Integrating HIV/AIDS prevention Sample Clauses

Integrating HIV/AIDS prevention. The fact that so many organizations are involved in both post conflict demobilization, reconstruction and HIV/AIDS prevention creates an opportunity for the rationalization of human and financial resources. Comprehensive HIV/AIDS prevention programs would require major inputs, although probably far less than is currently spent per capita on beneficiaries in the negotiation and maintenance of peace, demobilization and economic reconstruction. Linking HIV/AIDS prevention to these activities, and indeed making it an integral part of them, could be highly cost effective. At the same time, it would place HIV/AIDS prevention activities at the forefront of a political agenda that is supported by national and international bodies. It would also reach a population that is not only at high risk of the disease but that also has the capacity to benefit from and contribute to HIV/AIDS prevention within its own ranks and in the larger community. The following table outlines the range of per capita costs of selected demobilization programs, illustrating the relatively high investments that have been made.11 DEMOBILIZATION COSTS Country Components Total Program Costs Total Program Enrollment Per-Capita Cost Ethiopia12 Demobilization 518,300,000 475,759 13 1,089 ETB and Re- ETB/ Integration 195,500,000 US$ (notes about exchange rates used in WB) Uganda 14 Demobilization and Re- Integration 43,200,000,000 Ush/ 40,494,790 US$ (WB) 36,358 1,113,779 Ush/ 1,114 US$ Zimbabwe 15 Demobilization and Re- Integration Totals n/a Totals n/a +3,000 8,469US$ to Nicaragua 16 Demobilization and Re- integration Totals n/a Totals n/a 1,938 US$ El Salvador17 Demobilization Only Totals n/a Totals n/a 720.18 US$ Namibia18 Demobilization and Re- Integration 123,800,000N$/4 1,300,000 USD 32,570 3,790 N$ 11 In the absence of easily quantifiable success indicators, internationally comparable cost-benefit ratios of these programs are nearly impossible to calculate. Where indicators are available they are not necessarily comparable across different program segments within the same country. Success in one instance may be the result of external factors well beyond the control of the DDR implementors – political will, pre-conflict infrastructure, external economic conditions, etc. And without coordination of funding, even within a single DDR effort, the comparison of costs is of limited utility. Still, it is worth noting that to date, these programs have varied significantly in total program costs, and ...