Common use of Commission Report Clause in Contracts

Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (Government Printing Office, 2004), 399-423; The Princeton Project on National Security: Forging a World of Liberty Under Law, U.S. National Security In The 21st Century (The Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx School of Public and International Affairs, 2006) offers two relevant assessments, Strategic Planning for U.S. National Security: A Project Solarium for the 21st Century and, Report of The Working Group on Foreign Policy Infrastructure and Global Institutions. 190 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). committee process but NSS indicate it is not consistent and bureaucratic tensions inhibit effectiveness.191 Cohesiveness within the NSC is also not assured as the competing nature of the departments and agencies for budget and influence over policy is an undermining dynamic.192 This naturally results in bureaucratic competition that inhibits a cohesive, integrated effort to resolve policy issues.193 Thus adjudication within the NSC committee process requires a capable and sufficiently empowered NSA and NSS.194 While the specific composition of the NSS is not a point of focus in this study, it is important to understand the roles NSS members performed as contributing factors in policy success or failure in the selected cases. Since NSS composition and empowerment are subject to presidential prerogative, it stands to reason that their influence varies from administration to administration. The NSS is intended to perform several functions including administration; policy coordination; supervision; adjudication; formulation; advocacy; and crisis management.195 Specific to the decision-making procedure, their formulation function depends solely on executive empowerment. Their key function is to manage the committee process and upon decision, monitor policy implementation and performance. In the event a president does not fully leverage the committee process, decision analysis acumen among NSC principals becomes a key point of interest. 191 Ibid. 192 Xxxxxxxxxxx X. Xxxxxxxxx, “The NSC Staff: Rebuilding the Policy Crucible,” (Parameters, 1989), 21. 193 Xxxxxxx, Xxxxxx X., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 707. 194 Ibid, 22. 195 Ibid, 22. This is certainly not assured as, much like other professions and sectors, few are actually trained in how to make decisions on complex issues.196 This is of particular importance when confronted by contemporary security policy problems characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity.197 The persistent threat from Al Qaeda, the ongoing Taliban insurgency, the Iraqi civil war, and the rise of ISIS illustrate that security policy decisions are often 'wicked' problems where clear solutions are elusive. A further challenge, is that these types of problems might be addressed through multiple strategies whose consequences are difficult to forecast.198 It is therefore necessary to consider NSC composition and their capacity to provide the analytical rigor these problems demand. NSC principals typically change with each administration, and despite professional members who span administrations, the majority of NSS also changes. This practice creates breaks in continuity and understanding of issues, thereby imposing a steep learning curve for new administrations. The Xxxxxx X. Xxxx NSC experienced the 9/11 attacks in their first nine months. The Xxxxxx Xxxxx NSC entered office to immediate strategic reviews on Iraq and Afghanistan, while a dire financial crisis competed for the president’s attention. In this environment it is reasonable to assert that new administrations will be prone to mistakes. Nevertheless, when confronted with a flood of competing issues and the fast pace of 21st century information flow, administrations must be capable of responsive decision-making. In this environment decision-makers must rapidly identify and often 196 Xxxx Xxxxxxx, Xxxxx Xxxxxx, Xxxxxx Xxxxxx, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 4. 197 Xxxxxx Xxxxxx, U.S. Army War College: Military Education In A Democracy, (Temple University Press, 2002), 6. VUCA is term coined by U.S. Army War College faculty in describing the post-Cold War security environment. 198 Xxxxx X.X. Xxxxxx, Xxxxxx X. Xxxxxx, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, (Policy Sciences Volume 4, 1973), 160-161. choose between sub-optimal, hedging options laden with compromises. Their challenge is “...to not get it too far wrong.”199 In this environment it is easy to neglect extensive analysis and instead consider security issues through reference to history and personal experience. Historical context and experience are certainly invaluable in understanding the nature of an issue and in avoiding past mistakes. However, reliance on historical reference and experience can quickly lead to over-simplification and conflation of issues. Reliance on experience and judgment alone are insufficient as doing so assumes the current problem is similar to past problems such that experience, and intellect are sufficient to address them. This assumption requires that all actors behave similarly, that all interests are known and that these are collectively similar to past problems such that judgments about them are reasonable. This is a significant oversimplification as complex problems, specifically contemporary security issues, are typically unique such that they defy historical analogy. Yet, it is under this construct of ‘experienced judgment’ that the National Security Council and committee system largely functions.