Common use of Development and Support Clause in Contracts

Development and Support. DHS reported early in the development of the Pinnacle Plan that public sector resources were strained due to the growing number of children in xxxxxx care. To develop and support more xxxxxx homes, DHS implemented a set of short-term strategies while it developed a longer-term reconceptualization of its business model for recruiting, assessing, supporting and certifying xxxxxx homes. In 2012 and continuing through 2013, DHS approved staff overtime, hired temporary staff, xxxxxxx retirees and contracted with vendors to complete xxxxxx care home studies. Additionally, DHS increased the availability of xxxxxx parent pre-service trainings in order to increase convenience and options for families. As articulated in its Pinnacle Plan, DHS’ chief longer-term strategy involved the privatization of non-xxx xxxxxx home development and support. DHS planned to continue to manage the pool of public agency xxxxxx homes that it had already developed and to utilize those homes for children’s placements. Moving forward, DHS articulated that private agencies would develop and support new xxxxxx homes after contracts were awarded, creating a bifurcated xxxxxx care system that would require close coordination between DHS and private agencies. In order to select the private agencies authorized to undertake this work with xxxxxx homes, DHS committed in its Pinnacle Plan to administer a contract bidding process through the issuance of a Request for Proposals (RFP) with the bidding process to be completed by September 30, 2012. However, DHS did not post the RFP on the state’s Central Purchasing website until October 29, 2012 with a proposal deadline of December 3, 2012, two months late. Throughout the RFP process, bidders expressed concerns to DHS leadership regarding what they believed to be a lack of bidder input concerning RFP outcomes, unrealistic performance metrics and fiscal penalties for agencies if certain performance targets were missed. One hundred twenty proposals were submitted in response to the RFP and DHS selected ten agencies to provide xxxxxx care services in 26 of its 29 child welfare districts. On April 12, 2013, DHS leadership cancelled the ten contracts, believing its longer-term goals identified in the Pinnacle Plan would be compromised by the awards. In its notice of cancellation to the contracted agencies, DHS explained that its original RFP language was too prescriptive and worked against provider creativity, flexibility and capability. DHS further observed that the service regions of the state had been artificially defined and worked against the reality of how xxxxxx homes could be recruited and supported. DHS expressed concern that a number of high quality agencies had been eliminated in the process and that providers did not have an opportunity to provide input in the design and details of the contracts. DHS then implemented another contracting process that allowed the Department to include input from providers, with performance outcomes negotiated with agencies and with the focus on strong public-private partnerships. In August 2013, contracts were awarded to four agencies to provide xxxxxx care services statewide, eleven months after the state’s commitment to do so in the Pinnacle Plan. DHS charged its private partners to develop 1,197 homes between August 2013–July 2014 and the Co-Neutrals accepted and adopted this performance goal as the DHS target outcome for the development of new non-relative xxxxxx homes in SFY14. Contracting with private agencies to provide xxxxxx care services impacts all child welfare system partners, including prospective xxxxxx parents, existing xxxxxx parents, and DHS staff. Due to the scale and importance of this system change, thoughtful transition planning was critical to execute effective implementation. The Co-Neutrals have reviewed the new contracts and meeting notes between the private agencies and DHS staff; met with leadership of each of the private agencies and with xxxxxx parents in focus groups in Tulsa and Oklahoma County; and inquired about the transition process in meetings with DHS staff. The Co-Neutrals have not found sufficient evidence that an adequate transition plan was developed and implemented. As an example, the new contracts did not include start-up time for private agencies to adequately develop capacity to undertake the new work. Once the contracts were awarded, DHS quickly began sending new inquiries from prospective xxxxxx parents to the contracted private agencies, while the xxxxxx care agencies were just beginning to recruit, train and hire new staff and, in some cases, set up new office space. Not surprisingly, the transition period proved difficult, as evidenced by the very low number of homes (25) developed and approved by the contracted agencies from August-December 2013. As of December 31, 2013, DHS reported developing 345 new homes, or 29 percent of the SFY14 target of 1,197 new homes. Twenty-five of these 345 new homes were developed under the new private contracts, as noted above, while DHS developed the other 320 homes in-house between July-December 2013. DHS completed the approval process for the 320 new homes as they were already well through the DHS approval process at the time the private agency contracts were finalized in August 2013. In the October 2013 Commentary, the Co-Neutrals also established a net gain target of 615 xxxxxx homes for SFY14. The Co-Neutrals worked with DHS to establish a written methodology for calculating net gain/loss (see Appendix C). DHS’ net gain/loss analysis indicates that the Department had 1,704 open xxxxxx homes on July 1, 2013 and 1,754 open xxxxxx homes on December 31, 2013, for a net gain of 50 xxxxxx homes, eight percent of the target for SFY14.2 The Co-Neutrals have evaluated the pace, quality and progress of DHS’ efforts to achieve these target outcomes and conclude the Department’s work does not represent good faith efforts to achieve substantial and sustained progress toward these target outcomes.