Common use of Lessons learned Clause in Contracts

Lessons learned. Over the past six years in Mozambique, TechnoServe has also learned some important lessons regarding both what works and what does not work in rural enterprise development. ▪ Scale of operations and size of transactions matter. In cashew and oilseed processing, we have learned that the minimum plant capacity to capture economies of scale (and justify the cost of experienced management) is approximately 1,000 tons per annum. For this reason, smaller plants such as Oleos Cuti, Oleos Ribaue and QualiCaju have shut down or struggled. TechnoServe has thus shifted its focus to assisting those plants – such as Optima - willing and able to reach this minimum capacity and replicating their success elsewhere. ▪ Private enterprises can play a key role in extension. The success of our rural processing clients depends, to a certain extent, on the availability of high quality raw material. And TechnoServe has focused on empowering its clients to play an important role in ensuring the highest quality material. For example, cashew processors have a significant incentive to help families understand how to grow high quality cashew trees, and our clients are playing a critical role in helping them intercrop with groundnuts in order to improve the soil quality. We believe that private sector-led extension is a real, sustainable option for those sub sectors which have reached a certain level of development, such as cashew processing. ▪ Focusing on a single sub-sector without understanding its links to broader value chains can limit enterprise growth. For the past three years, TNS has been assisting oilseed processors to start up and expand in the Beira and Nacala Corridors. While 2,500 families benefited, the impact would have been greater if the companies had diversified into feed production or if assistance had also been given to start-ups in the animal feed business. These experiences have helped us understand that opportunities for rural oilseed processors must be evaluated in the context of the entire value chain. ▪ Pilots are the first step to building a competitive sub sector. One reason for TechnoServe’s success in cashew processing has been its approach: focusing first on a single pilot (Xxxxxxx Xxxx), digesting and applying learnings from this experience, and replicating the model for new entrants. As a result, we focus significant resources on a small number of enterprises (as opposed to working with 10-15 companies in each sub sector and hoping that a few of them succeed). We have found that this approach is also a good way to encourage more Mozambican participation in enterprise development. By proving the concept, we have been able to convince more risk-averse Mozambican nationals to invest in similar enterprises. ▪ Successful enterprise development requires a delicate balance of resources, sub sector growth, and industry expertise. TechnoServe invests significantly in hiring the country’s best experts in our target sub sectors (such as Xxx Xxxxxxx A’xxxxx in horticulture and Xxxxxx Xxx in cashew). Such resources are expensive and are most effective when the sub sector is poised for rapid growth. In horticulture and confectionary nuts, we have achieved the right balance of good people and resources. However, in oilseeds, we found that the slower growth of the sub sector did not necessarily merit our hiring a full-time oilseed advisor. But now that we are shifting our focus to the entire value chain of oilseeds – animal feed – livestock, we find that the potential does merit a full-time advisor in order to help realize the potential in Mozambique.

Lessons learned. Over The challenges of working with the past six years in Mozambiqueorganic sales and yield data are reflective of industry wide awareness of the need for more harmonized and regular collection and dissemination of data on the organic sector. These and many other data are already reported by growers as part of the organic system plan, TechnoServe has also learned some important lessons regarding both what works and what does not work in rural enterprise developmentwhich goes to the certifying agent. ▪ Scale of operations and size of transactions matter. In cashew and oilseed processingHowever, we few certifiers have learned that the minimum plant interest or capacity to capture economies of scale (“mine” these data and justify help better characterize the cost of experienced management) is approximately 1,000 tons per annum. For this reason, smaller plants such as Oleos Cuti, Oleos Ribaue and QualiCaju have shut down or struggled. TechnoServe has thus shifted its focus to assisting those plants – such as Optima - willing and able to reach this minimum capacity and replicating their success elsewhere. ▪ Private enterprises can play a key role in extensionorganic sector. The success USDA- ERS still goes through certifier files by hand to try to produce national estimates for select organic crops. Washington State is fortunate to have one certifier (WSDA) that certifies over 90% of our rural processing clients dependsthe farms, and enters some basic data for crops in a way that can be electronically manipulated and captured. There is on-going discussion within the organic industry of how improved data might be generated. But different players have different interests, and while theoretically possible to have all grower data flow to a certain extentcertifier in electronic form using a standardized set of fields and units, this is currently unlikely due to financial constraints and philosophical differences. WSU has been fortunate to partner with WSDA for over 10 years on organic statistics. This has made Washington State one of the availability of high quality raw material. And TechnoServe has focused on empowering its clients few to play an important role in ensuring the highest quality material. For examplehave regular, cashew processors have a significant incentive reliable data to help families understand how to grow high quality cashew treesguide the expanding organic sector. The broad lack of interest in the organic statistics by small scale direct market growers was not anticipated. However, a number of small scale farmers did comment that they were not aware of these statistics reports, that they would now look at them, and our clients are playing a critical role that this type of information was useful to keep them in helping them intercrop touch with groundnuts in order to improve the soil quality. We believe that private sector-led extension is a real, sustainable option for those sub sectors which have reached a certain level of development, such as cashew processing. ▪ Focusing on a single sub-sector without understanding its links to broader value chains can limit enterprise growth. For the past three years, TNS has been assisting oilseed processors to start up and expand trends in the Beira organic sector in the state, of which they are part, and Nacala Corridorspotentially directly or indirectly impacted even though they are not working in market channels where macro-level considerations of price and production potential drive their own farm decisions. A number of respondents in this group did state support for continued funding for the statistics. The challenges of working with the sales and yield data were not fully appreciated. While 2,500 families benefitedproject personnel did do some initial pre-testing, it was not fully adequate to anticipate some of the impact problems encountered and the magnitude of the data entry task. More exploration of the data prior to making a commitment to analyze it would have been greater if helpful. Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxxxx 000-000-0000 A portion of salary and benefits for Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxxxx were used as an in-kind match of $15,443 from Washington State University. This was realized through the companies had diversified into feed production or if assistance had also been given time he spent directing the project, working with project associates, fielding the survey, and presenting results at industry meetings. The WSDA Organic Food Program provided an unknown level of in- kind support by supplying database output for 2011 and 2012 years, and by scanning sales and yield forms to start-ups in supply the animal feed business. These experiences have helped us understand data for that opportunities for rural oilseed processors must be evaluated in the context part of the entire value chainproject. ▪ Pilots are The WSU BIOAg program provided over $5,000 to support research associate time in additional data entry and manipulation of the first step to building expanded years of sales and yield data as part of a competitive sub sectorproject funded through Dr. Xxxx Xxxxx. One reason for TechnoServe’s success in cashew processing has been its approach: focusing first on a single pilot (Xxxxxxx Xxxx), digesting and applying learnings Reports produced with support from this experienceproject, and replicating the model for new entrants. As a result, we focus significant resources on a small number of enterprises (as opposed to working with 10-15 companies in each sub sector and hoping that a few of them succeed). We have found that this approach is also a good way to encourage more Mozambican participation in enterprise development. By proving the concept, we have been able to convince more risk-averse Mozambican nationals to invest in similar enterprises. ▪ Successful enterprise development requires a delicate balance of resources, sub sector growth, and industry expertise. TechnoServe invests significantly in hiring the country’s best experts in our target sub sectors (such as Xxx Xxxxxxx A’xxxxx in horticulture and Xxxxxx Xxx in cashew). Such resources are expensive and are most effective when the sub sector is poised for rapid growth. In horticulture and confectionary nuts, we have achieved the right balance of good people and resources. However, in oilseeds, we found that the slower growth of the sub sector did not necessarily merit our hiring a full-time oilseed advisor. But now that we are shifting our focus to the entire value chain of oilseeds – animal feed – livestock, we find that the potential does merit a full-time advisor in order to help realize the potential in Mozambique.available at xxxx://xxxxx.xxx.xxx/pages/Organic_Statistics

Lessons learned. Over Unfortunately, several of the past six years in Mozambiqueoriginal goals of the project were not fully achieved. This was due to several factors, TechnoServe has also learned some important lessons including: • A miscommunication between the project manager and technical advisor regarding both what works and what does not work in rural enterprise development. ▪ Scale the extensive modification of operations and size of transactions matter. In cashew and oilseed processing, we have learned that the minimum plant capacity to capture economies of scale (and justify the cost of experienced management) is approximately 1,000 tons per annum. For this reason, smaller plants such as Oleos Cuti, Oleos Ribaue and QualiCaju have shut down or struggled. TechnoServe has thus shifted its focus to assisting those plants – such as Optima - willing and able to reach this minimum capacity and replicating their success elsewhere. ▪ Private enterprises can play a key role in extension. The success of our rural processing clients depends, to a certain extent, on the availability of high quality raw material. And TechnoServe has focused on empowering its clients to play an important role in ensuring the highest quality material. For example, cashew processors have a significant incentive to help families understand how to grow high quality cashew trees, and our clients are playing a critical role in helping them intercrop with groundnuts soil pH in order to improve ensure truffle production. We were not aware when drafting the proposal that truffles need soil in the 7.5-8.5 pH range: this requires amending the soil qualitywith 25 tons of lime per acre initially, and repeatedly amending the orchard with up to 10 additional tons annually. We believe simply did not project a long-term budget to account for this annual cost: potentially thousands of dollars each year. • There were interpersonal dynamics as a result of this first challenge that private sectorresulted in a lack of trust between project managers and industry partners. • The time lag between orchard establishment and truffle production (8-led extension 10 years) meant that even the farmers who were interested in truffle production indicated a reluctance to invest in this new crop without seeing whether our plot is successful. • High costs involved in establishing a realtruffle orchard may limit the number of farmers who can access the capital necessary to get started in truffle production. Despite the challenges we faced in this project, sustainable option for those sub sectors there are clear signs that truffle production may still become a viable new industry in Oregon. The Oregon Truffle Festival, which have reached a certain level of developmenthas sold out every year 2012-2014, is now planning to relocate from Eugene to Portland, to accommodate more participants. New truffle businesses, such as cashew processingXxxxx Xxxxxxx Dogs, are raising the profile of Oregon-harvested truffles. ▪ Focusing on Regional food branding efforts coordinated by municipal government including Lane County and the City of Xxxxxx, are emphasizing specialty crops such as truffles as a single sub-sector without understanding its links unique food product that reflects the clean water, forests, and agricultural heritage of the Willamette Valley. We will know in several years whether our demonstration orchard will be able to broader value chains can limit enterprise growthserve as a useful venue for educating farmers about opportunities connected to truffle production. For The subgrantee has worked the past three years, TNS has been assisting oilseed processors Oregon Department of Agriculture to start up and expand forfeit the remainder of the funding of this project in the Beira amount of $50,070.33. The Oregon Department of Agriculture will work with industry stakeholders to identify priority projects to focus these unspent funds towards and Nacala Corridorssubmit and amendment to the USDA early 2015. While 2,500 families benefitedODA-S06 Cracking the Distribution Dilemma in Support of Specialty Crop Producers – Final Report EMAIL: xxxxxxx@xxxxxxxx.xxx increase their awareness of distribution alternatives in the region, and to help open market access for these producers with high-volume buyers, such as schools and hospitals. When this project was conceived and awarded, the impact would have been greater if the companies had diversified into feed production or if assistance had also been given to FoodHub team was exploring a partnership with an innovative start-ups up company based in the animal feed business. These experiences have helped us understand Boston, MA that opportunities for rural oilseed processors must be evaluated in the context of the entire value chain. ▪ Pilots are the first step to building was developing a competitive sub sector. One reason for TechnoServe’s success in cashew processing has been its approach: focusing first on a single pilot (Xxxxxxx Xxxx)feasible, digesting and applying learnings from this experiencepractical, and replicating the replicable distribution model for that region’s food shed. FoodHub intended to collaborate with several local stakeholders to adapt a distribution model for Oregon. This project was developed in response to XXX’s funding priorities for Market development and access and Innovation and productivity, by creating a new entrantsdistribution model that would allow specialty crop producers to competitively market and sell commodities to high-volume regional purchasers. As a resultBeneficiaries include specialty crop producers, we focus significant resources on a small number of enterprises (as opposed to working with 10-15 companies in each sub sector and hoping that a few of them succeed). We have found that this approach is also a good way to encourage more Mozambican participation in enterprise development. By proving the concept, we have been able to convince more risk-averse Mozambican nationals to invest in similar enterprises. ▪ Successful enterprise development requires a delicate balance of resources, sub sector growthwholesale buyers at all scales, and industry expertiseconsumers of specialty crop products throughout Oregon and the region. TechnoServe invests significantly in hiring The project built on prior funding by leveraging and extending the country’s best experts in our target sub sectors (utility of FoodHub, xxx.xxxx-xxx.xxx, an online platform developed with support from ODA, which facilitates the connection of small and midsized producers directly to chefs, value-added food manufacturers, foodservice directors and other wholesale food buyers, as well as to important intermediaries such as Xxx Xxxxxxx A’xxxxx in horticulture brokers and Xxxxxx Xxx in cashew). Such resources are expensive and are most effective when the sub sector is poised for rapid growth. In horticulture and confectionary nuts, we have achieved the right balance of good people and resources. However, in oilseeds, we found that the slower growth of the sub sector did not necessarily merit our hiring a full-time oilseed advisor. But now that we are shifting our focus to the entire value chain of oilseeds – animal feed – livestock, we find that the potential does merit a full-time advisor in order to help realize the potential in Mozambiquedistributors.

Lessons learned. Over This section analyses implications for the past six years future wording and implementation of GFAs. First, lessons learned from the case studies are considered with regard to the wording of GFAs. Chapter 3 of this report has presented a content analysis of GFAs, identifying the need to use clear and comprehensive language. The case studies evaluated here support this claim and provide arguments for further strengthening of the wording in Mozambique, TechnoServe has also learned some important lessons regarding both what works and what does not work in rural enterprise development. ▪ Scale GFAs with regard to the application of operations and size of transactions matterthe agreement to GSCs. In cashew and oilseed processing, we have learned one case study it was reported that an MNE ceased an inquiry into workers’ rights abuses when it realized that the minimum plant capacity company was not one of its direct suppliers. This example stresses the importance of not lim- iting the application of the GFA to capture economies the direct contractors of scale (and justify the cost MNE, but to include the entire global supply chain. Moreover, the case studies document conflicts over the scope of experienced management) is approximately 1,000 tons per annum. For this reason, smaller plants such as Oleos Cuti, Oleos Ribaue and QualiCaju have shut down or struggled. TechnoServe has thus shifted its focus application to assisting those plants – such as Optima - willing and able to reach this minimum capacity and replicating their success elsewhere. ▪ Private enterprises can play a key role in extensionsubsidi- aries. The success implementation group at Securitas had to deal with two cases concerning the clarification of our rural processing clients dependsthe agreement’s scope of application to subsidiaries. This emphasizes the importance of including in the GFA a clear definition of the group represented by the MNE. Moreover, conflicts may arise with respect to subsidiaries that leave the group after a certain extent, on GFA has been signed. When the availability of high quality raw material. And TechnoServe has focused on empowering its clients French MNE EDF sold subsidiaries the buyers committed to play an important role respect the provisions in ensuring the highest quality material. For example, cashew processors have a significant incentive to help families understand how to grow high quality cashew trees, and our clients are playing a critical role in helping them intercrop with groundnuts in order to improve GFA for the soil quality. We believe that private sector-led extension is a real, sustainable option for those sub sectors which have reached a certain level of development, such as cashew processing. ▪ Focusing on a single sub-sector without understanding its links to broader value chains can limit enterprise growth. For the past next three years, TNS has been assisting oilseed processors to start up and expand an example indicating that the inclusion in a GFA of provisions in the Beira event of subsidiaries leaving the MNE could be considered. The impact of a GFA on the GSC does not solely depend on formulations in the agreements, however, but crucially on the implementation process. The research project “Organization and Nacala CorridorsRegu- lation of Employment Relations in Transnational Production and Supply Networks – Ensuring Core Labor Standards through International Framework Agreements?” led by Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx and Xxxx Xxxxx since 2008 includes a number of case studies at local production sites and suppliers that in- clude valuable good-practice examples of a successful implementation of the GFA in the supply chain and at local subsidiaries.17 However, according to the overall analysis, GFAs are still largely unknown among managers in MNE subsidiaries, local suppliers and local trade unions. While 2,500 families benefitedMoreover, local actors who are aware of them seldom have much understanding of their role. Issues include wide gaps in local actors’ involvement in negotiating GFAs; inadequate communication on the outcomes of these negotiations; subsequent lack of ownership; and little or no linkage between local unions and GUFs that sign the agreements. Recommendations for implementing GFAs try to counteract the observed weaknesses. First of all, the impact would have been greater if GFA needs to be widely disseminated. A comprehensive understanding of the companies had diversified into feed production or if assistance had agreement by local actors is a necessary condition for further actions. Local ownership needs to be strengthened. The involvement of local actors throughout the GFA process, from its initiation through negotiations to implementation is crucial. Going beyond the involvement of local unions, this could also been given to startinvolve a co-ups signing of the agreement by important suppliers and subcontractors of the MNE. 17 Three of the studies examined in the animal feed business. These experiences have helped us understand that opportunities for rural oilseed processors must be evaluated in the context present paper form part of the entire value chainresearch project: Xxxxxx et al. ▪ Pilots are the first step to building a competitive sub sector. One reason for TechnoServe’s success in cashew processing has been its approach: focusing first on a single pilot (2012); Xxxxxxx Xxxxand Stevis (2013); and Xxxxxxx, digesting Xxxxx and applying learnings from this experience, and replicating the model for new entrants. As a result, we focus significant resources on a small number of enterprises Agtas (as opposed to working with 10-15 companies in each sub sector and hoping that a few of them succeed2013). We have found that this approach is also a good way to encourage more Mozambican participation in enterprise development. By proving the concept, we have been able to convince more risk-averse Mozambican nationals to invest in similar enterprises. ▪ Successful enterprise development requires a delicate balance of resources, sub sector growth, and industry expertise. TechnoServe invests significantly in hiring the country’s best experts in our target sub sectors (such as Xxx Xxxxxxx A’xxxxx in horticulture and Xxxxxx Xxx in cashew). Such resources are expensive and are most effective when the sub sector is poised for rapid growth. In horticulture and confectionary nuts, we have achieved the right balance of good people and resources. However, in oilseeds, we found that the slower growth of the sub sector did not necessarily merit our hiring a full-time oilseed advisor. But now that we are shifting our focus to the entire value chain of oilseeds – animal feed – livestock, we find that the potential does merit a full-time advisor in order to help realize the potential in Mozambique.

Lessons learned. Over By submitting the past six years in Mozambique, TechnoServe has also learned some important lessons regarding both what works and what does not work in rural enterprise development. ▪ Scale XXXXX proposal one of operations and size of transactions matter. In cashew and oilseed processing, we have learned that the minimum plant capacity to capture economies of scale (and justify the cost of experienced management) is approximately 1,000 tons per annum. For this reason, smaller plants such as Oleos Cuti, Oleos Ribaue and QualiCaju have shut down or struggled. TechnoServe has thus shifted its focus to assisting those plants – such as Optima - willing and able to reach this minimum capacity and replicating their success elsewhere. ▪ Private enterprises can play a key role in extension. The success of our rural processing clients depends, to a certain extent, on the availability of high quality raw material. And TechnoServe has focused on empowering its clients to play an important role in ensuring the highest quality material. For example, cashew processors have a significant incentive to help families understand how to grow high quality cashew trees, and our clients are playing a critical role in helping them intercrop with groundnuts in order to improve the soil quality. We believe that private sector-led extension is a real, sustainable option for those sub sectors which have reached a certain level of development, such as cashew processing. ▪ Focusing on a single sub-sector without understanding its links to broader value chains can limit enterprise growth. For the past three years, TNS main assumptions made has been assisting oilseed processors to start up and expand in that «Experience shows that higher TRL usually goes with more strict protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) which contradicts the Beira and Nacala Corridors. While 2,500 families benefited, the impact would have been greater if the companies had diversified into feed production or if assistance had also been given to start-ups in the animal feed business. These experiences have helped us understand that opportunities for rural oilseed processors must be evaluated in the context concept of the entire value chain. ▪ Pilots are the first step to building a competitive sub sector. One reason for TechnoServe’s success in cashew processing has been its approach: focusing first on a single pilot (Xxxxxxx Xxxx), digesting and applying learnings from this experience, and replicating the model for new entrants. As a result, we focus significant resources on a small number of enterprises (as opposed to working with 10-15 companies in each sub sector and hoping that a few of them succeed). We have found that this approach is also a good way to encourage more Mozambican participation in enterprise development. By proving the concept, we have been able to convince more risk-averse Mozambican nationals to invest in similar enterprises. ▪ Successful enterprise development requires a delicate balance of resources, sub sector growth, and industry expertise. TechnoServe invests significantly in hiring the country’s best experts in our target sub sectors (such as Xxx Xxxxxxx A’xxxxx in horticulture and Xxxxxx Xxx in cashew). Such resources are expensive and are most effective when the sub sector is poised for rapid growth. In horticulture and confectionary nuts, we have achieved the right balance of good people and resourcesOpen Science. However, IPR protection is a central pillar of competitiveness. Hence, implementation of Open Science requires a transparent trade-off with IPR requirements». The results of the surveys and interviews have confirmed this assumption. Indeed, when research results are reaching high TRL levels (TRL>6) the implementation of Open Science becomes more difficult as it may be related to confidentiality issues, patents, IPR issues, etc. Furthermore the results of the surveys and interviews with experienced stakeholders have revealed that both, the researchers as well as the management of Research Establishments and Academia from developed countries e.g. France, Germany, etc. are in oilseedsfavour of implementing Open Science as it is considered to facilitate their research through the accessibility to results and data obtained by other researchers as well as to facilitate the publication of the results obtained through their own research. In countries where research is mainly performed by Academia and linked rather to the big European industrial players than to the limited local Industry (e.g. Greece) Open Science is also very well accepted and much appreciated. Furthermore, we found as expected, Open Science seems to be very important for the Research Organizations and Academia from countries advancing well with their Aviation research efforts (e.g. Romania.) On the other side, as expected, the industrial sector of the developed countries is more reluctant to proactively support the implementation of Open Science due to the reasons mentioned above (confidentiality issues, patents, IPR issues, competitiveness, etc.) and further efforts as well as appropriate clarifications, tools and political arrangements would be needed for convincing them for the benefits of implementing Open Science. Furthermore, for SMEs a high reluctance of implementing Open Science has been observed. This is an understandable result as for this type of Stakeholders their long term financial sustainability relies heavily on retaining and protecting their excellence on a technological niche. Finally it should be mentioned that the slower growth majority of scientists and researchers are interested on exploiting information, data or other content taken from Open Science sources yet in several cases they are encountering problems to exploit Open Science for publishing their own research results. To these problems belong the high publication fees applied by reliable Journals of high quality, the reluctance of the sub sector did not necessarily merit our hiring a fullmiddle-time oilseed advisormanagement of industry to endorse the Open publication of results, etc. But now that we are shifting our focus to the entire value chain of oilseeds – animal feed – livestock, we find It is worth mentioning that the potential does merit type of entity where a full-time advisor researcher is employed (i.e. University, Research Establishment, big Industry, SME ) has more influence on her/his perception of Open Science as well as her/his willingness of exploiting the opportunities offered by Open Science than the Region or Country where the researcher is active. Yet, the major challenges in order to help realize the potential implementation of Open Science in MozambiqueEurope are remaining the protection of background and foreground Intellectual Property and the understandable need for Competitiveness.

Lessons learned. Over One unexpected outcome of this mission was the past six years strong awareness of the health benefits of blueberries that existed among government officials in MozambiqueVietnam and produce buyers in Vietnam. Delighted by this finding, TechnoServe has also learned some important lessons regarding both what works the Oregon Blueberry Commission joined with the Oregon Potato Commission and what does not work the Oregon Department of Agriculture to exhibit at Food & Hotel Vietnam show in rural enterprise developmentApril 2015. ▪ Scale Participation in this show built on the awareness and connections that these entities had in the market. The challenge of operations selling commodity products, is that you are subject to global prices and size of transactions mattercurrency fluctuations. In cashew and oilseed processing, we have learned We were disappointed that the minimum plant capacity to capture economies stronger dollar coincided with the efforts of scale (and justify the cost of experienced management) is approximately 1,000 tons per annum. For this reasongrant project, smaller plants such as Oleos Cuti, Oleos Ribaue and QualiCaju have shut down or struggled. TechnoServe has thus shifted its focus to assisting those plants – such as Optima - willing and able making it difficult to reach this minimum capacity and replicating their success elsewhereour sales targets. ▪ Private enterprises can play a key role in extension. The success of our rural processing clients depends, to a certain extent, We believe that the work completed on the availability trade mission will yield the results expected, but over a longer time horizon. One of high quality raw material. And TechnoServe has focused on empowering its clients the things that would have strengthened our impact, in spite of the currency fluctuations, may have been to play an important role in ensuring the highest quality materialbring some of Oregon’s niche products. For example, cashew processors have a significant incentive to help families understand how to grow high quality cashew trees, Oregon and our clients are playing a critical role in helping them intercrop with groundnuts in order to improve Washington both produce many varieties of the soil quality. We believe that private sector-led extension is a real, sustainable option for those sub sectors which have reached a certain level of developmentspecialty potatoes, such as cashew processingfingerlings, purples and others. ▪ Focusing on a single sub-sector without understanding its links to broader value chains can limit enterprise growthOregon also produces some of the largest onions. For the past three years, TNS has been assisting oilseed processors to start up and expand Having companies in the Beira delegation that could offer these more specialized products that are less susceptible to price pressure, would have helped meet the targets of this project. ODA-004 Establishing a Nursery Cleanliness Program for Boxwood Blight – Final report Health Program EMAIL: xxxxxxxxxxx@xxx.xxxxx.xx.xx Boxwood blight (Cylindrocladium pseudonaviculatum) was discovered in the United Kingdom in the early 1990’s, causing a severe blight disease on Buxus. A disease outbreak in 1998 throughout Europe has virtually eliminated Buxus as a nursery crop there. Boxwood blight severely impacts plant appearance affecting marketability and Nacala Corridorskills young plants. While 2,500 families benefitedThis disease moves very rapidly under the right conditions, with the disease cycle taking 7- to 10-days. In October 2011, boxwood blight was reported infecting plants in North Carolina, Connecticut, and Virginia. After these initial finds, USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) requested several states conduct investigations to determine if the disease was elsewhere. In response, the impact would have been greater if Oregon Department of Agriculture (ODA) surveyed and collected samples from 18 nurseries, detecting boxwood blight in three. The disease was also reported in four other states and in British Columbia. The ODA worked with the companies had diversified into feed production or if assistance had also been given positive nurseries to start-ups in eradicate the animal feed business. These experiences have helped us understand that opportunities for rural oilseed processors must be evaluated in the context of the entire value chain. ▪ Pilots are the first step to building a competitive sub sector. One reason for TechnoServe’s success in cashew processing has been its approach: focusing first on a single pilot (Xxxxxxx Xxxx), digesting and applying learnings from this experience, and replicating the model for new entrants. As a result, we focus significant resources on a small number of enterprises (as opposed to working with 10-15 companies in each sub sector and hoping that a few of them succeed). We have found that this approach is also a good way to encourage more Mozambican participation in enterprise development. By proving the concept, we have been able to convince more risk-averse Mozambican nationals to invest in similar enterprises. ▪ Successful enterprise development requires a delicate balance of resources, sub sector growth, and industry expertise. TechnoServe invests significantly in hiring the country’s best experts in our target sub sectors (such as Xxx Xxxxxxx A’xxxxx in horticulture and Xxxxxx Xxx in cashew). Such resources are expensive and are most effective when the sub sector is poised for rapid growth. In horticulture and confectionary nuts, we have achieved the right balance of good people and resourcesdisease. However, in oilseedscustomers raised concerns about Buxus nursery stock from Oregon. We requested Specialty Crop Block Grant funding to address those concerns by developing a voluntary Nursery Cleanliness Program for Boxwood Blight. Our goal was to have this voluntary quality management program preclude the need for a more stringent regulatory response, we found that such as state and/or federal quarantines. After the slower growth first year of the sub sector did not necessarily merit our hiring project, a full-time oilseed advisor. But now that we are shifting our focus to the entire value chain of oilseeds – animal feed – livestock, we find that the potential does merit a full-time advisor in order to help realize the potential in Mozambiquesecondary objective was identified: identifying an effective mitigation measure for boxwood blight infested soil.

Lessons learned. Over Although distribution was the past six years key need project staff had heard anecdotally (and loudly) from specialty crop producers on FoodHub in MozambiqueOregon that led directly to the development of this project, TechnoServe has also during the course of completing this project the team learned some important lessons regarding both what works and what does not work that this need is actually more complex than originally presented to us. Our findings indicate that there are in rural enterprise development. ▪ Scale of operations and size of transactions matter. In cashew and oilseed fact three components: aggregation, processing, we have learned that the minimum plant capacity and distribution (now referred to capture economies of scale (and justify the cost of experienced managementcollectively as “infrastructure”) is approximately 1,000 tons per annum. For this reason, smaller plants such as Oleos Cuti, Oleos Ribaue and QualiCaju have shut down or struggled. TechnoServe has thus shifted its focus to assisting those plants – such as Optima - willing and able to reach this minimum capacity and replicating their success elsewhere. ▪ Private enterprises can play a key role in extension. The success of our rural processing clients depends, to a certain extent, on the availability of high quality raw material. And TechnoServe has focused on empowering its clients to play an important role in ensuring the highest quality material. For example, cashew processors have a significant incentive to help families understand how to grow high quality cashew trees, and our clients are playing a critical role in helping them intercrop with groundnuts be coordinated in order to improve effectively open institutional market access for regional-scale specialty crop producers. Research into the soil quality. We believe that private sector-led extension is a realbusiness models of regional distributors suggests extreme caution should be exercised before entering into this business, sustainable option for those sub sectors which have reached a certain level of development, such as cashew processing. ▪ Focusing on a single sub-sector without understanding its links to broader value chains can limit enterprise growth. For the past three years, TNS has been assisting oilseed processors to start up and expand in the Beira and Nacala Corridors. While 2,500 families benefited, the impact would have been greater if the companies had diversified into feed production or if assistance had also been given to start-ups in the animal feed business. These experiences have helped us understand that opportunities for rural oilseed processors must be evaluated in the context of the entire value chain. ▪ Pilots are the first step to building a competitive sub sector. One reason for TechnoServe’s success in cashew processing has been its approach: focusing first on a single pilot (Xxxxxxx Xxxx), digesting and applying learnings from this experience, and replicating the model for new entrants. As a result, we focus significant resources on a small number of enterprises (as opposed to working with 10-15 companies in each sub sector and hoping that a few of them succeed). We have found that this approach is also a good way to encourage more Mozambican participation in enterprise development. By proving the concept, we have been able to convince more risk-averse Mozambican nationals to invest in similar enterprises. ▪ Successful enterprise development requires a delicate balance of resources, sub sector growth, and industry expertise. TechnoServe invests significantly in hiring the country’s best experts in our target sub sectors (such as Xxx Xxxxxxx A’xxxxx in horticulture and Xxxxxx Xxx in cashew). Such resources are expensive and are most effective when the sub sector is poised for rapid growth. In horticulture and confectionary nuts, we have achieved the right balance of good people and resources. However, in oilseeds, we found that the slower growth of the sub sector did not necessarily merit our hiring a full-time oilseed advisor. But now that we are shifting our focus to the entire value chain of oilseeds – animal feed – livestock, we find that the potential does merit a full-time advisor in order to help realize ensure the potential best chance of developing an effective solution that can be sustained over time. High capital costs and low margins of minimally processed food yield net profit margins ranging from 0.5% - 0.9% for well- established regional produce distributors; 4-7% for large-scale broadliners. FoodEx, the Boston-based company whose model Ecotrust had identified for replication in MozambiqueOregon as a focus of this project, was ultimately not considered a viable partner. Some factors which led to this decision included: (1) the necessity of FoodEx focusing on the New England market to prove the business model, which, it was ultimately decided, would preclude the replication of the model in Oregon in the timeframe we’d hoped; (2) the difficulty of attempting to partner long distance, which took a high toll on the small staffs at both entities. Much was learned in the exploration of the opportunity however, and the insights gleaned continue to inform our consideration of infrastructure interventions here in Oregon. Learning generated through this project also clarified the key issues facing institutional buyers in sourcing specialty crops from within the state, and that learning has been shared in another initiative supported by ODA, the Northwest Food Buyers’ Alliance. Further, the learning from this project is currently informing Ecotrust’s restoration and further development of a city block in SE Portland, called The Xxxx on Salmon Street, to support the infrastructure needs of Oregon specialty crop producers and large scale buyers. ODA-S07 Growers Propose New Marketing Efforts to Promote the Continued Growth of Potato Production and Sales – Final report CONTACT NAME: Xxxxxx Xxxxx, Xxx Xxxx, Klamath Basin Fresh Direct EMAIL: xxxxxx@xxxxx.xxx The purpose of this project was for Klamath Basin Fresh Direct (KBFD) to expand on the existing marketing efforts of organic and specialty crops from a local program to a nationwide and international program to enhance the marketing of specialty crops and to further establish a sustainable future for family farms in the Klamath Basin. Our ultimate goal was to increase overall organic potato acreage by 50% over the two-year grant period by adding new varieties to be marketed under the KBFO brand name and to develop a cohesive brand presentation with new packaging, shipping cartons, and relevant marketing materials. From 2010-2012 the cooperative added six varieties to be marketed under the KBFO name. Having begun to build the brand successfully our growers made the decision in 2012 to add four additional organic potato varieties to be marketed under the KBFO umbrella. These include organic reds, yellows, purples, and russets, making a total of ten varieties to be marketed under a single brand name. With the formation of a diverse product line the cooperative then chose to re-design the brand and rename the cooperative to include the word “organic” in its name. In 2013 Klamath Basin Fresh Direct became Klamath Basin Fresh Organics. The purpose of redesigning our brand was to give our customers a clear and concise communication of what our products are-high quality organic specialty potatoes-and make the presentation of all ten varieties uniform, competitive and attractive in retail presentations. The fresh market is competitive and with organic produce we deal with a consumer who wants to know where their product is coming from and who is growing it. Because of our member involvement in the marketing consortiums for the industry (i.e. Oregon Potato Council, United States Potato Board) we are constantly gathering information about consumer trends, successful ways to market potatoes in retail stores, and adhere to the latest research and successes of potato industry research to develop our marketing strategies. At the beginning of this grant period in 2012 sales information being gathered nationally showed peeked interest in value-added products. We used this knowledge to develop a competitive and cohesive brand presentation, which included a new logo, value-added educational packaging, color-coded shipping cartons, and informative marketing tools for tradeshows, in-store demos, and customer presentation meetings. Our work over the two-year grant period was aimed toward enhancing direct communication with new and prospective customers as well as consumer-direct marketing to ensure a sustainable customer base. The Project Manager worked aggressively to facilitate the transition of the product line from KBFD to KBFO. It was critical that we maintain clear communication and develop good relationships with our retailer customers with regular meetings, promotions, enhancing marketing efforts at national and international industry tradeshows, organizing in- store demos, establishing promotional schedules with strategically chosen retail chains, and designing high-quality POS/POP materials to support marketing efforts. The purpose of redesigning our brand was to give our customers a clear and concise communication of what our products are-high quality organic specialty potatoes-and make the presentation of all ten varieties-this includes logo, package and shipping box design, product lines, and POS materials-uniform, professional, and more powerful at competing on the shelves with other organic potato brands. Our brand redesign and development of new product line/s will especially enhance our competitiveness nationally as we begin to establish a more widespread customer base nationally and will influence the presence of specialty crops on the shelves in retail stores across the nation. KBFO received funding in fiscal year 2009-2011 for a project titled “Grower’s Seek to Directly Xxxxxx Retail Interest in Organic Specialty Potatoes”. This project was focused on hiring a Project Manager to market one particular variety called Organic Klamath Pearls. The project segwayed into the first brand organization with the addition of 6 fingerling varieties to the KBFD name. This current grant period led itself to further development of the brand as explained in the prior paragraphs.

Lessons learned. Over This project taught CF2S staff the critical importance of produce distributors. While making direct connections with farmers works very well for some purchases, the CSD and other institutions will continue to rely on a produce distributor for the bulk of their purchasing. Getting commitments from Oregon produce distributors to source more products from Oregon farmers is critical to continue to significantly impact the amount of Oregon fruits and vegetables purchased by the CSD or other institutions. While some inroads and progress was made with the CSD’s current produce distributor, this is an area for growth. Through this project, we also learned the importance of simplifying, streamlining, and carefully documenting local produce purchasing. Creating direct relationships takes time, so it is important that each party has clear expectations and that relevant information about each producer is passed down from year to year. Because of the systems we put in place for the CSD, changes in their procurement behaviors are expected to extend into the future and have an impact well beyond the project period. While we did not quite reach our 20% target for Oregon produce, we are well on our way. It took longer to get up to speed than initially anticipated, but the CSD has begun to prioritize procurement of Oregon fruits and vegetables. An unexpected outcome of the project was the CSD applied for and received $85,000 in HB2649 funds to purchase Oregon products and for education over the next 2 years. This is not something the CSD would have done prior to participating in the CF2S project. The Xxxxx Soil and Water Conservation District (SWCD) became interested in expanding the market for Oregon cranberries several years ago. After researching several possibilities, we focused on Asia and its Pacific Rim countries as potential markets. There were several reasons: large populations in Asia (China, Japan, India, Hong Kong, etc); a growing middle class there with more income; and an opportunity to expand the consumption of Oregon cranberries. During the past six several years, Oregon cranberry growers have experienced a severe drop in the prices they receive domestically for their crop. Some farms here on the Coast have been sold, and others are in danger of foreclosure or bankruptcy. Ten years ago, the price paid to growers was sometimes as high as $1 per pound. Recently, however, it has dropped below the “break- even” price for cranberry production -- around 30 cents per pound --- to as low as 20 cents per pound. Even then, some growers have had to wait several years to receive payment for their crop. This Specialty grant from XXX helped us engage a sales and marketing agent to represent Oregon growers in MozambiqueAsia. We selected Xxxx Xxxxx, TechnoServe has also learned some important lessons regarding both what works of the Stone group, who spends several months in Asia each year. He already had deep connections in Asian countries, based on his work with Wisconsin growers. (Wisconsin grows 2/3 of all the berries produced by the U.S.). Xx. Xxxxx is fluent in Japanese, and what does not work in rural enterprise development. ▪ Scale of operations and size of transactions matter. In cashew and oilseed processingspeaks passable Chinese, we have learned that the minimum plant capacity to capture economies of scale (and justify the cost of experienced management) is approximately 1,000 tons per annum. For this reason, smaller plants such as Oleos Cuti, Oleos Ribaue and QualiCaju have shut down or struggled. TechnoServe has thus shifted its focus to assisting those plants – such as Optima - willing and able to reach this minimum capacity and replicating their success elsewhere. ▪ Private enterprises can play a key role in extensionwell. The success of following narrative outlines our rural processing clients dependsactivities during the grant - Per Specialty reporting requirements, to a certain extent, on the availability of high quality raw material. And TechnoServe has focused on empowering its clients to play an important role in ensuring the highest quality material. For example, cashew processors have a significant incentive to help families understand how to grow high quality cashew trees, and our clients are playing a critical role in helping them intercrop with groundnuts in order to improve the soil quality. We believe that private sectorit breaks down activities into 6-led extension is a real, sustainable option for those sub sectors which have reached a certain level of development, such as cashew processing. ▪ Focusing on a single sub-sector without understanding its links to broader value chains can limit enterprise growth. For the past three years, TNS has been assisting oilseed processors to start up and expand in the Beira and Nacala Corridors. While 2,500 families benefited, the impact would have been greater if the companies had diversified into feed production or if assistance had also been given to start-ups in the animal feed business. These experiences have helped us understand that opportunities for rural oilseed processors must be evaluated in the context of the entire value chain. ▪ Pilots are the first step to building a competitive sub sector. One reason for TechnoServe’s success in cashew processing has been its approach: focusing first on a single pilot (Xxxxxxx Xxxx), digesting and applying learnings from this experience, and replicating the model for new entrants. As a result, we focus significant resources on a small number of enterprises (as opposed to working with 10-15 companies in each sub sector and hoping that a few of them succeed). We have found that this approach is also a good way to encourage more Mozambican participation in enterprise development. By proving the concept, we have been able to convince more risk-averse Mozambican nationals to invest in similar enterprises. ▪ Successful enterprise development requires a delicate balance of resources, sub sector growth, and industry expertise. TechnoServe invests significantly in hiring the country’s best experts in our target sub sectors (such as Xxx Xxxxxxx A’xxxxx in horticulture and Xxxxxx Xxx in cashew). Such resources are expensive and are most effective when the sub sector is poised for rapid growth. In horticulture and confectionary nuts, we have achieved the right balance of good people and resources. However, in oilseeds, we found that the slower growth of the sub sector did not necessarily merit our hiring a full-month time oilseed advisor. But now that we are shifting our focus to the entire value chain of oilseeds – animal feed – livestock, we find that the potential does merit a full-time advisor in order to help realize the potential in Mozambiqueblocks.