Examples of MD OPC in a sentence
In Docket No. ER21-2020-000, the Maryland Public Service Commission (Maryland Commission) submitted a notice of intervention, and timely motions to intervene were filed by Maryland Office of People’s Counsel (MD OPC), the Office of the People’s Counsel for the District of Columbia (DC OPC), and Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc.
The MD OPC also submitted a motion to intervene in Docket No. ER21-2023-000.
The MD OPC and DC OPC (Interested Parties) protest the Companies’ filings, and SMECO protests Pepco’s filing.
MD OPC is an independent state agency designated by law to represent the interests of Maryland residential ratepayers before the Maryland Public Service Commission, federal agencies and the courts, pursuant to Section 2-201 et seq.
CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the Delaware PSC, Maryland PSC, Delaware DPA, MD OPC, ODEC, Easton, and DEMEC respectfully request that the Commission (i) accept and consider this Answer; (ii) reject the positions advanced in the PJM Transmission Owners’ Answer; and (iii) grant the relief requested in the Delmarva Zone Parties’ Protest, Motion for Rejection of Filing or, In the Alternative, for Suspension and Hearings filed in the above-captioned docket on August 25, 2017.
PJM’s review of the docket shows that on January 19, 2024, the Commission granted NextEra’s incentive requests and that MD OPC did not intervene in the proceeding to raise its concerns with the requested incentives.
The MD OPC Protest, PA OCA Answer, Newman’s Comments and Shaw’s Comments are collectively referred to herein as the “Protests,” and MD OPC, PA OCA, Newman, and Shaw are collectively referred to as “Protesters.” PJM notes that the Staff of the Virginia State Corporation Commission (“VSCC Staff”), Old Dominion Electric Cooperative (“ODEC”), and Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative, Inc.
January 10th Filing at 1.described above, MD OPC raises challenges regarding whether: (i) the Commission-accepted cost allocation methodologies applicable to transmission enhancements and expansions that address reliability needs are just and reasonable27 and (ii) PJM improperly implemented its tariffed process to select the Window 3 Projects.
California,26 which have, in turn, raised retail suppliers’ cost of business to unprofitable levels, driving them out of the retail business.27 The MD OPC also raised questions about whether some electricity suppliers may be withholding capacity, either unilaterally or collectively, in an effort to increase wholesale prices.28 In addition, some commenters noted that consistent market rules among wholesale markets are needed, especially among neighboring markets.
The MD OPC memo provides more discussion about how these savings estimates are dependent on the slope of capacity and energy market supply curves.