Common use of SENATOR XXXXXXXX Clause in Contracts

SENATOR XXXXXXXX. I understand your point, and what you said about India’s intent and India’s pledge that any U.S. assistance to its civil nuclear energy program will not benefit its nuclear weap- ons program, and it’s committed itself, as you noted in your testi- mony, to follow the same practices as responsible nations, to follow those practices. But how can we be fully assured of any commit- ment? I mean, India had previously claimed it was using nuclear technology for civilian purposes, right up until the time it tested in 1974. What kind of assurance do we have? Secretary XXXXX. Well, sir, there’s no perfect guarantee, as you know, but our conviction is that by moving in this direction, we’re deepening the incentive for India to focus on civilian nuclear en- ergy, and deepening its incentive to continue to move into the mainstream of the nonproliferation regime. But, to be honest, and to answer your question, there’s not per- fect guarantee. Senator XXXXXXXX. Well, I appreciate your candor. Secretary Xxxx, you testified that India has submitted a docu- ment with the IAEA that satisfies the requirement of the Hyde Act that India submit a declaration of its facilities in order to ensure that international—international assistance—does not benefit In- dia’s weapons programs. Isn’t it true, however, that India has negotiated an agreement with the IAEA which provides that the final declaration will not be submitted until the safeguards agreement has entered into force, and this has not yet occurred? Xx. XXXX. The Indian Government, in 2006, published a separa- tion plan, that is, a plan to separate its civilian facilities from those related to its strategic program. Since that time, the Indian Gov- ernment has negotiated an IAEA safeguards agreement, and they have transmitted their separation plan to the IAEA Director Gen- eral, which has then been transmitted to the IAEA membership. The Indian Government stands behind their separation plan, and that plan for the phased application of safeguards is—constitutes India’s indication of how it plans to declare facilities as civilian.

SENATOR XXXXXXXX. Thank you, Mr. Xxxxxxxx, this is obviously a very important hearing, so thank you for holding it. And Secretary Xxxxx, I understand also appreciate your pointwillingness to come back to the Senate, after seeing you yesterday on Russia and Geor- gia. Good to see you, Secretary Xxxx and Xx. Xxxxxxxxx. When we debated the United States-India Civil Nuclear Coopera- tion Agreement 2 years ago, I noted my concerns that it would dra- matically shift 30 years of nonproliferation policy. Without ques- tion, our relationship with India is one of the most important in the region, and what you said about in the world, and is absolutely critical to building a secure, stable, and prosperous global system. But, I still am concerned that this agreement does not have xxx- xxxxx protections to guard against the spread of nuclear weapons, and nuclear technology. After reviewing this unprecedented deal—including, once again, the supporting classified documents, which I recommend all of my colleagues take a look at, and after discussing this agreement with senior Indian Government officials on a recent trip to India—I am still concerned that this deal seriously undermines nonproliferation efforts, and could contribute to an arms race that would have glob- al implications. I think we could have crafted a deal that would have benefited our national interests, as well as India’s, but if Congress approves this deal in its current form, I believe we will not have done that. In late August, the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group at- tempted—attempted—to reduce the negative impact of this agree- ment on their ability to prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear ma- xxxxxxx, but the administration succeeded in overcoming those ef- forts. Congress now has a choice—approve this deal in its current, flawed form, or require the administration to seek nonproliferation measures to try to ensure we don’t undermine the coalitions that we all know we’ve meticulously put together over the last 30 years. The proliferation of nuclear technology, know-how and material is one of the top national security threats we face. While India may share a desire to control the spread of nuclear weapons, by under- mining international standards this agreement may actually con- tribute to that threat. Now, I remain concerned that this agreement could indirectly benefit India’s intent and India’s pledge that any U.S. assistance to its civil nuclear energy program will not benefit its nuclear weap- ons weapons program, and it’s committed itself, as you noted potentially con- tribute to an arms race in your testi- mony, to follow the same practices as responsible nations, to follow those practices. But how can we be fully assured of any commit- ment? I mean, India had previously claimed it was using nuclear technology for civilian purposes, right up until the time it tested in 1974. What kind of assurance do we have? Secretary XXXXX. Well, sir, there’s no perfect guarantee, as you know, but our conviction is that by moving in this direction, we’re deepening the incentive for India to focus on civilian nuclear en- ergy, and deepening its incentive to continue to move into the mainstream of the nonproliferation regime. But, to be honest, and to answer your question, there’s not per- fect guarantee. Senator XXXXXXXX. Well, I appreciate your candor. Secretary Xxxx, you testified that India has submitted a docu- ment with the IAEA that satisfies the requirement of the Hyde Act that India submit a declaration of its facilities in order to ensure that international—international assistance—does not benefit In- dia’s weapons programsregion. Isn’t it truetrue that, howeverby opening the door to providing nuclear supplies to India, that India has negotiated an agreement with the IAEA which provides that the final declaration will not be submitted until the safeguards agreement has entered into force, and this has not yet occurred? Xx. XXXX. The Indian Government, in 2006, published a separa- tion plan, that is, a plan to separate its civilian facilities from those related to its strategic program. Since that time, the Indian Gov- ernment has negotiated an IAEA safeguards agreement, and they have transmitted their separation plan to the IAEA Director Gen- eral, which has then been transmitted to the IAEA membership. The Indian Government stands behind their separation plan, and that plan we are freeing up local fuel supplies for the phased application of safeguards is—constitutes India’s indication of how it plans to declare facilities as civilianweapons program? Secretary Xxxxx.

SENATOR XXXXXXXX. Thank you very much, Mr. Xxxxxxxx. In this morning’s Washington Post, there was an article, ‘‘06 Blueprint Leak Intensifies Concerns over U.S./India Deal,’’ I understand your pointdon’t know if you’ve had a chance to see the article yet, but it says, ‘‘In January 2006, an Indian Government agency purchased newspaper ads seeking help in building an obscure piece of metal machinery. The details of the project available to bidders were laid out in a se- xxxx of drawings that jolted nuclear weapons experts who discov- ered them that spring. The blueprints depicted the inner workings of a centrifuge, a machine used to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. In most Western countries, such drawings would have been considered secret, but the Indian diagrams were available for a nominal bidding fee. ’’ And the person who was able to buy the diagrams paid about $10. Are we concerned about leakage of nuclear secrets if an agree- ment like this goes through, and what do we do to prevent it from happening? Xx. XXXX. Senator, we’ve seen the press article that you said about India’s intent and India’s pledge that any U.S. assistance to its civil nuclear energy program will not benefit its nuclear weap- ons programref- erence, and it’s committed itselfof course the underlying report from an institute called ISIS. We obviously take very seriously the subject matter, and the ex- amples that were cited. We were aware of these at the State De- partment prior to the publication of that article. I would say, the Indian Government has taken significant steps to strengthen their export controls since 2005. In 2005, you had the enactment of a landmark piece of legisla- tion in India, which is a weapons of mass destruction law, and the subsequent implementing regulations, and the harmonization with the nuclear suppliers group and missile technology control regime guidelines are very significant. So, we’ve seen a significant im- provement in Indian export controls and practices. We obviously take very seriously this whole range of concerns, and indeed, no export control system is perfect. Under my area of the State Department, for instance, the political-military bureau enforces compliance with U.S. export laws, in part, and there are other agencies of the government that do, as well. Regrettably, there are American firms which are fined by the State Department every year for violations of our export control laws. So, while we certainly want to encourage the Indian Govern- ment, and we believe they are taking greater steps to control their export controls, and we take this very seriously, there are no per- fect systems, including our own. Senator XXXXXXXX. In looking at this agreement, I see what we’re trying to do is increase international nuclear cooperation be- tween the United States and India and then deal with certain na- tions that do not want to cooperate on nonproliferation objectives. How do you noted in your testi- mony, to follow the same practices view this whole relationship as responsible nations, to follow those practices. But how can we be fully assured of any commit- ment? I mean, India had previously claimed it was using nuclear technology for civilian purposes, right up until the time it tested in 1974. What kind of assurance do we havehelping develop in- creased international cooperation? Secretary XXXXX. Well, sirxxx, there’s no perfect guarantee, as you know, but our conviction is I think the various steps that by moving in this direction, we’re deepening the incentive for India to focus on civilian nuclear en- ergyhas committed itself to, and deepening its incentive to continue to move into the mainstream of that it’s moving ahead on, I think, help on the nonproliferation regime. But, to be honest, and in other areas, as well. For ex- ample, we’ve talked about the danger of the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology of countries who decide that they need to answer your questionmaster the fuel cycle, therewhich is a huge challenge—not just in Iran in North Korea—but potentially other parts of the world. Indian’s not per- fect guaranteewillingness to commit itself to work actively with Xxxxxxx XxXxxxxxx and that IAEA on the concept of international fuel banks, which Senator Xxxx, and others, have worked on over the years, I think, is an important step forward and shows an In- dian willingness to work with us, and work with the IAEA to help stop, or fill, one of the major gaps that exists in nonproliferation regime today. So, that’s just one example. Senator XXXXXXXX. Well, I appreciate your candor. Secretary Xxxx, Do you testified also see economic benefits that India has submitted could come as a docu- ment with the IAEA that satisfies the requirement result of the Hyde Act that India submit a declaration of its facilities in order to ensure that international—international assistance—does not benefit In- dia’s weapons programs. Isn’t it true, however, that India has negotiated an agreement with the IAEA which provides that the final declaration will not be submitted until the safeguards agreement has entered into forcethis, and this has not yet occurred? Xx. XXXX. The Indian Government, in 2006, published talk about that a separa- tion plan, that is, a plan to separate its civilian facilities from those related to its strategic program. Since that time, the Indian Gov- ernment has negotiated an IAEA safeguards agreement, and they have transmitted their separation plan to the IAEA Director Gen- eral, which has then been transmitted to the IAEA membership. The Indian Government stands behind their separation plan, and that plan for the phased application of safeguards is—constitutes India’s indication of how it plans to declare facilities as civilian.little bit?