Reconciliation – Why Not Both? Sample Clauses

Reconciliation – Why Not Both?. Xxxxx offers an alternative that should appeal both to proponents of the standard Russellian argument and her dispositionalist argument for panpsychism by relying on the identity theory of powers, as discussed by X. X. Xxxxxx and Xxxx Xxxx (1999). It might seem that the Russellian monist argument and Xxxxx’x argument are incompatible, if Russellian monism is understood as a form of categoricalism, and if categorical and dispositional properties are opposites, as Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxx (1997) conceives of them since he claims that categorical properties are completely non-relational and non-dispositional (Dondoni 2022: 52). Standard Russellian monists would deny the view that mental properties are dispositional in their nature, which is what Xxxxx claims, while pure dispositionalists would simply reject the need for categorical properties, which is a part of the Russellian argument under this construal. Similarly, dispositionalists would reject that there is a need for a categorical aspect or part of a property, which is the claim that proponents of the identity theory of powers and of the compound view make (Dondoni 2022: 54). In order to accept both arguments and to make the case for panpsychism stronger, Mørch (2018: 1079) subscribes to the view that all properties are necessarily both dispositional and categorical, as opposed to purely one or the other. This means that ‘categorical’ and ‘dispositional’ are just two ways of referring to the same property – the categorical and dispositional aspect, as well as the property itself, are all identical (Dondoni 2022: 54). So, if the panpsychist accepts the identity theory of powers, they can accept both that the only causal powers we know of or can positively conceive of are mental and that all physical objects have categorical properties (Dondoni 2022: 50). The argument goes as follows (Dondoni 2022: 50):