Just Punishment. Finally, it is difficult to argue that the punishment of the convicted defendants was retributively just. The sentences themselves were generally consistent, even if some defendants likely deserved longer sentences (Xxxx in the Justice case; Xxxxxxx in Ministries), while others likely deserved shorter ones (Xxxxxxx in Xxxx). But were they fair? Xxxxxx has pointed out that although international crimes are considered more serious than their domestic counterparts, “sentences for multiple international crimes are generally not lengthier than what national jurisdictions award for a serious ordinary crime.” 6 That disparity is particularly glaring concerning the sentences imposed by the NMTs. It is difficult to imagine that a court in Poland or the U.S. would have sentenced a defendant who worked thousands of slaves to death in his factories to 12 years in prison (Xxxxxxx Xxxxx’x sentence) or a defendant who was 5 See Chapter 9. 6 DRUMBL, 155. responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent people to 15 years (General Xxxxx’s sentence in High Command). Despite such concerns, the NMTs at least deserve praise for attempting to impose fair and consistent sentences. The same cannot be said of XxXxxx’x clemency decisions, which left an indelible stain on the tribunals’ legacy. It is impossible to argue that Xxxxx Xxxxxxx deserved 15 years imprisonment instead of death, given that he had been Xxxxxxxxx’x deputy in Einsatzgruppen D, which had murdered at least 90,000 Soviet Jews. Similarly, there was no retributive justification for reducing the sentence of Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx, the architect of the vicious Dirlewanger Brigade, from 25 years (itself overly lenient) to a mere 10 years. Worse still, because of the liberal good-conduct and parole programs created by the U.S. after the tribunals shut down, very few of the convicted defendants ever served even a fraction of their modified sentences. To take only the most obvious example, seven defendants were facing life sentences after XxXxxx’x clemency decisions in January, 1951: List and Xxxxxx from the Hostage case; Xxxxxxxxxx, Klingelhofer, Ott, Xxxxxxxxxx from Einsatzgruppen; and Xxxxxxxx from High Command. Xxxx was released from prison in late 1952; Xxxxxx was released in early 1953; Xxxxxxxxxxxx was released in late 1956; and the others were all released in early 1958. In practice, therefore, a life sentence meant as few as three and no more than 10 years – a result that is impossible to reconcile with retributive pr...
