Religious Institutions as Self-Enforcing AgreementsSelf-Enforcing Agreements • December 19th, 2023
This paper was prepared for the Conference on the Economics of Judaism and Jewish Observance, Bar-Ilan University and the University of Illinois at Chicago, December 13-16, 1998. Special thanks are due to Carmel U. Chiswick and Barry
Self-enforcing agreements and forward induction reasoning*Self-Enforcing Agreements • June 4th, 2018
In dynamic games, players may observe a deviation from a pre-play, possibly incomplete, non-binding agreement before the game is over. The attempt to rationalize the deviation may lead players to revise their beliefs about the deviator's behavior in the continuation of the game. This instance of forward induction reasoning is based on inter- active beliefs about not just rationality, but also the compliance with the agreement itself. I study the effects of such rationalization on the self-enforceability of the agreement. Accordingly, outcomes of the game are deemed implementable by some agreement or not. Conclusions de- part substantially from what the traditional equilibrium refinements suggest. A non subgame perfect equilibrium outcome may be induced by a self-enforcing agreement, while a subgame perfect equilibrium out- come may not. The incompleteness of the agreement can be crucial to implement an outcome. A particular way to rationalize deviations
Self-enforcing agreements and forward induction reasoning*Self-Enforcing Agreements • March 29th, 2018
In dynamic games, players may observe a deviation from a pre-play, possi- bly incomplete, non-binding agreement before the game is over. The attempt to rationalize the deviation may lead players to revise their beliefs about the deviator's behavior in the continuation of the game. This instance of forward induction reasoning is based on interactive beliefs about not just rationality, but also the compliance with the agreement itself. I study the effects of such rationalization on the self-enforceability of the agreement. Accordingly, out- comes of the game are deemed implementable by some agreement or not. Con- clusions depart substantially from what the traditional equilibrium refinements suggest. A non subgame perfect equilibrium outcome may be induced by a self- enforcing agreement, while a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome may not. The incompleteness of the agreement can be crucial to implement an outcome. A particular way to rationalize deviations allows to establish connections
