High Command. British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. London: Xxxxx 3 Company, p. 98; Xxxxxx. The Political Context, p. 13. 973 Xxxx Xxxxxxx (2013). Strategic Culture in the United Kingdom. In X. Xxxxx, X. Xxxxxxxxx, 3 X. Xxxxx (Eds.), Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Politics Across the Continent. Wiesbaden: Springer, p. 377. 974 Grandia. Deadly Embrace, p. 102. 975 Xxxxxx. The Political Context, p. 13-15. 976 Xxxxxxx, High Command, p. 98. was an all-volunteer force since 1960.977 Beyond these common traits the British armed forces were far from a monolithical organization. At the advent of the new millennium, the services that constitute the British armed forces had vastly different outlooks. Naturally, there was always some inter-service rivalry over budget and prominence. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force were focused on the procurement of new platforms and adopting novel technologies to ensure their readiness.978 For the British Army, the situation was more diffuse. While the other services had been deployed to missions, the brunt of those had fallen on the Army. In particular, elements of the army had recently conducted stabilization and peace support operations in Northern Ireland (see section 5.2.2.1.) and the Balkans. However, another significant part of the army had largely fulfilled xxxxxxxx duty in the “British Army of the Rhine “(BAOR) during the Cold War and beyond. The BAOR was forward-deployed in Germany to bolster NATO defenses in a potential attack by the Warsaw Pact. In 1991 the army fielded a division to fight in the ground campaign of the Gulf War (operation Granby). After the Cold War ended, a smaller British force remained in Germany.979 Thus the army combined in it two distinct strands of experiences: one of training for conventional war and another of conducting stabilization or peace support operations. By and large, the dominant strand in British Army culture was that of war fighting. Like other armies, the Army had to balance training for conventional war while deploying in peace operations.980 As Xxxxxxx Xxxx notes, the “warfighting ethos” is fundamental to British service members. Moreover, British officers are generally expected to demonstrate qualities associated with conventional combat such as initiative, decisiveness and offensive action. Not only are such elements central to officer education, but they are also prerequisite for promotion.981 Combined with the “Adaptive Foundational Training” th...
High Command. A. The Indictment
B. The Tribunal C. Outcome
High Command a. The general mission of CS shall be to act on the directives issued by CCFADM, taking into account the establishment of the FADM structures and support for the FADM;
b. Until the new Government takes office, the command of FADM shall be exercised by two general officers of equal rank, appointed by each of the Parties. Decisions of the command shall be valid only when signed by these two general officers;
c. The FADM command structure shall be strictly non-political and shall receive directives and orders only through the appropriate chain of command;
d. The FADM shall have a single logistics service for all three branches. To that end, a Logistics and Infrastructure Command shall be established, under the authority of the FADM High Command;
e. Appointments to the FADM High Command and the commands of the three branches of the FADM and the Logistics Command shall be proposed by CCFADM and approved by CSC;
f. Until the new Government takes office, the FADM High Command shall be assisted by the General Staff, with departments headed by general officers or senior officers proposed by CCFADM and approved by CSC.
