Common use of Market Demand Curves Clause in Contracts

Market Demand Curves. Following Xxxxx and Vives [1984], we use a quadratic (strictly concave) utility function for a representative consumer to derive linear demand functions for differ- entiated products, but where differentiation exists up to the third product (second generic product), i.e., products 2, . . . , J + 1 are homogenous with respect to each other. Thus, let − U (q) = αq 1 qjΣq (12) where the vector α specifies the maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the brand, generic 1, generic 2, and so on. In a triopoly α = (α(T), α(T), α(T)), while in a monopoly α = α(M) (the

Market Demand Curves. Following Xxxxx and Vives [Xxxxx (1984]), we use a quadratic (strictly concavecon- cave) utility function for a representative consumer to derive linear demand functions for differ- entiated differenti- ated products, but where differentiation exists up to the third product (second generic product), i.e., products 2, . . . , J + 1 are homogenous with respect to each other. Thus, let − U (q) = αq 1 qjΣq (12) qrΣq where the vector α specifies the maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the brand, generic 1, generic 2, and so on. In a triopoly α = (α(T), α(T), α(T)), while in a monopoly α = α(M) (the

Market Demand Curves. Following Xxxxx and Vives [Xxxxx (1984]), we use a quadratic (strictly concavecon- cave) utility function for a representative consumer to derive linear demand functions for differ- entiated differenti- ated products, but where differentiation exists up to the third product (second generic product), i.e., products 2, . . . , J + 1 are homogenous with respect to each other. Thus, let − U (q) = αq 1 qjΣq (12) where the vector α specifies the maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the brand, generic 1, generic 2, and so on. In a triopoly α = (α(T), α(T), α(T)), while in a monopoly α = α(M) (the

Market Demand Curves. Following Xxxxx and Vives [Xxxxx (1984]), we use a quadratic (strictly concave) utility function for a representative consumer to derive linear demand functions for differ- entiated products, but where differentiation exists up to the third product (second generic productentrant), i.e., products 2firm 3, . . . , J + 1 are homogenous with respect to each other. Thus, let − U (q) = αq 1 qjΣq qrΣq (125) where the vector α specifies the maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the brand, generic 1, generic 2, and so on. In a triopoly α = (α(T), α(T), α(T)), while in a monopoly α = α(M) (the

Market Demand Curves. Following Xxxxx and Vives [Xxxxx (1984]), we use a quadratic (strictly concave) utility function for a representative consumer to derive linear demand functions for differ- entiated products, but where differentiation exists up to the third product (second generic productentrant), i.e., products 2firm 3, . . . , J + 1 are homogenous with respect to each other. Thus, let − U (q) = αq 1 qjΣq (125) where the vector α specifies the maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the brand, generic 1, generic 2, and so on. In a triopoly α = (α(T), α(T), α(T)), while in a monopoly α = α(M) (the