Acquisition Proposals (a) Except as provided in this Section 6.2(a) and in Section 6.2(d), the Company shall not (and shall cause the Company Subsidiaries to not), and shall take such reasonable actions to cause (and shall cause the Company Subsidiaries to take such reasonable actions to cause) each Company Entity’s officers, directors, investment bankers, attorneys, accountants, financial advisors, agents, and other representatives (collectively, the “Representatives”) not to, (i) directly or indirectly initiate, solicit, knowingly encourage, or facilitate (including by way of furnishing non-public information) any inquiries with respect to, or the making or submission of, any proposal that constitutes, or would reasonably be expected to lead to, an Acquisition Proposal, or (ii) participate or engage in discussions or negotiations with, furnish any non-public information or data relating to any Company Entity or any Company Asset to, or provide access to the properties, books or records of any Company Entity to, any Person that has made an Acquisition Proposal or in contemplation of an Acquisition Proposal. Notwithstanding the immediately foregoing sentence, at any time prior to obtaining the Company Required Vote, the Company and the Company’s Board are permitted to take any actions described in clause (ii) of this Section 6.2(a) with respect to a third party if (w) the Company has received a written Acquisition Proposal from such third party (and such Acquisition Proposal did not result from a breach of this Section 6.2(a), whether by any Company Entity or any Representative (as if all Company Entities and Representatives were bound by this Section 6.2(a))), (x) the Company gives the Parent the notice required by Section 6.2(e), (y) after receiving the advice of its financial advisors, the Company’s Board determines in good faith that such proposal constitutes, or is reasonably likely to lead to, a Superior Proposal, and (z) the Company’s Board determines in good faith, after consultation with its outside legal counsel, that the failure to participate in such negotiations or discussions or to furnish such information or data to such third party is likely to be inconsistent with the Company Board’s fiduciary duties under applicable Law; except that (1) the Company shall not deliver any non-public information to such third party without first entering into a confidentiality agreement with such third party on terms no less favorable to the Company than those contained in the Confidentiality Agreement (any such confidentiality agreement with such third party, an “Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement”) and (2) subject to applicable Law, the Company shall make available to the Parent any non-public information concerning any Company Entity that is made available to any other Person or group in connection with any actual or potential Acquisition Proposal that was not previously made available to the Parent, contemporaneously with the delivery of such information to (or as promptly as practicable after such information is delivered to) such Person. Nothing contained in this Section 6.2 will prohibit the Company or the Company’s Board from taking and disclosing to the Company’s stockholders a position with respect to an Acquisition Proposal pursuant to Rule 14d-9 or 14e-2(a) promulgated under the Exchange Act or from making any similar disclosure, in either case to the extent required by applicable Law, including the Company Board’s fiduciary duties; except that compliance with such rules will not permit the Company to make an Adverse Recommendation Change other than in accordance with Section 6.2(d).
(b) Except as provided in Section 6.2(d) and in Section 6.2(g), each of the Company, the Company’s Board, and each Company Board Committee shall not (i) withdraw or withhold (or amend or modify in a manner adverse to any Buyer Entity), or publicly propose to withdraw or withhold (or amend or modify in a manner adverse to any Buyer Entity), the approval, recommendation, or declaration of advisability by the Company’s Board or any Company Board Committee of this Agreement, the Merger, or any Transactions, (ii) recommend, adopt, or approve, or propose publicly to recommend, adopt, or approve, any Acquisition Proposal (any action described in the immediately foregoing clauses (i) or (ii), an “Adverse Recommendation Change”).
(c) Except as provided in Section 6.2(d), the Company shall not (and shall cause the Company Subsidiaries to not), and shall take reasonable actions to cause (and shall cause the Company Subsidiaries to take reasonable actions to cause) each Company Entity’s Representatives not to, execute or enter into any Contract (including any merger agreement, acquisition agreement, option agreement, joint venture agreement, partnership agreement or other similar agreement), or any letter of intent, term sheet, memorandum of understanding, or agreement in principle, (i) relating to or that could reasonably be expected to lead to any Acquisition Proposal (other than an Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement in circumstances contemplated in the penultimate sentence of Section 6.2(a)), or (ii) requiring the Company to abandon, terminate, or fail to consummate the Merger or any of the Transactions.
(d) Notwithstanding the foregoing set forth in this Section 6.2, at any time prior to obtaining the Company Required Vote, and subject to the Company’s compliance at all times with the provisions of this Section 6.2 and Section 6.4(a), with respect to an Acquisition Proposal, the Company’s Board is permitted to make an Adverse Recommendation Change if (i) a written Acquisition Proposal (that did not result from a breach of Section 6.2(a), whether by any Company Entity or any Representative (as if all Company Entities and Representatives were bound by this Section 6.2(d))) is made to the Company by a third party, and such Acquisition Proposal is not withdrawn, (ii) the Company’s Board determines in good faith after consultation with its legal and financial advisors that such Acquisition Proposal constitutes a Superior Proposal, (iii) the Company’s Board determines in good faith, after consultation with its outside legal counsel, that the failure to make such an Adverse Recommendation Change is likely to be inconsistent with the Company Board’s fiduciary duties under applicable Law, (iv) subject to compliance with applicable Law, the Company provides the Parent three Business Days’ prior written notice of the Company’s intention to make an Adverse Recommendation Change because of such Acquisition Proposal (such notice, a “Notice of Acquisition Proposal”), it being understood that a Notice of Acquisition Proposal does not in itself institute an Adverse Recommendation Change for purposes hereof, which notice must include the information with respect to such Acquisition Proposal that is specified in Section 6.2(e); except that, if there are any material revisions to the Acquisition Proposal (relative to the terms of the Acquisition Proposal as set forth in the Notice of Acquisition Proposal as provided to the Parent), then the Company must provide to the Parent a new Notice of Acquisition Proposal and, if the Company has not made an Adverse Recommendation Change, and subject to compliance with applicable Law, an additional three Business Days following the provision of such new Notice of Acquisition Proposal, and (v) at the end of the three-Business Day period described in the immediately foregoing clause (iv) (including any extension of such period required thereunder), the Company Board again makes the determination in good faith after consultation with its outside legal counsel and financial advisors (and taking into account any adjustment or modification of the terms hereof that the Parent proposes) that the Acquisition Proposal constitutes a Superior Proposal and that the failure to make such Adverse Recommendation Change is likely to be inconsistent with the Company Board’s fiduciary duties under applicable Law. If the Parent proposes to the Company any adjustment or modification of the terms hereof in response to a Notice of Acquisition Proposal, and such proposed adjustment or modification, if implemented, would reverse the determination of the Company Board that the Acquisition Proposal constituted a Superior Proposal, then the Company and Parent shall negotiate in good faith with the Parent to implement such adjustment or modification to the terms hereof and, upon implementation of such adjustment or modification, the Company Board shall not make an Adverse Recommendation Change (or, if already made, will reinstate its recommendation in favor of the Merger and this Agreement, as so adjusted or modified).
(e) As promptly as practicable after receipt thereof (but in any event within 24 hours after the Company’s receipt thereof), the Company shall (i) advise Parent in writing of any request for non-public information or any Acquisition Proposal received from any Person, or any inquiry, discussions, or negotiations with respect to any Acquisition Proposal, and the material terms of such request, Acquisition Proposal, inquiry, discussions, or negotiations, and (ii) promptly provide to Parent a detailed, written summary of all of the material terms, provisions, and other information set forth in any materials (including any draft agreements) that the Company receives in connection with any Acquisition Proposal (or, at the Company’s election, a copy thereof) and the identity of the Person or group making any such request, Acquisition Proposal, or inquiry or with whom any discussions or negotiations are taking place. The Company shall keep the Parent reasonably informed of the status of any Acquisition Proposals (including disclosing to the Parent the identity of the parties, the price involved, and any material changes to any terms thereof and providing to the Parent detailed, written summaries of all of the material terms, provisions, or other information set forth in any amended or additional documents received from or provided to any Person with respect to such Acquisition Proposal). The Company shall not release any third party from, or waive any provisions of, any confidentiality or standstill agreement to which the Company is a party and shall use its reasonable efforts to enforce any such agreement at the request of or on behalf of the Parent.
(f) Immediately after the execution and delivery hereof, the Company shall (and shall cause the Company Subsidiaries to) instruct the Representatives to cease and terminate any existing activities, discussions, or negotiations with any parties conducted heretofore with respect to any possible Acquisition Proposal. The Company shall (i) take the necessary steps to promptly inform the Representatives involved in the Transactions of the obligations undertaken in Section 6.2(a) and (ii) request each Person who has heretofore executed a confidentiality agreement in connection with such Person’s consideration of acquiring the Company or any portion thereof to return or destroy (and certify such destruction in writing by an executive officer of such Person) all confidential information heretofore furnished to such Person by or on its behalf.
(g) Nothing in this Agreement will prohibit or restrict the Company’s Board from effecting an Adverse Recommendation Change not involving or relating to an Acquisition Proposal in response to a material adverse development or change in circumstances with respect to the Parent Business occurring or arising after the Signing Date, if (i) the Company’s Board determines in good faith after consultation with its outside legal counsel that not making such Adverse Recommendation Change is likely to be inconsistent with the Company Board’s fiduciary duties under applicable Law (ii) subject to compliance with applicable Law, the Company provides the Parent three Business Days’ prior written notice of the Company’s intention to make public an Adverse Recommendation Change because of such material development or change in circumstances (such notice, a “Notice of Material Development”); and that it is considering such a recommendation change and summarizing in reasonable detail the reasons therefor; and (iii) at the end of the three-Business Day period described in the immediately foregoing clause (ii), the Company Board again makes the determination in good faith after consultation with its outside legal counsel and financial advisors (and taking into account any adjustment or modification of the terms hereof that the Parent proposes in writing) that failure to make such an Adverse Recommendation Change is likely to be inconsistent with the Company Board’s fiduciary duties under applicable Law. If the Parent proposes to the Company any adjustment or modification of the terms hereof in response to a Notice of Material Development, and such proposed adjustment or modification, if implemented, would reverse the determination of the Company Board that it make an Adverse Recommendation Change, then the Company and Parent shall negotiate in good faith (during a period not exceeding three Business days, unless otherwise mutually agreed) with respect to such adjustment or modification to the terms hereof and, upon implementation of such adjustment or modification, the Company Board shall not make an Adverse Recommendation Change (or, if already made, will reinstate its recommendation in favor of the Merger and this Agreement, as so adjusted or modified).
Governance Matters (a) The Company shall cause the Investor Designated Director to be elected or appointed on the Closing Date to the Board of Directors as well as the board of directors of the Bank (the “Bank Board”), subject to satisfaction of all legal and governance requirements regarding service as a member of the Board of Directors and the Bank Board. The Company shall recommend to its shareholders the election of the Investor Designated Director to the Board of Directors at the Company’s annual meeting, subject to satisfaction of all legal and governance requirements regarding service as a director of the Company. If the Investor no longer has the Qualifying Ownership Interest, it shall have no further rights under Sections 3.4(a), 3.4(b), 3.4(c) and 3.4(d) and, in each case, at the written request of the Board of Directors, the Investor shall use all reasonable best efforts to cause the Investor Designated Director to resign from the Board of Directors and the Bank Board as promptly as possible thereafter. The Board of Directors and the Bank Board shall cause the Investor Designated Director to be appointed to the committees of the Board of Directors and the Bank Board, as applicable, identified by the Investor, so long as the Investor Designated Director qualifies to serve on such committees subject to satisfaction of all legal and governance requirements regarding service as a committee member.
(b) For so long as the Investor owns, in the aggregate with its Affiliates, ten percent (10%) or more of the outstanding shares of Common Stock (as adjusted from time to time for any reorganization, recapitalization, stock dividend, stock split, reverse stock split, or other like changes in the Company’s capitalization) (the “Qualifying Ownership Interest”), the Investor Designated Director shall, subject to applicable Law, be the nominee of the Company and the Nominating Committee of the Board of Directors (the “Nominating Committee”) to serve on the Board of Directors and on the Bank Board. The Company shall use its reasonable best efforts to have the Investor Designated Director elected as director of the Company by the shareholders of the Company and the Company shall solicit proxies for the Investor Designated Director to the same extent as it does for any of its other nominees to the Board of Directors.
(c) For so long as the Investor owns, in the aggregate with its Affiliates, the Qualifying Ownership Interest, the Investor Designated Director shall, subject to applicable Law (including the applicable rules of the NYSE), be appointed to the committees of the Board of Directors and the Bank Board (or any other committees performing similar functions of the foregoing committees) identified by the Investor.
(d) Subject to Section 3.4(a), upon the death, disability, resignation, retirement, disqualification or removal from office of a Designated Investor Director, the Investor shall have the right to designate the replacement for the Investor Designated Director, which replacement shall be reasonably acceptable to the Company and shall satisfy all legal and governance requirements regarding service as a member of the Board of Directors and the Bank Board, as applicable. The Board of Directors shall use its reasonable best efforts to take all action required to fill the vacancy resulting therefrom with such person (including such person, subject to applicable Law, being the Company’s and the Nominating Committee’s nominee to serve on the Board of Directors, calling a special meeting of shareholders to vote on such person, using all reasonable best efforts to have such person elected as director of the Company by the shareholders of the Company and the Company soliciting proxies for such person to the same extent as it does for any of its other nominees to the Board of Directors).
(e) For so long the Investor with its Affiliates owns, in the aggregate with its Affiliates, five percent (5%) or more of the aggregate number of outstanding shares of Common Stock (as adjusted from time to time for any reorganization, recapitalization, stock dividend, stock split, reverse stock split, or other like changes in the Company’s capitalization), the Company shall, subject to applicable Law, invite a person designated by the Investor and reasonably acceptable to the Board of Directors (the “Observer”) to attend all meetings of the Board of Directors and the Bank Board (including any meetings of committees thereof which the Investor Designated Director is a member) in a nonvoting observer capacity. If the Investor no longer beneficially owns the minimum number of Common Shares as specified in the first sentence of this Section 3.4(e), the Investor shall have no further rights under this Section 3.4(e). The Investor shall cause the Observer to agree to hold in confidence and trust and to act in a fiduciary manner with respect to all information provided to such Observer and the Company, the Board of Directors, the Bank Board and any committees thereof shall have the right to withhold any information and to exclude the Observer from any meeting or portion thereof (i) if doing so is, in the opinion of counsel to the Company, necessary to protect the attorney-client privilege between the Company and counsel or (ii) if the Board of Directors, the Bank Board or any committee thereof determines in good faith, after consultation with counsel, that fiduciary requirements under applicable Law would make attendance by the Observer inappropriate. The Observer shall have no right to vote on any matters presented to the Board of Directors, the Bank Board or any committee thereof.
(f) The Investor Designated Director shall be entitled to the same compensation, including fees, and the same indemnification and insurance coverage in connection with his or her role as a director as the other members of the Board of Directors or the Bank Board, as applicable, and the Investor Designated Director shall be entitled to reimbursement for documented, reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred in attending meetings of the Board of Directors or the Bank Board, or any committee thereof, to the same extent as the other members of the Board of Directors or the Bank Board, as applicable. The Company shall notify the Investor Designated Director of all regular meetings and special meetings of the Board of Directors or the Bank Board and of all regular and special meetings of any committee of the Board of Directors or the Bank Board of which the Investor Designated Director is a member in accordance with the applicable bylaws. The Company and the Bank shall provide the Investor Designated Director with copies of all notices, minutes, consents and other material that they provide to all other members of their respective boards of directors concurrently as such materials are provided to the other members.
(g) Each of the Company and the Bank acknowledges that the Designated Investor Director may have certain rights to indemnification, advancement of expenses and/or insurance provided by the Investor and/or certain of its Affiliates (collectively, the “Investor Indemnitors”). Each of the Company and the Bank hereby agrees (1) that it is the indemnitor of first resort (i.e., its obligations to the Designated Investor Director are primary and any obligation of the Investor Indemnitors to advance expenses or to provide indemnification for the same expenses or liabilities incurred by the Designated Investor Director are secondary), and (2) that it shall be required to advance the full amount of expenses incurred by the Designated Investor Director and shall be liable for the full amount of all expenses and liabilities incurred by the Designated Investor Director, in each case to the extent legally permitted and as required by the terms of this Agreement and the articles of incorporation and bylaws of the Company and the Bank (and any other agreement regarding indemnification between the Company and/or the Bank, on the one hand, and the Designated Investor Director, on the other hand), without regard to any rights the Designated Investor Director may have against any Investor Indemnitor. The Company further agrees that no advancement or payment by any Investor Indemnitor on behalf of the Designated Investor Director with respect to any claim for which the Designated Investor Director has sought indemnification from the Company shall affect the foregoing and the Investor Indemnitors shall have a right of contribution and/or be subrogated to the extent of such advancement or payment to all of the rights of recovery of the Designated Investor Director against the Company. The Company agrees that the Investor Indemnitors are express third party beneficiaries of the terms of this Section 3.4(g).
(h) For the purposes of the definition of “Change in Control” under the Benefit Plans, the Company acknowledges and agrees that the Investor Designated Director shall be deemed to be an “Incumbent Director” as defined in the applicable Benefit Plans.
