International Fisheries AgreementsInternational Fisheries Agreements • May 16th, 2003
Pham Do, K. H., & Folmer, H. (2003). International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-52). Microeconomics.
International Fisheries Agreements and Non-consumptive ValuesInternational Fisheries Agreements • November 18th, 2016
The management of internationally shared fish stocks is a major economic, environmental and political issue. According to international law, these resources should be managed cooperatively under international fisheries agreements (IFAs). This paper studies the formation and stability of IFAs through a coalition game that accounts for both direct consumptive values (harvesting profits) and non-consumptive values of the fish stock per se. The results show that accounting for non-consumptive values helps conserve the fish stock in that equilibrium fishing efforts are smaller and fish stock larger than without non-consumptive values under all possible coalition scenarios (full, partial and no cooperation). However, considering non-consumptive values does not affect the outcome of the game in terms of the prospects for cooperation: even with substantial non-consumptive benefits, the outcome is full non-cooperation. Hence, the trap of non-cooperation in international fisheries management can
International Fisheries AgreementsInternational Fisheries Agreements • May 16th, 2003
Pham Do, K. H., & Folmer, H. (2003). International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-52). Microeconomics.
