Dispositionalism and Dispositional Essences. The first objection concerns the need for positing categorical properties. This is connected to the wider debate about the ontology of properties, specifically to the distinction between dispositionalism, categoricalism, and hybrid views of properties. The dispositionalist argues that the world can be wholly characterised in terms of dispositions – how something behaves under certain conditions. The most straightforward way of analysing dispositions in terms of counterfactual conditionals is the simple conditional analysis (Xxxx & Xxxx 2018): An object is disposed to M when C if and only if it would M if it were the case that C. A common example is mass: it is because of mass that particles have the disposition to exert a force of attraction on each other. The condition C is the two particles standing in a certain relation, while the manifestation M is the exertion of the force of attraction. The broader idea is that stimulus conditions and manifestations can be identified for any disposition, so that any disposition would exhibit its characteristic manifestation under the relevant stimulus condition (Xxxx & Xxxx 2018). There are various counterexamples to the simple conditional analysis, but for the purposes of this section, I believe it is sufficient. In the simplest possible terms, it is intuitive that the definition of a disposition rests on how the object possessing that disposition behaves under certain conditions, which is also how Russellian monists frame the issue when making the claim that science only ever describe what things do. The dispositionalist can object to the Russellian monist by asking for a justification of the claim that dispositions have to be grounded in something categorical. The strongest forms of dispositionalism, such as dispositional monism or pan-dispositionalism, state that either all suitably qualified properties are essentially dispositional, for the former, or that all properties in the broadest sense of the term have dispositional essences, for the latter (Xxxx & Xxxx 2018). How does the Russellian monist refute these views, apart from the demand that dispositions must be based in something categorical? In addition, if the dispositionalist can give a positive account of a dispositional essence, then it is unclear why consciousness should be regarded as the only suitable candidate to play the role of the ‘deep nature’ of matter. For example, Xxxxx Xxxxx (2013) and Xxxxxx Xxxxxx (2003) argue that dispositional essences ar...
