Information asymmetry Sample Clauses

Information asymmetry. The information asymmetry/signaling hypothesis predicts low stock returns prior to a repurchase, thus we control for the firm’s pre-repurchase stock returns, as well as the market returns (defined as the value-weighted market return from CRSP) to deal with the possibility that information asymmetry may also be related to the market condition. Yet our agreement hypothesis also predicts pre-repurchase low stock returns due to low investor-management agreement. Controlling for stock returns alone, thus, is not sufficient to draw a distinction between these two hypotheses. Furthermore, one may argue that some of our agreement proxies may be related to information asymmetry. As discussed later, we rely on firm fixed-effect estimation to explore within-firm variation in examining a firm’s repurchase decision. Therefore, the effect of any unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics that are related to information asymmetry will be eliminated. Additionally, large firms are more likely to be included in our sample as we use institutional ownership and analyst forecast data. The advantage of the estimation method and our sampling of relatively large firms both work to help alleviate the information asymmetry problem to some extent, which is more of a severe concern in cross-sectional studies and in small firms. Nevertheless, to further disentangle the effect of agreement from that of asymmetric information, we include several measures of information asymmetry that are not related to agreement.19 One proxy is the firm-specific stock return variation, Psi, developed in Durney, ▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2003). 20 Based on Roll’s (1988) observation that low R2 statistics for common asset pricing models is due to firm-specific return variation that is not associated with public information, they show that firms and industries with lower market-model R2 statistics exhibit higher association between current returns and future earnings. The idea is that greater firm-specific variation in stock prices implies that more information about future earnings is incorporated into the stock price and hence there is less information asymmetry. Specifically, the firm-specific stock return variation of a given firm-year is defined as Psi = log(1–R2), where R2 is obtained from regressing a firm’s weekly stock returns on market return and industry return (defined at the two-digit SIC level) for the given year. Intuitively, the higher the level of Psi, the lower is the information asym...
Information asymmetry. The principal’s perceived performance, comes from the linear interpolation of the level of performance she perceives from inspections. Therefore, the information asymmetry is the difference between the perceived performance and the real performance. In Figure

Related to Information asymmetry

  • Information Sources The Custodian may rely upon information received from issuers of Investments or agents of such issuers, information received from Subcustodians and from other commercially reasonable sources such as commercial data bases and the like, but shall not be responsible for specific inaccuracies in such information, provided that the Custodian has relied upon such information in good faith, or for the failure of any commercially reasonable information provider.

  • INFORMATION ASSURANCE (a) Information provided by LOCKHEED ▇▇▇▇▇▇ to SELLER remains the property of LOCKHEED ▇▇▇▇▇▇. SELLER shall comply with the terms of any proprietary information agreement with LOCKHEED ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and comply with all proprietary information markings and restrictive legends applied by LOCKHEED ▇▇▇▇▇▇ to anything provided hereunder to SELLER. SELLER shall not use any LOCKHEED ▇▇▇▇▇▇ provided information for any purpose except to perform this Contract and shall not disclose such information to third parties without the prior written consent of LOCKHEED ▇▇▇▇▇▇. SELLER shall maintain data protection processes and systems sufficient to adequately protect LOCKHEED ▇▇▇▇▇▇ provided information and comply with any law or regulation applicable to such information. (b) If SELLER becomes aware of any compromise of information used in the performance of this Contract or provided by LOCKHEED ▇▇▇▇▇▇ to SELLER, its officers, employees, agents, suppliers, or subcontractors (an “Incident”), SELLER shall take appropriate immediate actions to investigate and contain the Incident and any associated risks, including notification within seventy-two (72) hours to LOCKHEED ▇▇▇▇▇▇ after learning of the Incident. As used in this clause, “compromise” means that information has been exposed to unauthorized access, inadvertent disclosure, known misuse, loss, destruction, or alteration other than as required to perform the Work. SELLER shall provide reasonable cooperation to LOCKHEED ▇▇▇▇▇▇ in conducting any investigation regarding the nature and scope of any Incident. Any costs incurred in investigating or remedying Incidents shall be borne by SELLER. (c) Any LOCKHEED ▇▇▇▇▇▇ provided information identified as proprietary or subject to restrictions on public disclosure by law or regulation shall be encrypted (i) if transmitted via the Internet, or (ii) during electronic storage if potentially accessible by the Internet or otherwise by non-authorized users. (d) The provisions set forth above are in addition to and do not alter, change or supersede any obligations contained in a proprietary information agreement between the parties.

  • Information Services The Custodian may rely upon information received from issuers of Securities or agents of such issuers, information received from Subcustodians or depositories, information from data reporting services that provide detail on corporate actions and other securities information, and other commercially reasonable industry sources; and, provided the Custodian has acted in accordance with the standard of care set forth in Section 6 (a), the Custodian shall have no liability as a result of relying upon such information sources, including but not limited to errors in any such information.

  • Information/Cooperation Executive shall, upon reasonable notice, furnish such information and assistance to the Bank as may be reasonably required by the Bank, in connection with any litigation in which it or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates is, or may become, a party; provided, however, that Executive shall not be required to provide information or assistance with respect to any litigation between Executive and the Bank or any other subsidiaries or affiliates.

  • Information Management Information and Records