马拉喀什建立世界贸易组织协定——附件 1A:货物贸易多边协定——补贴与反补 贴措施协定
马拉喀什建立世界贸易组织协定——附件 1A:货物贸易多边协定——补贴与反补 贴措施协定
辽宁电子图书有限责任公司 编著
辽宁电子图书有限责任公司
书名:马拉喀什建立世界贸易组织协定——附件1A:货物贸易
多边协定——补贴与反补贴措施协定
作者:辽宁电子图书有限责任公司责任编辑:孟厦
出版社:辽宁电子图书有限责任公司
ISBN:L-FL-0342/D92
出版日期:2003年12月定价:9.00元
——附件 1A:货物贸易多边协定
——补贴与反补贴措施协定
(关于附件 1A的总体解释性说明:如《1994 年关税与贸易总协定》的条款与《建立世界贸易组织协定》(附件 1A所列各协定中称“《WTO协定》”)附件 1A中另一协定的条款产生抵触,则以该另一协定的条款为准。)
各成员特此协议如下:
第一部分:总则
第 1 条 补贴的定义
1.1 就本协定而言,如出现下列情况应视为存在补贴:
(a)(1)在一成员(本协定中称“政府”)领土内,存在由政府或任何公共机构提供的财政资助,即如果:
(i)涉及资金的直接转移(如赠款、贷款和投股)、潜在的资金或债务的直接转移
(如贷款担保)的政府做法;
(ii)放弃或未征收在其他情况下应征收的政府税收(如税收抵免之类的财政鼓励)
(注 1);
注 1:依照GATT 1994 第 16 条(第 16 条的注释)和本协定附件 1 至附件 3 的规定,对一出口产品免征其同类产品供国内消费时所负担的关税或国内税,或免除此类关税或国内税的数量不超过增加的数量,不得视为一种补贴。
(iii)政府提供除一般基础设施外的货物或服务,或购买货物;
(iv)政府向一筹资机构付款,或委托或指示一私营机构履行以上(i)至(iii)列举的一种或多种通常应属于政府的职能,且此种做法与政府通常采用的做法并无实质差别;
或
(a)(2)存在GATT 1994 第 16 条意义上的任何形式的收入或价格支持;及
(b)则因此而授予一项利益。
1.2 如按第 1 款定义的补贴依照第 2 条的规定属专向性补贴,则此种补贴应符合第二部分或符合第三部分或第五部分的规定。
2.1 为确定按第 1 条第 1 款规定的补贴是否属对授予机关管辖范围内的企业或产业、或一组企业或产业(本协定中称“某些企业”)的专向性补贴,应适用下列原则:
(a)如授予机关或其运作所根据的立法将补贴的获得明确限于某些企业,则此种补贴应属专向性补贴。
(b)如授予机关或其运作所根据的立法制定适用于获得补贴资格和补贴数量的客观标准或条件(注 2),则不存在专向性,只要该资格为自动的,且此类标准和条件得到严格遵守。标准或条件必须在法律、法规或其他官方文件中明确说明,以便能够进行核实。
注 2:此处使用的客观标准或条件指中立的标准或条件,不仅仅优惠某些企业,且属经济性质,并水平适用,如雇员的数量或企业的大小。
(c)如尽管因为适用(a)项和(b)项规定的原则而表现为非专向性补贴,但是有理由认为补贴可能事实上属专向性补贴,则可考虑其他因素。此类因素为:有限数量的某些企业使用补贴计划、某些企业主要使用补贴、给予某些企业不成比例的大量补贴以及授予机关在作出给予补贴的决定时行使决定权的方式。(注 3)在适用本项时,应考虑授予机关管辖范围内经济活动的多样性程度,及已经实施补贴计划的持续时间。
注 3:在这方面,应特别考虑补贴申请被拒绝或获得批准的频率,及作出此类决定的理由。
2.2 限于授予机关管辖范围内指定地理区域的某些企业的补贴属专向性补贴。各方理解,就本协定而言,不得将有资格的各级政府所采取的确定或改变普遍适用的税率的行动被视为专向性补贴。
2.3 任何属第 3 条规定范围内的补贴应被视为专向性补贴。
2.4 根据本条规定对专向性的确定应依据肯定性证据明确证明。
第二部分:禁止性补贴
第 3 条 禁 止
3.1 除《农业协定》的规定外,下列属第 1 条范围内的补贴应予禁止:
(a)法律或事实上(注 4)视出口实绩为惟一条件或多种其他条件之一而给予的补贴,包括附件 1 列举的补贴(注 5);
注 4:如事实证明补贴的给予虽未在法律上视出口实绩而定,而事实上与实际或预期出口或出口收入联系在一起,则符合此标准。将补贴给予从事出口的企业这一事实本身不得成为被视为属本规定含义范围内的出口补贴的原因。
注 5:附件 1 所指的不构成出口补贴的措施不得根据本规定和本协定任何其他规定而被禁止。
(b)视使用国产货物而非进口货物的情况为惟一条件或多种其他条件之一而给予的补贴。
3.2 一成员不得给予或维持第 1 款所指的补贴。第 4 条 补救
4.1 只要一成员有理由认为另一成员正在给予或维持一禁止性补贴,则该成员即可请求与该另一成员进行磋商。
4.2 根据第 1 款提出的磋商请求应包括一份说明,列出有关所涉补贴的存在和性质的可获得的证据。
4.3 应根据第 1 款提出的磋商请求,被视为给予或维持所涉补贴的成员应尽快进行此类磋商。磋商的目的应为澄清有关情况的事实并达成双方同意的解决办法。
4.4 如在提出磋商请求后 30 天内(注 6)未能达成双方同意的解决办法,则参加此类磋商的任何成员可将该事项提交争端解决机构(“DSB”),以便立即设立专家组,除非DSB经协商一致决定不设立专家组。
注 6:本条提到的任何时限均可经双方同意而予以延长。
4.5 专家组设立后,可就所涉措施是否属禁止性补贴而请求常设专家小组(注 7)
(本协定中称“PGE”)予以协助。如提出请求,则PGE应立即审议关于所涉措施的存在和性质的证据,并向实施或维持所涉措施的成员提供证明该措施不属禁止性补贴的机会。PGE应在专家组确定的时限内向专家组报告其结论。PGE关于所涉措施是否属禁止性补贴问题的结论应由专家组接受而不得进行修改。
注 7:按第 24 条规定设立。
4.6 专家组应向争端各方提交其最终报告。该报告应在专家组组成和专家组职权范围确定之日起 90 天内散发全体成员。
4.7 如所涉措施被视为属禁止性补贴,则专家组应建议进行补贴的成员立刻撤销该补贴。在这方面,专家组应在其建议中列明必须撤销该措施的时限。
4.8 在专家组报告散发全体成员后 30 天内,DSB应通过该报告,除非一争端方正式将其上诉的决定通知DSB,或DSB经协商一致决定不通过该报告。
4.9 如专家组报告被上诉,则上诉机构应在争端方正式通知其上诉意向之日起 30天内作出决定。如上诉机构认为不能在 30 天内提供报告,则应将迟延的原因和它将提交报告的估计期限以书面形式通知DSB。该程序决不能超过 60 天。上诉机构报告应由D SB通过,并由争端各方无条件接受,除非DSB在将报告散发各成员后 20 天内经协商一致决定不通过上诉机构报告。(注 8)
注 8:如此期间未安排DSB会议,则应为此举行一次DSB会议。
4.10 如在专家组指定的时限内DSB的建议未得到遵守,该时限自专家组报告或上诉机构报告获得通过之日起开始,则DSB应给予起诉方采取适当(注 9)反措施的授权,除非DSB经协商一致决定拒绝该请求。
注 9:此措辞并不意味着按照在这些条款下处理的补贴属禁止性补贴这一事实而允许实施不成比例的反措施。
4.11 如一争端方请求根据《争端解决谅解》(“DSU”)第 22 条第 6 款进行仲裁,则仲裁人应确定反措施是否适当。(注 10)
注 10:此措辞并不意味着按照在这些条款下处理的补贴属禁止性补贴这一事实而允许实施不成比例的反措施。
4.12 就按照本条处理的争端而言,除本条具体规定的时限外,DSU项下适用于处理此类争端的时限应为该谅解中规定时间的一半。
第 5 条 不利影响
任何成员不得通过使用第 1 条第 1 款和第 2 款所指的任何补贴而对其他成员的利益造成不利影响,即:
(a)损害另一成员的国内产业(注 11);
注 11:此处使用的“损害国内产业”的措辞与第五部分使用的意义相同。
(b)使其他成员在GATT 1994 项下直接或间接获得的利益丧失或减损,特别是在GATT 1994 第 2 条下约束减让的利益(注 12);
注 12:本协定使用的“丧失或减损”的措辞与GATT 1994 相关条款使用的意义相同,此类丧失或减损的存在应根据实施这些条款的惯例确定。
(c)严重侵害另一成员的利益。(注 13)
注 13:本协定使用的“严重侵害另一成员利益”的措辞与GATT 1994 第 16 条第 1 款使用的意义相同,且包括严重侵害的威胁。
本条不适用于按《农业协定》第 13 条规定的对农产品维持的补贴。第 6 条 严重侵害
6.1 在下列情况下,应视为存在第 5 条(c)款意义上的严重侵害:
(a)对一产品从价补贴的总额(注 14)超过 5%(注 15);注 14:从价补贴的总额应依照附件 4 的规定计算。
注 15:因预期民用航空器将受专门的多边规则的约束,此项中的最低限度不适用于民用航空器。
(b)用以弥补一产业承受的经营亏损的补贴;
(c)用以弥补一企业承受的经营亏损的补贴,但仅为制定长期解决办法提供时间和避免严重社会问题而给予该企业的非经常性的和不能对该企业重复的一次性措施除外;
(d)直接债务免除,即免除政府持有的债务,及用以偿债的赠款。(注 16)
注 16:各方认识到,如因民用航空器的实际销售低于预测的销售,而使以专利权使用费为基础的民用航空器计划的筹资不能得到全部偿还,则此点本身不构成就本项而言的严重侵害。
6.2 尽管有第 1 款的规定,但是如提供补贴的成员证明所涉补贴未造成第 3 款列举的任何影响,则不得视为存在严重侵害。
6.3 如下列一种或多种情况适用,则可产生第 5 条(c)款意义上的严重侵害:
(a)补贴的影响在于取代或阻碍另一成员同类产品进入提供补贴成员的市场;
(b)补贴的影响在于在第三国市场中取代或阻碍另一成员同类产品的出口;
(c)补贴的影响在于与同一市场中另一成员同类产品的价格相比,补贴产品造成大幅价格削低,或在同一市场中造成大幅价格抑制、价格压低或销售损失;
(d)补贴的影响在于与以往 3 年期间的平均市场份额相比,提供补贴成员的一特定补贴初级产品或商品(注 17)的世界市场份额增加,且此增加在给予补贴期间呈一贯的趋势。
注 17:除非其他多边议定的具体规则适用于所涉产品或商品的贸易。
6.4 就第 3 款(b)项而言,对出口产品的取代或阻碍,在遵守第 7 款规定的前提下,应包括已被证明存在不利于未受补贴的同类产品相对市场份额变化的任何情况(经过一段足以证明有关产品明确市场发展趋势的适当代表期后,在通常情况下,该代表期应至少为 1 年)。“相对市场份额变化”应包括下列任何一种情况:(a)补贴产品的市场份额增加;(b)补贴产品的市场份额保持不变,但如果不存在该补贴,市场份额则会降低;(c)补贴产品的市场份额降低,但速度低于不存在该补贴的情况。
6.5 就第 3 款(c)项而言,价格削低应包括通过对供应同一市场的补贴产品与未受补贴产品的价格进行比较所表明的此类价格削低的任何情况。此种比较应在同一贸易水平上和可比的时间内进行,同时适当考虑影响价格可比性的任何其他因素。但是,如不可能进行此类直接比较,则可依据出口单价证明存在价格削低。
6.6 被指控出现严重侵害的市场中的每一成员,在遵守附件 5 第 3 款规定的前提下,应使第 7 条下产生争端的各方和根据第 7 条第 4 款设立的专家组可获得、关于与争端各方市场份额变化以及关于所涉及的产品价格的所有有关信息。
6.7 如在有关期限内存在下列任何情况(注 18),则不产生第 3 款下造成严重侵害的取代或阻碍;
注 18:本款所指的某些情况这一事实本身,并未授予这些情况在GATT 1994 或本协定范围内的任何法律地位。这些情况不得是无关联的、偶发的或在其他情况下无关紧要的。
(a)禁止或限制来自起诉成员同类产品的出口,或禁止或限制起诉成员的产品进入有关第三国市场;
(b)对有关产品实行贸易垄断或国营贸易的进口国政府出于非商业原因,决定将来自起诉成员的进口产品改为来自另一个或多个国家进口产品;
(c)自然灾害、罢工、运输中断或其他不可抗力影响起诉成员可供出口产品的生产、质量、数量或价格;
(d)存在限制来自起诉成员出口的安排;
(x)起诉成员自愿减少可供出口的有关产品(特别包括起诉成员中公司自主将该产品的出口重新分配给新的市场的情况);
(f)未能符合进口国的标准或其他管理要求。
6.8 在未出现第 7 款所指的情况时,严重侵害的存在应依据提交专家组或专家组获得的信息确定,包括依照附件 5 的规定提交的信息。
6.9 本条不适用于按《农业协定》第 13 条规定对农产品维持的补贴。第 7 条 补救
7.1 除《农业协定》第 13 条的规定外,只要一成员有理由认为另一成员给予或维持的第 1 条所指的任何补贴对其国内产业产生损害、使其利益丧失或减损或产生严重侵害,则该成员即可请求与另一成员进行磋商。
7.2 根据第 1 款提出的磋商请求应包括一份说明,列明关于以下内容的可获得的证据:(a)所涉补贴的存在和性质,及(b)对请求磋商的成员国内产业造成的损害、利益丧失或减损或严重侵害(注 19)。
注 19:如请求与被视为导致第 6 条第 1 款意义上的严重侵害的补贴有关时,关于严重侵害的可获得的证据可限于与第 6 条第 1 款的条件是否得到满足有关的可获得的证据。
7.3 应根据第 1 款提出的磋商请求,被视为给予或维持所涉补贴做法的成员应尽快进行此类磋商。磋商的目的应为澄清有关情况的事实并达成双方同意的解决办法。
7.4 如磋商未能在 60 天内(注 20)达成双方同意的解决办法,则参加此类磋商的任何成员可将该事项提交DSB,以立即设立专家组,除非DSB经协商一致决定不设立专家组。专家组的组成及其职权范围应在专家组设立之日起 15 天内确定。
注 20:本条所指的任何时限均可经双方同意而延长。
7.5 专家组应审议该事项并向争端各方提交其最终报告。该报告应在专家组组成和职权范围确定之日起 120 天内散发全体成员。
7.6 在专家组报告散发全体成员后 30 天内,DSB(注 21)应通过该报告,除非一争端方正式将其上诉的决定通知DSB,或DSB经协商一致决定不通过该报告。
注 21:如此间未安排DSB会议,则应为此举行一次DSB会议。
7.7 如专家组报告被上诉,上诉机构应在争端方正式通知其上诉意向之日起 60 天内作出决定。如上诉机构认为不能在 60 天内提供报告,则应将延误的理由和它将提交报告的估计期限以书面形式通知DSB。该程序决不能超过 90 天。上诉机构报告应由DS B通过,并由争端各方无条件接受,除非DSB在将报告散发各成员后 20 天内经协商一致决定不通过上诉机构报告。(注 22)
注 22:如此间未安排DSB会议,则应为此举行一次DSB会议。
7.8 如专家组报告或上诉机构报告获得通过,其中确定任何补贴对另一成员的利益导致第 5 条范围内的不利影响,则给予或维持该补贴的成员应采取适当步骤以消除不利影响或应撤销该补贴。
7.9 如在DSB通过专家组报告或上诉机构报告之日起 6 个月内,该成员未采取适当步骤以消除补贴的不利影响或撤销该补贴,且未达成补偿协议,则DSB应授权起诉成员采取与被确定存在的不利影响的程度和性质相当的反措施,除非DSB经协商一致决定拒绝该请求。
7.10 如一争端方请求根据DSU第 22 条第 6 款进行仲裁,则仲裁人应确定反措施是否与被确定存在的不利影响的程度和性质相当。
第四部分:不可诉补贴
第 8 条 不可诉补贴的确认
8.1 下列补贴应被视为属不可诉补贴(注 23):
注 23:各方认识到,各成员普遍提供用于各种目的的政府援助,此种援助可能不符合本条规定的不可诉待遇这一事实本身并不限制各成员提供此种援助的能力。
(a)不属第 2 条范围内的专向性补贴;
(b)属第 2 条范围内的专向性补贴,但符合以下第 2 款(a)项、(b)项或(c)项规定的所有条件。
8.2 尽管有第三部分和第五部分的规定,但是下列补贴属不可诉补贴:
(a)对公司进行研究活动的援助,或对高等教育机构或研究机构与公司签约进行研究活动的援助,如:(注 24,25,26)
注 24:因预期民用航空器将受专门的多边规则的约束,本项的规定不适用于该产品。注 25:在不迟于《WTO协定》生效之日起 18 个月,第 24 条规定的补贴与反补贴
措施委员会(本协定中称“委员会”)应审议第 2 款(a)项规定的运用情况,以期进行所有必要的修改以改善这些规定的运用情况。在考虑进行可能的修改时,委员会应按照各成员在开展研究计划中的经验和在其他有关国际机构中的工作,认真审议本项所列类别的定义。
注 26:本协定的规定不适用于由高等教育机构或研究机构独立进行的基础研究活动。 “基础研究”一词指与工业和商业目标无联系的一般科技知识的扩充。
援助涵盖(注 27)不超过工业研究(注 28)成本的 75%或xxxxxxx(x 00, 00)成本的 50%;
注 27:本项所指的不可诉援助的允许水平应参考在一独立项目实施期间发生的全部符合条件的费用而确定。
注 28:“工业研究”一词指旨在发现新知识的有计划探求或关键性调查,目的在于此类知识可用于开发新产品、新工艺或新的服务,或对现有产品、工艺或服务进行重大改进。
注 29:“竞争前开发活动”一词指将工业研究结果转化为新的、改型的或改进的产品、工艺或服务的计划、蓝图或设计,无论是否旨用于销售或使用,包括创造不能用于商业用途的第一个原型。还可以包括对产品、工艺或服务的备选方案、最初展示或试验项目的概念表述和设计,只要这些相同的项目不能转化为或用于工业应用或商业开发。不包括对现有产品、生产线、制造工艺、服务及其他正在进行的操作的常规或定期更改,尽管这些更改也可能代表着革新。
注 30:对于横跨工业研究和竞争前开发活动的项目,不可诉援助的允许水平不得超过根据本项(i)目至(v)目所列所有符合条件的费用计算的、对上述两类不可诉援助允许水平的简单平均数。
且只要此种援助仅限于:
(i)人事成本(研究活动中专门雇佣的研究人员、技术人员和其他辅助人员);
(ii)专门和永久(在商业基础上处理时除外)用于研究活动的仪器、设备、土地和建筑物的成本;
(iii)专门用于研究活动的咨询和等效服务的费用,包括外购研究成果、技术知识、专利等费用;
(iv)因研究活动而直接发生的额外间接成本;
(v)因研究活动而直接发生的其他日常费用(如材料、供应品和同类物品的费用)。
(b)按照地区发展总体框架(注 31)对一成员领土内落后地区的援助,且在符合条件的地区内属非专向性(属第 2 条范围内),但是:
注 31:“地区发展总体框架”指地区补贴计划是内部一致和普遍适用的地区发展政策的一部分,且地区发展补贴不给予对地区发展没有或实际上没有影响的孤立地点。
(i)每一落后地区必须是一个明确界定的毗连地理区域,具有可确定的经济或行政特征;
(ii)该地区依据中性和客观的标准(注 32)被视为属落后地区,表明该地区的困难不是因临时情况产生的;此类标准必须在法律、法规或其他官方文件中明确说明,以便能够进行核实;
注 32:“中性和客观标准”指不优惠某些地区的标准,不仅是适合于在地区发展政策框架内消除或减少地区差异。在这方面,地区补贴计划应包括对每一补贴项目给予援助数量的最高限额。此类最高限额必须根据受援地区的不同发展水平而有所差别,且必须以投资成本或创造就业成本进行表述。在最高限额以内,援助的分配应足够广泛和平均,以避免使按第 2 条规定的某些企业主要使用补贴,或给予它们不成比例的大量补贴。
(iii)标准应包括对经济发展的测算,此种测算应依据下列至少一个因素:
-人均收入或人均家庭收入二者取其一,或人均国内生产总值,均不得高于有关地区平均水平的 85%;
-失业率,必须至少相当于有关地区平均水平的 110%;
以上均按三年期测算;但是该测算可以是综合的并可包括其他因素。
(c)为促进现有设施(注 33)适应法律和/或法规实行的新的环境要求而提供的援助,这些要求对公司产生更多的约束和财政负担,只要此种援助是:
注 33:“现有设施”一词指实行新的环境要求时已运行至少 2 年的设施。
(i)一次性的临时措施;且
(ii)限于适应所需费用的 20%;且
(iii)不包括替代和实施受援投资的费用,这些费用应全部由公司负担;且
(iv)与公司计划减少废弃物和污染有直接联系且成比例,不包括任何可实现的对制造成本的节省;且
(v)能够适应新设备和/或生产工艺的公司均可获得。
8.3 援引第 2 款规定的补贴计划应依照第七部分的规定在实施之前通知委员会。任何此种通知应足够准确,以便其他成员能够评估该计划与第 2 款有关条款规定的条件和标准的一致性。各成员还应向委员会提供此类通知的年度更新,特别是通过提供关于每一计划的全球支出的信息,及关于对该计划任何修改的信息。其他成员有权请求提供已通知计划下个案的信息。(注 34)
注 34:各方认识到,此通知规定的任何一点不要求提供机密信息,包括机密商业信息。
8.4 应一成员请求,秘书处应审议按照第 3 款作出的通知,必要时,可要求提供补贴的成员提供有关审议中的已通知计划的额外信息。秘书处应将审议结果报告委员会。应请求,委员会应迅速审议秘书处的结果(或如果未请求秘书处进行审议,则审议通知本身),以期确定第 2 款规定的条件和标准是否得到满足。本款规定的程序应至迟在就补贴计划作出通知后的委员会第一次例会上完成,但是作出通知与委员会例会之间应至
少过去 2 个月。应请求,本款所述的审议程序也适用于第 3 款所指的在年度更新中作出通知的对计划的实质性修改。
8.5 应一成员请求,第 4 款所指的委员会作出的确定、或委员会未能作出此种确定以及在个案中违反已通知计划中所列条件的情况均应提交进行有约束力的仲裁。仲裁机构应在此事项提交之日起 120 天内将其结论提交各成员。除本款另有规定外,DSU适用于根据本款进行的仲裁。
第 9 条 磋商和授权的补救
9.1 如在实施第 8 条第 2 款所指的补贴计划过程中,尽管存在该计划与该款规定的标准相一致的事实,但是一成员有理由认为该计划已导致对其国内产业的严重不利影响,例如造成难以补救的损害,则该成员可请求与给予或维持该补贴的成员进行磋商。
9.2 应根据第 1 款提出的磋商请求,给予或维持该补贴计划的成员应尽快进行此类磋商。磋商的目的应为澄清有关情况的事实并达成双方接受的解决办法。
9.3 如在提出磋商请求后 60 天内,根据第 2 款进行的磋商未能达成双方接受的解决办法,则提出磋商请求的成员可将此事项提交委员会。
9.4 如一事项提交委员会处理,委员会应立即审议所涉及的事实和第 1 款所指的关于影响的证据。如委员会确定存在此类影响,则可建议提供补贴的成员修改该计划,以消除这些影响。委员会应在此事项根据第 3 条提交其之日起 120 天内作出结论。如建议在 6 个月内未得到遵守,则委员会应授权提出请求的成员采取与确定存在的不利影响的程度和性质相当的反措施。
第五部分:反补贴措施
第 10 条 GATT 1994 第 6 条的适用(注 35)
注 35:本协定第二部分或第三部分的规定可以与第五部分的规定平行援引;但是,对于进口成员内市场中一特定补贴的影响,仅可采取一种形式的补救(或是反补贴税,如满足第五部分的要求,或是根据第 4 条或第 7 条实行的反措施)。第三部分和第五部
分的规定不得对依照第四部分的规定被视为属不可诉的措施援引。但是,对第 8 条第 1
款(a)项所指的措施可以进行调查,以便确定它们是否属第 2 条含义范围内的专向性
补贴。此外,对于第 8 条第 2 款所指的、根据一计划授予的、且未依照第 8 条第 3 款作
出通知的补贴,可援引第三部分或第五部分的规定,但此类补贴如被视为符合第 8 条第 2款所列标准,则应被视为不可诉补贴。
各成员应采取所有必要步骤以保证对任何成员领土的任何产品进口至另一成员领土征收反补贴税(注 36)符合GATT 1994 第 6 条的规定和本协定的规定。反补贴税仅可根据依照本协定和《农业协定》的规定发起(注 37)和进行的调查征收。
注 36:“反补贴税”一词应理解为指按GATT 1994 第 6 条第 3 款的规定,为抵消对任何商品的制造、生产或出口给予的直接或间接补贴而征收的一种特别税。
注 37:以下使用的“发起”一词指正式开始第 11 条规定调查的一成员的程序性行动。
第 11 条 发起和随后进行调查
11.1 除第 6 款的规定外,确定任何被指控的补贴的存在、程度和影响的调查应在收到国内产业或代表国内产业提出的书面申请后发起。
11.2 第 1 款下的申请应包括充足证据以证明存在(a)补贴,如可能,及其金额,
(b)属由本协定所解释的GATT 1994 第 6 条范围内的损害,以及(c)补贴进口产品与被指控损害之间的一种因果关系。缺乏有关证据的简单断言不能视为足以满足本款的要求。申请应包括申请人可合理获得的关于下列内容的信息:
(i)申请人的身份和申请人提供的对国内同类产品生产的数量和价值的说明。如代表国内产业提出书面申请,则申请应通过一份列出同类产品的所有已知国内生产者的清单(或同类产品的国内生产者协会),确认其代表提出申请的产业,并在可能的限度内,提供此类生产者所占国内同类产品生产的数量和价值的说明;
(ii)对被指控的补贴产品的完整说明、所涉一个或多个原产国或出口国名称、每一已知出口商或外国生产者的身份以及已知的进口所涉产品的人员名单;
(iii)关于所涉补贴的存在、金额和性质的证据;
(iv)关于对国内产业的被指控的损害是由补贴进口产品通过补贴的影响造成的证据;此证据包括被指控的补贴进口产品数量变化的信息,这些进口产品对国内市场同类产品价格的影响,以及由影响国内产业状况的有关因素和指标所证明的这些产品对国内产业造成的影响,例如第 15 条第 2 款和第 4 款中所列的因素和指标。
11.3 主管机关应审查申请中提供的证据的准确性和充分性,以确定是否有足够的证据证明发起调查是正当的。
11.4 除非主管机关根据对国内同类产品生产者对申请表示的支持或反对程度(注 38)的审查确定申请是由国内产业或代表国内产业提出的,否则不得按照第 1 款发起调查。(注 39)如申请得到总产量构成国内产业中表示支持或反对申请的国内同类产品生产者生产的同类产品总产量的 50%以上,则该申请应被视为“由国内产业或代表国内产业提出”。但是,如表示支持申请的国内生产者的产量不足国内产业生产的同类产品总产量的 25%,则不得发起调查。
注 38:在分割的产业涉及数量巨大的生产者的情况下,主管机关可通过统计上有效的抽样技术确定支持和反对程序。
注 39:各成员意识到,在某些成员领土内,同类产品国内生产者的雇员或这些雇员的代表可提出或支持申请根据第 1 款进行调查。
11.5 主管机关应避免公布关于发起调查的申请,除非已决定发起调查。
11.6 在特殊情况下,如有关主管机关在未收到国内产业或代表国内产业提出的发起调查的书面申请的情况下决定发起调查,则只有在具备第 2 款所述关于补贴、损害和因果关系的充分证据证明发起调查是正当的情况下,方可发起调查。
11.7 补贴和损害的证据应(a)在有关是否发起调查的决定中及(b)此后在调查过程中同时予以考虑,调查过程自不迟于依照本协定规定可实施临时措施的最早日期开始。
11.8 在产品不自原产国直接进口而自一中间国向进口成员出口的情况下,本协定的规定应完全适用,就本协定而言,此项交易或此类交易应被视为发生在原产国与进口成员之间。
11.9 主管机关一经确信不存在有关补贴或损害的足够证据以证明继续进行该案是正当的,则根据第 1 款提出的申请即应予以拒绝,且调查应迅速终止。如补贴金额属微量或补贴进口产品的实际或潜在数量或损害可忽略不计,则应立即终止调查。就本款而言,如补贴不足从价金额的 1%,则补贴金额应被视为属微量。
11.10 调查不得妨碍通关程序。
11.11 除特殊情况外,调查应在发起后 1 年内结束,且决不能超过 18 个月。第 12 条 证据
12.1 应将主管机关要求的信息通知反补贴税调查中的利害关系成员和所有利害关系方,并给予它们充分的机会以书面形式提出其认为与所涉调查有关的所有证据。
12.1.1 应给予收到反补贴税调查中所使用问卷的出口商、外国生产者或利害关系成员至少 30 天时间作出答复。(注 40)对于延长该 30 天期限的任何请求应给予适当考虑,且根据所xx的原因,只要可行即应予以延长。
注 40:作为一般规则,出口商的时限应自收到问卷之日起计算,为此,该问卷应被视为在送往答卷或转交出口成员的适当外交代表之日起一周内已经收到,如为WTO单独关税区成员,则为出口领土的官方代表。
12.1.2 在遵守保护机密信息要求的前提下,一利害关系成员或几个利害关系方提出的书面证据应迅速使参与调查的其他利害关系成员和利害关系方可获得。
12.1.3 调查一经发起,主管机关即应将根据第 11 条第 1 款收到的书面申请的全文向已知出口商(注 41)和出口成员的主管机关提供,并应请求,应向其他涉及的利害关系方提供。应适当注意按第 4 款规定的保护机密信息的要求。
注 41:各方理解,如所涉及的出口商的数量特别多,书面申请的全文应改为只向出口成员的主管机关或向有关贸易协会提供,贸易协会随后应向有关出口商转交副本。
12.2 利害关系成员和利害关系方,在说明正当理由后,也有权口头提供信息。如此类信息为口头提供,则利害关系成员和利害关系方随后需要将此类提交的信息转为书面形式。调查主管机关的任何决定只能根据主管机关书面记录的此类信息和论据作出,且该书面记录应已经使参与调查的利害关系成员和利害关系方可获得,同时考虑保护机密信息的需要。
12.3 只要可行,主管机关即应迅速向所有利害关系成员和利害关系方提供机会,使其了解与其案情xx有关的、不属第 4 款定义的机密性质、且主管机关在反补贴税调查中使用的所有信息,并应根据此信息准备xx。
12.4 任何原属机密性质的信息(例如,由于信息的披露会给予一竞争者巨大的竞争优势,或由于信息的披露会给信息提供者或给向信息获得者提供信息的人士带来严重不利影响),或由调查参加方在保密基础上提供的信息,主管机关应在对方说明正当原因后,按机密信息处理。此类信息未经提供方特别允许不得披露。(注 42)
注 42:各成员意识到,在某些成员领土内,可能需要根据严格制定的保护性法令披露信息。
12.4.1 主管机关应要求提供机密信息的利害关系成员或利害关系方提供此类信息的非机密摘要。这些摘要应足够详细,以便能够合理了解以机密形式提交的信息的实质内容。在特殊情况下,此类成员或各方可表明此类信息无法进行摘要。在此类特殊情况下,必须提供一份关于为何不能进行摘要的原因的说明。
12.4.2 如主管机关认为关于保密的请求缺乏正当理由,且如果信息提供者不愿披露信息,或不愿授权以概括或摘要的形式披露信息,则主管机关可忽略此类信息,除非主管机关可从适当的来源满意地证明此类信息是正确的。(注 43)
注 43:各成员同意,不应任意拒绝关于保密的请求。各成员进一步同意,调查主管机关只能就与程序有关的信息请求豁免保密要求。
12.5 除第 7 款规定的情况外,在调查过程中,主管机关应设法使自己确信利害关系成员或利害关系方提供的、其调查结果所依据的信息的准确性。
12.6 调查主管机关可按需要在其他成员领土内进行调查,只要它们已经及时通知所涉成员,除非该成员反对该调查。此外,如(a)一公司同意及(b)已通知所涉成员且该成员不反对,则调查主管机关可在该公司所在地点进行调查且可审查该公司的记录。附件 6 所列程序应适用于在企业所在地点进行的调查。在遵守保护机密信息要求的前提下,主管机关应使任何此类调查的结果可获得,或应根据第 8 款向与调查结果有关的公司进行披露,并可使申请人可获得此类结果。
12.7 如任何利害关系成员或利害关系方不允许使用或未在合理时间内提供必要的信息,或严重妨碍调查,则初步和最终裁定,无论是肯定的或还是否定的,均可在可获得的事实基础上作出。
12.8 主管机关在作出最终裁定之前,应将考虑中的、构成是否实施最终措施决定依据的基本事实通知所有利害关系成员和利害关系方。此披露应使各方有充分的时间为其利益进行辩护。
12.9 就本协定而言,“利害关系方”应包括:
(i)被调查产品的出口商或外国生产者或进口商,或大多数成员为该产品的生产者、出口商或进口商的同业公会或商会;及
(ii)进口成员中同类产品的生产者,或大多数成员在进口成员领土内生产同类产品的同业公会和商会。
除上述各方外,本清单不妨碍各成员允许国内或国外其他各方被列为利害关系方。
12.10 主管机关应向被调查产品的工业用户,或在该产品通常为零售的情况下,向具有代表性的消费者组织提供机会,使其能够提供与关于补贴、损害和因果关系的调查有关的信息。
12.11 主管机关应适当考虑利害关系方、特别是小公司在提供所要求的信息方面遇到的任何困难,并应提供任何可行的帮助。
12.12 上述程序无意阻止一成员主管机关依照本协定的有关规定,迅速发起调查,作出无论是肯定的还是否定的初步或最终裁定,也无意阻止实施临时或最终措施。
第 13 条 磋 商
13.1 根据第 11 条提出的申请一经接受,且无论如何在发起任何调查之前,应邀请产品可能接受调查的成员进行磋商,以期澄清有关第 11 条第 2 款所指事项的有关情况,并达成双方同意的解决办法。
13.2 此外,在整个调查期间,应给予产品被调查的成员继续进行磋商的合理机会,以期澄清实际情况,并达成双方同意的解决办法。(注 44)
注 44:依照本款的规定,如未给予进行磋商的合理机会,则不能作出肯定的裁定,无论是初步的还是最终的,此点特别重要。此类磋商可为根据第二部分、第三部分或第十部分的规定进行的程序建立基础。
13.3 在不损害提供合理机会进行磋商义务的情况下,这些关于磋商的规定无意阻止一成员主管机关依照本协定的规定迅速发起调查,作出无论是肯定的还是否定的初步或最终裁定,也无意阻止实施临时或最终措施。
13.4 应请求,准备发起任何调查或正在进行此种调查的成员应允许产品接受该项调查的一个或多个成员使用非机密证据,包括用于发起或进行调查的机密数据的非机密摘要。
第 14 条 以接受者所获利益计算补贴的金额
就第五部分而言,调查主管机关计算根据第 1 条第 1 款授予接受者的利益所使用的任何方法应在有关成员国内立法或实施细则中作出规定,这些规定对每一具体案件的适用应透明并附充分说明。此外,任何此类方法应与下列准则相一致:
(a)政府提供股本不得视为授予利益,除非投资决定可被视为与该成员领土内私营投资者的通常投资做法(包括提供风险资金)不一致;
(b)政府提供贷款不得视为授予利益,除非接受贷款的公司支付政府贷款的金额不同于公司支付可实际从市场上获得的可比商业贷款的金额。在这种情况下,利益为两金额之差;
(c)政府提供贷款担保不得视为授予利益,除非获得担保的公司支付政府担保贷款的金额不同于公司支付无政府担保的可比商业贷款的金额。在这种情况下,利益为在调整任何费用差别后的两金额之差;
(d)政府提供货物或服务或购买货物不得视为授予利益,除非提供所得低于适当的报酬,或购买所付高于适当的报酬。报酬是否适当应与所涉货物或服务在提供国或购买国现行市场情况相比较后确定(包括价格、质量、可获性、适销性、运输和其他购销条件)。
第 15 条 损害的确定(注 45)
注 45:在本协定项下,“损害”一词,除非另有规定,否则应理解为指对一国内产业的实质损害、对一国内产业的实质损害威胁或对此类产业建立的实质阻碍,并应依照本条的规定予以解释。
15.1 就GATT 1994 第 6 条而言,对损害的确定应根据肯定性证据,并应包括对以下内容的客观审查:(a)补贴进口产品的数量和补贴进口产品对国内市场同类产品
(注 46)价格的影响,及(b)这些进口产品随之对此类产品国内生产者产生的影响。注 46:在整个协定中,“同类产品”一词应解释为指相同的产品,即与考虑中的产
品在各方面都相同的产品,或如果无此种产品,则为尽管并非在各方面都相同,但具有与考虑中的产品极为相似特点的另一种产品。
15.2 关于补贴进口产品的数量,调查主管机关应考虑补贴进口产品的绝对数量或相对于进口成员中生产或消费的数量是否大幅增加。关于补贴进口产品对价格的影响,调查主管机关应考虑与进口成员同类产品的价格相比,补贴进口产品是否大幅削低价格,或此类进口产品的影响是否是大幅压低价格,或是否是在很大程度上抑制在其他情况下本应发生的价格增加。这些因素的一个或多个均未必能够给予决定性的指导。
15.3 如来自一个以上国家的一产品的进口同时接受反补贴税调查,则调查主管机关只有在确定以下内容后,方可累积评估此类进口产品的影响:(a)对来自每一国家的进口产品确定的补贴金额大于第 11 条第 9 款定义的微量水平,且自每一国家的进口量并非可忽略不计;及(b)根据进口产品之间的竞争条件和进口产品与国内同类产品之间的竞争条件,对进口产品的影响所作的累积评估是适当的。
15.4 关于补贴进口产品对国内产业影响的审查应包括对影响产业状况的所有有关经济因素和指标的评估,包括产量、销售、市场份额、利润、生产力、投资收益或设备利用率的实际和潜在的下降;影响国内价格的因素;对现金流动、库存、就业、工资、增长、筹措资金或投资能力的实际和潜在的消极影响,对于农业,则为是否给政府支持计划增加了负担。该清单不是详尽无遗的,这些因素中的一个或多个均未必能够给予决定性的指导。
15.5 必须证明通过补贴的影响(注 47),补贴进口产品正在造成属本协定范围内的损害。证明补贴进口产品与对国内产业损害之间存在因果关系应以审查主管机关得到的所有有关证据为依据。主管机关还应审查除补贴进口产品外的、同时正在损害国内产
业的任何已知因素,且这些其他因素造成的损害不得归因于补贴进口产品。在这方面可能有关的因素特别包括未接受补贴的所涉及的产品的进口数量和价格、需求的减少或消费模式的变化、外国和国内生产者的限制贸易做法及它们之间的竞争、技术发展以及国内产业的出口实绩和生产率。
注 47:按第 2 款和第 4 款所列。
15.6 如可获得的数据允许根据以工序、生产者的销售和利润等标准为基础,单独确认同类产品的国内生产,则补贴进口产品的影响应与该生产相比较进行评估。如不能单独确认该生产,则补贴进口产品的影响应通过审查包含同类产品的最小产品组或产品类别的生产而进行评估,而这些产品能够提供必要的信息。
15.7 对实质损害威胁的确定应依据事实,而不是仅依据指控、推测或极小的可能性。补贴将造成损害发生的情形变化必须是能够明显预见且迫近的。在作出有关存在实质损害威胁的确定时,主管机关应特别考虑下列因素:
(i)所涉一项或几项补贴的性质和因此可能产生的贸易影响;
(ii)补贴进口产品进入国内市场的大幅增长率,表明进口实质增加的可能性;
(iii)出口商可充分自由使用的、或即将实质增加的能力,表明补贴出口产品进入进口成员市场实质增加的可能性,同时考虑吸收任何额外出口的其他出口市场的可获性;
(iv)进口产品是否以对国内价格产生大幅度抑制或压低影响的价格进入,是否会增加对更多进口产品的需求;以及
(v)被调查产品的库存情况。
这些因素中的任何一个本身都未必能够给予决定性的指导,但被考虑因素作为整体必须得出如下结论,即更多的补贴出口产品是迫近的,且除非采取保护性行动,否则实质损害将会发生。
15.8 对于补贴进口威胁造成损害的情况,实施反补贴措施的考虑和决定应特别慎重。
第 16 条 国内产业的定义
16.1 就本协定而言,“国内产业”一词,除第 2 款的规定外,应解释为指同类产品的国内生产者全体,或指总产量构成同类产品国内总产量主要部分的国内生产者,但是如生产者与出口商或进口商有关联(注 48),或他们本身为自其他国家进口被指控的补贴产品或同类产品的进口商,则“国内产业”一词可解释为指除他们外的其他生产者。
注 48:就本款而言,只有在下列情况下,生产者方可被视为与出口商或进口商有关联:(a)他们中的一方直接或间接控制另一方;或(b)他们直接或间接被一第三者控制;或(c)他们直接或间接共同控制一第三者,但应有理由相信或怀疑此种关系的后果是使有关生产者的行为不同于无关联的生产者。就本款而言,如一方在法律上或经营上处于限制或指导另一方的地位,即前者应被视为控制后者。
16.2 在特殊情况下,对所涉生产,一成员的领土可分为两个或两个以上的竞争市场,在下述条件下,每一市场中的生产者均可被视为一独立产业:(a)该市场中的生产者在该市场中出售他们生产的全部或几乎全部所涉产品,且(b)该市场中的需求在很大程度上不是由位于该领土内其他地方的所涉产品生产者供应的。在此种情况下,则
可认为存在损害,即使全部国内产业的主要部分未受损害,只要补贴产品集中进入该孤立市场,且只要补贴进口产品正在对该市场中全部或几乎全部生产的生产者造成损害。
16.3 如国内产业被解释为指某一地区的生产者,即按第 2 款规定的市场,则反补贴税只能对供该地区最终消费的所涉产品征收。如进口成员的宪法性法律不允许以此为基础征收反补贴税,则进口成员只能在下列条件下方可征收反补贴税而不受限制:(a)应给予出口商停止以补贴价格向有关地区出口的机会或按照第 18 条作出保证,而出口商未能迅速在此方面作出保证,且(b)此类反补贴税不能仅对供应所涉地区的特定生产者的产品征收。
16.4 如两个或两个以上国家已根据GATT 1994 第 24 条第 8 款(a)项达到具有单一统一市场特点的一体化水平,则全部一体化地区的产业应被视为第 1 款和第 2 款所指的国内产业。
16.5 第 15 条第 6 款的规定应适用于本条。第 17 条 临时措施
17.1 临时措施只有在下列情况下方可实施:
(a)已依照第 11 条的规定发起调查,已为此发出公告,且已给予利害关系成员和利害关系方提交信息和提出意见的充分机会;
(b)已作出关于存在补贴和存在补贴进口产品对国内产业造成损害的初步肯定裁定;以及
(c)有关主管机关判断此类措施对防止在调查期间造成损害是必要的。
17.2 临时措施可采取征收临时反补贴税的形式,以金额等于临时计算的补贴金额的现金保证金或保函担保。
17.3 临时措施不得早于发起调查之日起 60 天实施。
17.4 临时措施的实施应限制在尽可能短的时间内,不超过 4 个月。
17.5 在实施临时措施时应遵循第 19 条的有关规定。第 18 条 承诺
18.1 如收到下列令人满意的自愿承诺,则调查程序可以(注 49)中止或终止,而不采取临时措施或征收反补贴税:
注 49:“可以”一词不得解释为允许在执行承诺的同时继续进行调查程序,但第 4款的规定除外。
(a)出口成员政府同意取消或限制补贴,或采取其他与此影响有关的措施;或
(b)出口商同意修改价格,从而使调查主管确信补贴的损害性影响已经消除。根据此类承诺的提价不得超过消除补贴金额所必需的限度。如提价幅度小于补贴金额即足以消除对国内产业的损害,则该提价幅度是可取的。
18.2 除非进口成员的主管机关已就补贴和补贴所造成的损害作出初步肯定裁定,在出口商作出承诺的情况下,已获得出口成员的同意,否则不得寻求或接受承诺。
18.3 如进口成员的主管机关认为接受承诺不可行,则不必接受所提承诺,例如由于实际或潜在的出口商数量过大,或由于其他原因,包括一般政策原因。如发生此种情况且在可行的情况下,主管机关应向出口商提供其认为不宜接受承诺的理由,且应在可能的限度内给予出口商就此发表意见的机会。
18.4 如承诺被接受,且如果出口商希望或主管机关决定,则关于补贴和损害的调查仍应完成。在此种情况下,如作出关于补贴或损害的否定裁定,则承诺即自动失效,除非此种裁定主要是由于承诺的存在而作出的。在此类情况下,主管机关可要求在与本协定规定相一致的合理期限内维持承诺。如作出关于补贴和损害的肯定裁定,则承诺应按其条件和本协定的规定继续有效。
18.5 价格承诺可由进口成员的主管机关提出建议,但不得强迫出口商作出此类承诺。政府或出口商不提出此类承诺或不接受这样做的邀请的事实,决不能有损于对该案的审查。但是,如补贴进口产品继续发生,则主管机关有权确定损害威胁更有可能出现。
18.6 进口成员的主管机关可要求承诺已被接受的任何政府或出口商定期提供有关履行该承诺的信息,并允许核实有关数据。如违反承诺,则进口成员的主管机关可根据本协定的相应规定采取迅速行动,包括使用可获得的最佳信息立即实施临时措施。在此类情况下,可依照本协定对在实施此类临时措施前90 天内进口供消费的产品征收最终税,但此追溯课征不得适用于在违反承诺之前已入境的进口产品。
第 19 条 反补贴税的征收
19.1 如为完成磋商而作出合理努力后,一成员就补贴的存在和金额作出最终裁定,并裁定通过补贴的影响,补贴进口产品正在造成损害,则该成员可依照本条的规定征收反补贴税,除非此项或此类补贴被撤销。
19.2 在所有征收反补贴税的要求均已获满足的情况下是否征税的决定,及征收反补贴税金额是否应等于或小于补贴的全部金额的决定,均由进口成员的主管机关作出。宜允许在所有成员领土内征税,如反补贴税小于补贴的全部金额即足以消除对国内产业的损害,则该反补贴税是可取得,并宜建立程序以允许有关主管机关适当考虑其利益可能会因征收反补贴税而受到不利影响的国内利害关系方(注 50)提出的交涉。
注 50:就本款而言,“国内利害关系方”一词包括接受调查的进口产品的消费者和工业用户。
19.3 如对任何产品征收反补贴税,则应对已被认定接受补贴和造成损害的所有来源的此种进口产品根据每一案件的情况在非歧视基础上收取适当金额的反补贴税,来自已经放弃任何所涉补贴或根据本协定的条款提出的承诺已被接受的来源的进口产品除外。任何出口产品被征收最终反补贴税的出口商,如因拒绝合作以外的原因实际上未接受调查,则有资格接受加速审查,以便调查主管机关迅速为其确定单独的反补贴税率。
19.4 对任何进口产品征收(注 51)的反补贴税不得超过认定存在的补贴的金额,该金额以补贴出口产品的单位补贴计算。
注 51:本协定使用的“征收”应指最终或最后的合法课税或征税或收税。第 20 条 追溯效力
20.1 临时措施和反补贴税仅对在分别根据第 17 条第 1 款和第 19 条第 1 款作出的决定生效之后进口供消费的产品适用,但需遵守本条所列例外。
20.2 如作出损害的最终裁定(而不是损害威胁或实质阻碍一产业建立的最终裁定),或在虽已作出损害威胁的最终裁定,但如无临时措施,将会导致对补贴进口产品的影响作出损害裁定的情况下,则反补贴税可对已经实施措施(若有的话)的期间追溯征收。
20.3 如最终反补贴税高于现金保证金或保函担保的金额,则差额部分不得收取。如最终税低于现金保证金或保函担保的金额,则超出的金额应迅速予以退还,或保函应迅速予以解除。
20.4 除第 2 款的规定外,如作出损害威胁或实质阻碍的裁定(但未发生损害),则最终反补贴税只能自作出损害威胁或实质阻碍的裁定之日起征收,在实施临时措施期间所交纳的任何现金应迅速予以退还,任何保函应迅速予以解除。
20.5 如最终裁定是否定的,则在实施临时性措施期间所交纳的任何现金应迅速予以退还,任何保函应迅速予以解除。
20.6 在紧急情况下,对于所涉补贴产品,如主管机关认为难以补救的损害是由于得益于以与GATT 1994 和本协定的规定不一致的方式支付或给予的补贴产品在较短时间内大量进口造成的,则在其认为为防止此种损害再次发生而有必要对这些进口追溯课征反补贴税的情况下,可对实施临时措施前 90 天内进口供消费的进口产品课征最终反补贴税。
第 21 条 反补贴税和承诺的期限和复审
21.1 反补贴税应仅在抵消造成损害的补贴所必需的时间和限度内实施。
21.2 主管机关在有正当理由的情况下,自行复审或在最终反补贴税的征收已经过一段合理时间后,应提交证实复审必要性的肯定信息的任何利害关系方请求,复审继续征税的必要性。利害关系方有权请求主管机关复审是否需要继续征收反补贴税以抵消补贴,如取消或改变反补贴税,则损害是否有可能继续或再度发生,或同时复审两者。如作为根据本款复审的结果,主管机关确定反补贴税已无正当理由,则反补贴税应立即终止。
21.3 尽管有第 1 款和第 2 款的规定,但是任何最终反补贴税应在征收之日起(或在复审涉及补贴和损害两者的情况下,自根据第 2 款进行的最近一次复审之日起,或根据本款)5 年内的一日期终止,除非主管机关在该日期之前自行进行的复审或应在该日期之前一段合理时间内由国内产业或代表国内产业提出的有充分证据的请求下进行的复审确定,反补贴税的终止有可能导致补贴和损害的继续或再度发生。(注 52)在此种复审的结果产生之前,可继续征税。
注 52:如反补贴税的金额在追溯基础上征收,则在最近征税过程中产生的关于不拟征税的调查结果本身不得要求主管机关终止征收最终税。
21.4 第 12 条关于证据和程序的规定应适用于根据本条进行的任何复审。任何此类复审应迅速进行,且通常应在自复审开始之日起 12 个月内结束。
21.5 本条的规定在细节上作必要修改后应适用于根据第 18 条接受的承诺。第 22 条 公告和裁定的说明
22.1 如主管机关确信有充分证据证明按照第 11 条发起的调查是正当的,则应通知其产品将接受该调查的一个或多个成员和调查主管机关已知与该调查有利害关系的其他利害关系方,并应发布公告。
22.2 关于发起调查的公告应包括或通过单独报告(注 53)提供有关下列内容的充足信息:
注 53:如主管机关根据本条规定在单独报告中提供信息和说明,则应保证该报告可使公众容易获得。
(i)一个或多个出口国的名称和所涉及的产品名称;
(ii)发起调查的日期;
(iii)关于拟接受调查的补贴做法的说明;
(iv)关于损害的指控所依据因素的摘要;
(v)利害关系成员和利害关系方送交交涉的地址;以及
(vi)允许利害关系成员和利害关系方公布其意见的时限。
22.3 对于任何初步或最终裁定,无论是肯定的还是否定的,按照第 18 条接受承诺的决定、此种承诺的终止以及最终反补贴税的终止均应作出公告。每一公告均应详细列出或通过单独报告详细提供调查主管机关就其认为重要的所有事实问题和法律问题所得出的调查结果和结论。所有此类公告和报告应转交其产品受该裁定或承诺约束的一个或多个成员,及已知与此有利害关系的其他利害关系方。
22.4 实施临时措施的公告应列出或通过单独报告提供关于补贴的存在和损害的初步裁定的详细说明,并应提及导致有关论据被接受或被拒绝的事实问题和法律问题。该公告或报告应在适当考虑保护机密信息要求的同时,特别包含下列内容:
(i)供应商名称,如不可行,则为所涉及的供应国名称;
(ii)足以符合报关目的的产品描述;
(iii)确定的补贴金额和确定补贴存在的依据;
(iv)按第 15 条所列与损害裁定有关的考虑;
(v)导致作出裁定的主要理由。
22.5 在规定征收最终反补贴税或接受承诺的肯定裁定的情况下,关于结束或中止调查的公告应包含或通过一份单独报告提供导致实施最终措施或接受承诺的所有有关的事实问题和法律问题及理由,同时应适当考虑保护机密信息的要求。特别是,公告或报告应包含第 4 款所述的信息,以及接受或拒绝利害关系成员及进口商和出口商所提有关论据或请求事项的理由。
22.6 关于在根据第 18 条接受承诺后终止或中止调查的公告应包括或通过一份单独报告提供该承诺的非机密部分。
22.7 本条的规定在细节上作必要修改后应适用于根据第 21 条进行和完成的审查,并适用于根据第 20 条追溯征税的决定。
第 23 条 司法审查
国内立法包含反补贴税措施规定的每一成员均应设有司法、仲裁或行政庭或程序,其目的特别包括迅速审查与最终裁定的行政行为有关、且属第 21 条范围内的对裁定的审查。此类法庭或程序应独立于负责所涉裁定或审查的主管机关,且应向参与行政程序及直接和间接受行政行为影响的所有利害关系方提供了解审查情况的机会。
第六部分:机构
第 24 条 补贴与反补贴措施委员会及附属机构
24.1 特此设立补贴与反补贴措施委员会,由每一成员的代表组成。委员会应选举自己的主席,每年应至少召开 2 次会议,或按本协定有关规定所设想的在任何成员请求下召开会议。委员会应履行本协定项下或各成员指定的职责,并应向各成员提供机会,就有关本协定的运用或促进其目标实现的任何事项进行磋商。WTO秘书处担任委员会的秘书处。
24.2 委员会可酌情设立附属机构。
24.3 委员会应设立由 5 名在补贴和贸易关系领域的资深独立人士组成的常设专家小组。专家将由委员会选举,每年更换其中 1 名。可请求常设专家小组按第 4 条第 5 款的规定,向专家组提供协助。委员会也可就任何补贴的存在和性质的问题寻求咨询意见。
24.4 任何成员均可征求常设专家小组的意见,小组可就该成员拟议实施的或当前维持的任何补贴的性质提供咨询意见。此类咨询意见属机密,不得在第 7 条下的程序中援引。
24.5 委员会及任何附属机构在行使其职能时,可向其认为适当的任何来源进行咨询和寻求信息。但是,委员会或附属机构在向一成员管辖范围内的一来源寻求此类信息之前,应通知所涉及的成员。
第七部分:通知和监督
第 25 条 通 知
25.1 各成员同意,在不损害GATT 1994 第 16 条第 1 款规定的情况下,其补贴通知应不迟于每年 6 月 30 日提交,且应符合第 2 款至第 6 款的规定。
25.2 各成员应通知在其领土内给予或维持的、按第 1 条第 1 款的规定且属第 2 条范围内的任何专向性补贴。
25.3 通知的内容应足够具体,以便其他成员能够评估贸易影响并了解所通知的补贴计划的运作情况。在这方面,在不损害有关补贴问卷(注 54)的内容和形式的情况下,各成员应保证其通知包含下列信息:
注 54:委员会应设立一工作组,以审议BISD9 册 193 至 194 页所载的问卷内容和形式。
(i)补贴的形式(即赠款、贷款、税收优惠等);
(ii)单位补贴量,在此点不可能提供的情况下,为用于该补贴的预算总额或年度预算额(如可能,可表明上一年平均单位补贴量);
(iii)政策目标和/或补贴的目的;
(iv)补贴的期限和/或所附任何其他时限;
(v)可据以评估补贴的贸易影响的统计数据。
25.4 如一通知中未涉及第 3 款中的具体要点,则应在该通知中提供说明。
25.5 如补贴给予特定产品或部门,则通知应按产品或部门编制。
25.6 如成员认为在其领土内不存在根据GATT 1994 第 16 条第 1 款和本协定需要作出通知的措施,则应将此情况以书面形式通知秘书处。
25.7 各成员认识到,关于一措施的通知并不预断该措施在GATT1994 和本协定项下的法律地位、在本协定项下的影响或措施本身的性质。
25.8 任何成员可随时提出书面请求,请求提供有关另一成员给予或维持的任何补贴的性质和范围的信息(包括第四部分所指的任何补贴),或请求说明一具体措施被视为不受通知要求约束的原因。
25.9 收到上述请求的成员应尽快和全面地提供此类信息,并应随时准备应请求向提出请求的成员提供额外信息。特别是,它们应提供足够详细的信息,以使其他成员能够评估其是否符合本协定的规定。任何认为此类信息未予提供的成员可提请委员会注意此事项。
25.10 认为另一成员的任何措施具有补贴作用而未依照GATT 1994 第 16 条和本条的规定作出通知的任何成员可提请该另一成员注意此事项。如被指控的补贴此后仍未迅速作出通知,则该成员自己可将被指控的所涉补贴提请委员会注意。
25.11 各成员应立刻通知委员会其对反补贴税采取的所有初步或最终行动。此类报告应可从秘书处获得,供其他成员检查。各成员还应每半年提交关于在过去 6 个月内采取的任何反补贴税行动的报告。半年期报告应以议定的标准格式提交。
25.12 每一成员应通知委员会:(a)哪一个主管机关负责发起和进行第 11 条所指的调查,及(b)适用于发起和进行此类调查的国内程序。
第 26 条 监 督
26.1 委员会应在 3 年一届的特别会议上审议根据GATT 1994 第 16 条第 1 款和本协定第 25 条第 1 款提交的新的和全面的通知。在两届特别会议之间提交的通知(更新通知)应在委员会的每次例会上审议。
26.2 委员会应在每次例会上审议根据第 25 条第 11 款提交的报告。
第八部分:发展中国家成员
第 27 条 发展中国家成员的特殊和差别待遇
27.1 各成员认识到,补贴可在发展中国家成员的经济发展计划中发挥重要作用。
27.2 第 3 条第 1 款(a)项规定的禁止不得适用于:
(a)附件 7 所指的发展中国家成员。
(b)其他发展中国家成员自《WTO协定》生效之日起 8 年内不适用,但需符合
第 4 款的规定。
27.3 第 3 条第 1 款(b)项规定的禁止自《WTO协定》生效之日起 5 年内不得适用于发展中国家成员,8 年内不得适用于最不发达国家成员。
27.4 第 2 款(b)项所指的任何发展中国家成员应在 8 年期限内逐步取消其出口补贴,最好以渐进的方式进行。但是,一发展中国家成员不得提高其出口补贴的水平(注 55),且在此类出口补贴的使用与其发展需要不一致时,应在短于本款规定的期限内取消。如一发展中国家成员认为有必要在 8 年期满后继续实施此类补贴,则应在不迟于期满前 1 年与委员会进行磋商,委员会应在审查所涉发展中国家成员的所有有关经济、财政和发展需要后,确定延长该期限是合理。如委员会认为延期合理,则有关发展中国家
成员应与委员会进行年度磋商,以确定维持该补贴的必要性。如委员会未作出该确定,则该发展中国家成员应自最近一次授权期限结束后 2 年内逐步取消剩余的出口补贴。
注 55:对于截至《WTO协定》生效时未给予出口补贴的发展中国家,该款应在 1986年给予的出口补贴水平上适用。
27.5 如一发展中国家的任何特定产品已达到出口竞争力,则该发展中国家成员应在 2 年内取消给予此项或此类产品的出口补贴。但是,对于附件 7 所指的、且一项或多项产品已达到出口竞争力的发展中国家成员,应在 8 年内逐步取消对此类产品的出口补贴。
27.6 如一发展中国家成员一产品的出口连续 2 个日历年在该产品世界贸易中达到至少 3.25%的份额,则该产品已具备出口竞争力。确定具备出口竞争力应依据(a)达到出口竞争力的发展中国家成员所作通知,或(b)秘书处在任何成员请求下进行的计算。就本款而言,一产品被定义为协调制度税则中的一类。委员会应在《WTO协定》生效之日起 5 年后审议本规定的运用情况。
27.7 在出口补贴符合第 2 款至第 5 款规定的情况下,第 4 条的规定不得适用于发展中国家成员。与这种情况下适用的规定应为第 7 条的规定。
27.8 不得按照第 6 条第 1 款推定一发展中国家成员给予的补贴造成按本协定规定的严重侵害。此类严重侵害,如在第 9 款的条件下适用,应依照第 6 条第 3 款至第 8 款的规定以肯定性证据加以证明。
27.9 对于一发展中国家给予或维持的、不同于第 6 条第 1 款所指补贴的可诉补贴,除非被认定由于该补贴而使GATT 1994 项下的关税减让或其他义务的利益丧失或减损,从而取代或阻碍另一成员的同类产品进入补贴发展中国家成员的市场,或除非发生对进口成员市场中国内产业的损害,否则不得根据第 7 条授权或采取措施。
27.10 有关主管机关在确定下列内容后,应立即终止对原产自发展中国家成员产品进行的任何反补贴税调查:
(a)对所涉产品给予补贴的总体水平不超过按单位计算的价值的 2%;或
(b)补贴进口产品的数量占进口成员同类产品总进口量的不足 4%,除非来自单个发展中国家成员的进口量份额虽不足总进口量的 4%,但这些成员的总进口量占进口成员同类产品总进口量的 9%以上。
27.11 对于属第 2 款(b)项范围内的、且在自《WTO协定》生效之日起 8 年期满之前已取消出口补贴的发展中国家成员,以及对于附件 7 所指的发展中国家成员,第 10 款(a)项中的数字应为 3%而非 2%。此规定应自通知委员会取消出口补贴之日起适用,且只要作出通知的成员不再给予出口补贴即继续适用。此规定自《WTO协定》生效之日起 8 年后失效。
27.12 第 10 款和第 11 款的规定适用于根据第 15 条第 3 款对微量补贴的任何确定。
27.13 如补贴在发展中国家成员的私有化计划内给予或与该计划有直接联系,则第三部分的规定不得适用于债务的直接免除及用于支付社会成本的无论何种形式的补贴,包括放弃政府税收和其他债务转移,只要该计划和涉及的补贴在有限期限内给予,并已通知委员会,且该计划使有关企业最终实现私有化。
27.14 应一有利害关系的成员请求,委员会应对一发展中国家成员的特定出口补贴做法进行审议,以审查该做法是否符合其发展需要。
27.15 应一有利害关系的发展中国家成员请求,委员会应对一特定反补贴措施进行审议,以审查该措施是否符合适用于所涉发展中国家成员的第 10 款和第 11 款的规定。
第九部分:过渡性安排
第 28 条 现有计划
28.1 任何成员在签署《WTO协定》之前,在其领土内制定的、与本协定规定不一致的补贴计划应:
(a)在《WTO协定》对该成员生效之日起 90 天内通知委员会;并
(b)在《WTO协定》对该成员生效之日起 3 年内使该补贴计划符合本协定的规定,届时将无需遵守第二部分的规定。
28.2 任何成员不得扩大任何此类计划的范围,此类计划在期满后不得展期。第 29 条 转型为市场经济
29.1 处于自中央计划经济转型为市场和自由企业经济的成员可实施此种转型所必需的计划和措施。
29.2 对于此类成员,属第 3 条范围的、且根据第 3 款作出通知的补贴应在《WT O协定》生效之日起 7 年内逐步取消或使其符合第 3 条的规定。在此种情况下,不得适用第 4 条的规定。此外,在该期限内:
(a)属第 6 条第 1 款(d)项范围内的补贴计划不得根据第 7 条列为可诉补贴;
(b)对于其他可诉补贴,应适用第 27 条第 9 款的规定。
29.3 属第 3 条范围的补贴计划应在《WTO协定》生效之日后可行的最早日期通知委员会。关于此类补贴的进一步通知可最迟于《WTO协定》生效之日后 2 年作出。
29.4 在特殊情况下,可允许第 1 款所指的成员偏离其作出通知的补贴计划和措施以及委员会确定的时限,如此类背离被视为属转型过程所必需的。
第十部分:争端解决
第 30 条
由《争端解决谅解》详述和适用的GATT 1994 第 22 条和第 23 条应适用于本协定项下的磋商和争端解决,除非本协定另有具体规定。
第十一部分:最后条款
第 31 条 临时适用
第 6 条第 1 款的规定及第 8 条和第 9 条的规定应自《WTO协定》生效之日起适用 5
年。委员会将在不迟于该期限结束前 180 天审议这些规定的运用情况,以期确定是否延长其适用,或是按目前起草的形式延长或是按修改后的形式延长。
第 32 条 其他最后条款
32.1 除依照由本协定解释的GATT 1994 的规定外,不得针对另一成员的补贴采取具体行动。(注 56)
注 56:本款无意排除根据GATT 1994 的其他有关规定酌情采取行动。
32.2 未经其他成员同意,不得对本协定的任何规定提出保留。
32.3 在遵守第 4 款规定的前提下,本协定的规定应适用于根据在《WTO协定》对一成员生效之日或之后提出的申请而发起的调查和对现有措施的审查。
32.4 就第 21 条第 3 款而言,现有反补贴措施应被视为在不迟于《WTO协定》对其生效之日起的一日期实施,除非一成员在该日有效的国内立法中已包括该款规定类型的条款。
32.5 每一成员应采取所有必要的一般或特殊步骤,在不迟于《WTO协定》对其生效之日,使其法律、法规和行政程序符合可能对所涉成员适用的本协定的规定。
32.6 每一成员应将与本协定有关的法律和法规的任何变更情况以及此类法律和法规管理方面的变更情况通知委员会。
32.7 委员会应每年审议本协定的执行和运用情况,同时考虑本协定的目标。委员会应每年将此类审议所涉期间的发展情况通知货物贸易理事会。
32.8 本协定的附件为本协定的组成部分。附件 1 出口补贴例示清单
(a)政府视出口实绩对一公司或一产业提供的直接补贴。
(b)涉及出口奖励的货币保留方案或任何类似做法。
(c)政府提供或授权的对出口装运货物征收的内部运输和货运费用,条件优于给予国内装运货物的条件。
(d)由政府或其代理机构直接或间接通过政府授权的方案提供在生产出口货物中使用的进口或国产品或服务,条款或条件优于给予为生产供国内消费货物所提供的同类或直接竞争产品或服务的条款或条件,如(就产品而言)此类条款或条件优于其出口商在世界市场中商业上可获得的(注 57)条款或条件。
注 57:“商业上可获得的”的措辞指在选择国产品和进口产品方面无限制,仅取决于商业考虑。
(e)全部或部分免除、减免或递延工业或商业企业已付或应付的、专门与出口产品有关的直接税(注 58)或社会福利费用。(注 59)
注 58:就本协定同而言:
“直接税”一词指对工资、利润、利息、租金、专利权使用费及其他形式的收入所征收的税,及对不动产所有权征收的税;
“进口费用”一词指关税和本注释其他部分未列举的对进口产品征收的其他财务税
收;
“间接税”一词指对销售税、消费税、营业税、增值税、特许税、印花税、转让税、存货税、设备税、边境税以及除直接税和进口费用外的所有税;
“前阶段”间接税指对直接或间接用于制造产品的货物或服务所征收的税;
“累积”间接税指在一生产阶段应征税的货物或服务用于下一生产阶段的情况下,在缺乏后续计税机制时征收的多级税;
“减免”税包括退税;
“减免或退税”包括全部或部分减免或递延进口费用。
注 59:各成员认识到,递延的金额不必等于出口补贴,例如在收取适当的利息费用的情况下。各成员重申如下原则:出口企业和受其控制或受共同控制的外国购买者之间交易货物的价格,为征税目的,应为在活动无关联的独立企业间收取的价格。任何成员可提请另一成员注意可能违背此原则且在出口交易中可使直接税大量节省的行政或其他做法。在这类情况下,各成员通常应努力尝试利用现有双边税收条约或其他专门国际机制的便利,解决它们之间的分歧,同时不损害各成员在GATT 1994 项下的权利和义务,包括在前句中创设的磋商权利。
(e)款无意限制一成员采取措施避免对其企业或另一成员企业所获国外来源的收入进行双重征税。
(f)在计算直接税的征税基础时,与出口产品或出口实绩直接相关的特殊扣除备抵超过给予供国内消费的生产的特殊扣除备抵。
(g)对于出口产品的生产和分销,间接税(注 58)的免除或减免超过对于销售供国内消费的同类产品的生产和分销所征收的间接税。
注 58:就本协定同而言:
“直接税”一词指对工资、利润、利息、租金、专利权使用费及其他形式的收入所征收的税,及对不动产所有权征收的税;
“进口费用”一词指关税和本注释其他部分未列举的对进口产品征收的其他财务税
收;
“间接税”一词指对销售税、消费税、营业税、增值税、特许税、印花税、转让税、存货税、设备税、边境税以及除直接税和进口费用外的所有税;
“前阶段”间接税指对直接或间接用于制造产品的货物或服务所征收的税;
“累积”间接税指在一生产阶段应征税的货物或服务用于下一生产阶段的情况下,在缺乏后续计税机制时征收的多级税;
“减免”税包括退税;
“减免或退税”包括全部或部分减免或递延进口费用。
(h)对用于生产出口产品的货物或服务所征收的前阶段累积间接税(注 58)的免除、减免或递延超过对用于生产国内消费的同类产品的货物或服务所征收的前阶段累积间接税(注 58)的免除、减免或递延;但是如前阶段累积间接税是对生产出口产品过程中消耗的投入物所征收的(扣除正常损耗),则即使当同类产品销售供国内消费时前阶段累积间接税不予免除、减免或递延,对出口产品征收的前阶段累积间接税也可予免除、减免或递延。(注 60)本项应依照附件 2 中的关于生产过程中投入物消耗的准则予以解释。
注 58:就本协定同而言:
“直接税”一词指对工资、利润、利息、租金、专利权使用费及其他形式的收入所征收的税,及对不动产所有权征收的税;
“进口费用”一词指关税和本注释其他部分未列举的对进口产品征收的其他财务税
收;
“间接税”一词指对销售税、消费税、营业税、增值税、特许税、印花税、转让税、存货税、设备税、边境税以及除直接税和进口费用外的所有税;
“前阶段”间接税指对直接或间接用于制造产品的货物或服务所征收的税;
“累积”间接税指在一生产阶段应征税的货物或服务用于下一生产阶段的情况下,在缺乏后续计税机制时征收的多级税;
“减免”税包括退税;
“减免或退税”包括全部或部分减免或递延进口费用。
注 60:(h)款不适用于增值税和代替增值税的边境税调节;对增值税的超额减免问题全部涵盖在(g)款的规定中。
(i)对进口费用的减免或退还(注 58)超过对生产出口产品过程中消耗的进口投入物所收取的进口费用(扣除正常损耗);但是,在特殊情况下,如进口和相应的出口营业发生在不超过 2 年的合理期限内,则一公司为从本规定中获益,可使用与进口投入物
的数量、质量和特点均相同的国内市场投入物作为替代。此点应依照附件 2 中的关于生
产过程中投入物消耗的准则和附件 3 中的关于确定替代退税制度为出口补贴的准则予以解释。
注 58:就本协定同而言:
“直接税”一词指对工资、利润、利息、租金、专利权使用费及其他形式的收入所征收的税,及对不动产所有权征收的税;
“进口费用”一词指关税和本注释其他部分未列举的对进口产品征收的其他财务税
收;
“间接税”一词指对销售税、消费税、营业税、增值税、特许税、印花税、转让税、存货税、设备税、边境税以及除直接税和进口费用外的所有税;
“前阶段”间接税指对直接或间接用于制造产品的货物或服务所征收的税;
“累积”间接税指在一生产阶段应征税的货物或服务用于下一生产阶段的情况下,在缺乏后续计税机制时征收的多级税;
“减免”税包括退税;
“减免或退税”包括全部或部分减免或递延进口费用。
(j)政府(或政府控制的特殊机构)提供的出口信贷担保或保险计划、针对出口产品成本增加或外汇风险计划的保险或担保计划,保险费率不足以弥补长期营业成本和计划的亏损。
(k)政府(或政府控制的和/或根据政府授权活动的特殊机构)给予的出口信贷,利率低于它们使用该项资金所实际应付的利率(或如果它们为获得相同偿还期和其他信贷条件且与出口信贷货币相同的资金而从国际资本市场借入时所应付的利率),或它们支付的出口商或其他金融机构为获得信贷所产生的全部或部分费用,只要这些费用保证在出口信贷方面能获得实质性的优势。
但是,如一成员属一官方出口信贷的国际承诺的参加方,且截至 1979 年 1 月 1 日至少有 12 个本协定创始成员属该国际承诺的参加方(或创始成员所通过的后续承诺),或如果一成员实施相关承诺的利率条款,则符合这些条款的出口信贷做法不得视为本协定所禁止的出口补贴。
(l)对构成GATT 1994 第 16 条意义上的出口补贴的官方账户收取的任何其他费用。
附件 2 关于生产过程中投入物消耗的准则(注 61)
注 61:生产过程中消耗的投入物为生产过程中使用的物理结合的投入物、能源、燃料和油以及在用以获得出口产品过程中所消耗的催化剂。
一
1.间接税退还方案可允许免除、减免或递延对生产出口产品过程中消耗的投入物(扣除正常损耗)征收的前阶段累积间接税。同样,退税方案可允许对生产出口产品过程中消耗的投入物(扣除正常损耗)征收的进口费用进行减免或退税。
2.本协定附件 1 中的出口补贴例示清单的(h)款和(i)款中提及“在生产出口产品过程中消耗的投入物”的措辞。按照(h)款,间接税退还方案如果使前阶段累积间接税的免除、减免或递延超过对生产出口产品过程中消耗的投入物所实际征收的此类税,则构成出口补贴。按照(i)款,退税方案如果使进口费用的减免或退税超过对生产出口产品过程中消耗的投入物所实际征收的同类费用,则构成出口补贴。两款均规定在有关生产出口产品过程中消耗投入物的调查结果中必须考虑正常损耗。(i)款还规定在适当时的替代。
二
作为按照本协定进行的反补贴税调查的一部分,在审查投入物是否在生产出口产品过程中消耗时,调查主管机关应根据下列依据进行:
1.如一间接税退还方案或退税方案被指控因退还或退税超过对生产出口产品过程中消耗的投入物所征收的间接税或进口费用而授予补贴,则调查主管机关应首先确定出口成员政府是否已建立和实施用以确认生产出口产品过程中消耗的投入物种类和数量的制度或程序。如确定此类制度或程序已实施,则调查主管机关随后应审查该制度或程序,以确定其是否合理、是否对预期的目的有效以及是否依据出口国普遍接受的商业做法。调查主管机关可能认为有必要依照第 12 条第 6 款的规定进行某些实际检查,以核实信息或使自己确信该制度或程序正在得到有效实施。
2.如不存在此种制度或程序,或此种制度或程序不合理,或此种制度或程序虽已设立并被视为合理,但被视为未实施或虽实施但无效,则出口成员需要根据所涉及的实际投入物进行进一步审查,以确定是否发生超额支付。如调查主管机关认为有必要,则可依照第 1 款进行进一步审查。
3.如投入物用于生产过程且实际呈现在出口产品中,则调查主管机关应将此类投入物视为物理结合的投入物。各成员注意到,投入物在最终产品中存在的形态不必为其进入生产过程时的形态。
4.在确定生产出口产品过程中消耗的特定投入物的数量时,应考虑“扣除正常损耗”,且此种损耗应被视为在生产出口产品过程中消耗的。“损耗”一词指在生产过程中不发挥独立作用、不在生产出口产品过程中消耗(由于效率低等原因)且不能被同一制造商回收、使用或销售的特定投入物的一部分。
5.调查主管机关对关于要求的损耗扣除是否属“正常”的确定应酌情考虑生产工艺、出口国产业的一般经验以及其他技术因素。调查主管机关应记住的一个重要的问题是,如损耗的数量旨在包括在税收或关税退还或减免中,则出口成员的主管机关是否已经合理计算此种数量。
附件 3 关于确定替代退税制度为出口补贴的准则
一
对于在生产另一产品过程中消耗的投入物所征收的进口费用,如该产品的出口中包含与被替代的进口投入物相同质量和特点的国产投入物,则退税制度可允许对进口费用进行退还或退税。按照附件 1 中的出口补贴例示清单(i)款,替代退税制度如使进口费用的退税额超过最初对要求退税的进口投入物所收取的进口费用,则构成出口补贴。
二
作为按照本协定进行的反补贴税调查的一部分,在审查任何替代退税制度时,调查主管机关应根据下列依据进行:
1.出口补贴例示清单(i)款规定,国内市场的投入物可替代在生产供出口产品过程中的进口投入物,只要此类投入物与被替代的进口投入物在数量、质量和特点方面均相同。核实制度或程序的存在很重要,因为这样可使出口成员政府能够保证和证明要求退税的投入物数量不超过类似产品的出口数量,无论以何种形式,且对进口费用的退税不超过原来对所涉进口投入物征收的费用。
2.如替代退税制度被指控授予补贴,则调查主管机关应首先着手确定出口成员政府是否已建立和实施核实制度或程序。如确定此类制度或程序已实施,则调查主管机关随后应审查核实程序,以确定其是否合理、是否对预定目的有效以及是否依据出口国普遍接受的商业做法。如确定该程序符合此检查标准且有效实施,则不应认为存在补贴。调查主管机关可能认为有必要依照第 12 条第 6 款的规定进行某些实际的检查,以便核实信息或使自己确信核实程序正在得到有效实施。
3.如不存在核实程序,或此类程序不合理,或此类程序已设立并被视为是合理的,但被视为未实施或虽实施但无效,则可能存在补贴。在这类情况下,需要出口成员依据所涉及的实际交易进行进一步审查,以确定是否发生超额支付。如调查主管机关认为必要,则可依照第 2 款进行进一步审查。
4.对于存在允许出口商选择特定进口装运货物要求退税的替代退税规定本身,不应被视为授予补贴。
5.如政府对在其退税方案下任何退还的款项支付的利息在实付或应付利息的限度内,则被视为存在(i)款意义上的对进口费用的过量退税。
附件 4 从价补贴总额的计算(第 6 条第 1 款(a)项)(注 62)
注 62:对于本附件未作规定的事项或就第 6 条第 1 款(a)而言而需要进一步澄清的事项,各成员之间应在必要时达成谅解。
1.就第 6 条第 1 款(a)项而言而对补贴金额的任何计算应依据授予政府的费用进行。
2.除第 3 款至第 5 款的规定外,在确定总补贴率是否超过产品价值的 5%时,产品的价值应按接受补贴公司(注 63)在被给予补贴之前可获得销售数据的最近 12 个月的总销售额计算。(注 64)
注 63:接受补贴的公司应为提供补贴的成员领土内的一公司。
注 64:对于与税收有关的补贴,产品的价值应按接受补贴公司在获得与税收有关措施的财政年度内的总销售额计算。
3.如补贴与一特定产品的生产和销售联系在一起,则该产品的价值应按接受补贴公司在被给予补贴之前可获得数据的最近 12 个月的总销售额计算。
4.在接受补贴公司处于投产状态的情况下,如总补贴率超过投资资金总额的 15%,即被视为存在严重侵害。就本款而言,投产期将不超过生产的第一年。(注 65)
注 65:投产状态包括已作出产品开发的财政承诺或已建设用于制造从补贴中获益产品的设施,尽管生产还未开始。
5.如接受补贴公司位于一经济通货膨胀的国家中,则该产品的价值应按给予补贴的月份之前 12 个月内发生的通货膨胀率调整的前一日历年的总销售额(如补贴与销售联系在一起,则为有关产品的销售额)计算。
6.在确定一给定年度的总补贴率时,应综合计算一成员领土内在不同计划下、由不同主管机关给予的补贴。
7.在《WTO协定》生效之日前给予的、且利益分配给未来生产的补贴应计入总补贴率。
8.根据本协定有关规定属不可诉的补贴不得计入就第 6 条第 1 款(a)项而言所进行的补贴金额的计算中。
附件 5 搜集关于严重侵害的信息的程序
1.在搜集供专家组根据第 7 条第 4 款至第 6 款规定的程序审查的证据时,每个成员
应进行合作。第 7 条第 4 款的规定一经援引,争端各方和任何有关第三国成员即应通知 DSB其领土内负责管理此规定的组织和用于应答提供信息请求的程序。
2.在根据第 7 条第 4 款将有关事项提交DSB的情况下,应请求,DSB应开始有关程序,自给予补贴成员的政府获得确定补贴的存在和金额、接受补贴企业的总销售额以及分析补贴产品所造成的不利影响所必需的信息。(注 66)在适当时,该程序可包括向给予补贴成员的政府和起诉成员的政府提出问题以收集信息,以及通过第七部分所列通知程序,澄清和获得争端各方可获得的对信息的详细说明。(注 67)
注 66:在需要证明存在严重侵害的情况下。
注 67:DSB的信息收集过程应考虑保护属机密性质的信息、或由该过程所涉及的任何成员以保密条件提供的信息。
3.关于对第三国市场的影响,一争端方可收集信息,包括通过向第三国成员政府提出分析不利影响所必要的问题,这些信息以其他方式无法自起诉成员或补贴成员处合理获得。此请求的管理不应以给第三国成员带来不合理负担的方式进行。特别是,不应期望此类成员专门为此目的而进行市场或价格分析。拟提供的信息为该成员现有的或可容
易获得的信息(例如,有关统计机构已经收集但尚未公布的最新统计数字,有关进口产品和有关产品申报价值的海关数据等)。但是,如一争端方自费进行详细的市场分析,则第三国成员的主管机关应便利此人或该公司进行此项分析,且应给予此人或公司获得该成员政府通常情况下不予保密的所有信息的机会。
4.DSB应指定一名代表负责便利信息收集过程。该代表的惟一目的为保证迅速搜集便利随后对争端进行的多边审议所必需的信息。特别是,该代表可提出有关收集必要信息的最有效方法的建议,以及鼓励各方进行合作。
5.第 2 款至第 4 款略述的信息收集程序应在根据第 7 条第 4 款将此事项提交DSB后60 天内完成。在此过程中获得的信息应提交DSB依照第十部分的规定设立的专家组。此信息应特别包括有关所涉补贴的金额的数据(且在适当时,接受补贴公司的总销售额)、补贴产品的价格、无补贴产品的价格、市场中其他供应商的价格、对所涉市场供应补贴产品的变化以及市场份额的变化。此信息还应包括反驳的证据,以及专家组认为在形成其结论过程中有关的补充信息。
6.如给予补贴的成员和/或第三国成员未能在信息收集过程中进行合作,则起诉成员可依据其可获得的证据,将此严重侵害案件与给予补贴成员和/或第三国成员不合作的事实和情况一并提起申诉。如由于给予补贴成员和/或第三国成员的不予合作而无法获得信息,则专家组可依靠从其他方面获得的最佳信息完成必要的记录。
7.专家组在作出确定时,应从信息收集过程所涉及的任何一方不予合作的事例作出反向推断。
8.专家组在使用可获得的最佳信息或反向推断作出确定时,应考虑根据第 4 款任命的DSB代表对任何提供信息请求的合理性及各方以合作和及时的态度应答这些请求所作努力的建议。
9.信息收集过程不得限制专家组寻求其认为对正确解决争端所必需的额外信息的能力,这些信息在该过程中未得到充分寻求或搜集。但是,如额外信息可支持特定一方的立场且记录中缺乏此类信息是由于该方在收集信息过程中不合理地不进行合作所造成的,则专家组通常不应要求此类信息以完成记录。
附件 6 根据第 12 条第 6 款进行实地调查的程序
1.在发起调查后,应将进行实地调查的意向通知出口成员的主管机关和已知的有关公司。
2.如在特殊情况下,有意在调查组中包含非政府专家,则应将此通知出口成员的公司和主管机关。此类非政府专家如违反保密要求,应受到有效处罚。
3.标准做法应为,在访问最终确定之前,应获得出口成员中有关公司的明确同意。
4.一经获得有关公司的同意,调查主管机关即应将准备访问的公司名称和地址以及商定的日期通知出口成员的主管机关。
5.在进行访问之前,应向所涉公司作出充分的预先通知。
6.对于解释问卷的访问,只应在出口公司提出请求后进行。此种访问只有在(a)进口成员的主管机关通知所涉成员的代表和(b)后者不反对该访问的情况下进行。
7.由于实地调查的主要目的是核实所提供的信息或获得进一步的细节,因此应在收到对问卷的答复之后进行,除非该公司同意相反的做法,且调查主管机关已将预期的访问通知出口成员政府,而后者不持异议;此外,实地调查的标准做法应为,在访问之前告知有关公司需要核实信息的一般性质和需要提供的任何进一步信息,但是此点不应排除根据所获信息当场提出提供进一步细节的请求。
8.出口成员的主管机关或公司提出的对成功进行实地调查所必要的询问或问题,只要可能,均应在访问前作出答复。
附件 7 第 27 条第 2 款(a)项所指的发展中国家成员
根据第 27 条第 2 款(a)项的条款,无需遵守第 3 条第 1 款(a)项规定的发展中国家成员为:
(a)联合国指定为最不发达国家的WTO成员。
(b)下列属发展中国家之列的WTO成员在人均年国民生产总值已达到 1000 美元时,根据第 27 条第 2 款(b)项的规定,应适用对其他发展中国家成员适用的规定(注 68):玻利维亚、喀麦隆、刚果(布)、科特迪瓦、多米尼加共和国、埃及、xx、危地马拉、圭亚那、印度、印度尼西亚、肯尼亚、摩洛哥、尼加拉瓜、尼日利亚、巴基斯坦、菲律宾、塞内加尔、斯里兰卡和津巴布韦。
注 68:将发展中国家列入(b)款的清单中的依据为世界银行关于人均国民生产总值的最新数据。
AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
ANNEX 1A OF ANNEX 1 OF MARRAKESH AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLDTRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
Members hereby agree as follows:
PART I: GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1 Definition of a Subsidy
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within
the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as "government"), i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits) (Notes 1);
Notes 1: In accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of GATT 1994 (Note to Article XVI) and the provisions of Annexes I through III of this Agreement, the exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments;
or
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994;
and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
1.2 A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II or shall be subject to the provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is specific in accordance with the provisions of Article 2.
Article 2 Specificity
2.1 In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1, is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to in this Agreement as "certain enterprises") within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the
following principles shall apply:
(a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific.
(b) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions (Notes 2) governing the
eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to. The criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of
verification.
Notes 2: Objective criteria or conditions, as used herein, mean criteria or conditions which are neutral, which do not favour certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as number of employees or size of enterprise.
(c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may be considered. Such factors are: use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy. (Notes 3). In applying this subparagraph, account shall be taken of the extent of diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the length of time during which the
subsidy programme has been in operation.
Notes 3: In this regard, in particular, information on the frequency with which applications for a subsidy are refused or approved and the reasons for such decisions shall be considered.
2.2 A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be specific. It is understood that the setting or change of generally applicable tax rates by all levels of government entitled to do so shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the purposes of this Agreement.
2.3 Any subsidy falling under the provisions of Article 3 shall be deemed to be specific.
2.4 Any determination of specificity under the provisions of this Article shall be clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence.
PART II: PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES
Article 3 Prohibition
3.1 Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited:
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact (Notes 4), whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I (Notes 5);
Notes 4: This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision.
Notes 5: Measures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall not be prohibited under this or any other provision of
this Agreement.
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.
3.2 A Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to in paragraph 1. Article 4 Remedies
4.1 Whenever a Member has reason to believe that a prohibited subsidy is being granted or maintained by another Member, such Member may request consultations with such other Member.
4.2 A request for consultations under paragraph 1 shall include a statement of available evidence with regard to the existence and nature of the subsidy in question.
4.3 Upon request for consultations under paragraph 1, the Member believed to be granting or maintaining the subsidy in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as possible. The purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually agreed solution.
4.4 If no mutually agreed solution has been reached within 30 days (Notes 6) of the request for consultations, any Member party to such consultations may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") for the immediate establishment of a panel, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel.
Notes 6: Any time periods mentioned in this Article may be extended by mutual agreement.
4.5 Upon its establishment, the panel may request the assistance of the Permanent Group of Experts (Notes 7) (referred to in this Agreement as the "PGE") with regard to whether the measure in question is a prohibited subsidy. If so requested, the PGE shall immediately review the evidence with regard to the existence and nature of the measure in question and shall provide an opportunity for the Member applying or maintaining the measure to demonstrate that the measure in question is not a prohibited subsidy. The PGE shall report its conclusions to the panel within a time-limit determined by the panel. The PGE's conclusions on the issue of whether or not the
measure in question is a prohibited subsidy shall be accepted by the panel without modification.
Notes 7: As established in Article 24.
4.6 The panel shall submit its final report to the parties to the dispute. The report shall be circulated to all Members within 90 days of the date of the composition and the establishment of the panel's terms of reference.
4.7 If the measure in question is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the panel shall recommend that the subsidizing Member withdraw the subsidy without delay. In this regard, the panel shall specify in its recommendation the time period within which the measure must be withdrawn.
4.8 Within 30 days of the issuance of the panel's report to all Members, the report shall be adopted by the DSB unless one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.
4.9 Where a panel report is appealed, the Appellate Body shall issue its decision within 30 days from the date when the party to the dispute formally notifies its intention to appeal. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 30 days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings exceed 60 days. The appellate report shall be
adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the appellate report within 20 days following its issuance to the Members. (Notes 8)
Notes 8: If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose.
4.10 In the event the recommendation of the DSB is not followed within the time-period specified by the panel, which shall commence from the date of adoption of the panel's report or the Appellate Body's report, the DSB shall grant authorization to the complaining Member to take appropriate (Notes 9) countermeasures, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.
Notes 9: This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited.
4.11 In the event a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), the arbitrator shall determine whether the countermeasures are
appropriate. (Notes 10)
Notes 10: This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited.
4.12 For purposes of disputes conducted pursuant to this Article, except for time-periods specifically prescribed in this Article, time-periods applicable under the DSU for the conduct of such disputes shall be half the time prescribed therein.
PART III: ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES
Article 5 Adverse Effects
No Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.:
(a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member (Notes 11);
Notes 11: The term "injury to the domestic industry" is used here in the same sense as it is used in Part V .
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994 (Notes 12);
Notes 12: The term "nullification or impairment" is used in this Agreement in the same sense as it is used in the relevant provisions of GATT 1994, and the existence of such nullification or impairment shall be established in accordance with the practice of application of these provisions.
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member. (Notes 13)
Notes 13: The term "serious prejudice to the interests of another Member" is used in this Agreement in the same sense as it is used in paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994, and includes threat of serious prejudice.
This Article does not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural products as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
Article 6 Serious Prejudice
6.1 Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 shall be deemed to exist in the case of:
(a) the total ad valorem subsidization (Notes 14) of a product exceeding 5 per cent (Notes 15);
Notes 14: The total ad valorem subsidization shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex IV.
Notes 15: Since it is anticipated that civil aircraft will be subject to specific multilateral rules, the threshold in this subparagraph does not apply to civil aircraft.
(b) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an industry;
(c) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an enterprise, other than one-time measures which are non-recurrent and cannot be repeated for that enterprise and which are given merely to provide time for the development of long-term solutions and to avoid acute social problems;
(d) direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. forgiveness of government-held debt, and grants to cover debt repayment. (Notes 16)
Notes 16: Members recognize that where royalty-based financing for a civil aircraft programme is not being fully repaid due to the level of actual sales falling below the level of forecast sales, this does not in itself constitute serious prejudice for the purposes of this subparagraph.
6.2 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, serious prejudice shall not be found if the subsidizing Member demonstrates that the subsidy in question has not resulted in any of the effects enumerated in paragraph 3.
6.3 Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise in any case where one or several of the following apply:
(a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing
Member;
(b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like product of another Member from a third country market;
(c) the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market;
(d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product or commodity (Notes 17) as compared to the average share it had during the previous period of three years and this increase follows a consistent trend over a period when subsidies have been granted.
Notes 17: Unless other multilaterally agreed specific rules apply to the trade in the product or commodity in question.
6.4 For the purpose of paragraph 3(b), the displacement or impeding of exports shall include any case in which, subject to the provisions of paragraph 7, it has been demonstrated that there has been a change in relative shares of the market to the disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product (over an appropriately representative period sufficient to demonstrate clear trends in the development of the market for the product concerned, which, in normal circumstances, shall be at least one year). "Change in relative shares of the market" shall include any of
the following situations: (a) there is an increase in the market share of the subsidized product; (b) the market share of the subsidized product remains constant in circumstances in which, in the absence of the subsidy, it would have declined; (c) the market share of the subsidized product declines, but at a slower rate than would have been the case in the absence of the subsidy.
6.5 For the purpose of paragraph 3(c), price undercutting shall include any case in which such price undercutting has been demonstrated through a comparison of prices of the subsidized product with prices of a non-subsidized like product supplied to the same market. The comparison shall be made at the same level of trade and at comparable times, due account being taken of any other factor affecting price comparability. However, if such a direct comparison is not possible, the existence of price undercutting may be demonstrated on the basis of export unit values.
6.6 Each Member in the market of which serious prejudice is alleged to have arisen shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Annex V , make available to the parties to a dispute arising under Article 7, and to the panel established pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 7, all relevant information that can be obtained as to the changes in market shares of the parties to the dispute as well as concerning prices of the products involved.
6.7 Displacement or impediment resulting in serious prejudice shall not arise under paragraph 3 where any of the following circumstances exist (Notes 18) during the relevant period:
Notes 18: The fact that certain circumstances are referred to in this paragraph does not, in itself, confer upon them any legal status in terms of either GATT 1994or this Agreement. These circumstances must not be isolated, sporadic or otherwise insignificant.
(a) prohibition or restriction on exports of the like product from the complaining Member or on imports from the complaining Member into the third-country market concerned;
(b) decision by an importing government operating a monopoly of trade or state trading in the product concerned to shift, for non-commercial reasons, imports from the complaining Member to another country or countries;
(c) natural disasters, strikes, transport disruptions or other force majeure substantially affecting production, qualities, quantities or prices of the product available for export from the complaining Member;
(d) existence of arrangements limiting exports from the complaining Member;
(e) voluntary decrease in the availability for export of the product concerned from the complaining Member (including, inter alia, a situation where firms in the complaining Member have been autonomously reallocating exports of this product to new markets);
(f) failure to conform to standards and other regulatory requirements in the importing country.
6.8 In the absence of circumstances referred to in paragraph 7, the existence of serious prejudice should be determined on the basis of the information submitted to or obtained by the panel, including information submitted in accordance with the provisions of Annex X .
6.9 This Article does not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural products as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
Article 7 Remedies
7.1 Except as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture, whenever a Member has reason to believe that any subsidy referred to in Article 1, granted or maintained by another Member,results in injury to its domestic industry, nullification or impairment or serious prejudice, such Member may request consultations with such other Member.
7.2 A request for consultations under paragraph 1 shall include a statement of available evidence with regard to (a) the existence and nature of the subsidy in question, and (b) the injury caused to the domestic industry, or the nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice (Notes 19) caused to the interests of the Member requesting consultations.
Notes 19: In the event that the request relates to a subsidy deemed to result in serious prejudice in terms of paragraph 1 of Article 6, the available evidence of serious prejudice may be limited to the available evidence as to whether the conditions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 have been met or not.
7.3 Upon request for consultations under paragraph 1, the Member believed to be granting or maintaining the subsidy practice in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as possible. The purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually agreed solution.
7.4 If consultations do not result in a mutually agreed solution within 60 days (Notes 20), any Member party to such consultations may refer the matter to the DSB for the establishment of a panel, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel. The composition of the panel and its terms of reference shall be established within 15 days from the date when it is established.
Notes 20: Any time periods mentioned in this Article may be extended by mutual agreement.
7.5 The panel shall review the matter and shall submit its final report to the parties to the dispute. The report shall be circulated to all Members within 120 days of the date of the composition and establishment of the panel's terms of reference.
7.6 Within 30 days of the issuance of the panel's report to all Members, the report shall be adopted by the DSB (Notes 21) unless one of the parties to the dispute
formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.
Notes 21: If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose.
7.7 Where a panel report is appealed, the Appellate Body shall issue its decision within 60 days from the date when the party to the dispute formally notifies its intention to appeal. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60 days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days. The appellate report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the appellate report within 20 days following its issuance to the Members. (Notes 22)
Notes 22: If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose.
7.8 Where a panel report or an Appellate Body report is adopted in which it is determined that any subsidy has resulted in adverse effects to the interests of another Member within the meaning of Article 5, the Member granting or maintaining such subsidy shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or shall withdraw the subsidy.
7.9 In the event the Member has not taken appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects of the subsidy or withdraw the subsidy within six months from the date when the DSB adopts the panel report or the Appellate Body report, and in the absence of agreement on compensation, the DSB shall grant authorization to the complaining Member to take countermeasures, commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.
7.10 In the event that a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the DSU, the arbitrator shall determine whether the countermeasures are commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist.
PART IV: NON-ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES
Article 8 Identification of Non-Actionable Subsidies
8.1 The following subsidies shall be considered as non-actionable (Notes 23):
Notes 23: It is recognized that government assistance for various purposes is widely provided by Members and that the mere fact that such assistance may not
qualify for non-actionable treatment under the provisions of this Article does not in itself restrict the ability of Members to provide such assistance.
(a) subsidies which are not specific within the meaning of Article 2;
(b) subsidies which are specific within the meaning of Article 2 but which meet all of the conditions provided for in paragraphs 2 (a), 2 (b) or 2 (c) below.
8.2 Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V , the following subsidies shall be non-actionable:
(a) assistance for research activities conducted by firms or by higher education or research establishments on a contract basis with firms if: (Notes 24, 25, 26)
Notes 24: Since it is anticipated that civil aircraft will be subject to specific multilateral rules, the provisions of this subparagraph do not apply to that product.
Notes 25: Not later than 18 months after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures provided for in Article 24 (referred to in this Agreement as "the Committee") shall review the operation of the provisions of subparagraph 2(a) with a view to making all necessary modifications to improve the operation of these provisions. In its consideration of possible modifications, the Committee shall carefully review the definitions of the categories set forth in this subparagraph in the light of the experience of Members in the operation of research programmes and the work in other relevant international institutions.
Notes 26: The provisions of this Agreement do not apply to fundamental research activities independently conducted by higher education or research establishments. The term "fundamental research" means an enlargement of general scientific and technical knowledge not linked to industrial or commercial objectives.
the assistance covers (Notes 27) not more than 75 per cent of the costs of industrial research (Notes 28) or 50 per cent of the costs of pre-competitive development activity (Notes 29, 30);
Notes 27: The allowable levels of non-actionable assistance referred to in this subparagraph shall be established by reference to the total eligible costs incurred over the duration of an individual project.
Notes 28: The term "industrial research" means planned search or critical investigation aimed at discovery of new knowledge, with the objective that such knowledge may be useful in developing new products,processes or services, or in bringing about a significant improvement to existing products, processes or services.
Notes 29: The term "pre-competitive development activity" means the translation of industrial research findings into a plan, blueprint or design for new, modified or improved products, processes or services whether intended for sale or use, including the creation of a first prototype which would not be capable of commercial use. It may
further include the conceptual formulation and design of products, processes or services alternatives and initial demonstration or pilot projects,
provided that these same projects cannot be converted or used for industrial application or commercial exploitation. It does not include routine or periodic alterations to existing products, production lines, manufacturing processes, services, and other on-going operations even though those alterations may represent improvements.
Notes 30: In the case of programmes which span industrial research and pre-competitive development activity, the allowable level of non-actionable assistance shall not exceed the simple average of the allowable levels of non-actionable assistance applicable to the above two categories, calculated on the basis of all eligible costs as set forth in items (i) to (v) of this subparagraph.
and provided that such assistance is limited exclusively to:
(i) costs of personnel (researchers, technicians and other supporting staff employed exclusively in the research activity);
(ii) costs of instruments, equipment, land and buildings used exclusively and permanently (except when disposed of on a commercial basis) for the research activity;
(iii) costs of consultancy and equivalent services used exclusively for the research activity, including bought-in research, technical knowledge, patents, etc.;
(iv) additional overhead costs incurred directly as a result of the research activity;
(v) other running costs (such as those of materials, supplies and the like), incurred directly as a result of the research activity.
(b) assistance to disadvantaged regions within the territory of a Member given pursuant to a general framework of regional development (Notes 31) and non-specific (within the meaning of Article 2) within eligible regions provided that:
Notes 31: A "general framework of regional development" means that regional subsidy programmes are part of an internally consistent and generally applicable regional development policy and that regional development subsidies are not granted in isolated geographical points having no, or virtually no, influence on the development of a region.
(i) each disadvantaged region must be a clearly designated contiguous geographical area with a definable economic and administrative identity;
(ii) the region is considered as disadvantaged on the basis of neutral and objective criteria (Notes 32), indicating that the region's difficulties arise out of more than temporary circumstances; such criteria must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of verification;
Notes 32: "Neutral and objective criteria" means criteria which do not favour certain regions beyond what is appropriate for the elimination or reduction of regional disparities within the framework of the regional development policy. In this regard,
regional subsidy programmes shall include ceilings on the amount of assistance which can be granted to each subsidized project. Such ceilings must be
differentiated according to the different levels of development of assisted regions and must be expressed in terms of investment costs or cost of job creation. Within such ceilings, the distribution of assistance shall be sufficiently broad and even to avoid the predominant use of a subsidy by, or the granting of disproportionately large amountsof subsidy to, certain enterprises as provided for in Article 2.
(iii) the criteria shall include a measurement of economic development which shall be based on at least one of the following factors:
- one of either income per capita or household income per capita, or GDP per capita, which must not be above 85 per cent of the average for the territory concerned;
- unemployment rate, which must be at least 110 per cent of the average for the territory concerned; as measured over a three-year period; such measurement, however, may be a composite one and may include other factors.
(c) assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities (Notes 33) to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms, provided that the assistance:
Notes 33: The term "existing facilities" means facilities which have been in operation for at least two years at the time when new environmental requirements are imposed.
(i) is a one-time non-recurring measure; and
(ii) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation; and
(iii) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must be fully borne by firms; and
(iv) is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's planned reduction of nuisances and pollution, and does not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and
(v) is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production processes.
8.3 A subsidy programme for which the provisions of paragraph 2 are invoked shall be notified in advance of its implementation to the Committee in accordance with the provisions of Part VII. Any such notification shall be sufficiently precise to enable other Members to evaluate the consistency of the programme with the conditions and criteria provided for in the relevant provisions of paragraph 2. Members
shall also provide the Committee with yearly updates of such notifications, in particular by supplying information on global expenditure for each programme, and on any modification of the programme. Other Members shall have the right to request information about individual cases of subsidization under a notified programme.
(Notes 34)
Notes 34: It is recognized that nothing in this notification provision requires the provision of confidential information, including confidential business information.
8.4 Upon request of a Member, the Secretariat shall review a notification made pursuant to paragraph 3 and, where necessary, may require additional information from the subsidizing Member concerning the notified programme under review. The Secretariat shall report its findings to the Committee. The Committee shall, upon request, promptly review the findings of the Secretariat (or, if a review by the Secretariat has not been requested, the notification itself), with a view to determining whether the conditions and criteria laid down in paragraph 2 have not been met. The procedure provided for in this paragraph shall be completed at the latest at the first regular meeting of the Committee following the notification of a subsidy programme, provided that at least two months have elapsed between such notification and the regular meeting of the Committee. The review procedure described in this paragraph shall also apply, upon request, to substantial modifications of a programme notified in the yearly updates referred to in paragraph 3.
8.5 Upon the request of a Member, the determination by the Committee referred to in paragraph 4, or a failure by the Committee to make such a determination, as well as the violation, in individual cases, of the conditions set out in a notified programme, shall be submitted to binding arbitration. The arbitration body shall present its conclusions to the Members within 120 days from the date when the matter was referred to the arbitration body. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the DSU shall apply to arbitrations conducted under this paragraph.
Article 9 Consultations and Authorized Remedies
9.1 If, in the course of implementation of a programme referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8, notwithstanding the fact that the programme is consistent with the criteria laid down in that paragraph, a Member has reasons to believe that this programme has resulted in serious adverse effects to the domestic industry of that Member, such as to cause damage which would be difficult to repair, such Member may request consultations with the Member granting or maintaining the subsidy.
9.2 Upon request for consultations under paragraph 1, the Member granting or maintaining the subsidy programme in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as possible. The purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution.
9.3 If no mutually acceptable solution has been reached in consultations under paragraph 2 within 60 days of the request for such consultations, the requesting Member may refer the matter to the Committee.
9.4 Where a matter is referred to the Committee, the Committee shall immediately review the facts involved and the evidence of the effects referred to in paragraph 1. If the Committee determines that such effects exist, it may recommend to the subsidizing
Member to modify this programme in such a way as to remove these effects. The Committee shall present its conclusions within 120 days from the date when the matter is referred to it under paragraph 3. In the event the recommendation is not
followed within six months, the Committee shall authorize the requesting Member to take appropriate countermeasures commensurate with the nature and degree of the effects determined to exist.
PART V : COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
Article 10 Application of Article VI of GATT 1994 (Notes 35)
Notes 35: The provisions of Part II or III may be invoked in parallel with the provisions of Part V ; however, with regard to the effects of a particular subsidy in the domestic market of the importing Member, only one form of relief (either a countervailing duty, if the requirements of Part V are met, or a countermeasure under Articles 4 or
7) shall be available. The provisions of Parts III and V shall not be invoked regarding measures considered non-actionable in accordance with the provisions of Part IV. However, measures referred to in paragraph 1(a) of Article 8 may be investigated in order to determine whether or not they are specific within the meaning of Article 2. In addition, in the case of a subsidy referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8 conferred pursuant to a programme which has not been notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 8, the provisions of Part III or V may be
invoked, but such subsidy shall be treated as non-actionable if it is found to conform to the standards set forth in paragraph 2 of Article 8.
Members shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the imposition of a countervailing duty (Notes 36) on any product of the territory of any Member imported into the territory of another Member is in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of GATT 1994 and the terms of this Agreement. Countervailing duties may only be imposed pursuant to investigations initiated (Notes 37) and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture.
Notes 36: The term "countervailing duty" shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise, as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article VI of GATT 1994.
Notes 37: The term "initiated" as used hereinafter means procedural action by which a Member formally commences an investigation as provided in Article 11.
Article 11 Initiation and Subsequent Investigation
11.1 Except as provided in paragraph 6, an investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged subsidy shall be initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry.
11.2 An application under paragraph 1 shall include sufficient evidence of the existence of (a) a subsidy and, if possible, its amount,(b) injury within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement, and (c) a causal link between the subsidized imports and the alleged injury. Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph. The application shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the applicant on the following:
(i) the identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of the domestic production of the like product by the applicant. Where a written application is made on behalf of the domestic industry, the application shall identify the industry on behalf of which the application is made by a list of all known domestic producers of the like product (or associations of domestic producers of the like product) and, to the extent possible, a description of the volume and value of domestic production of the like product accounted for by such producers;
(ii) a complete description of the allegedly subsidized product, the names of the country or countries of origin or export in question, the identity of each known exporter or foreign producer and a list of known persons importing the product in question;
(iii) evidence with regard to the existence, amount and nature of the subsidy in question;
(iv) evidence that alleged injury to a domestic industry is caused by subsidized imports through the effects of the subsidies; this evidence includes information on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly subsidized imports, the effect of these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market and the consequent impact of the imports on the domestic industry, as demonstrated by relevant factors
and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry, such as those listed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 15.
11.3 The authorities shall review the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation.
11.4 An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph 1 unless the authorities have determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of support for, or opposition to, the application expressed (Notes 38) by domestic producers of the like product, that the application has been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry.
(Notes 39) The application shall be considered to have been made "by or on behalf of the domestic industry" if it is supported by those domestic producers whose collective
output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support for or opposition to the application. However, no investigation shall be initiated when domestic producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25 per cent of total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry.
Notes 38: In the case of fragmented industries involving an exceptionally large number of producers, authorities may determine support and opposition by using statistically valid sampling techniques.
Notes 39: Members are aware that in the territory of certain Members employees of domestic producers of the like product or representatives of those employees may make or support an application for an investigation under paragraph 1.
11.5 The authorities shall avoid, unless a decision has been made to initiate an investigation, any publicizing of the application for the initiation of an investigation.
11.6 If, in special circumstances, the authorities concerned decide to initiate an investigation without having received a written application by or on behalf of a domestic industry for the initiation of such investigation, they shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of the existence of a subsidy, injury and causal link, as described in paragraph 2, to justify the initiation of an investigation.
11.7 The evidence of both subsidy and injury shall be considered
simultaneously (a) in the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation and (b) thereafter, during the course of the investigation, starting on a date not later than the earliest date on which in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement provisional measures may be applied.
11.8 In cases where products are not imported directly from the country of origin but are exported to the importing Member from an intermediate country, the provisions of this Agreement shall be fully applicable and the transaction or transactions shall, for the purposes of this Agreement, be regarded as having taken place between the country of origin and the importing Member
11.9 An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of either subsidization or of injury to justify proceeding with the case. There shall be immediate termination in cases where the amount of a subsidy is de minimis, or where the volume of subsidized imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible. For the purpose of this paragraph, the amount of the subsidy shall be considered to be de minimis if the subsidy is less than 1 per cent ad valorem.
11.10 An investigation shall not hinder the procedures of customs clearance.
11.11 Investigations shall, except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after their initiation.
Article 12 Evidence
12.1 Interested Members and all interested parties in a countervailing duty investigation shall be given notice of the information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in question.
12.1.1 Exporters, foreign producers or interested Members receiving questionnaires used in a countervailing duty investigation shall be given at least 30 days for reply. (Notes 40) Due consideration should be given to any request for an extension of the 30-day period and, upon cause shown, such an extension should be granted whenever practicable.
Notes 40: As a general rule, the time-limit for exporters shall be counted from the date of receipt of the questionnaire, which for this purpose shall be deemed to have been received one week from the date on which it was sent to the respondent or transmitted to the appropriate diplomatic representatives of the exporting Member or, in the case of a separate customs territory Member of the WTO, an official representative of the exporting territory.
12.1.2 Subject to the requirement to protect confidential information, evidence presented in writing by one interested Member or interested party shall be made available promptly to other interested Members or interested parties participating in the investigation.
12.1.3 As soon as an investigation has been initiated, the authorities shall provide the full text of the written application received under paragraph 1 of Article 11 to the known exporters (Notes 41) and to the authorities of the exporting Member and shall make it available, upon request, to other interested parties involved. Due regard shall be paid to the protection of confidential information, as provided for in paragraph 4.
Notes 41: It being understood that where the number of exporters involved is particularly high, the full text of the application should instead be provided only to the authorities of the exporting Member or to the relevant trade association who then should forward copies to the exporters concerned.
12.2. Interested Members and interested parties also shall have the right, upon justification, to present information orally. Where such information is provided orally, the interested Members and interested parties subsequently shall be required to reduce such submissions to writing. Any decision of the investigating authorities can only be based on such information and arguments as were on the written record of this authority and which were available to interested Members and interested
parties participating in the investigation, due account having been given to the need to protect confidential information.
12.3 The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities for all interested Members and interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases, that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 4, and that is
used by the authorities in a countervailing duty investigation, and to prepare presentations on the basis of this information.
12.4 Any information which is by nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its disclosure would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom the supplier acquired the information), or which is provided on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation shall, upon good cause shown, be treated as such by the authorities. Such information shall not be disclosed without specific permission of the party submitting it. (Notes 42)
Notes 42: Members are aware that in the territory of certain Members disclosure pursuant to a narrowly-drawn protective order may be required.
12.4.1 The authorities shall require interested Members or interested parties providing confidential information to furnish non-confidential summaries thereof. These summaries shall be in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence. In exceptional
circumstances, such Members or parties may indicate that such information is not susceptible of summary. In such exceptional circumstances, a statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible must be provided.
12.4.2 If the authorities find that a request for confidentiality is not warranted and if the supplier of the information is either unwilling to make the information public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or summary form, the authorities may disregard such information unless it can be demonstrated to their satisfaction from appropriate sources that the information is correct. (Notes 43)
Notes 43: Members agree that requests for confidentiality should not be arbitrarily rejected. Members further agree that the investigating authority may request the waiving of confidentiality only regarding information relevant to the proceedings.
12.5 Except in circumstances provided for in paragraph 7, the authorities shall during the course of an investigation satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested Members or interested parties upon which their findings are based.
12.6 The investigating authorities may carry out investigations in the territory of other Members as required, provided that they have notified in good time the Member in question and unless that Member objects to the investigation. Further, the investigating authorities may carry out investigations on the premises of a firm and may examine the records of a firm if (a) the firm so agrees and (b) the Member in question is notified and does not object. The procedures set forth in Annex VI shall apply to investigations on the premises of a firm. Subject to the requirement to protect confidential information, the authorities shall make the results of any such
investigations available, or shall provide disclosure thereof pursuant to paragraph 8, to the firms to which they pertain and may make such results available to the applicants.
12.7 In cases in which any interested Member or interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available.
12.8 The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested Members and interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests.
12.9 For the purposes of this Agreement, "interested parties" shall include:
(i) an exporter or foreign producer or the importer of a product subject to investigation, or a trade or business association a majority of the members of which are producers, exporters or importers of such product; and
(ii) a producer of the like product in the importing Member or a trade and business association a majority of the members of which produce the like product in the territory of the importing Member.
This list shall not preclude Members from allowing domestic or foreign parties other than those mentioned above to be included as interested parties.
12.10 The authorities shall provide opportunities for industrial users of the product under investigation, and for representative consumer organizations in cases where the product is commonly sold at the retail level, to provide information which is relevant to the investigation regarding subsidization, injury and causality.
12.11 The authorities shall take due account of any difficulties experienced by interested parties, in particular small companies, in supplying information requested, and shall provide any assistance practicable.
12.12 The procedures set out above are not intended to prevent the authorities of a Member from proceeding expeditiously with regard to initiating an investigation, reaching preliminary or final determinations, whether affirmative or negative, or from applying provisional or final measures, in accordance with relevant provisions of this Agreement.
Article 13 Consultations
13.1 As soon as possible after an application under Article 11 is accepted, and in any event before the initiation of any investigation, Members the products of which may be subject to such investigation shall be invited for consultations with the aim of clarifying the situation as to the matters referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11 and arriving at a mutually agreed solution.
13.2 Furthermore, throughout the period of investigation, Members the products of which are the subject of the investigation shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
continue consultations, with a view to clarifying the factual situation and to arriving at a mutually agreed solution. (Notes 44)
Notes 44: It is particularly important, in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph, that no affirmative determination whether preliminary or final be made without reasonable opportunity for consultations having been given. Such consultations may establish the basis for proceeding under the provisions of Part II, III or X .
13.3 Without prejudice to the obligation to afford reasonable opportunity for consultation, these provisions regarding consultations are not intended to prevent the authorities of a Member from proceeding expeditiously with regard to initiating the investigation, reaching preliminary or final determinations, whether affirmative or negative, or from applying provisional or final measures, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
13.4 The Member which intends to initiate any investigation or is conducting such an investigation shall permit, upon request, the Member or Members the products of which are subject to such investigation access to non-confidential evidence, including the non-confidential summary of confidential data being used for initiating or conducting the investigation.
Article 14 Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to the Recipient
For the purpose of Part V , any method used by the investigating authority to calculate the benefit to the recipient conferred pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 1 shall be provided for in the national legislation or implementing regulations of the Member concerned and its application to each particular case shall be transparent and adequately explained. Furthermore, any such method shall be consistent with the following guidelines:
(a) government provision of equity capital shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless the investment decision can be regarded as inconsistent with the usual investment practice (including for the provision of risk capital) of private investors in the territory of that Member;
(b) a loan by a government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless there is a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the loan pays on the government loan and the amount the firm would pay on a comparable commercial loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market. In this case the benefit shall be the difference between these two amounts;
(c) a loan guarantee by a government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless there is a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the guarantee pays on a loan guaranteed by the government and the amount that the firm would pay on a comparable commercial loan absent the government guarantee. In this
case the benefit shall be the difference between these two amounts adjusted for any differences in fees;
(d) the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit unless the provision is made for less than adequate remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than adequate remuneration. The adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service in question in the country of provision or purchase (including price, quality, availability ,marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale).
Article 15 Determination of Injury (Notes 45)
Notes 45: Under this Agreement the term "injury" shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
15.1 A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the subsidized imports and the effect of the subsidized imports on prices in the domestic market for like products (Notes 46) and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic producers of such products.
Notes 46: Throughout this Agreement the term "like product"("product similiar") shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.
15.2 With regard to the volume of the subsidized imports, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in subsidized imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. With regard to the effect of the subsidized imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the subsidized imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or to prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.
15.3 Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to countervailing duty investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of such imports only if they determine that (a) the amount of subsidization established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de minimis as defined in paragraph 9 of Article 11 and the volume of
imports from each country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between the imported products and the conditions of competition between the imported products and the like domestic product.
15.4 The examination of the impact of the subsidized imports on the domestic industry shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments and, in the case of agriculture, whether there has been an increased burden on government support programmes. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.
15.5 It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects (Notes 47) of subsidies, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the subsidized imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the subsidized imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volumes and prices of non-subsidized imports of the product in question, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry.
Notes 47: As set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4.
15.6 The effect of the subsidized imports shall be assessed in relation to the domestic production of the like product when available data permit the separate identification of that production on the basis of such criteria as the production process, producers' sales and profits. If such separate identification of that production is not possible, the effects of the subsidized imports shall be assessed by the examination of the production of the narrowest group or range of products, which includes the like product, for which the necessary information can be provided.
15.7 A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility.The change in circumstances which would create a situation in which the subsidy would cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent. In making a determination regarding the existence of a threat of material injury, the investigating authorities should consider, inter alia, such factors as:
(i) nature of the subsidy or subsidies in question and the trade effects likely to arise therefrom;
(ii) a significant rate of increase of subsidized imports into the domestic market indicating the likelihood of substantially increased importation;
(iii) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of the exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially increased subsidized exports to the importing Member's market, taking into account the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional exports;
(iv) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports; and
(v) inventories of the product being investigated.
No one of these factors by itself can necessarily give decisive guidance but the totality of the factors considered must lead to the conclusion that further subsidized exports are imminent and that, unless protective action is taken, material injury would occur.
15.8 With respect to cases where injury is threatened by subsidized imports, the application of countervailing measures shall be considered and decided with special care.
Article 16 Definition of Domestic Industry
16.1 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "domestic industry" shall, except as provided in paragraph 2, be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products, except that when producers are related (Notes 48) to the exporters or importers or are themselves importers of the allegedly subsidized product or a like product from other countries, the term "domestic industry" may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the producers.
Notes 48: For the purpose of this paragraph, producers shall be deemed to be related to exporters or importers only if (a) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other; or (b) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; or (c) together they directly or indirectly control a third person, provided that there are grounds for believing or suspecting that the effect of the
relationship is such as to cause the producer concerned to behave differently from non-related producers. For the purpose of this paragraph, one shall be deemed to control another when the former is legally or operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction over the latter.
16.2 In exceptional circumstances, the territory of a Member may, for the production in question, be divided into two or more competitive markets and the
producers within each market may be regarded as a separate industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their production of the product in question in that market, and (b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the territory. In such circumstances, injury may be found to exist even where a major portion of the total domestic industry is not injured, provided there is a concentration of subsidized imports into such an isolated market and provided further that the subsidized imports are causing injury to the producers of all or almost all of the production within such market.
16.3 When the domestic industry has been interpreted as referring to the producers in a certain area, i.e. a market as defined in paragraph 2, countervailing duties shall be levied only on the products in question consigned for final consumption to that area. When the constitutional law of the importing Member does not permit the levying of countervailing duties on such a basis, the importing Member may levy the countervailing duties without limitation only if (a) the exporters
shall have been given an opportunity to cease exporting at subsidized prices to the area concerned or otherwise give assurances pursuant to Article 18, and adequate assurances in this regard have not been promptly given, and (b) such duties cannot be levied only on products of specific producers which supply the area in question.
16.4 Where two or more countries have reached under the provisions of paragraph 8(a) of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 such a level of integration that they have the characteristics of a single, unified market, the industry in the entire area of integration shall be taken to be the domestic industry referred to in paragraphs 1and 2.
16.5 The provisions of paragraph 6 of Article 15 shall be applicable to this Article. Article 17 Provisional Measures
17.1 Provisional measures may be applied only if:
(a) an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 11, a public notice has been given to that effect and interested Members and interested parties have been given adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments;
(b) a preliminary affirmative determination has been made that a subsidy exists and that there is injury to a domestic industry caused by subsidized imports; and
(c) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation.
17.2 Provisional measures may take the form of provisional countervailing duties guaranteed by cash deposits or bonds equal to the amount of the provisionally calculated amount of subsidization.
17.3 Provisional measures shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of the investigation.
17.4 The application of provisional measures shall be limited to as short a period as possible, not exceeding four months.
17.5 The relevant provisions of Article 19 shall be followed in the application of provisional measures.
Article 18 Undertakings
18.1 Proceedings may (Notes 49) be suspended or terminated without the imposition of provisional measures or countervailing duties upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings under which:
Notes 49: The word "may" shall not be interpreted to allow the simultaneous continuation of proceedings with the implementation of undertakings, except as provided in paragraph 4.
(a) the government of the exporting Member agrees to eliminate or limit the subsidy or take other measures concerning its effects; or
(b) the exporter agrees to revise its prices so that the investigating authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the subsidy is eliminated. Price increases under such undertakings shall not be higher than necessary to eliminate the amount of the subsidy. It is desirable that the price increases be less than the amount of the subsidy if such increases would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.
18.2 Undertakings shall not be sought or accepted unless the authorities of the importing Member have made a preliminary affirmative determination of subsidization and injury caused by such subsidization and, in case of undertakings from exporters, have obtained the consent of the exporting Member.
18.3 Undertakings offered need not be accepted if the authorities of the importing Member consider their acceptance impractical, for example if the number of actual or potential exporters is too great, or for other reasons, including reasons of general policy. Should the case arise and where practicable, the authorities shall provide to the exporter the reasons which have led them to consider acceptance of an undertaking as inappropriate, and shall, to the extent possible, give the exporter an opportunity to make comments thereon.
18.4 If an undertaking is accepted, the investigation of subsidization and injury shall nevertheless be completed if the exporting Member so desires or the importing Member so decides. In such a case, if a negative determination of subsidization or injury is made, the undertaking shall automatically lapse, except in cases where such a determination is due in large part to the existence of an undertaking. In such cases, the authorities concerned may require that an undertaking be maintained for a reasonable period consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. In the event that an affirmative determination of subsidization and injury is made, the undertaking shall continue consistent with its terms and the provisions of this Agreement.
18.5 Price undertakings may be suggested by the authorities of the importing Member, but no exporter shall be forced to enter into such undertakings. The fact that governments or exporters do not offer such undertakings, or do not accept an invitation to do so, shall in no way prejudice the consideration of the case. However, the authorities are free to determine that a threat of injury is more likely to be realized if the subsidized imports continue.
18.6 Authorities of an importing Member may require any government or exporter from whom an undertaking has been accepted to provide periodically information relevant to the fulfillment of such an undertaking, and to permit verification of pertinent data. In case of violation of an undertaking, the authorities of the importing Member may take, under this Agreement in conformity with its provisions,
expeditious actions which may constitute immediate application of provisional measures using the best information available. In such cases, definitive duties may be levied in accordance with this Agreement on products entered for consumption not more than 90 days before the application of such provisional measures, except that any such retroactive assessment shall not apply to imports entered before the violation of the undertaking.
Article 19 Imposition and Collection of Countervailing Duties
19.1 If, after reasonable efforts have been made to complete consultations, a Member makes a final determination of the existence and amount of the subsidy and that, through the effects of the subsidy, the subsidized imports are causing injury, it may impose a countervailing duty in accordance with the provisions of this Article unless the subsidy or subsidies are withdrawn.
19.2 The decision whether or not to impose a countervailing duty in cases where all requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the decision whether the amount of the countervailing duty to be imposed shall be the full amount of the subsidy or less, are decisions to be made by the authorities of the importing Member. It is desirable that the imposition should be permissive in the territory of all Members, that the duty should be less than the total amount of the subsidy if
such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry, and that procedures should be established which would allow the authorities concerned to take due account of representations made by domestic interested parties (Notes 50) whose interests might be adversely affected by the imposition of a countervailing duty. Notes 50: For the purpose of this paragraph, the term "domestic interested parties" shall include consumers and industrial users of the imported product subject to
investigation.
19.3 When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, such countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be
subsidized and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources which have renounced any subsidies in question or from which undertakings under the terms of this Agreement have been accepted. Any exporter whose exports are subject to a definitive countervailing duty but who was not actually investigated for reasons other than a refusal to cooperate, shall be entitled to an expedited review in order that the investigating authorities promptly establish an individual countervailing duty rate for that exporter
19.4 No countervailing duty shall be levied (Notes 51) on any imported product in excess of the amount of the subsidy found to exist, calculated in terms of subsidization per unit of the subsidized and exported product.
Notes 51: As used in this Agreement "levy" shall mean the definitive or final legal assessment or collection of a duty or tax.
Article 20 Retroactivity
20.1 Provisional measures and countervailing duties shall only be applied to products which enter for consumption after the time when the decision under paragraph 1 of Article 17 and paragraph 1 of Article 19, respectively, enters into force, subject to the exceptions set out in this Article.
20.2 Where a final determination of injury (but not of a threat thereof or of a material retardation of the establishment of an industry) is made or, in the case of a final determination of a threat of injury, where the effect of the subsidized imports would, in the absence of the provisional measures, have led to a determination of injury, countervailing duties may be levied retroactively for the period for which provisional measures, if any, have been applied.
20.3 If the definitive countervailing duty is higher than the amount guaranteed by the cash deposit or bond, the difference shall not be collected. If the definitive duty is less than the amount guaranteed by the cash deposit or bond, the excess amount shall be reimbursed or the bond released in an expeditious manner.
20.4 Except as provided in paragraph 2, where a determination of threat of injury or material retardation is made (but no injury has yet occurred) a definitive countervailing duty may be imposed only from the date of the determination of threat of injury or material retardation, and any cash deposit made during the period of the application of provisional measures shall be refunded and any bonds released in an expeditious manner.
20.5 Where a final determination is negative, any cash deposit made during the period of the application of provisional measures shall be refunded and any bonds released in an expeditious manner.
20.6 In critical circumstances where for the subsidized product in question the authorities find that injury which is difficult to repair is caused by massive imports in a relatively short period of a product benefiting from subsidies paid or bestowed
inconsistently with the provisions of GATT 1994 and of this Agreement and where it is deemed necessary, in order to preclude the recurrence of such injury, to assess countervailing duties retroactively on those imports, the definitive countervailing duties may be assessed on imports which were entered for consumption not more than 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional measures.
Article 21 Duration and Review of Countervailing Duties and Undertakings
21.1 A countervailing duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to counteract subsidization which is causing injury.
21.2 The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive countervailing duty, upon request by any interested party which submits positive information substantiating the need for a review. Interested parties shall have the right to request the authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset subsidization, whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or both. If, as a result of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine that the countervailing duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.
21.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, any definitive countervailing duty shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition (or from the date of the most recent review under paragraph 2 if that review has covered both subsidization and injury, or under this paragraph), unless the authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date on their own initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry within a reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the expiry
of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury. (Notes 52) The duty may remain in force pending the outcome of such a review. Notes 52: When the amount of the countervailing duty is assessed on a retrospective basis, a finding in the most recent assessment proceeding that no duty is
to be levied shall not by itself require the authorities to terminate the definitive duty.
21.4 The provisions of Article 12 regarding evidence and procedure shall apply to any review carried out under this Article. Any such review shall be carried out expeditiously and shall normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review.
21.5 The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to undertakings accepted under Article 18.
Article 22 Public Notice and Explanation of Determinations
22.1 When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation pursuant to
Article 11, the Member or Members the products of which are subject to such investigation and other interested parties known to the investigating authorities to have an interest therein shall be notified and a public notice shall be given.
22.2 A public notice of the initiation of an investigation shall contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report (Notes 53), adequate information on the following:
Notes 53: Where authorities provide information and explanations under the provisions of this Article in a separate report, they shall ensure that such report is readily available to the public.
(i) the name of the exporting country or countries and the product involved;
(ii) the date of initiation of the investigation;
(iii) a description of the subsidy practice or practices to be investigated;
(iv) a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury is based;
(v) the address to which representations by interested Members and interested parties should be directed; and
(vi) the time-limits allowed to interested Members and interested parties for making their views known.
22.3 Public notice shall be given of any preliminary of final determination, whether affirmative or negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to Article 18, of the termination of such an undertaking, and of the termination of a definitive countervailing duty. Each such notice shall set forth, or otherwise make available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities. All such notices and reports shall be forwarded to the Member or Members the products of which are subject to such determination or undertaking and to other interested parties known to have an interest therein.
22.4 A public notice of the imposition of provisional measures shall set forth, or otherwise make available through a separate report, sufficiently detailed explanations for the preliminary determinations on the existence of a subsidy and injury and shall refer to the matters of fact and law which have led to arguments being accepted or rejected. Such a notice or report shall, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of confidential information, contain in particular:
(i) the names of the suppliers or, when this is impracticable, the supplying countries involved;
(ii) a description of the product which is sufficient for customs purposes;
(iii) the amount of subsidy established and the basis on which the existence of a subsidy has been determined;
(iv) considerations relevant to the injury determination as set out in Article 15;
(v) the main reasons leading to the determination.
22.5 A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the acceptance of an undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report, all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of an undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the information described in paragraph 4, as well as the reasons for the acceptance or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by interested Members and by the exporters and importers.
22.6 A public notice of the termination or suspension of an investigation following the acceptance of an undertaking pursuant to Article 18 shall include, or otherwise make available through a separate report, the non-confidential part of this undertaking.
22.7 The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to the initiation and completion of reviews pursuant to Article 21 and to decisions under Article 20to apply duties retroactively.
Article 23 Judicial Review
Each Member whose national legislation contains provisions on countervailing duty measures shall maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review of administrative actions relating to final determinations and reviews of determinations within the meaning of Article 21. Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the authorities responsible for the determination or review in question, and shall provide all interested parties who participated in the administrative proceeding and are directly and individually affected by the administrative actions with access to review.
PART VI: INSTITUTIONS
Article 24 Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and Subsidiary Bodies
24.1 There is hereby established a Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures composed of representatives from each of the Members. The Committee shall elect its own Chairman and shall meet not less than twice a year and otherwise as envisaged by relevant provisions of this Agreement at the request of any Member. The Committee shall carry out responsibilities as assigned to it under this Agreement or by the Members and it shall afford Members the opportunity of consulting on any matter relating to the operation of the Agreement or the furtherance of its objectives. The WTO Secretariat shall act as the secretariat to the Committee.
24.2 The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies as appropriate.
24.3 The Committee shall establish a Permanent Group of Experts composed of five independent persons, highly qualified in the fields of subsidies and trade relations. The experts will be elected by the Committee and one of them will be replaced every year. The PGE may be requested to assist a panel, as provided for in paragraph 5 of Article 4. The Committee may also seek an advisory opinion on the existence and nature of any subsidy.
24.4 The PGE may be consulted by any Member and may give advisory opinions on the nature of any subsidy proposed to be introduced or currently maintained by that Member. Such advisory opinions will be confidential and may not be invoked in proceedings under Article 7.
24.5 In carrying out their functions, the Committee and any subsidiary bodies may consult with and seek information from any source they deem appropriate. However, before the Committee or a subsidiary body seeks such information from a source within the jurisdiction of a Member, it shall inform the Member involved.
PART VII: NOTIFICATION AND SURVEILLANCE
Article 25 Notifications
25.1 Members agree that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994, their notifications of subsidies shall be submitted not later than 30 June of each year and shall conform to the provisions of paragraphs 2 through 6.
25.2 Members shall notify any subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1, which is specific within the meaning of Article 2, granted or maintained within their territories.
25.3 The content of notifications should be sufficiently specific to enable other Members to evaluate the trade effects and to understand the operation of notified subsidy programmes. In this connection, and without prejudice to the contents and form of the questionnaire on subsidies (Notes 54), Members shall ensure that their notifications contain the following information:
Notes 54: The Committee shall establish a Working Party to review the contents and form of the questionnaire as contained in BISD 9S/193-194.
(i) form of a subsidy (i.e. grant, loan, tax concession, etc.);
(ii) subsidy per unit or, in cases where this is not possible, the total amount or the annual amount budgeted for that subsidy (indicating,if possible, the average subsidy per unit in the previous year);
(iii) policy objective and/or purpose of subsidy;
(iv) duration of a subsidy and/or any other time-limits attached to it;
(v) statistical data permitting an assessment of the trade effects of a subsidy.
25.4 Where specific points in paragraph 3 have not been addressed in a notification, an explanation shall be provided in the notification itself.
25.5 If subsidies are granted to specific products or sectors, the notifications should be organized by product or sector.
25.6 Members which consider that there are no measures in their territories requiring notification under paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994 and this Agreement shall so inform the Secretariat in writing.
25.7 Members recognize that notification of a measure does not prejudge either its legal status under GATT 1994 and this Agreement, the effects under this Agreement, or the nature of the measure itself.
25.8 Any Member may, at any time, make a written request for information on the nature and extent of any subsidy granted or maintained by another Member (including any subsidy referred to in Part IV), or for an explanation of the reasons for which a specific measure has been considered as not subject to the requirement of notification.
25.9 Members so requested shall provide such information as quickly as possible and in a comprehensive manner, and shall be ready, upon request, to provide additional information to the requesting Member. In particular, they shall provide sufficient details to enable the other Member to assess their compliance with the terms of this Agreement. Any Member which considers that such information has not been provided may bring the matter to the attention of the Committee.
25.10 Any Member which considers that any measure of another Member having the effects of a subsidy has not been notified in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994 and this Article may bring the matter to the attention of such other Member. If the alleged subsidy is not thereafter notified promptly, such Member may itself bring the alleged subsidy in question to the notice of the Committee.
25.11 Members shall report without delay to the Committee all preliminary or final actions taken with respect to countervailing duties. Such reports shall be available in the Secretariat for inspection by other Members. Members shall also submit, on a semi-annual basis, reports on any countervailing duty actions taken within the preceding six months. The semi-annual reports shall be submitted on an agreed standard form.
25.12 Each Member shall notify the Committee (a) which of its authorities are competent to initiate and conduct investigations referred to in Article 11 and (b) its domestic procedures governing the initiation and conduct of such investigations.
Article 26 Surveillance
26.1 The Committee shall examine new and full notifications submitted under paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994 and paragraph 1 of Article 25 of this Agreement at special sessions held every third year. Notifications submitted in the
intervening years (updating notifications) shall be examined at each regular meeting of the Committee.
26.2 The Committee shall examine reports submitted under paragraph11 of Article 25 at each regular meeting of the Committee.
PART VIII: DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS
Article 27 Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members
27.1 Members recognize that subsidies may play an important role in economic development programmes of developing country Members.
27.2 The prohibition of paragraph 1 (a) of Article 3 shall not apply to:
(a) developing country Members referred to in Annex VII.
(b) other developing country Members for a period of eight years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, subject to compliance with the provisions in paragraph 4.
27.3 The prohibition of paragraph 1 (b) of Article 3 shall not apply to developing country Members for a period of five years, and shall not apply to least-developed country Members for a period of eight years, from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
27.4 Any developing country Member referred to in paragraph 2 (b) shall phase out its export subsidies within the eight-year period, preferably in a progressive manner. However, a developing country Member shall not increase the level of its export subsidies (Notes 55), and shall eliminate them within a period shorter than that provided for in this paragraph when the use of such export subsidies is inconsistent with its development needs. If a developing country Member deems it necessary to apply such subsidies beyond the eight-year period, it shall not later than one year before the expiry of this period enter into consultation with the Committee, which will determine whether an extension of this period is justified, after examining all the relevant economic, financial and development needs of the developing country Member in question. If the Committee determines that the extension is justified, the developing country Member concerned shall hold annual consultations with the Committee to determine the necessity of maintaining the subsidies. If no such determination is made by the Committee, the developing country Member shall phase out the remaining export subsidies within two years from the end of the last authorized period.
Notes 55: For a developing country Member not granting export subsidies as of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, this paragraph shall apply on the basis of the level of export subsidies granted in 1986.
27.5 A developing country Member which has reached export competitiveness in any given product shall phase out its export subsidies for such product(s) over a period of two years. However, for a developing country Member which is referred to in Annex VII and which has reached export competitiveness in one or more products, export subsidies on such products shall be gradually phased out over a period of eight years.
27.6 Export competitiveness in a product exists if a developing country Member's exports of that product have reached a share of at least 3.25 per cent in world trade of that product for two consecutive calendar years. Export competitiveness shall exist either (a) on the basis of notification by the developing country Member having reached export competitiveness, or (b) on the basis of a computation undertaken by the Secretariat at the request of any Member. For the purpose of this paragraph, a product is defined as a section heading of the Harmonized System Nomenclature. The Committee shall review the operation of this provision five years from the date of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
27.7 The provisions of Article 4 shall not apply to a developing country Member in the case of export subsidies which are in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 2 through 5. The relevant provisions in such a case shall be those of Article 7.
27.8 There shall be no presumption in terms of paragraph 1 of Article 6 that a subsidy granted by a developing country Member results in serious prejudice, as defined in this Agreement. Such serious prejudice, where applicable under the terms of paragraph 9, shall be demonstrated by positive evidence, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3 through 8 of Article 6.
27.9 Regarding actionable subsidies granted or maintained by a developing country Member other than those referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 6, action may not be authorized or taken under Article 7 unless nullification or impairment of tariff concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994 is found to exist as a result of such a subsidy, in such a way as to displace or impede imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing developing country Member or unless injury to a domestic industry in the market of an importing Member occurs.
27.10 Any countervailing duty investigation of a product originating in a developing country Member shall be terminated as soon as the authorities concerned determine that:
(a) the overall level of subsidies granted upon the product in question does not exceed 2 per cent of its value calculated on a per unit basis; or
(b) the volume of the subsidized imports represents less than 4 percent of the total imports of the like product in the importing Member, unless imports from developing country Members whose individual shares of total imports represent less than 4 per cent collectively account for more than 9 per cent of the total imports of the like product in the importing Member.
27.11 For those developing country Members within the scope of paragraph 2 (b) which have eliminated export subsidies prior to the expiry of the period of eight years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and for those developing country Members referred to in Annex VII, the member in paragraph 10 (a) shall be 3 per cent rather than 2 per cent. This provision shall apply from the date that the elimination of export subsidies is notified to the Committee, and for so long as export subsidies are not granted by the notifying developing country Member. This provision shall expire eight years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
27.12 The provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11 shall govern any determination of de minimis under paragraph 3 of Article 15.
27.13 The provisions of Part III shall not apply to direct forgiveness of debts, subsidies to cover social costs, in whatever form, including relinquishment of government revenue and other transfer of liabilities when such subsidies are granted within and directly linked to a privatization programme of a developing country Member, provided that both such programme and the subsidies involved are granted for a limited period and notified to the Committee and that the programme results in eventual privatization of the enterprise concerned.
27.14 The Committee shall, upon request by an interested Member, undertake a review of a specific export subsidy practice of a developing country Member to examine whether the practice is in conformity with its development needs.
27.15 The Committee shall, upon request by an interested developing country Member, undertake a review of a specific countervailing measure to examine whether it is consistent with the provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11 as applicable to the developing country Member in question.
PART IX: TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Article 28 Existing Programmes
28.1 Subsidy programmes which have been established within the territory of any Member before the date on which such a Member signed the WTO Agreement and which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement shall be:
(a) notified to the Committee not later than 90 days after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for such Member; and
(b) brought into conformity with the provisions of this Agreement within three years of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for such Member and until then shall not be subject to Part II.
28.2 No Member shall extend the scope of any such programme, nor shall such a programme be renewed upon its expiry.
Article 29 Transformation into a Market Economy
29.1 Members in the process of transformation from a centrally-planned into a market, free-enterprise economy may apply programmes and measures necessary for such a transformation.
29.2 For such Members, subsidy programmes falling within the scope nof Article 3, and notified according to paragraph 3, shall be phased out or brought into conformity with Article 3 within a period of seven years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. In such a case, Article 4 shall not apply. In addition during the same period:
(a) subsidy programmes falling within the scope of paragraph 1 (d) of Article 6 shall not be actionable under Article 7;
(b) with respect to other actionable subsidies, the provisions of paragraph 9of Article 27 shall apply.
29.3 Subsidy programmes falling within the scope of Article 3 shall be notified to the Committee by the earliest practicable date after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Further notifications of such subsidies may be made up to two years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
29.4 In exceptional circumstances Members referred to in paragraph 1 may be given departures from their notified programmes and measures and their time-frame by the Committee if such departures are deemed necessary for the process of transformation.
PART X: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Article 30
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.
PART XI: FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 31 Provisional Application
The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 and the provisions of Article 8 and Article 9 shall apply for a period of five years, beginning with the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Not later than 180 days before the end of this period, the Committee shall review the operation of those provisions, with a view to determining whether to extend their application, either as presently drafted or in a modified form, for a further period.
Article 32 Other Final Provisions
32.1 No specific action against a subsidy of another Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement. (Notes 56)
Notes 56: This paragraph is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of GATT 1994, where appropriate.
32.2 Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of this Agreement without the consent of the other Members.
32.3 Subject to paragraph 4, the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to investigations, and reviews of existing measures, initiated pursuant to applications which have been made on or after the date of entry into force for a Member of the WTO Agreement.
32.4 For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 21, existing countervailing measures shall be deemed to be imposed on a date not later than the date of entry into force for a Member of the WTO Agreement, except in cases in which the domestic legislation of a Member in force at that date already included a clause of the type provided for in that paragraph.
32.5 Each Member shall take all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not later than the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this Agreement as they may apply to the Member in question.
32.6 Each Member shall inform the Committee of any changes in its laws and regulations relevant to this Agreement and in the administration of such laws and regulations.
32.7 The Committee shall review annually the implementation and operation of this Agreement, taking into account the objectives thereof. The Committee shall inform annually the Council for Trade in Goods of developments during the period covered by such reviews.
32.8 The Annexes to this Agreement constitute an integral part thereof.
ANNEX I ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES
(a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry contingent upon export performance.
(b) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a bonus on exports.
(c) Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments.
(d) The provision by governments or their agencies either directly or indirectly through government-mandated schemes, of imported or domestic products or services
for use in the production of exported goods, on terms or conditions more favourable than for provision of like or directly competitive products or services for use in the production of goods for domestic consumption, if (in the case of products) such terms or conditions are more favourable than those commercially available (Notes 57) on world markets to their exporters.
Notes 57: The term "commercially available" means that the choice between domestic and imported products is unrestricted and depends only on commercial considerations.
(e) The full or partial exemption remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes (Notes 58) or social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises.
(Notes 59)
Notes 58: For the purpose of this Agreement:
The term "direct taxes" shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property;
The term "import charges" shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges not elsewhere enumerated in this note that are levied on imports;
The term "indirect taxes" shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges;
"Prior-stage" indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in making the product;
"Cumulative" indirect taxes are multi-staged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in a succeeding stage of production;
"Remission" of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes;
"Remission or drawback" includes the full or partial exemption or deferral of import charges.
Notes 59: The Members recognize that deferral need not amount to an export subsidy where, for example, appropriate interest charges are collected. The Members reaffirm the principle that prices for goods in transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or under the same control should for tax purposes be the prices which would be charged between independent enterprises acting at arm's length. Any Member may draw the attention of another Member to administrative or other practices which may contravene this principle and which result in a significant saving of direct taxes in export transactions. In such circumstances the Members shall normally attempt to resolve their differences using the facilities of existing bilateral tax treaties or other specific international mechanisms, without
prejudice to the rights and obligations of Members under GATT 1994, including the right of consultation created in the preceding sentence.
Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a Member from taking measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income earned by its enterprises or the enterprises of another Member.
(f) The allowance of special deductions directly related to exports or export performance, over and above those granted in respect to production for domestic consumption, in the calculation of the base on which direct taxes are charged.
(g) The exemption or remission, in respect of the production and distribution of exported products, of indirect taxes (Notes 58) in excess of those levied in respect of the production and distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption.
Notes 58: For the purpose of this Agreement:
The term "direct taxes" shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property;
The term "import charges" shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges not elsewhere enumerated in this note that are levied on imports;
The term "indirect taxes" shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges;
"Prior-stage" indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in making the product;
"Cumulative" indirect taxes are multi-staged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in a succeeding stage of production;
"Remission" of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes;
"Remission or drawback" includes the full or partial exemption or deferral of import charges.
(h) The exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes (Notes 58) on goods or services used in the production of exported products in excess of the exemption, remission or deferral of like prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes on goods or services used in the production of like products when sold for domestic consumption; provided, however, that prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes may be exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products even when not exempted, remitted or deferred on like products when sold for domestic consumption, if the prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product (making normal allowance for waste). (Notes 60) This item shall be interpreted in accordance with the guidelines on consumption of inputs in the production process contained in Annex II.
Notes 58: For the purpose of this Agreement:
The term "direct taxes" shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property;
The term "import charges" shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges not elsewhere enumerated in this note that are levied on imports;
The term "indirect taxes" shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges;
"Prior-stage" indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in making the product;
"Cumulative" indirect taxes are multi-staged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in a succeeding stage of production;
"Remission" of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes;
"Remission or drawback" includes the full or partial exemption or deferral of import charges.
Notes 60: Paragraph (h) does not apply to value-added tax systems and border-tax adjustment in lieu thereof; the problem of the excessive remission of value-added taxes is exclusively covered by paragraph (g).
(i) The remission or drawback of import charges (Notes 58) in excess of those levied on imported inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product (making normal allowance for waste); provided, however, that in particular cases a firm may use a quantity of home market inputs equal to, and having the same quality and characteristics as, the imported inputs as a substitute for them in order to benefit from this provision if the import and the corresponding export operations both occur within a reasonable time period, not to exceed two years. This item shall be interpreted in accordance with the guidelines on consumption of inputs in the production process contained in Annex II and the guidelines in the determination of substitution drawback systems as export subsidies contained in Annex III.
Notes 58: For the purpose of this Agreement:
The term "direct taxes" shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property;
The term "import charges" shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges not elsewhere enumerated in this note that are levied on imports;
The term "indirect taxes" shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges;
"Prior-stage" indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in making the product;
"Cumulative" indirect taxes are multi-staged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in a succeeding stage of production;
"Remission" of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes;
"Remission or drawback" includes the full or partial exemption or deferral of import charges.
(j) The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of export credit guarantee or insurance programmes, of insurance or guarantee programmes against increases in the cost of exported products or of exchange risk programmes, at premium rates which are inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes.
(k) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled byand/or acting under the authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which they actually have to pay for the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they borrowed on international capital markets in order to obtain funds of the same maturity and other credit terms and denominated in the same currency as the export credit), or the payment by them of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms.
Provided, however, that if a Member is a party to an international undertaking on official export credits to which at least twelve original Members to this Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original Members), or if in practice a Member applies the interest rates provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement.
(l) Any other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994.
ANNEX II GUIDELINES ON CONSUMPTION OF INPUTS IN THE PRODUCTION PROCESS
(Notes 61)
Notes 61: Inputs consumed in the production process are inputs physically incorporated, energy, fuels and oil used in the production process and catalysts which are consumed in the course of their use to obtain the exported product.
I
1. Indirect tax rebate schemes can allow for exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product (making normal allowance for waste). Similarly, drawback schemes can allow for the remission or drawback of import charges levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product (making normal allowance for waste).
2. The Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I of this Agreement makes reference to the term "inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product" in paragraphs (h) and (i). Pursuant to paragraph (h), indirect tax rebate schemes can constitute an export subsidy to the extent that they result in exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes in excess of the amount of such taxes actually levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product. Pursuant to paragraph (i), drawback schemes can constitute an export subsidy to the extent that they result in a remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those actually levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product. Both paragraphs stipulate that normal allowance for waste must be made in findings regarding consumption of inputs in the production of the exported product. Paragraph (i) also provides for substitution, where appropriate.
II
In examining whether inputs are consumed in the production of the exported product, as part of a countervailing duty investigation pursuant to this Agreement, investigating authorities should proceed on the following basis:
1. Where it is alleged that an indirect tax rebate scheme, or a drawback scheme, conveys a subsidy by reason of over-rebate or excess drawback of indirect taxes or import charges on inputs consumed in the production of the exported product, the investigating authorities should first determine whether the government of the exporting Member has in place and applies a system or procedure to confirm which inputs are consumed in the production of the exported product and in what amounts.
Where such a system or procedure is determined to be applied, the investigating authorities should then examine the system or procedure to see whether it is reasonable, effective for the purpose intended, and based on generally accepted commercial practices in the country of export. The investigating authorities may deem it necessary to carry out, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 12, certain practical tests in order to verify information or to satisfy themselves that the system or procedure is being effectively applied.
2. Where there is no such system or procedure, where it is not reasonable, or where it is instituted and considered reasonable but is found not to be applied or not to
be applied effectively, a further examination by the exporting Member based on the actual inputs involved would need to be carried out in the context of determining whether an excess payment occurred. If the investigating authorities deemed it necessary, a further examination would be carried out in accordance with paragraph 1.
3. Investigating authorities should treat inputs as physically incorporated if such inputs are used in the production process and are physically present in the product exported. The Members note that an input need not be present in the final product in the same form in which it entered the production process.
4. In determining the amount of a particular input that is consumed in the production of the exported product, a "normal allowance for waste" should be taken into account, and such waste should be treated as consumed in the production of the exported product. The term "waste" refers to that portion of a given input which does not serve an independent function in the production process, is not consumed in the production of the exported product (for reasons such as inefficiencies) and is not recovered, used or sold by the same manufacturer.
5. The investigating authority's determination of whether the claimed allowance for waste is "normal" should take into account the production process, the average experience of the industry in the country of export, and other technical factors, as appropriate. The investigating authority should bear in mind that an important question is whether the authorities in the exporting Member have reasonably calculated the amount of waste, when such an amount is intended to be included in the tax or duty rebate or remission.
ANNEX III GUIDELINES IN THE DETERMINATION OF SUBSTITUTION DRAWBACK SYSTEMS ASEXPORT SUBSIDIES
I
Drawback systems can allow for the refund or drawback of import charges inputs which are consumed in the production process of another product and where the export of this latter product contains domestic inputs having the same quality and characteristics as those substituted for the imported inputs. Pursuant to paragraph (i) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I,substitution drawback systems can constitute an export subsidy to the extent that they result in an excess drawback of the import charges levied initially on the imported inputs for which drawback is being claimed.
II
In examining any substitution drawback system as part of a countervailing duty investigation pursuant to this Agreement, investigating authorities should proceed on the following basis:
1. Paragraph (i) of the Illustrative List stipulates that home market inputs may be substituted for imported inputs in the production of a product for export provided such inputs are equal in quantity to, and have the same quality and characteristics as, the imported inputs being substituted. The existence of a verification system or procedure is important because it enables the government of the exporting Member to ensure and demonstrate that the quantity of inputs for which drawback is claimed does not exceed the quantity of similar products exported, in whatever form, and that there is not drawback of import charges in excess of those originally levied on the imported inputs in question.
2. Where it is alleged that a substitution drawback system conveys a subsidy, the investigating authorities should first proceed to determine whether the government of the exporting Member has in place and applies a verification system or procedure. Where such a system or procedure is determined to be applied, the investigating authorities should then examine the verification procedures to see whether they are reasonable, effective for the purpose intended, and based on generally accepted commercial practices in the country of export. To the extent that the procedures are determined to meet this test and are effectively applied, no subsidy should be presumed to exist. It may be deemed necessary by the investigating authorities to carry out, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 12, certain practical tests in order to verify information or to satisfy themselves that the verification procedures are being effectively applied.
3. Where there are no verification procedures, where they are not reasonable, or where such procedures are instituted and considered reasonable but are found not to be actually applied or not applied effectively, there may be a subsidy. In such cases a further examination by the exporting Member based on the actual transactions involved would need to be carried out to determine whether an excess payment occurred. If the investigating authorities deemed it necessary, a further examination would be carried out in accordance with paragraph 2.
4. The existence of a substitution drawback provision under which exporters are allowed to select particular import shipments on which drawback is claimed should not of itself be considered to convey a subsidy.
5. An excess drawback of import charges in the sense of paragraph (i) would be deemed to exist where governments paid interest on any monies refunded under their drawback schemes, to the extent of the interest actually paid or payable.
ANNEX IV CALCULATION OF THE TOTAL AD VALOREM SUBSIDIZATION (PARAGRAPH 1(a)OF ARTICLE 6)
(Notes 62)
Notes 62: An understanding among Members should be developed, as necessary, on matters which are not specified in this Annex or which need further clarification for the purposes of paragraph 1 (a) of
Article 6
1. Any calculation of the amount of a subsidy for the purpose of paragraph 1(a) of Article 6 shall be done in terms of the cost to the granting government.
2. Except as provided in paragraphs 3 through 5, in determining whether the overall rate of subsidization exceeds 5 per cent of the value of the product, the value of the product shall be calculated as the total value of the recipient firm's (Notes 63) sales in the most recent 12-month period, for which sales data is available, preceding the period in which the subsidy is granted. (Notes 64)
Notes 63: The recipient firm is a firm in the territory of the subsidizing Member.
Notes 64: In the case of tax-related subsidies the value of the product shall be calculated as the total value of the recipient firm's sales in the fiscal year in which the tax-related measure was earned.
3. Where the subsidy is tied to the production or sale of a given product, the value of the product shall be calculated as the total value of the recipient firm's sales of that product in the most recent 12-month period, for which sales data is available, preceding the period in which the subsidy is granted.
4. Where the recipient firm is in a start-up situation, serious prejudice shall be deemed to exist if the overall rate of subsidization exceeds 15 per cent of the total funds invested. For purposes of this paragraph, a start-up period will not extend beyond the first year of production. (Notes 65)
Notes 65: Start-up situations include instances where financial commitments for product development or construction of facilities to manufacture products benefiting from the subsidy have been made, even though production has not begun.
5. Where the recipient firm is located in an inflationary economy country, the value of the product shall be calculated as the recipient firm's total sales (or sales of the relevant product, if the subsidy is tied) in the preceding calendar year indexed by the rate of inflation experienced in the 12 months preceding the month in which the subsidy is to be given.
6. In determining the overall rate of subsidization in a given year, subsidies given under different programmes and by different authorities in the territory of a Member shall be aggregated.
7. Subsidies granted prior to the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the benefits of which are allocated to future production, shall be included in the overall rate of subsidization.
8. Subsidies which are non-actionable under relevant provisions of this Agreement shall not be included in the calculation of the amount of a subsidy for the purpose of paragraph 1 (a) of Article 6.
ANNEX V PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING INFORMATION CONCERNING SERIOUS PREJUDIC
1. Every Member shall cooperate in the development of evidence to be examined by a panel in procedures under paragraphs 4 through 6 of Article 7. The parties to the dispute and any third-country Member concerned shall notify to the DSB, as soon as the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 7 have been invoked, the organization responsible for administration of this provision within its territory and the procedures to be used to comply with requests for information.
2. In cases where matters are referred to the DSB under paragraph 4 of Article 7, the DSB shall, upon request, initiate the procedure to obtain such information from the government of the subsidizing Member as necessary to establish the existence and amount of subsidization, the value of total sales of the subsidized firms, as well as information necessary to analyze the adverse effects caused by the subsidized product. (Notes 66) This process may include, where appropriate, presentation of questions to the government of the subsidizing Member and of the complaining Member to collect information, as well as to clarify and obtain elaboration of information available to the parties to a dispute through the notification procedures set forth in Part VII. (Notes 67)
Notes 66: In cases where the existence of serious prejudice has to be demonstrated.
Notes 67: The information-gathering process by the DSB shall take into account the need to protect information which is by nature confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis by any Member involved in this process.
3. In the case of effects in third-country markets, a party to a dispute may collect information, including through the use of questions to the government of the third country Member, necessary to analyze adverse effects, which is not otherwise reasonably available from the complaining Member or the subsidizing Member. This requirement should be administered in such a way as not to impose an unreasonable burden on the third-country Member. In particular, such a Member is not expected to make a market or price analysis specially for that purpose. The information to be supplied is that which is already available or can be readily obtained by this Member (e.g. most recent statistics which have already been gathered by relevant statistical
services but which have not yet been published, customs data concerning imports and declared values of the products concerned, etc.). However, if a party to a dispute undertakes a detailed market analysis at its own expense, the task of the person or firm conducting such an analysis shall be facilitated by the authorities of the third-country Member and such a person or firm shall be given access to all information which is not normally maintained confidential by the government.
4. The DSB shall designate a representative to serve the function of facilitating the information-gathering process. The sole purpose of the representative shall be to ensure the timely development of the information necessary to facilitate expeditious subsequent multilateral review of the dispute. In particular, the representative may suggest ways to most efficiently solicit necessary information as well as encourage the cooperation of the parties.
5. The information-gathering process outlined in paragraphs 2 through 4 shall be completed within 60 days of the date on which the matter has been referred to the DSB under paragraph 4 of Article 7. The information obtained during this process shall be submitted to the panel established by the DSB in accordance with the provisions of Part X . This information should include, inter alia, data concerning the amount of the subsidy in question (and, where appropriate, the value of total
s\ ales of the subsidized firms), prices of the subsidized product, prices of the non-subsidized product, prices of other suppliers to the market, changes in the supply of the subsidized product to the market in question and changes in market shares. It should also include rebuttal evidence, as well as such supplemental information as the panel deems relevant in the course of reaching its conclusions.
6. If the subsidizing and/or third-country Member fail to cooperate in the information-gathering process, the complaining Member will present its case of serious prejudice, based on evidence available to it, together with facts and circumstances of the non-cooperation of the subsidizing and/or third-country Member. Where information is unavailable due to non-cooperation by the subsidizing and/or third-country Member, the panel may complete the record as necessary relying on best information otherwise available.
7. In making its determination, the panel should draw adverse inferences from instances of non-cooperation by any party involved in the information-gathering process.
8. In making a determination to use either best information available or adverse inferences, the panel shall consider the advice of the DSB representative nominated under paragraph 4 as to the reasonableness of any requests for information and the efforts made by parties to comply with these requests in a cooperative and timely manner.
9. Nothing in the information-gathering process shall limit the ability of the panel to seek such additional information it deems essential to a proper resolution to the dispute, and which was not adequately sought or developed during that process. However, ordinarily the panel should not request additional information to complete the record where the information would support a particular party's position and the absence of that information in the record is the result of unreasonable noncooperation by that party in the information-gathering process.
ANNEX VI PROCEDURES FOR ON-THE-SPOT INVESTIGATIONS PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE 12
1. Upon initiation of an investigation, the authorities of the exporting Member and the firms known to be concerned should be informed of the intention to carry out on-the-spot investigations.
2. If in exceptional circumstances it is intended to include non-governmental experts in the investigating team, the firms and the authorities of the exporting Member should be so informed. Such non-governmental experts should be subject to effective sanctions for breach of confidentiality requirements.
3. It should be standard practice to obtain explicit agreement of the firms concerned in the exporting Member before the visit is finally scheduled.
4. As soon as the agreement of the firms concerned has been obtained, the investigating authorities should notify the authorities of the exporting Member of the names and addresses of the firms to be visited and the dates agreed.
5. Sufficient advance notice should be given to the firms in question before the visit is made.
6. Visits to explain the questionnaire should only be made at the request of an exporting firm. In case of such a request the investigating authorities may place themselves at the disposal of the firm; such a visit may only be made if (a) the authorities of the importing Member notify the representatives of the government of the Member in question and (b) the latter do not object to the visit.
7. As the main purpose of the on-the-spot investigation is to verify information provided or to obtain further details, it should be carried out after the response to the questionnaire has been received unless the firm agrees to the contrary and the government of the exporting Member is informed by the investigating authorities of the anticipated visit and does not object to it; further, it should be standard practice prior to the visit to advise the firms concerned of the general nature of the information to be verified and of any further information which needs to be provided, though this should not preclude requests to be made on the spot for further details to be provided in the light of information obtained.
8. Enquiries or questions put by the authorities or firms of the exporting Members and essential to a successful on-the-spot investigation should, whenever possible, be answered before the visit is made.
ANNEX VII DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 (a) OF ARTICLE 27
The developing country Members not subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 (a) of Article 3 under the terms of paragraph 2(a) of Article 27 are:
(a) Least-developed countries designated as such by the United Nations which are Members of the WTO.
(b) Each of the following developing countries which are Members of the WTO shall be subject to the provisions which are applicable to other developing country Members according to paragraph 2 (b) of Article 27 when GNP per capita has reached
$1,000per annum (Notes 68): Bolivia, Cameroon, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe.
Notes 68: The inclusion of developing country Members in the list in paragraph (b) is based on the most recent data from the World Bank on GNP per capita.