Fang Lu, Jiangshun Zhang, Dandan WangCooperative Service Contract • May 8th, 2016
During tour-guides service outsourcing, tourists entrust travel agencies with tourism service, and travel agencies entrust tour-guides service providers with part of tourism service. Due to asymmetric information, tourists‟ experience and satisfaction cannot achieve their expected targets. To solve it, cooperative service contracts are designed on tour-guides service outsourcing with a travel agency as dual principal-agent roles, and parameters of cooperative contracts and tourists‟ revenue are analyzed by mathematical models and numerical simulation. Research results show that contracts with reward-penalty mechanism added to revenue sharing can effectively increase partners‟ revenue and improve tourists‟ satisfaction; but too high intensity of reward-penalty can only ensure revenue of tourists and travel agencies, which, however, damages revenue of service providers, failing to guarantee long-term cooperation during tour-guides service outsourcing.
