Putting The Pieces Together. Political Economy Models of Investor Protections While identifying the relevant interest groups is an important first step towards understanding the politics of corporate governance, the crucial second step is to understand the political-economic environment in which they operate. One commonly adopted model is as parsimonious as it is potentially powerful: corporate insiders represent the most organized and influential interest groups, and their preferences will ultimately dictate policy (Xxxxxxxxx forthcoming, Xxxxx and Zingales 2003, Xxxxxx 1987).. While the success of corporate insiders in protecting their rents is undeniable, most analysts do not see the inevitable domination of one interest group, but rather a contested political battles in which both side can and do occasionally win. To that end, a variety of theories focus on the political context in which interest groups compete. Xxx (2003) argues that the key contextual factor is the presence or absence of a social democratic government that empowers labor and their supposed opposition to investor protection. Xxxxxxxxxx and Xxxxx (2005) argue that the social democracy observed by Xxx is not principally characterized by labor strength, but rather by a cross-class alliance between labor and management. In other models, including, to an extent Xxxxxxxxxx and Xxxxx'x but particularly Hall and Xxxxxxx (2001), investor protections are one part of a larger set of interrelated policies – along with labor relations, banking, education and others – that, in the language of the varieties of capitalism literature, separate coordinated market economies (CME) from liberal market economies (LME). The premise of a CME is that actors make investments in skills, product market standards, production strategies, and firm to firm relationships that assume long term stability in the corporate landscape and in employment. An inactive market for corporate control is a necessary precondition for this stability. Importantly, this cross-interest group bargain also requires the political stability found in consensus-based government.1011 Xxxxxx and Xxxxxx (2005) develop a four actor model (labor, managers, shareholders and a residual group of the unemployed and the self-employed) in which investor protection and employment benefits are jointly determined by election seeking politicians. The need to maximize votes under proportional representation leads politicians to aim their policies towards the most organized social group...
Putting The Pieces Together. Morphology on D shows GEND, but never NUM features. • Movement into D targets constituents that contain GEND-, but not NUM- features. Proposal: D acquires its φ-features in a relation with NP. The connection to movement in Sec. A.2.2 suggests that this might be AGREE. • If so the φ-features on D must not delete after being checked, but must remain present be accessed by agreement targets. This issue is related to the persistent presence of φ-features discussed in Sec. 4. • If the probe on D was a normal φ-probe comprising GEND and NUM, φP should intervene between D and NP. I suggest instead that the feature on D is a categorical N-feature, a syntactic expression of the relation between D and its complement. The sharing of φ-features between D and N is a byproduct of D checking the N-feature. If on GEND is present on D, DP external agreement controllers only have access to GEN, resulting in partial agreement.
