重, 他的地位就越尊荣。 难点在于如何寻找到良策, 使小的实体在大的实体之内保持良好的状态;小实体在加强自身力量的同时,不至于削弱国家的整个体制,使致力于自保其身的
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ning its own, and so that its private force, designed for its own preservation, shall always be distinct from the public force, designed for the preservation of the state; in short, so that it will always be ready to sacrifice the government to the people and not the people to the gov唱 ernment.
Moreover, even though the artificial body of the government is the work of another e唱 qually artificial body, and even though it has only a kind of borrowed and subordinate life, this does not prevent its being able to act with greater or less vigour and speed, and enjo唱 ying, so to speak, a health that may be more robust or less.Lastly, without departing di唱 rectly from the purposes for which it has been set up, it may deviate from them in varying degrees according to the manner in which it has been constituted.
It is all these differences which give rise to the various relations that ought to exist be唱 tween the government and the body of the state, in accordance with the fortuitous and parti唱 cular relations by which this same state is changed.For often the government which is in it唱 self the best becomes the most evil unless its relations with the state are modified to meet the defects of the body politic to which it belongs.
Chapter 2 The Constitutive Principle of the Diffrent Forms of Government
To explain the general reason for these differences, it is necessary to distinguish here between the xxxxxx and the government, as I have already distinguished between the state and the sovereign.
The body of the magistrates may be composed of a greater or lesser number of mem唱 bers.We have already observed that the ratio of sovereign to subjects is greater to the extent that the people are more numerous, and by an obvious analogy we can say the same of the government in relation to the magistrates.
As the total power of the government is at all times that of the state, it never varies; and from this it follows that the more force the government exerts over its own members, the less there remains for it to use over the whole people.
Hence the more numerous the magistrates, the weaker the government.As this princi唱 ple is fundamental, let us try to make it clearer.
We may distinguish in the person of the magistrate three essentially different wills. First, there is the will which belongs to the individual, and tends only to his personal advan唱 tage.Secondly, there is the collective will of the magistrates; this is concerned only with the
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个体力量游离出以捍卫国家利益为目的的公众力量。 一言以蔽之: 应该随时为了人民的利益而舍弃政府的利益, 而不应为了政府的利益将人民当牺牲品。
另外, 政府实体虽然是非自然的, 系另一非自然实体作用的产物, 虽然它只拥有外借的、 从属的生命, 但这并不妨碍它以旺盛的精力及迅捷的速度处理事务, 不妨碍它保持健康的活力。 最后, 政府只要不与其设立的目标背道而驰, 就可以根据自身的体制和模式或多或少地偏离这一目标。
这些千差万别的现象导致了政府与国家实体之间形形色色关系的产生, 它们与偶然出现的个别关系保持着和谐, 而后者是催发国家变化的因素。 政府必须调整它与国家的关系, 使之适合它所从属的政治实体的特点, 否则就连最好的政府也会变为最坏的政府, 这是常有的事。
要想解释清产生这些区别的总体原因, 此处很有必要将君主和政府区分开, 正如我先前区分国家和主权体一样。
行政实体内部成员的数量可多可少。 我们已经看到, 人民的数量越多, 主权体与臣民的比例就越大。 显然, 以此类推, 我们可以说: 政府与行政官员的关系也是一样的。
政府的所有权力, 在任何时候都是属于国家的, 它永不会发生变化。 由此可以得知: 政府在自己成员身上花费的精力越大, 那它用在全体人民身上的精力就越小。
所以, 行政官越多, 政府就越弱。 鉴于这是一条基本原则, 我们还是争取把它再解释清楚些吧。
我们可以在行政官身上区分出三种根本不同的意志。 首先要讲的是属于个人的意志, 它只为个人谋福利; 其次是行政官们的集体意志, 此意志只为君主的利益效
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advantage of the xxxxxx, and might be called the corporate will, since it is general vis唱a唱vis the government and particular vis唱a唱vis the state of which the government is a part.Thirdly, there is the will of the people or the sovereign will, which is general both with regard to the state considered as a whole and with regard to the government considered as part of the whole.
In a perfect system of legislation, the individual or particular will would be nonexistent, the government摧s own corporate will very subordinate, and the general or sovereign will therefore always dominant and always the sole regulator of all the others.
In the order of nature, on the contrary, these different wills become the more active as they are the more concentrated.Hence, the general will is always the weakest, the corporate will takes second place, and the particular will comes first of all; so much so, that within the government, each member is primarily a private self, secondly a magistrate, and thirdly a citizen.This sequence is exactly the reverse of what the social order demands.
That being so, let us suppose that the government is in the hands of a single individu唱 xx.Then the particular will and the corporate will will be perfectly united, and the corporate will accordingly raised to its highest possible degree of intensity.Now, since the exercise of power depends on the degree of will, and since the absolute power of the government is in唱 variable, it follows that the most active government is that of one man.
If, on the other hand, we combine the government and the legislative authority, make the xxxxxx the sovereign, and each citizen a magistrate -then the corporate will, being mer唱 ged in the general will, will be no more active than the general will,and so leave the parti唱 cular will to command the totality of power.Thus the government, having always the same absolute power, will be left with a minimum of relative strength and activity.
These relations are indisputable, and other considerations add further confirmation.It is clear, for example, that each magistrate is more active within the body of the government than is each citizen within the body of the state, and hence that the particular will has more influence over the acts of the government than it has over those of the sovereign, for every magistrate is nearly always entrusted with some distinct function of government, while no cit唱 izen, taken singly, has any distinct function of sovereignty.Besides, the more the state ex唱 pands, the more its real strength is increased, though not in proportion to its expansion; but while the state remains the same size, the magistrates can be multiplied without the govern唱 ment gaining thereby any real strength, since its strength is that of the state, which is always the same.In this way the relative strength or activity of the government diminishes without
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力, 可以称之为共同意志, 它对政府而言是普遍的意志, 但对把政府包含在内的国家来说又是个别的意志。 第三种是人民的意志或主权体的意志, 它无论对于被视为整体的国家还是被视为整体中一个组成部分的政府, 都是一种普遍的意志。
在完美的法律体系中, 私人的或个体的意志是不能够存在的, 政府的团体意志处于非常低的从属地位, 而公众的或主权体的意志则永远处于主导地位, 总是独立操纵着所有其他的意志。
按照自然的规律却恰恰相反, 不同的意志越是集中, 就越显得活跃。 结果, 普遍意志总是最弱的, 团体意志次之, 个体的意志才是最强的。 所以在政府内部, 每位成员首先是位个体, 其次是行政官员, 再下来才是公民。 这一排列的顺序与社会秩序之要求恰恰颠倒。
鉴于此因, 那让我们假设政府被把持在某一个人的手中罢。 此时, 个体的意志与团体的意志会彻底合二为一, 而团体的意志会上升, 尽其所能地达到最高点。 由于权力的实施程度取决于意志的强弱, 而政府的绝对权力又是不变的, 所以最有活力的政府是一人政府。
从另一方面讲, 如果我们把政府与立法权威机构合为一体, 使君主成为主权体,让每位公民当行政官员, 那么, 团体意志会融入普遍意志, 它的活跃程度不会高于普遍意志, 而个体意志因之独揽大权。 由于政府的绝对权力总是一样的, 于是它的相对力量以及活力便降到了最低限度。
这些情况是无可非议的, 还有一些观点补充进来可进一步加以证实。 例如, 政府实体内的每一位官员显然都比国家实体里的公民活跃。 所以, 个体意志对政府活动的影响要大于其对主权体活动的影响, 因为差不多每位官员都承担着政府的某项职能, 而公民按个体来说并不承担主权体的任何职能。 另外, 国家一旦扩张, 其实力虽然不会成比例增长, 但一定会加大。 但如果国家的规模保持不变, 而行政官员的数量有所增加, 那么政府并不会因此而增加实力, 因为政府的力量即国家之力,永远都会是一样的。这样, 政府的相对力量或活力减弱时, 它的绝对力量或实力是
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there being any possibility of its absolute or real power increasing.
Again, there is no doubt that the dispatch of public business becomes slower in propor唱 tion as there are more persons responsible for it; attaching too much importance to pru唱 dence,large bodies attach too little to luck; they miss opportunities,and they deliberate so long that they lose the profits of deliberation.
I have just shown that the government slackens to the extent that the magistrates are multiplied, and I showed earlier that the more numerous the people, the more the repressive force must increase.From this it follows that the ratio of magistrates to government should be the inverse of the ratio of subjects to sovereign; that is to say, the more the state is en唱 larged, the more the government must reduce its ranks, so that the number of magistrates di唱 minishes in proportion to the increase of the people.
I should add that I am speaking here of the relative strength of the government and not the quality of its behaviour; for, on the contrary, the more numerous the magistrates, the closer their corporate will approaches the general will, while under a single magistrate that same corporate will is, as I have said,only a particular will.Thus there is lost on the one side what could be gained on the other; and the art of the lawgiver is to know how to settle the point at which the strength and the will of the government, which always stand in inverse ratio, can be combined in the proportion most beneficial to the state.
Chapter 3 Classification of Governments
In the preceding chapter we saw why the different types or forms of government are dis唱 tinguished according to the number of members who compose them; it remains to be seen in the present chapter how this classification is made.
First, the sovereign may put the government in the hands of the whole people, or of the greater part of the people, so that there are more citizen唱magistrates than there are ordinary private citizens.This form of government is known as democracy.
Alternatively, the sovereign may confine the government to the hands of a few, so that there are more ordinary citizens than there are magistrates: this form of government is called aristocracy.
Yet again, the sovereign may concentrate the entire government in the hands of one sin唱 gle magistrate, from whom all the others will derive their power.This third form of govern唱 ment is the most common, and is called monarchy or royal government.
It should be noticed that all these forms , or at any rate the first two , can be had in
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不可能增加的。
还有一点是毋庸置疑的: 政府里负责人越多, 处理公务的效力便越差。 机构臃肿, 干起事来就前怕狼后怕虎, 不能把握形势, 因而坐失良机。 他们瞻前顾后, 拖拖拉拉, 所以考虑来考虑去也没有收获。
我刚才指出: 行政官员数量增加, 政府工作效率就会降低。 以前我也解释过:人民的数量一多, 弹压的力量就必须加大。 我们由此得知: 行政官员之于政府的比例和臣民之于主权体的比例应该是相反的。 也就是说, 国家越是扩展, 政府就越需裁减人员; 人民的数量越多, 行政官员就应该越少。
我补充一点: 我此处谈的是政府的相对力量, 而非指点其行为之得失。 因为行政官员一多, 团体意志反而会接近普遍意志, 但一位官员独揽大权, 团体意志就如以上所说的成了个体的意志了。 这样便有得有失。 立法者的艺术就在于知道如何选择, 使总是成反比的政府力量及政府意志结合起来, 构成对国家最为有利的比例。
第三章 政府的分类
在上一章里, 我们看到为什么要根据构成政府的人员数量区分出不同类型或不同形式的政府, 而在本章我们则要阐述怎样进行这种分类。
首先要说的是: 主权体可以将政府交由全体人民管理或者交由人民中的大多数人管理, 于是充当行政人员的公民数量便多于普通的无职公民。 这种类型的政府就是所谓的民主政府。
或者, 主权体将政府的权力集中在少数人的手里, 使得普通公民多于行政官员。这种形式的政府被人称作贵族政府。
还有, 主权体可以将整个政府的权力都集中在一个行政官的手里, 而其他的行政人员则是从他那儿获得各自的权力。 这第三种形式的政府最为常见, 人称君主政府或xx政府。
应该注意的是:所有这些类型的政府,或者起码前两种政府,其规模可大可小,
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greater or lesser degrees; they have a fairly marked elasticity.Democracy may include all the people or it may be limited so as to include only half.Aristocracy in its turn may extend to half the people or be limited to the smallest possible number.Even royal government can to some extent be shared.Sparta had always two kings according to its constitution, and the Roman Empire is known to have had as many as eight Emperors at once without it being true to say that the Empire was divided.Thus there is always a point at which each form of gov唱 ernment overlaps the next form; and it is clear that although government has only three names, it is actually open to as many variations of form as the state has citizens.
Moreover, since a government is able in certain respects to divide itself into separate parts, one administered in one way and the other in another way, the three forms of govern唱 ment may be combined to yield a multitude of mixed forms, each of which it can multiply by the three simple forms.
Throughout the ages men have debated the question “ What is government?”, and yet they have failed to see that each of the possible forms is the best in some cases and the worst in others.
If in each particular state the number of supreme magistrates should be in inverse ratio to the number of citizens, it follows that, in general, democratic government suits small states, aristocratic government suits states of intermediate size and monarchy suits large states.This rule follows directly from our axiom; but how are we to calculate the multitude of particular circumstances which may offer exceptions to the rule?
Chapter 4 Democracy
He who makes the law knows better than anyone how it should be executed and inter唱 preted.So it might seem that there could be no better constitution than one which united the executive power with the legislative; in fact, this very union makes that form of government deficient in certain respects,for things which ought to be kept apart are not, and the xxxxxx and the sovereign being the same person constitute, so to speak, a government without gov唱 ernment.
It is not good that he who makes the law should execute it or that the body of the people should turn its attention away from general perspectives and give it to particular objects. Nothing is more dangerous in public affairs than the influence of private interests, and the a唱 buse of the law by the government is a lesser evil than that corruption of the legislator which inevitably results from the pursuit of private interests.When this happens, the state is cor唱
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有相当大的弹性。 民主政府可以将所有的人民都包括在内, 也可以限制规模, 只包括一半人。 贵族政府的规模可包括一半人民, 或者只包括极少数的人。 甚至就连xx政府的xx也可在某种程度上分享。 斯巴达按照他们的体制一直都有两位国王,而xx帝国则曾经同时拥有八位皇帝, 而且帝国并没有因此四分五裂。 每一种类型的政府总会在某一点上与其他类型的政府相同。 显而易见, 政府虽然只有三种名称,但实际上政府会因国家公民的多寡具有很多种不同的形式。
另外, 鉴于政府能够在某些方面分成若干独立的部分, 管理的方式各有所异,那么, 以上三种类型的政府可以结合起来, 产生许多混合型政府, 而其中的每一类型还可根据那三种单一的类型加以繁衍。
从古至今, 人们一直都在喋喋不休地争论同一问题: 怎么样才是好政府? 人们浑然不知: 每一种类型的政府都是在某些方面比较优秀, 在别的方面却很糟糕。
如果在各个国家里, 最高行政官的数量与公民的人数成反比, 那么一般来说,民主政府适合于小国家, 贵族政府适合于中等规模的国家, 而君主政府则适合于大国家。 这一道理是直接从我们的规律中总结出来的。 可是, 特殊的情况层出不穷,也许会不适合于这一道理, 那我们又该如何衡量呢?
第四章 民主制
制订法律者比任何人都清楚该如何执行和解释法律。 由此看来, 最佳的体制应该是把执法权和立法权结合起来。 实际上, 这种形式的结合在某些方面使政府会产生缺陷。 应该分开的没有分开, 君主和主权体混成了一体, 也就是说, 这种政府是虚无的政府。
由立法者去执法, 或者说人民这一实体不去注意总体的目标却关心个别的现象,这些都是不对的。 最为危险的情况莫过于以私人的利益影响公共事务; 立法者贪图私利, 必定会导致腐败, 这比政府滥用法律还要可恶。出现这种情况的时候, 一个
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rupted in its very substance and no reform is possible.A people which never misused the powers of government would never misuse independence, and a people which always gov唱 erned itself well would not need to be governed.
In the strict sense of the term, there has never been a true democracy, and there never will be.It is contrary to the natural order that the greater number should govern and the smaller number be governed.One can hardly imagine that all the people would sit perma唱 nently in an assembly to deal with public affairs; and one can easily see that they could not appoint commissions for that purpose without the form of administration changing.
I believe indeed that one can lay down as an axiom that when the functions of govern唱 ment are divided between several commissions, those with the fewest members acquire soon唱 er or later the greatest authority, if only because the facility of dispatching business leads naturally in that direction.
Besides, how many things that are difficult to have at the same time does the democrat唱 ic form of government not presuppose? First, a very small state, where the people may be readily assembled and where each citizen may easily know all the others.Secondly, a great simplicity of manners and morals, to prevent excessive business and thorny discussions. Thirdly,a large measure of equality in social rank and fortune, without which equality in rights and authority will not last long.Finally, little or no luxury; for luxury is either the effect of riches or it makes riches necessary; it corrupts both the xxxx and the poor; it sells the country to effeminacy and vanity; it deprives the state of all its citizens by making some the slaves of others and all the slaves of opinion.
This is why a celebrated author① has made virtue the cardinal principle of a republic; for all the conditions that I have named cannot prevail without virtue.But this same great genius, having failed to make the necessary distinctions, was often wrong and sometimes ob唱 scure, and failed to see that since the sovereign authority is everywhere the same, the same principles should have a place in every well唱constituted state, though to a greater or lesser extent, assuredly, according to the form of the government.
We may add that there is no government so liable to civil war and internecine strife as is democracy or popular government, for there is none which has so powerful and constant a tendency to change to another form or which demands so much vigilance and courage to maintain it unchanged.It is under this constitution, before all others, that the citizen must
① 此处指孟德斯鸠。
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国家就已经从根部烂掉了, 不可能再进行改革了。 从不滥用政府职权的民族决不会滥用自由; 一个把自身管理得很好的民族, 是不需要受别人统治的。
按严格的意义解释, 真正的民主是史无前例的, 而且也永远不会产生。 让大多数人去行使统治权, 而少数人被统治, 这是违反自然规律的。 让全体人民动辄便坐在议会里开会, 处理公共事务, 这简直令人无法想象; 显而易见, 如果不改变行政的方式, 他们便不可能授命他人去达到目的。
我认为我们不妨可以得出这样一条道理: 当政府的职能分散开去完成若干使命时, 成员最少的部门, 早晚都会获得最大的权威性。 只要有利于处理事务, 情况自然会向这一方面发展。
另外, 有许多作为先决条件的情况, 对民主类型的政府来说是很难同时具备的。首先, 国家应该非常小, 很容易便可以将人民集中起来, 而且全体公民应该很容易便彼此熟悉。 其次, 行政方式应该非常简单, 人们的心理素质也应很简单, 免得使事务繁琐化、 频开会议而不决。 第三, 社会等级和财富分配上应非常平等, 否则权利和权威的平等就不会长久。 最后, 奢侈的现象应该少些, 或根本没有, 因为奢侈是追求金钱的恶果, 或者使追求金钱成为一种必要, 即使富人堕落, 又腐蚀穷人的精神; 国家因此而萎靡和讲求浮华, 国中之公民一些沦为另一些的奴隶, 而所有公民都是舆论的奴隶。
正因为如此, 一位名作家将美德列为共和国的基本原则; 没有美德, 我以上提到的条件就全都行不通。 但这位伟大的天才却没有做必要的区分, 其观点常常是错误的, 有时则含混不清; 他没有看到: 主权体的权力在各处都是一样的, 所以同样的原则应可以运用于一切制度良好的国家, 只不过根据政府类型的不同, 运用的程度有强弱之分罢了。
应该补充的是: 民主的政府或公众的政府是最容易爆发内战和内乱的, 因为它有着最为xx和最为经常的倾向要改朝换代, 或需求同样的警觉和勇气来稳固江山。在这样的制度下生活,公民最需要具备的是勇气和忠诚,每一日都应在内心深处默
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