Network Initialization Sample Clauses
Network Initialization. For a single-authority MANET under consideration, it is reasonable to assume a trusted PKG to bootstrap the network, which itself is not part of the resulting network. We adopted some notations and frameworks for network initialization from [8].
(1) Generation of pairing parameters: To bootstrap the network, the PKG does the following:
(a) Generate the pairing parameters . Select an arbitrary generator W of .
(b) Choose a hash function that maps arbitrary binary strings to non-zero elements in . The specific MapToPoint operation, is described by [17].
(c) Pick two distinct random numbers ∈ as network master secrets. Section Ⅲ.1. Next, we discuss the method to achieve private key updating in Section Ⅲ.2. In Section Ⅲ.3,
표 1. 기호들 Table 1. Notations. Parameters are public knowledge preloaded to each node, while should never be random integers ∈ two large primes pairing s. t. × → i-th key update period unique binary string associated with encryption of m with symmetric key k signature of m with private key A pair-wise secret of node A and node B → , MaptoPoint function →, where t is bit length of key network ID of node A generator of master secret for ID; only the TTP knows master secret for the update element (in domain A); the TTP and a SC know private ID of node A private update element in phase disclosed to any single node. But is known to the SC in domain A only. In other words, only SCs can know the master secret for the update element.
(2) Generation of ID-based private key: In our schemes, the private key is both node-specific and phase-specific. For instance, node A's private key which is valid only during phase is denoted by , in particular, . Initially, the PKG issues to node A, then which can acquire ≤ from the SCs in running network, as will be shown later. Such '-s may not be of the same duration and thus do not require nodes to be time-synchronized for them either. Each is associated with a unique binary string, called a phase salt and denoted by . Due to the difficulty of solving the DLP in , it is computationally infeasible to derive the network as follow: ① B → A B chooses a random integer ∈ , computes ...
