A note on Nozickian Lockeanism Sample Clauses

A note on Nozickian Lockeanism. Xxxxxx is one of the most influential modern Lockeans, particularly regarding matters of property.138 He is not typically considered a liberal, however. Xxxxxxx uses the example of Xxxxxx to help make a distinction between libertarians and liberals, claiming that libertarians are not liberals partly because theorists like Xxxxxx believe in a kind of feudalistic ‘private political power’, rather than the public political power that Xxxxxxx claims that liberals believe should be ‘impartially exercised for 138 This focus on property rights is shared by various non-Nozickian contemporary classical liberals who could also be seen to have been influenced by Xxxxx. Xxx Xxx and Xxxxxxxxx, for instance, equate property rights to ‘the freedom to act and, hence, to live according to one’s own choices’: Xxx Xxx and Xxxxxxxxx, Norms of Liberty, 100. This reflects the Hegelian approach to the grounding of property rights, on which, ‘because property gives “existence” to freedom, it grounds a right’: Xxxxxx, “Xxxxx’x Justification of Private Property,” 576. But the focus by Xxx Xxx and Xxxxxxxxx on living ‘according to one’s choices’ also resonates with the importance of being a free agent, in a Lockean sense. This relates, too, to the subtle yet fundamental difference between this kind of account and the more standard contemporary Lockean account, on which, as Christmas summarises, ‘a claim against interference in one’s ongoing activities captures the basic liberal impulse behind the various interpretations of Lockeanism [with regards to property acquisition]’: Christmas, “Ambidextrous Lockeanism,” 210. the common good’.139 Furthermore, Xxxxxxx contends that libertarians’ focus on the ‘sanctity of private property’ and the ‘inherent justice of market distribution’ leads them to believe that people have a fundamental right to ‘whatever they acquire by market exchange’ — and that this amounts to preferencing a set of ‘bilateral contracts’ over the bigger societal social contract.140 Now, some of Xxxxxx’x positions do seem inimical to liberalism; it is arguable, for instance, as to whether he advances any kind of conception of political society. Moreover, whilst he is certainly a Lockean in many senses, he is not a Lockean liberal, not least regarding his rejection of contractarianism (in favour of a hypothetical invisible-hand process, by which something that qualifies sufficiently as a state-like entity is justifiedly ‘backed into’). 141 Xxxxxxxxx, however, contrasts ‘Ra...