Ashish KhistiSecret Key Agreement Protocol • May 8th, 2009
as required. Thus it only remains to establish (26). The proof follows closely the upper bound derived in [5] with some modifications to take into account the state parameters. Since κ = gn(u, ψk, sn) we have that
Ashish KhistiSecret Key Agreement Protocol • May 8th, 2009
as required. Thus it only remains to establish (26). The proof follows closely the upper bound derived in [5] with some modifications to take into account the state parameters. Since κ = gn(u, ψk, sn) we have that
Secret Key Agreement with Large Antenna Arrays under the Pilot Contamination AttackSecret Key Agreement Protocol • July 2nd, 2015
Abstract—We present a secret key agreement (SKA) protocol for a multi-user time-division duplex system where a base-station (BS) with a large antenna array (LAA) shares secret keys with users in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers. In the system, when the BS transmits random sequences to legitimate users for sharing common randomness, the eavesdroppers can attempt the pilot contamination attack (PCA) in which each of eavesdroppers transmits its target user’s training sequence in hopes of acquiring possible information leak by steering beam towards the eavesdropper. We show that there exists a crucial complementary relation between the received signal strengths at the eavesdropper and its target user. This relation tells us that the eavesdropper inevitably leaves a trace that enables us to devise a way of measuring the amount of information leakage to the eavesdropper even if PCA parameters are unknown. To this end, we derive an estimator for the channel gain from the BS to the
