Network Initialization Sample Clauses

Network Initialization. For a single-authority MANET under consideration, it is reasonable to assume a trusted PKG to bootstrap the network, which itself is not part of the resulting network. We adopted some notations and frameworks for network initialization from [8]. (1) Generation of pairing parameters: To bootstrap the network, the PKG does the following: (a) Generate the pairing parameters  . Select an arbitrary generator W of  . (b) Choose a hash function  that maps arbitrary binary strings to non-zero elements in  . The specific MapToPoint operation,  is described by [17]. (c) Pick two distinct random numbers   ∈  as network master secrets. Section Ⅲ.1. Next, we discuss the method to achieve private key updating in Section Ⅲ.2. In Section Ⅲ.3,    표 1. 기호들 Table 1. Notations. Parameters     are public knowledge preloaded to each node, while  should never be    random integers ∈    two large primes  pairing s. t.   × →  i-th key update period  unique binary string associated with   encryption of m with symmetric key k   signature of m with private key A  pair-wise secret of node A and node B  → , MaptoPoint function    →, where t is bit length of key   network ID of node A  generator of   master secret for ID; only the TTP knows    master secret for the update element (in domain A); the TTP and a SC know    private ID of node A    private update element in phase  disclosed to any single node. But  is known to the SC in domain A only. In other words, only SCs can know the master secret for the update element. (2) Generation of ID-based private key: In our schemes, the private key is both node-specific and phase-specific. For instance, node A's private key which is valid only during phase  is denoted by            , in particular,                    . Initially, the      PKG issues    to node A, then which can    acquire      ≤   from the SCs in running network, as will be shown later. Such  '-s may not be of the same duration and thus do not require nodes to be time-synchronized for them either. Each  is associated with a unique binary string, called a phase salt and denoted by . Due to the difficulty of solving the DLP in  , it is computationally infeasible to derive the network as follow: ① B → A  B chooses a random integer ∈ , computes   ...