Plan of the Dissertation Sample Clauses

Plan of the Dissertation. The present chapter outlined how both longstanding and emergent reading approaches to the Gospel of John have for the most part neglected or caricatured its economic dimensions; reviewed those studies which have distinguished themselves by treating some dimension of the Gospel and economic factors; and identified the methodological approach of the current investigation into John 2:13–22. As noted, this study will carry out an exegesis of John 2:13–22 that pays special attention to the unique commercial language and imagery of the scene in light of the archaeological, textual, and comparative evidence relevant to temple commerce in first-century Judea and first- and early second-century Asia Minor Egypt, and Syria. Chapter 2 presents the economic background of John 2:13–22 by examining the temple commerce of the Jerusalem temple in the first century. Chapter 3 provides an exegesis of John 2:13–22 within its narrative setting of pre-70 Judea. Chapter 4 will raise the relevant economic evidence pertaining to John’s readers in first- and second-century C.E. Asia Minor, Egypt, and Syria and will address the meaning-effects such economic evidence has for readers in those contexts, using economic evidence derived mainly from the temple of Artemis in Ephesus but also from the Serapeum in Alexandria and the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus in Antioch.142 A concluding chapter will discuss the implications of this investigation for the interpretation of other parts of John’s Gospel (including other passages with unique economic features) and for Johannine scholarship more generally.

Plan of the Dissertation. The remainder of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the political and economic determinants of variation in investor protection. Chapter 3 presents a formal model of my theory, its equilibrium solution, and enumerates the hypotheses to be tested. Chapters, 4, 5 and 6 are empirical. In chapter 4 I explore the political determinants of variation in shareholder voting rights and the worldwide diffusion of xxxxxxx xxxxxxx laws through a series of quantitative tests. The appeal of these two variables is that, collectively, they reflect both corporate governance policy and securities law. Moreover, both variables speak directly to the distributional consequences between insiders and outside investors, and both have been shown in the quantitative literature to covary with economic outcomes in the way envisioned by my theory. Of particular note, xxxxxxx xxxxxxx laws have statistical qualities that allow for far more precise insights into the political and economic conditions that engender high levels of investor protection than either shareholder voting rights or any other variable used in the extant literature.