Replay Attack Sample Clauses

Replay AttackThe proposed scheme is secure against the replay attack due to the changeable session keys: SK = SKA = SKB = e(QA, QB )K(XA+XB)xAxBP. The session key derived from the hash value of the temporary identities and the public keys. The temporary identity GUTI is changeable according to the user’s loca- tion area, and hence when the attacker replays with the previous security parameters, then the request will be re- jected because the users UE’s will know that this request is invalid.
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Replay Attack. During the communication between the B-GKAP entities, an attacker might sniff mes- sages in the network and re-transmit sniffed messages for malicious reasons such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. To protect against replay attacks, timestamp variable (T ) is added into the protocol messages. Hence, the receiver entity can check T value against replay attack attempts.
Replay Attack. Transmitted messages include 𝑥 and 𝑦 nonces but have no timestamp. Because of traffic constraints of vehicles and IoT devices, they cannot store all the nonces. Thus, an adversary can capture the first <𝐼𝐷𝑖, 𝑅𝑖 , 𝜏𝑖 > or the second < 𝐼𝐷𝑗 , Xx, 𝜏𝑗 > message and transmit it later to be verified by the receiver. It is, therefore, vulnerable to replay attack.
Replay Attack. The random numbers xXX and gS prevent replay attacks. Suppose an adversary A cap- tures any or all of the aired messages such as QR, C0, and C1 and masquerades these messages either with a previous message or any arbitrary values, the enti- ties return a failure as the substituted message does not contain the correct response for a given challenge.
Replay Attack. We assume that the intruder , with the aim of intercepting communication between ℛ and ℛ , attempts to capture and then replay the message, Ψ1: Ψ1 = ( NON, Ω, Λ, , , ) To proceed ahead, will be required to compute the value of NON = ( N). However, to do so, the value needs to be extracted from the relation = . . The same process needs to be repeated in case replay is demanded for 2 and 3. Here, again, performing such computational effort is equivalent to solving the hyper elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which is far too complex to be resolved by the intruder . Therefore, the proposed scheme guarantees protection from the Replay Attack.
Replay Attack. In [12], Ȃ may initiate replay attack which may prevent user and ESP to authenticate the involved CSj. The attack may be initiated by taking the following steps: 1. The attacker intercepts the message M1={NIDi, Ru, EL, B1} on its way to a particular charging station CSj. Next, it appends any intercepted message of CSj issued for other subscriber {IDc, Rc, LRICS, B2} with Ui’s message and forwards M2={M1, IDc, Rc, LRICS, B2} towards ESP. Now Ȃ may obstruct the message completely and forwards a new message; or else it may utilize a fast communication channel to forward message towards ESP before original message could reach the server. 2. Upon receiving the message from Ȃ, the ESP verifies all the parameters of legitimate user. However, it may not determine the Ȃ’s involvement or non-participation of CSj entity in forwarding the received message. The ESP constructs response message and submits to CSj, which is received by Ȃ. The Ȃ, in return, forwards the message to Xx. The message is validated by the user and recovers agreed session key. The pseudonym is also updated in its repository by Xx. However, the legal CSj is ignorant of the created session key by Ui or ESP. Although, it does not disturb the overall system, yet it makes the participants (user and ESP) erroneously believe that the session key is mutually shared by the intended participants. The user will be kept in waiting position from the CSj for any feedback or response. Similarly, ESP shall be expecting from CSj of any revenue credited to its account, since ESP had verified CSj’s authenticity to a particular user.
Replay Attack. The replay attack is replaying the same message of the receiver or the sender again.
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Replay Attack. Suppose that an adversary E eavesdrops the login re- quest message and tries to perform replay attack in fu- ture. Upon receiving {CIDi, V, D, F1, F2, M1} from E, user Uijs identity IDi, server’s private key x. Mean- while, Uk requires to compute F1∗ = RPWi ⊕ h(C1ǁIDi), F2∗ = C4 ⊕ h(V ∗ǁC1) ⊕ h(xǁyǁD), which is not possible, since E does not know IDi, RPWi, x. That is, the pro- posed scheme is able to against the user spoofing attack.
Replay Attack. 1 1 1 The replay attack is one of the known attacks that the attacker attempt to interrupts the message and resends it in later time. Suppose an adversary V intercepts the authentication message <Di, Ci, Fi, Xi> from the legitimate user Xx, and tries to replay the request message at a later point of the time. The proposed scheme make of use the freshly generated timestamp T for login and authentication. In each communication message the fresh timestamp is send in plain text like <Di, Ci, Fi, Xi> as well as embedded in some secret message such as Fi = (idbi || pwbi || N1 || Ri || T1) it contains timestamps T1. Therefore, if adversary V replays the old message it will not pass the freshness test, and if V may sends new timestamp along with the old message, it will not pass the next verification test where the proposed scheme checks the embedded timestamp by |T * - T | ≤ ∆T. Figure 5 shows this operation, where if |T * - T1| > ∆T, it will be fails to generate shared session key between client and server. So that, the proposed scheme prevents the replay attack. See figure 5-1. 5-1. Failure of generate session key. In impersonation attack, an adversary V try to impersonate the server S or user Xx. In server impersonation attack, the adversary V tries to generate <Ki, N3, T2>. However, it's impossible to generate Ki = h (SK || Ri || N2 || T2 || N1 || T1) without the knowledge of pwi, bi, and ds, where ds is a private key for server S that is hard to derive due to ECDLP problem in elliptic curve algorithm. In user impersonation attack the adversary V cannot impersonate user Xx during login phase and cannot modify the login request message <Ci, Fi, Di> due to the unknown parameters pwi, bi, and Ri that’s used in the computation of this login request message. Also, the authentication request message cannot be modified by adversary V, that’s the computation of SKV embedded SK that requires Ri, N1, and T1. In addition to, it's hard to know the private key ds of the server S (ECDLP problem). If the adversary V stole the smart-card SC and get the information in the SC (Ai, DP, Xx, EP (a, b), h (.)), there is no way for V to guess the identity ID and password pw. For example, Ai = Ri ^ h (pwbi || ID), Ri = h (idbi || ds), the adversary V cant guess the ID and pw due to the hash function, and cannot know private key ds for server S due to the difficulty of solving ECDLP in elliptic curve algorithm. So that the proposed scheme prevents stolen smart attack. During the logi...
Replay AttackThe participants MUi and GRSj select random numbers and compute the login request message and response message as R4 and R10, respectively. Since the random nonces are fresh, the participants GRSj, CMDi and MUi might discern the legitimate requests from the replayed messages through verification checks. Hence, our scheme is immune to this replay attack threat.
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