Server Masquerading Attack Sample Clauses

Server Masquerading Attack. In the proposed scheme, a malicious server MS cannot compute the correct M2= h(SK W C1*) because he (or she) does not know S’s private key x. Thereby, MS cannot compute or know C1*, and thus cannot derive the valid IDi. Without knowing Xx’s valid IDi and S’s private key x, MS has to break the secure one-way hash function to retrieve h(IDi). Furthermore, because MS cannot obtain h(IDi), it is impossible to fabricate the proper C1*=h(h(IDi)⊕x) to pass the verification of Ui in Step L2 of the verification phase. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against server masquerading attack.
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Server Masquerading Attack. The attacker may impersonate himself as GRSj and submits the message R7 towards the

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