INCOMPLETE INFORMATION Sample Clauses

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. Where the information provided by the exporter or producer under anti-dumping investigation may not be ideal in all respects and provided that the producer or exporter concerned has acted to the best of his ability, the investigating authority of a Party shall, before rejecting the information, use its best endeavours to obtain more complete information for the purposes of the investigation including, where requested, granting a reasonable extension of time to the producer or exporter concerned to make a more detailed and proper response in accordance with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. Where the information provided by the exporter or producer under anti-dumping investigation may not be ideal in all respects and provided that the producer or exporter concerned has acted to the best of his ability, the investigating authority of a Party shall, before rejecting the information, use its best endeavours to obtain 2-2 This relates to the questionnaire referred to in Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. more complete information for the purposes of the investigation including, where requested, granting a reasonable extension of time to the producer or exporter concerned to make a more detailed and proper response in accordance with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. ‌ The presence of incomplete information is largely responsible for inducing the two-part structure of health insurance. Incomplete information leads to a second-best equilibrium, but monopoly with two-part health insurance also achieves this competitive outcome. We demonstrate the argument by deriving this result in the context of moral hazard, which is ex post incomplete information. The appendix adds adverse selection, or ex ante incomplete information. Studying the moral hazard problem requires incorporating some additional consumer heterogeneity. We continue to assume that consumers are indexed by h ∈[0,1] , and distributed uniformly over this interval. We also keep the assumption that the fraction σ fall sick, namely all consumers for whom h ≤ σ . Sick consumers place value on the medical care good, while healthy consumers do not. However, information on the severity of illness is incomplete. Patients with lower values of h are sicker, but the insurer cannot observe this. Therefore, even though they may benefit from more insurance than the less ill patients, there is no way for the insurer to make payments contingent on the underlying health state. Payments can only be contingent on the consumer’s observed decision to purchase the medical good or not. This makes it impossible to insure all consumers fully. The result is a second-best solution, where the insurer charges co- payments below marginal cost. This results in “over-utilization” relative to the first-best, but this is a second-best means of delivering some additional insurance in the face of informational incompleteness. All consumers continue to be ex ante identical; we relax this assumption in the appendix, where we study adverse selection.

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. Failure to complete or provide any of the information requested in this Request for Proposal, including references, and/or additional information as indicated, may result in disqualification by reason of “non- responsiveness”. In the event of conflict, the Special Terms and Conditions shall take precedence over the General Terms and Conditions, included herein.

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. If it is the information provided by the public agency does not verify eligibility, the local educational agency must conduct verification in accordance with para- graph (f) of this section. In addition, households must be able to dispute the § 245.7 validity of income information ac- quired through direct verification and shall be given the opportunity to pro- vide other documentation.