Performance Grid. The number of Performance Share Units earned by the Participant under this Agreement will be determined in accordance with the following grid. If the actual performance results fall between two of the categories listed below, straight-line interpolation will be used to determine the amount earned. Payouts that otherwise would have been more than 100% of Target will be capped at Target if the Company’s total shareholder return (“TSR”) is negative over the three-year period. TSR shall be calculated in the manner set forth in Exhibit 1 hereto and compared to the peer group identified in Exhibit 1. Ameren’s Percentile in Total Shareholder Return vs. Utility Peers During the Performance Period Payout—Percent of Target Performance Share Units Granted 90th percentile + 200% 70th percentile 150% 50th percentile 100% 30th percentile 50% <30th percentile but three-year average GAAP Earnings Per Share (“EPS”)1 reaches or exceeds the average of the Executive Incentive Plan (“EIP”) threshold levels for 2012, 2013 and 2014 30% <30th percentile and three-year average GAAP EPS1 does not reach the average of the EIP threshold levels for 2012, 2013 and 2014 0% (no payout)
Performance Grid. One-half of Participant’s Target Award will be earned based on the TSR, as defined herein, on shares of Citigroup common stock as compared to the TSRs of the Comparison Group during the Performance Period. The number of PSUs earned based on relative TSR (subject to vesting and the other terms and conditions of the Award) will be determined by multiplying the number of PSUs representing one-half of Participant’s Target Award by a percentage determined as follows: Relative TSR (Percentile) of Citigroup Percentage Earned Based on Relative TSR Lower than 25th Entire Award is cancelled under Section 2(d) 25th 0% 50th 100% 75th or higher 150%
Performance Grid. The number of Performance Share Units earned by the Participant under this Agreement will be determined in accordance with the following grid. If the actual performance results fall between two of the categories listed below, straight-line interpolation will be used to determine the amount earned. Payouts that otherwise would have been more than 100% of Target will be capped at Target if the Company’s total shareholder return (“TSR”) is negative over the three-year period. TSR shall be calculated in the manner set forth in Exhibit 1 hereto and compared to the peer group identified in Exhibit 1. Ameren’s Percentile in Total Shareholder Return vs. Utility Peers During the Performance Period Payout—Percent of Target Performance Share Units Granted 90th percentile + 200% 70th percentile 150% 50th percentile 100% 30th percentile 50% <30th percentile but three-year average GAAP Earnings Per Share (“EPS”) reaches or exceeds the average of the Executive Incentive Plan (“EIP”) threshold levels for 2014, 2015 and 2016 30% <30th percentile and three-year average GAAP EPS1 does not reach the average of the EIP threshold levels for 2014, 2015 and 2016 0% (no payout) __________________________________ 1 GAAP EPS achievement levels could be adjusted to include or exclude specified items of an unusual or non recurring nature as determined by the Committee at its sole discretion and as permitted by the Plan.
Performance Grid. The number of Performance Share Units earned by the Participant under this Agreement will be determined in accordance with the following grid. If the actual performance results fall between two of the categories listed below, straight-line interpolation will be used to determine the amount earned. Payouts that otherwise would have been more than 100% of Target will be capped at Target if the Company’s total shareholder return (“TSR”) is negative over the three-year period. TSR shall be calculated in the manner set forth in Exhibit 1 hereto and compared to the peer group identified in Exhibit 1. Ameren’s Percentile in Total Shareholder Return vs. Utility Peers During the Performance Period Payout—Percent of Target Performance Share Units Granted 90th percentile + 200% 70th percentile 150% 50th percentile 100% 30th percentile 50% <30th percentile but Earnings Per Share in each year of the Performance Period is $2.54 or greater 30% <30th percentile and Earnings Per Share in each year of the Performance Period is not $2.54 or greater 0% (no payout)
Performance Grid. The number of Restricted Shares earned by Participant under this Agreement will be determined in accordance with the following grid. If the actual performance results fall between two of the categories listed below, straight-line interpolation will be used to determine the amount earned. EPS of the Companyduring Fiscal 2014 Achievement Percentage of Target Restricted Shares Earned $[X.XX] Maximum 175% $[X.XX] Target 100% $[X.XX] Threshold 25% Prior to the determination of the Company’s performance during Fiscal 2015 for purposes of calculating the number of Restricted Shares earned by Participant and prior to the application of any interpolation, EPS of the Company shall be rounded to the nearest whole cent. In no event will Participant earn more Restricted Shares under this Agreement than 175% of the target number of Restricted Shares (rounded up, if applicable, to the next whole Share) specified in Section 1. Without limitation of the foregoing, in no event will the aggregate payout to Participant pursuant to this Agreement exceed, or cause to be exceeded, the limitations of Section 3(c) of the LTIP.
Performance Grid. The number of Performance Share Units payable to the Participant under this Agreement will be determined in accordance with the following grid based on Company performance during the Performance Period. If the actual performance results fall between two of the categories listed below, straight-line interpolation will be used to determine the amount earned. Notwithstanding anything in the Agreement to the contrary, payouts that otherwise would have been more than 100% of Target will be capped at 150% of Target if Ameren’s total shareholder return (“TSR”) is negative over the three-year period. TSR shall be calculated in the manner set forth in Exhibit 1 hereto and compared to the peer group identified in Exhibit 1. Ameren’s Percentile in Total Shareholder Return vs. Utility Peers During the Performance Period Payout – Percent of Target Performance Share Units Granted 90th percentile + 200% 70th percentile 150% 50th percentile 100% 25th percentile 50% <25th percentile 0% (no payout)
Performance Grid. One-half of Participant’s Target Award will be earned based on Citigroup’s Average ROA, as defined herein. The number of PSUs earned by Participant based on Average ROA (subject to vesting and the other terms and conditions of the Award) will be determined by multiplying the number of PSUs representing one-half of Participant’s Target Award by a percentage determined as follows: Average ROA Percentage Earned Based on Average ROA Less than 0.65% Entire Award is cancelled under Section 2(d) 0.65% 0% 0.85% 100% 1.0% or greater 150%
Performance Grid. The number of Performance Share Units payable to the Participant under this Agreement will be determined in accordance with the following grid based on Company performance during the Performance Period. If the actual performance results fall between two of the categories listed below, straight-line interpolation will be used to determine the amount earned. Payouts that otherwise would have been more than 100% of Target will be capped at Target if the Company’s total shareholder return (“TSR”) is negative over the three-year period. TSR shall be calculated in the manner set forth in Exhibit 1 hereto and compared to the peer group identified in Exhibit 1. Ameren’s Percentile in Total Shareholder Return vs. Utility Peers During the Performance Period Payout—Percent of Target Performance Share Units Granted 90th percentile + 200% 70th percentile 150% 50th percentile 100% 30th percentile 50% <30th percentile but three-year average GAAP Earnings Per Share (“EPS”) reaches or exceeds the average of the Executive Incentive Plan for Officers (“EIP”) threshold levels for 2016, 2017 and 2018 30% <30th percentile and three-year average GAAP EPS1 does not reach the average of the EIP threshold levels for 2016, 2017 and 2018 0% (no payout)
Performance Grid. The Incentive Award earned by the Participant under this Agreement will be determined in accordance with the Performance Grid (See Exhibit A, attached). For example, if the thirty-six (36) month cumulative earnings per share is $_.__, the Participant will earn one hundred percent (100%) of the Target Incentive Award amount set forth in Section 1(b) of this Agreement.
Performance Grid. The number of Performance Share Units payable to the Participant under this Agreement will be determined in accordance with the following grid based on Company performance during the Performance Period. If the actual performance results fall between two of the categories listed below, straight-line interpolation will be used to determine the amount earned. Payouts that otherwise would have been more than 100% of Target will be capped at Target if the Company’s total shareholder return (“TSR”) is negative over the three-year period. TSR shall be calculated in the manner set forth in Exhibit 1 hereto and compared to the peer group identified in Exhibit 1. Ameren’s Percentile in Total Shareholder Return vs. Utility Peers During the Performance Period Payout—Percent of Target Performance Share Units Granted 90th percentile + 200% 70th percentile 150% 50th percentile 100% 30th percentile 50% <30th percentile but three-year average earnings per share (“EPS”) as defined in the Executive Incentive Plan for Officers (“EIP”) reaches or exceeds the average of the EIP threshold levels for the calendar years in the Performance Period 30% <30th percentile and three-year average EPS1 as defined in the EIP does not reach the average of the EIP threshold levels for the calendar years in the Performance Period 0% (no payout)
