National polarization and international agreementsInternational Environmental Agreements • September 23rd, 2021
aSchool of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287; bSchool of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287; and cCollege of Humanities and Social Sciences, Grand Canyon University, Phoenix, AZ 85017
Overlapping International Environmental R&D Agreements with Transaction CostsInternational Environmental Agreements • September 21st, 2018
◼ Paris Agreement (2015) goals: Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is very likely necessary to achieve these goals (see, e.g., “The Global Status of CCS: 2017”).
International environmental agreements in shortInternational Environmental Agreements • April 12th, 2009
International environmental agreements to which the Maldives is PartyInternational Environmental Agreements • September 13th, 2007
International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertaintyInternational Environmental Agreements • December 3rd, 2011
This paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two-period model where the prob- ability of a regime shift increases with the first-period emissions, we examine the issue of coalition formation under both fixed and dynamic membership. Our analysis suggests that endogenous uncertainty may increase participation. Moreover, we find that full cooperation may be sustained, but only in the presence of endogenous uncertainty. Interestingly, when the shift in the environmental damage is large enough, the model provides a way to solve the “puzzle of small coalitions” found in the literature related to International Environmental Agreements (IEAs).
ContractInternational Environmental Agreements • July 26th, 2004
略号 英語 訳語 備考 AEWA African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbird Agreement アフリカ・ユーラシア渡り性水鳥保全協定 ボン条約の補足協定のひとつ CBD CEPA Convention on Biological Diversity 生物多様性条約 Communications, education, and publicawareness 広報・教育・普及啓発 CIESIN Center for International Earth ScienceInformation Network 地球科学情報ネットワーク国際センター CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 絶滅のおそれのある野生動植物の種の国際取引に関する条約 ワシントン条約 CMS Convention on the Conservation of MigratorySpecies of Wild Animals 移動性の野生動物種の保全に関する条約 ボン条約 COP COP8 Conference of the Contracting Parties 締約国会議 8th meeting of the Conference of theContracting Parties 第８回締約国会議 CP CST Contracting Party 条約の締約国 Committee on Science and Technology 科学技術委員会 砂漠化対処条約の技術委員会 DIVERSITAS Scientific Committee On Problems of theEnvironment-Worldwide 生物多様性科学国際協同プログラム EIA EKBY Environmental impact assessment 環境影響評価 The Greek Wetland / Biotope Centre ギリシャ湿地・ビオトープセンター FARWE Functional Analysis of European WetlandEcosystems 欧州湿地生態系機能分析法 GAP
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND THE CASE OF GLOBAL WARMINGInternational Environmental Agreements • October 8th, 2022
Keywords: global warming, externalities, international environmental agreements, Nash equilibrium, cost efficiency, participation constraints, equity, Kyoto Protocol
International Environmental Agreements, Fiscal Federalism, and Constitutional DesignfiInternational Environmental Agreements • April 9th, 2013
where the subscript s indicates the cooperative solution, which is optimal from the polluting regions‘ viewpoint. In contrast to the non-cooperative equilibrium, the abatement externality between the polluting regions is now internalised to some degree, which is reflected by the term ‹ α ‡ Øj on the right hand side of (F). Consequently, abatement levels are higher and environmental damage is lower than in the non-cooperative equilibrium.F Furthermore, condition (F) directly implies that, in contrast to the non-cooperative equilibrium, the abatement level in country s now also increases with the compensation rate in country j, and not only, as before, with the compensation and matching rates in country s. Thus, we have
Appendix 1: Current and Historical International Environmental Agreements affecting the Arctic58 MarineEnvironment Agreement Years of treaty and subsequent amendments andnotes Nations involved*,ᵼ Agreement Between The Government Of The United States...International Environmental Agreements • September 26th, 2022
Constitutional Choice, Fiscal Federalism, and International Environmental AgreementsInternational Environmental Agreements • February 17th, 2011
In this paper, we analyse how the prospect of international negotiations over trans- boundary pollution shape the countries' constitutional and political decisions that precede the bargaining process. We show that the countries' dominant strategy at the constitutional stage is to assign the authority over environmental policy and international negotiations to a subsidiary government in that region where the pol- lution has its origin. Although this decentralization of power is usually accompanied by a federal transfer scheme, there is no ‘fair' cost sharing within each country. The negotiating regions' shares of the national damage falls short of the corresponding shares of costs. This depresses the bargaining incentives of the regional negotiators and leads to a suboptimal international environmental agreement from the perspec- tive of the countries as a whole.
